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Analysis Report BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Analysis ID:	357315
MD5:	2374bb6b2675413f13a74466b9325b97
SHA1:	143c5d4ef23ca231614a625971788275d9daee44
SHA256:	4c2079f57e1ecb6dd303d37cbe6b7e84e44d987a3fc29ef1e351ebba9fd5cc35
Tags:	EnduranceexeNanoCoreRAT
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Nanocore

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Detected Nanocore Rat

Found malware configuration

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Sigma detected: Suspicious Double Extension

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Executable has a suspicious name (potential lure to open the executable)

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Machine Learning detection for sample

Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)

Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Detected potential crypto function

Drops PE files

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe (PID: 6836 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe' MD5: 2374BB6B2675413F13A74466B9325B97)

schtasks.exe (PID: 4692 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7646.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 6292 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe (PID: 6552 cmdline: {path} MD5: 2374BB6B2675413F13A74466B9325B97)

schtasks.exe (PID: 5556 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp243E.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 6556 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe (PID: 6428 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe' 0 MD5: 2374BB6B2675413F13A74466B9325B97)

schtasks.exe (PID: 7084 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE53C.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 7032 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe (PID: 7132 cmdline: {path} MD5: 2374BB6B2675413F13A74466B9325B97)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

{"Version": "1.2.2.0", "Mutex": "c4cca249-81f6-4232-9f14-01569e09f5f0", "Group": "JANUARY", "Domain1": "shahzad73.casacam.net", "Domain2": "shahzad73.ddns.net", "Port": 9036, "KeyboardLogging": "Enable", "RunOnStartup": "Disable", "RequestElevation": "Disable", "BypassUAC": "Enable", "ClearZoneIdentifier": "Enable", "ClearAccessControl": "Disable", "SetCriticalProcess": "Disable", "PreventSystemSleep": "Enable", "ActivateAwayMode": "Disable", "EnableDebugMode": "Disable", "RunDelay": 0, "ConnectDelay": 4000, "RestartDelay": 5000, "TimeoutInterval": 5000, "KeepAliveTimeout": 30000, "MutexTimeout": 5000, "LanTimeout": 2500, "WanTimeout": 8000, "BufferSize": "ffff0000", "MaxPacketSize": "0000a000", "GCThreshold": "0000a000", "UseCustomDNS": "Enable", "PrimaryDNSServer": "8.8.8.8", "BackupDNSServer": "8.8.4.4#=qs2bxKs15DbteFYTMsjthM8IIAMC9Avo9uFWUE1JbxpU=", "BypassUserAccountControlData": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n  <RegistrationInfo />\r\n  <Triggers />\r\n  <Principals>\r\n    <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n      <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>\r\n      <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n    </Principal>\r\n  </Principals>\r\n  <Settings>\r\n    <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n    <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n    <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n    <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n    <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n    <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n    <IdleSettings>\r\n      <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n      <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n    </IdleSettings>\r\n    <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n    <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n    <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n    <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n    <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n    <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n    <Priority>4</Priority>\r\n  </Settings>\r\n  <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n    <Exec>\r\n      <Command>\"#EXECUTABLEPATH\"</Command>\r\n      <Arguments>$(Arg0)</Arguments>\r\n    </Exec>\r\n  </Actions>\r\n</Task"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xff8d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xffca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13afd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfcf5:$a: NanoCore 0xfd05:$a: NanoCore 0xff39:$a: NanoCore 0xff4d:$a: NanoCore 0xff8d:$a: NanoCore 0xfd54:$b: ClientPlugin 0xff56:$b: ClientPlugin 0xff96:$b: ClientPlugin 0xfe7b:$c: ProjectData 0x10882:$d: DESCrypto 0x1824e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1623c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x12437:$i: get_Connected 0x10bb8:$j: #=q 0x10be8:$j: #=q 0x10c04:$j: #=q 0x10c34:$j: #=q 0x10c50:$j: #=q 0x10c6c:$j: #=q 0x10c9c:$j: #=q 0x10cb8:$j: #=q
00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x6942b:$a: NanoCore 0x69484:$a: NanoCore 0x694c1:$a: NanoCore 0x6953a:$a: NanoCore 0x6948d:$b: ClientPlugin 0x694ca:$b: ClientPlugin 0x69dc8:$b: ClientPlugin 0x69dd5:$b: ClientPlugin 0x5f5ae:$e: KeepAlive 0x69915:$g: LogClientMessage 0x69895:$i: get_Connected 0x59861:$j: #=q 0x59891:$j: #=q 0x598cd:$j: #=q 0x598f5:$j: #=q 0x59925:$j: #=q 0x59955:$j: #=q 0x59985:$j: #=q 0x599b5:$j: #=q 0x599d1:$j: #=q 0x59a01:$j: #=q
00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x113d6d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x1a39ad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x113daa:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x1a39ea:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x1178dd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x1a751d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x113ad5:$a: NanoCore 0x113ae5:$a: NanoCore 0x113d19:$a: NanoCore 0x113d2d:$a: NanoCore 0x113d6d:$a: NanoCore 0x1a3715:$a: NanoCore 0x1a3725:$a: NanoCore 0x1a3959:$a: NanoCore 0x1a396d:$a: NanoCore 0x1a39ad:$a: NanoCore 0x113b34:$b: ClientPlugin 0x113d36:$b: ClientPlugin 0x113d76:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1a3774:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1a3976:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1a39b6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x92c8a:$c: ProjectData 0x113c5b:$c: ProjectData 0x1a389b:$c: ProjectData 0x114662:$d: DESCrypto 0x1a42a2:$d: DESCrypto
0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x113d6d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x14678d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x113daa:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x1467ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x1178dd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x14a2fd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x113ad5:$a: NanoCore 0x113ae5:$a: NanoCore 0x113d19:$a: NanoCore 0x113d2d:$a: NanoCore 0x113d6d:$a: NanoCore 0x1464f5:$a: NanoCore 0x146505:$a: NanoCore 0x146739:$a: NanoCore 0x14674d:$a: NanoCore 0x14678d:$a: NanoCore 0x113b34:$b: ClientPlugin 0x113d36:$b: ClientPlugin 0x113d76:$b: ClientPlugin 0x146554:$b: ClientPlugin 0x146756:$b: ClientPlugin 0x146796:$b: ClientPlugin 0x92c8a:$c: ProjectData 0x113c5b:$c: ProjectData 0x14667b:$c: ProjectData 0x114662:$d: DESCrypto 0x147082:$d: DESCrypto
00000012.00000002.485969919.0000000004169000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000012.00000002.485969919.0000000004169000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x435cd:$a: NanoCore 0x43626:$a: NanoCore 0x43663:$a: NanoCore 0x436dc:$a: NanoCore 0x56d87:$a: NanoCore 0x56d9c:$a: NanoCore 0x56dd1:$a: NanoCore 0x6fd7b:$a: NanoCore 0x6fd90:$a: NanoCore 0x6fdc5:$a: NanoCore 0x4362f:$b: ClientPlugin 0x4366c:$b: ClientPlugin 0x43f6a:$b: ClientPlugin 0x43f77:$b: ClientPlugin 0x56b43:$b: ClientPlugin 0x56b5e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x56b8e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x56da5:$b: ClientPlugin 0x56dda:$b: ClientPlugin 0x6fb37:$b: ClientPlugin 0x6fb52:$b: ClientPlugin
Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6428	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x21aa32:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x239261:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x21aa93:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x2392c2:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x21fe98:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x22de0a:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x23e6c7:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x24c639:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6428	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6428	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x21a537:$a: NanoCore 0x21a553:$a: NanoCore 0x21a6ae:$a: NanoCore 0x21a6bd:$a: NanoCore 0x21a996:$a: NanoCore 0x21a9c2:$a: NanoCore 0x21aa32:$a: NanoCore 0x22a474:$a: NanoCore 0x22a486:$a: NanoCore 0x22a4c2:$a: NanoCore 0x238d66:$a: NanoCore 0x238d82:$a: NanoCore 0x238edd:$a: NanoCore 0x238eec:$a: NanoCore 0x2391c5:$a: NanoCore 0x2391f1:$a: NanoCore 0x239261:$a: NanoCore 0x248ca3:$a: NanoCore 0x248cb5:$a: NanoCore 0x248cf1:$a: NanoCore 0x21a5de:$b: ClientPlugin
Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 7132	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x4e5f:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x4794c:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x5e8b1:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x64470:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x75836:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x4ec0:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x47972:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x5e8d7:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x644b5:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x7587b:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0xa2c5:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x18237:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 7132	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 7132	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x4964:$a: NanoCore 0x4980:$a: NanoCore 0x4adb:$a: NanoCore 0x4aea:$a: NanoCore 0x4dc3:$a: NanoCore 0x4def:$a: NanoCore 0x4e5f:$a: NanoCore 0x148a1:$a: NanoCore 0x148b3:$a: NanoCore 0x148ef:$a: NanoCore 0x20604:$a: NanoCore 0x2066b:$a: NanoCore 0x2070f:$a: NanoCore 0x4783e:$a: NanoCore 0x478df:$a: NanoCore 0x4794c:$a: NanoCore 0x47a0d:$a: NanoCore 0x488de:$a: NanoCore 0x48931:$a: NanoCore 0x4896a:$a: NanoCore 0x489dd:$a: NanoCore
Click to see the 14 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.31c964c.2.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe75:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xe8f:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.31c964c.2.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe75:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x1261:$s3: PipeExists 0x1136:$s4: PipeCreated 0xeb0:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1018d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x101ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13cfd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xff05:$x1: NanoCore Client.exe 0x1018d:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x117c6:$s1: PluginCommand 0x117ba:$s2: FileCommand 0x1266b:$s3: PipeExists 0x18422:$s4: PipeCreated 0x101b7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfef5:$a: NanoCore 0xff05:$a: NanoCore 0x10139:$a: NanoCore 0x1014d:$a: NanoCore 0x1018d:$a: NanoCore 0xff54:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10156:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10196:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1007b:$c: ProjectData 0x10a82:$d: DESCrypto 0x1844e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1643c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x12637:$i: get_Connected 0x10db8:$j: #=q 0x10de8:$j: #=q 0x10e04:$j: #=q 0x10e34:$j: #=q 0x10e50:$j: #=q 0x10e6c:$j: #=q 0x10e9c:$j: #=q 0x10eb8:$j: #=q
11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe38d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xe3ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x11efd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe105:$x1: NanoCore Client.exe 0xe38d:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xf9c6:$s1: PluginCommand 0xf9ba:$s2: FileCommand 0x1086b:$s3: PipeExists 0x16622:$s4: PipeCreated 0xe3b7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xe0f5:$a: NanoCore 0xe105:$a: NanoCore 0xe339:$a: NanoCore 0xe34d:$a: NanoCore 0xe38d:$a: NanoCore 0xe154:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe356:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe396:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe27b:$c: ProjectData 0xec82:$d: DESCrypto 0x1664e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1463c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x10837:$i: get_Connected 0xefb8:$j: #=q 0xefe8:$j: #=q 0xf004:$j: #=q 0xf034:$j: #=q 0xf050:$j: #=q 0xf06c:$j: #=q 0xf09c:$j: #=q 0xf0b8:$j: #=q
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.397f800.2.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x6d1ad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x6d1ea:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x70d1d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.397f800.2.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x6cf25:$x1: NanoCore Client.exe 0x6d1ad:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x6e7e6:$s1: PluginCommand 0x6e7da:$s2: FileCommand 0x6f68b:$s3: PipeExists 0x75442:$s4: PipeCreated 0x6d1d7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.397f800.2.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.397f800.2.raw.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x6cf15:$a: NanoCore 0x6cf25:$a: NanoCore 0x6d159:$a: NanoCore 0x6d16d:$a: NanoCore 0x6d1ad:$a: NanoCore 0x6cf74:$b: ClientPlugin 0x6d176:$b: ClientPlugin 0x6d1b6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x6d09b:$c: ProjectData 0x6daa2:$d: DESCrypto 0x7546e:$e: KeepAlive 0x7345c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x6f657:$i: get_Connected 0x6ddd8:$j: #=q 0x6de08:$j: #=q 0x6de24:$j: #=q 0x6de54:$j: #=q 0x6de70:$j: #=q 0x6de8c:$j: #=q 0x6debc:$j: #=q 0x6ded8:$j: #=q
11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1018d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x42bad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x101ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x42bea:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13cfd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x4671d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.raw.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfef5:$a: NanoCore 0xff05:$a: NanoCore 0x10139:$a: NanoCore 0x1014d:$a: NanoCore 0x1018d:$a: NanoCore 0x42915:$a: NanoCore 0x42925:$a: NanoCore 0x42b59:$a: NanoCore 0x42b6d:$a: NanoCore 0x42bad:$a: NanoCore 0xff54:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10156:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10196:$b: ClientPlugin 0x42974:$b: ClientPlugin 0x42b76:$b: ClientPlugin 0x42bb6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1007b:$c: ProjectData 0x42a9b:$c: ProjectData 0x10a82:$d: DESCrypto 0x434a2:$d: DESCrypto 0x1844e:$e: KeepAlive
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b4c4d.4.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xb184:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x24178:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xb1b1:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x241a5:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b4c4d.4.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xb184:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x24178:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xc25f:$s4: PipeCreated 0x25253:$s4: PipeCreated 0xb19e:$s5: IClientLoggingHost 0x24192:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b4c4d.4.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xf7ad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x287a1:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xf7da:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x287ce:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xf7ad:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x287a1:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x10888:$s4: PipeCreated 0x2987c:$s4: PipeCreated 0xf7c7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost 0x287bb:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3890f60.3.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xcbe0d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x15ba4d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xcbe4a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x15ba8a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0xcf97d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x15f5bd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3890f60.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3890f60.3.raw.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xcbb75:$a: NanoCore 0xcbb85:$a: NanoCore 0xcbdb9:$a: NanoCore 0xcbdcd:$a: NanoCore 0xcbe0d:$a: NanoCore 0x15b7b5:$a: NanoCore 0x15b7c5:$a: NanoCore 0x15b9f9:$a: NanoCore 0x15ba0d:$a: NanoCore 0x15ba4d:$a: NanoCore 0xcbbd4:$b: ClientPlugin 0xcbdd6:$b: ClientPlugin 0xcbe16:$b: ClientPlugin 0x15b814:$b: ClientPlugin 0x15ba16:$b: ClientPlugin 0x15ba56:$b: ClientPlugin 0x4ad2a:$c: ProjectData 0xcbcfb:$c: ProjectData 0x15b93b:$c: ProjectData 0xcc702:$d: DESCrypto 0x15c342:$d: DESCrypto
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xd9ad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xd9da:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xd9ad:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xea88:$s4: PipeCreated 0xd9c7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe38d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xe3ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x11efd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe105:$x1: NanoCore Client.exe 0xe38d:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xf9c6:$s1: PluginCommand 0xf9ba:$s2: FileCommand 0x1086b:$s3: PipeExists 0x16622:$s4: PipeCreated 0xe3b7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xe0f5:$a: NanoCore 0xe105:$a: NanoCore 0xe339:$a: NanoCore 0xe34d:$a: NanoCore 0xe38d:$a: NanoCore 0xe154:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe356:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe396:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe27b:$c: ProjectData 0xec82:$d: DESCrypto 0x1664e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1463c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x10837:$i: get_Connected 0xefb8:$j: #=q 0xefe8:$j: #=q 0xf004:$j: #=q 0xf034:$j: #=q 0xf050:$j: #=q 0xf06c:$j: #=q 0xf09c:$j: #=q 0xf0b8:$j: #=q
11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3ae0f60.1.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xcbe0d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xfe82d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xcbe4a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0xfe86a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0xcf97d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x10239d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3ae0f60.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3ae0f60.1.raw.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xcbb75:$a: NanoCore 0xcbb85:$a: NanoCore 0xcbdb9:$a: NanoCore 0xcbdcd:$a: NanoCore 0xcbe0d:$a: NanoCore 0xfe595:$a: NanoCore 0xfe5a5:$a: NanoCore 0xfe7d9:$a: NanoCore 0xfe7ed:$a: NanoCore 0xfe82d:$a: NanoCore 0xcbbd4:$b: ClientPlugin 0xcbdd6:$b: ClientPlugin 0xcbe16:$b: ClientPlugin 0xfe5f4:$b: ClientPlugin 0xfe7f6:$b: ClientPlugin 0xfe836:$b: ClientPlugin 0x4ad2a:$c: ProjectData 0xcbcfb:$c: ProjectData 0xfe71b:$c: ProjectData 0xcc702:$d: DESCrypto 0xff122:$d: DESCrypto
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41ab7ee.5.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe75:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x145e3:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x2d5d7:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xe8f:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x14610:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x2d604:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41ab7ee.5.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe75:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x145e3:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x2d5d7:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x1261:$s3: PipeExists 0x1136:$s4: PipeCreated 0x156be:$s4: PipeCreated 0x2e6b2:$s4: PipeCreated 0xeb0:$s5: IClientLoggingHost 0x145fd:$s5: IClientLoggingHost 0x2d5f1:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41ab7ee.5.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41ab7ee.5.raw.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xddf:$a: NanoCore 0xe38:$a: NanoCore 0xe75:$a: NanoCore 0xeee:$a: NanoCore 0x14599:$a: NanoCore 0x145ae:$a: NanoCore 0x145e3:$a: NanoCore 0x2d58d:$a: NanoCore 0x2d5a2:$a: NanoCore 0x2d5d7:$a: NanoCore 0xe41:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe7e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x177c:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1789:$b: ClientPlugin 0x14355:$b: ClientPlugin 0x14370:$b: ClientPlugin 0x143a0:$b: ClientPlugin 0x145b7:$b: ClientPlugin 0x145ec:$b: ClientPlugin 0x2d349:$b: ClientPlugin 0x2d364:$b: ClientPlugin
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1018d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x9fdcd:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x101ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x9fe0a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13cfd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0xa393d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.raw.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfef5:$a: NanoCore 0xff05:$a: NanoCore 0x10139:$a: NanoCore 0x1014d:$a: NanoCore 0x1018d:$a: NanoCore 0x9fb35:$a: NanoCore 0x9fb45:$a: NanoCore 0x9fd79:$a: NanoCore 0x9fd8d:$a: NanoCore 0x9fdcd:$a: NanoCore 0xff54:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10156:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10196:$b: ClientPlugin 0x9fb94:$b: ClientPlugin 0x9fd96:$b: ClientPlugin 0x9fdd6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1007b:$c: ProjectData 0x9fcbb:$c: ProjectData 0x10a82:$d: DESCrypto 0xa06c2:$d: DESCrypto 0x1844e:$e: KeepAlive
Click to see the 38 entries

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

Author: Joe Security: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, ProcessId: 6552, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Joe Security: Data: Command: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7646.tmp', CommandLine: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7646.tmp', CommandLine|base64offset|contains: *j, Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, ParentProcessId: 6836, ProcessCommandLine: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7646.tmp', ProcessId: 4692

Sigma detected: Suspicious Double Extension

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth (rule), @blu3_team (idea): Data: Command: {path}, CommandLine: {path}, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, ParentProcessId: 6836, ProcessCommandLine: {path}, ProcessId: 6552

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: NanoCore {"Version": "1.2.2.0", "Mutex": "c4cca249-81f6-4232-9f14-01569e09f5f0", "Group": "JANUARY", "Domain1": "shahzad73.casacam.net", "Domain2": "shahzad73.ddns.net", "Port": 9036, "KeyboardLogging": "Enable", "RunOnStartup": "Disable", "RequestElevation": "Disable", "BypassUAC": "Enable", "ClearZoneIdentifier": "Enable", "ClearAccessControl": "Disable", "SetCriticalProcess": "Disable", "PreventSystemSleep": "Enable", "ActivateAwayMode": "Disable", "EnableDebugMode": "Disable", "RunDelay": 0, "ConnectDelay": 4000, "RestartDelay": 5000, "TimeoutInterval": 5000, "KeepAliveTimeout": 30000, "MutexTimeout": 5000, "LanTimeout": 2500, "WanTimeout": 8000, "BufferSize": "ffff0000", "MaxPacketSize": "0000a000", "GCThreshold": "0000a000", "UseCustomDNS": "Enable", "PrimaryDNSServer": "8.8.8.8", "BackupDNSServer": "8.8.4.4#=qs2bxKs15DbteFYTMsjthM8IIAMC9Avo9uFWUE1JbxpU=", "BypassUserAccountControlData": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo />\r\n <Triggers />\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>\r\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <IdleSettings>\r\n <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n </IdleSettings>\r\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Priority>4</Priority>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>\"#EXECUTABLEPATH\"</Command>\r\n <Arguments>$(Arg0)</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n</Task"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ihNagUDDVeQ.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 40%

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 40%

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000012.00000002.485969919.0000000004169000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6428, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 7132, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.397f800.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b4c4d.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3890f60.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3ae0f60.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41ab7ee.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ihNagUDDVeQ.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack

Avira: Label: TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen7

Compliance:

Uses 32bit PE files

Show sources

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Contains modern PE file flags such as dynamic base (ASLR) or NX

Show sources

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: shahzad73.ddns.net
Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: shahzad73.casacam.net

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.6:49728 -> 91.212.153.84:9036

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 91.212.153.84 91.212.153.84

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: MYLOC-ASIPBackboneofmyLocmanagedITAGDE MYLOC-ASIPBackboneofmyLocmanagedITAGDE

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: shahzad73.casacam.net

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.400465122.0000000002841000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.470826846.0000000002A91000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.400396424.0000000001087000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comm
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.400396424.0000000001087000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comoitu
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000003.348946561.000000000108C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.coms
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Binary or memory string: RegisterRawInputDevices

E-Banking Fraud:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000012.00000002.485969919.0000000004169000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6428, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 7132, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.397f800.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b4c4d.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3890f60.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3ae0f60.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41ab7ee.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000012.00000002.485969919.0000000004169000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6428, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6428, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 7132, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 7132, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.31c964c.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.397f800.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.397f800.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b4c4d.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3890f60.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3890f60.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3ae0f60.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3ae0f60.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41ab7ee.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41ab7ee.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>

Executable has a suspicious name (potential lure to open the executable)

Show sources

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Static file information: Suspicious name

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: Filename: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: Filename: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 1_2_005A8D28
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 1_2_06F74190
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 1_2_06F7417F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 1_2_06F73E4E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 1_2_06F76F40
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 11_2_006D8D28
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 11_2_06CA3E4E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 11_2_06CA6F40
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 11_2_06CA418A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 11_2_06CA4190
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 18_2_00E28D28
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 18_2_0300E471
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 18_2_0300E480
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 18_2_0300BBD4

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.421992668.0000000008C80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: System.OriginalFileName vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000000.338522850.00000000005B0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameGH5E vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.420986865.00000000072E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: originalfilename vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.420986865.00000000072E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamepropsys.dll.mui@ vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000007.00000003.412581348.0000000006BB6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameToolsClientPlugin.dll4 vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000007.00000000.398445627.0000000001030000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameGH5E vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.481309628.0000000008780000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: System.OriginalFileName vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.481612850.0000000008870000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: originalfilename vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.481612850.0000000008870000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamepropsys.dll.mui@ vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.467276178.00000000006E0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameGH5E vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000012.00000002.484423891.0000000000E30000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameGH5E vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameSurveillanceExClientPlugin.dll4 vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameClientPlugin.dll4 vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000012.00000002.485969919.0000000004169000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameLzma#.dll4 vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameGH5E vs BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000012.00000002.485969919.0000000004169000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6428, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6428, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 7132, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 7132, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.31c964c.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.31c964c.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.397f800.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.397f800.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.397f800.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b4c4d.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b4c4d.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3890f60.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3890f60.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3ae0f60.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3ae0f60.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41ab7ee.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41ab7ee.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41ab7ee.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
Source: ihNagUDDVeQ.exe.1.dr	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqjIje6jGWLd2EOkfZXKqBbgu003du003d.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqVxXNKnhAcArgJoGGYXiyyQu003du003d.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqVxXNKnhAcArgJoGGYXiyyQu003du003d.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock'

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@15/11@14/2

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ihNagUDDVeQ.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6292:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\{c4cca249-81f6-4232-9f14-01569e09f5f0}
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\lCfSqYSytpJOspWCqhSjNR
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6556:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:7032:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7646.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 40%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7646.tmp'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe {path}
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp243E.tmp'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe' 0
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE53C.tmp'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe {path}
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7646.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe {path}
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp243E.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE53C.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe {path}

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{95E15D0A-66E6-93D9-C53C-76E6219D3341}\InProcServer32

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Data Obfuscation:

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Show sources

Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqjIje6jGWLd2EOkfZXKqBbgu003du003d.cs	.Net Code: #=q_FL69pQf17BUSAFbWYu1SStMAbdu$R1GJ8VY8UL5_EA= System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqxoz66kOqvxr21iYXZYXWiumy9eZGwFWaiX4C5X8aecUu003d.cs	.Net Code: #=qKU0J1fiP8KA33eFK1owekQ== System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 1_2_04ECBE78 pushad ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Code function: 11_2_06CA097D push es; ret

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.92505185821
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.92505185821

Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqJT4I5hOweIku0024xYFEeDszbikglXCuquUdu0024v9AXtyq2nsu003d.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '#=qBeOBlH6CwHFnQdZWWBgZ_pemudZ6CfCVcfOQtgpeG$Y=', '#=q5v5cLSMFBaxiTtOEjscx86gN2ozXlfytiL6UmXnyWtg=', '#=q_XA5h2lVGHLcY9dK754wKGrOjAm6aBbwPxcUJXgJThJUz83kMbCL53G5uuOLP6Rq', '#=qIFfr$DrKqIieRc688$vylAlBsEnx9Z3$TxvrDsPURfM=', '#=qejgvNXJQvgM2GomZsygLjreyguSPQ29pQHqjR_a0dWk=', '#=qCGokdf0OOxeMJLDkXSfc3NPmwygIQ29RjKQWj$wbNGB9C1pPgma_891QiNyTRXcA', '#=qDqyUVyJLXCtYqhZ0$opqkomqhUBn2WCeEEvGAXlNQ$I=', '#=qdImPAY1o3YhbLtukwCQ91cISaeIEWRKSYrGZ3dTVnkY=', '#=qza7O1AHrroJC7yRIJz4wINR_Sgo4hDpQrj_OYfIrlJE=', '#=q6Ct3QmvVLFC7my$dL1uEiHGmXJ5qCuK4WIhDwfhPTFs='
Source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, u0023u003dqWrm21vQ8CBMZP_RBTwpusAu003du003d.cs	High entropy of concatenated method names: '#=qCgU$tDqtOAyz2b$RwfSF7UzBcCAr0rFJWxm16x7Lre0=', '#=qeD3MBfedCIuKIQf9V1u2N3YS4VXE_FOHqw_XAjWtZK8=', '#=q$mvEHEBkZud$AdHPWqsMQnw5Xm5sD4vBSSmqrKuXGOk=', '#=qZaN94n8dM6tBEf$qCdY2kbTZb5BOW8Z134$2tNv7EJs=', '#=qtlZnL8mho$rv1eTFz0Mw9UYFC_yCabEZ0xtVePn6wR5aSHE7ti3UfKg2l7D0_xk8', '#=qVS$QmQjvFfsXSqQAKGSl6HGbkse2SG0XCab4upVjtRJkvhTEk$oIS2I9Zja7id1Q', '#=qxJg7RxTW1v5mnt12xXeJiYJv_bcctbtL2BCD5MjDi45Hlz6t8vwDNTv1Rv7tgIct', '#=qp$ZVC1r9spi890l$D7IwEd3faoKeWHvv42mVq8wIIWM=', '#=qCoWHlVuoVRMkOzC7RZubJCslkxaEWn9yZiIydECf69$ktj0IPD5wAwC2H5Cc8C$L', '#=qqs1moO$mYaS72OXOWe0Z6GycslEb6e9Ipoy7ppW0O5abIp05ajv8doqdJZHlN3cK'

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ihNagUDDVeQ.exe

Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival:

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Show sources

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7646.tmp'

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

File opened: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe:Zone.Identifier read attributes | delete

Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)

Show sources

Source: Possible double extension: pdf.exe

Static PE information: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Registry key monitored for changes: HKEY_CURRENT_USER_Classes

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

File opened / queried: SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 5912
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 3168
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 628
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 566

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe TID: 6868	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe TID: 5600	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe TID: 6424	Thread sleep time: -11990383647911201s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe TID: 6676	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe TID: 6108	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe TID: 2292	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000007.00000003.463933016.00000000017C5000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll@

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Anti Debugging:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Memory written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Memory written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7646.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe {path}
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp243E.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE53C.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe {path}

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arial.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariali.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariblk.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\bahnschrift.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibril.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibriz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambria.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candara.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candaraz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comic.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comici.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constan.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constani.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbel.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbeli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cour.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\couri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrima.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrimabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framdit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAMDCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHV.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PALSCRI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OCRAEXT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAIAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEBO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\IMPRISHA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HATTEN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDYSTO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIL_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLSNECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIGI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABKIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FORTE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FELIXTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASMD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASLGHT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASDEMI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ENGR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCEDSCR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CURLZ___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENSCBK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CASTELAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_R.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_I.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_B.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCBLKAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARLRDBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BSSYM7.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSPCL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTEXTRA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\marlett.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeuii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeuiz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Management.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000012.00000002.485969919.0000000004169000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6428, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 7132, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.397f800.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b4c4d.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3890f60.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3ae0f60.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41ab7ee.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Remote Access Functionality:

Detected Nanocore Rat

Show sources

Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000007.00000003.412581348.0000000006BB6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
Source: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: <Module>mscorlibMicrosoft.VisualBasicMyApplicationNanoCore.MyMyComputerMyProjectMyWebServicesThreadSafeObjectProvider`1IClientNetworkNanoCore.ClientPluginIClientDataIClientAppIClientDataHostNanoCore.ClientPluginHostIClientNetworkHostIClientUIHostIClientLoggingHostIClientAppHostIClientNameObjectCollectionNanoCoreIClientReadOnlyNameObjectCollectionClientInvokeDelegateMicrosoft.VisualBasic.ApplicationServicesApplicationBase.ctorMicrosoft.VisualBasic.DevicesComputerSystemObject.cctorget_Computerm_ComputerObjectProviderget_Applicationm_AppObjectProviderUserget_Userm_UserObjectProviderget_WebServicesm_MyWebServicesObjectProviderApplicationWebServicesEqualsoGetHashCodeTypeGetTypeToStringCreate__Instance__TinstanceDispose__Instance__get_GetInstanceMicrosoft.VisualBasic.MyServices.InternalContextValue`1m_ContextGetInstanceReadPacketpipeNameparamsPipeCreatedPipeClosedConnectionStateChangedconnectedConnectionFailedhostportBuildingHostCacheVariableChangednameClientSettingChangedPluginUninstallingClientUninstallingget_Variablesget_ClientSettingsget_BuilderSettingsVariablesClientSettingsBuilderSettingsget_ConnectedClosePipePipeExistsRebuildHostCacheAddHostEntryDisconnectSendToServercompressConnectedInvokemethodstateLogClientMessagemessageExceptionLogClientExceptionexsiteRestartShutdownDisableProtectionRestoreProtectionUninstallEntryExistsSystem.Collections.GenericKeyValuePair`2GetEntriesGetValuedefaultValueSetValuevalueRemoveValueMulticastDelegateTargetObjectTargetMethodIAsyncResultAsyncCallbackBeginInvokeDelegateCallbackDelegateAsyncStateEndInvokeDelegateAsyncResultSystem.ComponentModelEditorBrowsableAttributeEditorBrowsableStateSystem.CodeDom.CompilerGeneratedCodeAttributeSystem.DiagnosticsDebuggerHiddenAttributeMicrosoft.VisualBasic.CompilerServicesStandardModuleAttributeHideModuleNameAttributeSystem.ComponentModel.DesignHelpKeywordAttributeSystem.Runtime.CompilerServicesRuntimeHelpersGetObjectValueRuntimeTypeHandleGetTypeFromHandleActivatorCreateInstanceMyGroupCollectionAttributeget_Valueset_ValueSystem.Runtime.InteropServicesComVisibleAttributeParamArrayAttributeCompilationRelaxationsAttributeRuntimeCompatibilityAttributeSystem.ReflectionAssemblyFileVersionAttributeGuidAttributeAssemblyTrademarkAttributeAssemblyCopyrightAttributeAssemblyProductAttributeAssemblyCompanyAttributeAssemblyDescriptionAttributeAssemblyTitleAttributeClientPluginClientPlugin.dll

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000012.00000002.485969919.0000000004169000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6428, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 7132, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.397f800.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3b9cbe0.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b4c4d.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3890f60.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41b0624.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 11.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.3ae0f60.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.41ab7ee.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.394cbe0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation1	Scheduled Task/Job1	Process Injection111	Masquerading11	Input Capture11	Query Registry1	Remote Services	Input Capture11	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion3	LSASS Memory	Security Software Discovery121	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data11	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Non-Standard Port1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Disable or Modify Tools1	Security Account Manager	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion3	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Remote Access Software1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection111	NTDS	Process Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	LSA Secrets	Application Window Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Application Layer Protocol11	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Hidden Files and Directories1	Cached Domain Credentials	File and Directory Discovery1	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Obfuscated Files or Information12	DCSync	System Information Discovery12	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Software Packing13	Proc Filesystem	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	40%	ReversingLabs	ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.NanoBot
BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ihNagUDDVeQ.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ihNagUDDVeQ.exe	40%	ReversingLabs	ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.NanoBot

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
18.2.BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Dropper.MSIL.Gen7		Download File

Domains

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
shahzad73.casacam.net	5%	Virustotal		Browse

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
shahzad73.ddns.net	1%	Virustotal		Browse
shahzad73.ddns.net	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.coms	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comoitu	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comoitu	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comoitu	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comoitu	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
shahzad73.casacam.net	5%	Virustotal		Browse
shahzad73.casacam.net	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	true	true	5%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
shahzad73.ddns.net	true	1%, Virustotal, Browse Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
shahzad73.casacam.net	true	5%, Virustotal, Browse Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.tiro.coms	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000003.348946561.000000000108C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.tiro.com	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.coml	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.comoitu	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.400396424.0000000001087000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comm	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.400396424.0000000001087000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fonts.com	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.400465122.0000000002841000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.470826846.0000000002A91000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sakkal.com	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 00000001.00000002.412476630.0000000006A22000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe, 0000000B.00000002.479024535.00000000059F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
91.212.153.84	unknown	unknown		24961	MYLOC-ASIPBackboneofmyLocmanagedITAGDE	true

Private

IP
192.168.2.1

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	357315
Start date:	24.02.2021
Start time:	12:56:18
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 10m 26s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	27
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@15/11@14/2
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 89% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information. TCP Packets have been reduced to 100 Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 51.104.139.180, 168.61.161.212, 204.79.197.200, 13.107.21.200, 23.54.113.53, 52.255.188.83, 104.42.151.234, 52.147.198.201, 51.104.144.132, 23.0.174.187, 23.0.174.185, 51.103.5.159, 23.10.249.26, 23.10.249.25, 52.155.217.156, 20.54.26.129, 95.100.54.203 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): au.download.windowsupdate.com.edgesuite.net, arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, arc.msn.com, vip1-par02p.wns.notify.trafficmanager.net, db5eap.displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, wns.notify.trafficmanager.net, www-bing-com.dual-a-0001.a-msedge.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net, www.bing.com, displaycatalog-europeeap.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, client.wns.windows.com, fs.microsoft.com, dual-a-0001.a-msedge.net, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, skypedataprdcolcus17.cloudapp.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, a767.dscg3.akamai.net, skypedataprdcoleus16.cloudapp.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, skypedataprdcoleus17.cloudapp.net, a-0001.a-afdentry.net.trafficmanager.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, skypedataprdcolwus16.cloudapp.net, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Report size exceeded maximum capacity and may have missing behavior information. Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
12:57:25	API Interceptor	749x Sleep call for process: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe modified
12:57:46	Task Scheduler	Run new task: DHCP Monitor path: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe" s>$(Arg0)

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link
91.212.153.84	JMG Memo-Circular No 018-21.PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	LIST OF DELISTED AGENCIES 22ND FEB 2021.PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	POEA ADVISORY ON DELISTED AGENCIES.PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Swift copy_BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	POEA ADVISORY ON DELISTED AGENCIES.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	POEA ADVISORY NO 450 2021.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	POEA DELISTED AGENCIES (BATCH A).PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	POEA MEMORANDUM N0 056.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Protected.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Protected.2.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
shahzad73.casacam.net	JMG Memo-Circular No 018-21.PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	LIST OF DELISTED AGENCIES 22ND FEB 2021.PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	POEA ADVISORY ON DELISTED AGENCIES.PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	Swift copy_BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	POEA ADVISORY ON DELISTED AGENCIES.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	POEA ADVISORY NO 450 2021.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	POEA DELISTED AGENCIES (BATCH A).PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	POEA MEMORANDUM N0 056.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	Protected.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	Protected.2.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
MYLOC-ASIPBackboneofmyLocmanagedITAGDE	JMG Memo-Circular No 018-21.PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	LIST OF DELISTED AGENCIES 22ND FEB 2021.PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	POEA ADVISORY ON DELISTED AGENCIES.PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	Swift copy_BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	POEA ADVISORY ON DELISTED AGENCIES.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	POEA ADVISORY NO 450 2021.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	POEA DELISTED AGENCIES (BATCH A).PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	POEA MEMORANDUM N0 056.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	Swift_Payment_jpeg.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	62.141.37.17
	Protected.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	Protected.2.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.212.153.84
	FickerStealer.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	89.163.225.172
	Documentaci#U00f3n.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	89.163.210.141
	SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.DownLoader36.34557.26355.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	89.163.140.102
	TaskAudio Driver.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	193.111.198.220
	Z8363664.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	89.163.210.141
	OhGodAnETHlargementPill2.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	193.111.198.220
	godflex-r2.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	193.111.198.220
	PolarisBiosEditor-master.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	193.111.198.220
	NKsplucdAu.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.114.134.88

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1216
Entropy (8bit):	5.355304211458859
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:MLUE4K5E4Ks2E1qE4qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4x84j:MIHK5HKXE1qHiYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHKzr
MD5:	FED34146BF2F2FA59DCF8702FCC8232E
SHA1:	B03BFEA175989D989850CF06FE5E7BBF56EAA00A
SHA-256:	123BE4E3590609A008E85501243AF5BC53FA0C26C82A92881B8879524F8C0D5C
SHA-512:	1CC89F2ED1DBD70628FA1DC41A32BA0BFA3E81EAE1A1CF3C5F6A48F2DA0BF1F21A5001B8A18B04043C5B8FE4FBE663068D86AA8C4BD8E17933F75687C3178FF6
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Xml\b219d4630d26b88041b59c21

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp243E.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1312
Entropy (8bit):	5.114327114062219
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+S/4oL600QlMhEMjn5pwjVLUYODOLG9RJh7h8gK0VKZxtn:cbk4oL600QydbQxIYODOLedq3tj
MD5:	5ADF9BAA3F018F7135770CE8913A6CBE
SHA1:	0A15D3279AEC06B1428ED22191656B5704188A3A
SHA-256:	35F2AA041A3F5D5BD661018D40D331D630F2D0D6D104699591F5F41BDF8DC6DC
SHA-512:	8B4CA8D6327A664AC1782A0A401109E81078E7624385130C30F5DAB8CE062D04E0668110867EE868FE8A45DE311C87D08CE3E3B61A6F937BBAA9F84679D042EF
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo />.. <Triggers />.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>.. <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>.. <IdleSettings>.. <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>.. <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>.. </IdleSettings>.. <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <Hidden>false</Hidden>.. <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>.. <Wak

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7646.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1656
Entropy (8bit):	5.162410656291698
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+SEqC/S7h2ulNMFp2O/rlMhEMjnGpwjpIgUYODOLD9RJh7h8gKB3+qtn:cbha7JlNQV/rydbz9I3YODOLNdq3Mc
MD5:	7D606680B22EE1B5946753B87107DD2F
SHA1:	0B0FF271AB0F95CC85B56097BD0F3FE31F5D7D34
SHA-256:	E9DF8AC1EF30AA4DFE4AE252BAA408D81391A8718F47CCFA1DCA634FE30210CE
SHA-512:	7DE94C954F99A130E6D76DE5C626A3431A0FDEB4B08D444DF2A09CF6C28B12FC5FBC4173C500ED094C3B9DA5ABFFB0CEDEF9E8BB772C3792ADED4A8B0753458F
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo>.. <Date>2014-10-25T14:27:44.8929027</Date>.. <Author>computer\user</Author>.. </RegistrationInfo>.. <Triggers>.. <LogonTrigger>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. </LogonTrigger>.. <RegistrationTrigger>.. <Enabled>false</Enabled>.. </RegistrationTrigger>.. </Triggers>.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvail

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE53C.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1656
Entropy (8bit):	5.162410656291698
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+SEqC/S7h2ulNMFp2O/rlMhEMjnGpwjpIgUYODOLD9RJh7h8gKB3+qtn:cbha7JlNQV/rydbz9I3YODOLNdq3Mc
MD5:	7D606680B22EE1B5946753B87107DD2F
SHA1:	0B0FF271AB0F95CC85B56097BD0F3FE31F5D7D34
SHA-256:	E9DF8AC1EF30AA4DFE4AE252BAA408D81391A8718F47CCFA1DCA634FE30210CE
SHA-512:	7DE94C954F99A130E6D76DE5C626A3431A0FDEB4B08D444DF2A09CF6C28B12FC5FBC4173C500ED094C3B9DA5ABFFB0CEDEF9E8BB772C3792ADED4A8B0753458F
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo>.. <Date>2014-10-25T14:27:44.8929027</Date>.. <Author>computer\user</Author>.. </RegistrationInfo>.. <Triggers>.. <LogonTrigger>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. </LogonTrigger>.. <RegistrationTrigger>.. <Enabled>false</Enabled>.. </RegistrationTrigger>.. </Triggers>.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvail

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\catalog.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1856
Entropy (8bit):	7.089541637477408
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	48:IknjhUknjhUknjhUknjhUknjhUknjhUknjhUknjhL:HjhDjhDjhDjhDjhDjhDjhDjhL
MD5:	30D23CC577A89146961915B57F408623
SHA1:	9B5709D6081D8E0A570511E6E0AAE96FA041964F
SHA-256:	E2130A72E55193D402B5F43F7F3584ECF6B423F8EC4B1B1B69AD693C7E0E5A9E
SHA-512:	2D5C5747FD04F8326C2CC1FB313925070BC01D3352AFA6C36C167B72757A15F58B6263D96BD606338DA055812E69DDB628A6E18D64DD59697C2F42D1C58CC687
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........~f.G0^..;....W2.=...K.~.L..&f...p............:7rH}..../H......L...?...A.K...J.=8x!....+.2e'..E?.G......[.&Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........~f.G0^..;....W2.=...K.~.L..&f...p............:7rH}..../H......L...?...A.K...J.=8x!....+.2e'..E?.G......[.&Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........~f.G0^..;....W2.=...K.~.L..&f...p............:7rH}..../H......L...?...A.K...J.=8x!....+.2e'..E?.G......[.&Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........~f.G0^..;....W2.=...K.~.L..&f...p............:7rH}..../H......L...?...A.K...J.=8x!....+.2e'..E?.G......[.&Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	8
Entropy (8bit):	3.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:XyAn:iA
MD5:	F5C9CFE85A11961BD3AEB58399B50444
SHA1:	D7E92C41BC0CE6E0AD648E7FF08DCEDB01EAB2AB
SHA-256:	DF1CF9AF49C4A2756ED3A1B4C828C40658C2E59B0F378A4E45FA618DBD59BC87
SHA-512:	74C1EA3D84B1AE7812AA0B4E7FCDD86610B858E066D32F2B83A781AE1F8A290D6692C2A99B1E172B974B23B2A2910421A770D19230AB22A19F1E1B91C5B8B6AA
Malicious:	true
Preview:	..8....H

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\settings.bak Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	24
Entropy (8bit):	4.501629167387823
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:9bzY6oRDIvYk:RzWDI3
MD5:	ACD3FB4310417DC77FE06F15B0E353E6
SHA1:	80E7002E655EB5765FDEB21114295CB96AD9D5EB
SHA-256:	DC3AE604991C9BB8FF8BC4502AE3D0DB8A3317512C0F432490B103B89C1A4368
SHA-512:	DA46A917DB6276CD4528CFE4AD113292D873CA2EBE53414730F442B83502E5FAF3D1AE87BFA295ADF01E3B44FDBCE239E21A318BFB2CCD1F4753846CB21F6F97
Malicious:	false
Preview:	9iH...}Z.4..f..J".C;"a

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\settings.bin Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	64
Entropy (8bit):	5.320159765557392
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:9bzY6oRDIvYVsRLY6oRDT6P2bfVn1:RzWDIfRWDT621
MD5:	BB0F9B9992809E733EFFF8B0E562CFD6
SHA1:	F0BAB3CF73A04F5A689E6AFC764FEE9276992742
SHA-256:	C48F04FE7525AA3A3F9540889883F649726233DE021724823720A59B4F37CEAC
SHA-512:	AE4280AA460DC1C0301D458A3A443F6884A0BE37481737B2ADAFD72C33C55F09BED88ED239C91FE6F19CA137AC3CD7C9B8454C21D3F8E759687F701C8B3C7A16
Malicious:	false
Preview:	9iH...}Z.4..f..J".C;"a9iH...}Z.4..f.~a........~.~.......3.U.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\storage.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	327768
Entropy (8bit):	7.999367066417797
Encrypted:	true
SSDEEP:	6144:oX44S90aTiB66x3PlZmqze1d1wI8lkWmtjJ/3Exi:LkjbU7LjGxi
MD5:	2E52F446105FBF828E63CF808B721F9C
SHA1:	5330E54F238F46DC04C1AC62B051DB4FCD7416FB
SHA-256:	2F7479AA2661BD259747BC89106031C11B3A3F79F12190E7F19F5DF65B7C15C8
SHA-512:	C08BA0E3315E2314ECBEF38722DF834C2CB8412446A9A310F41A8F83B4AC5984FCC1B26A1D8B0D58A730FDBDD885714854BDFD04DCDF7F582FC125F552D5C3CA
Malicious:	false
Preview:	pT..!..W..G.J..a.).@.i..wpK.so@...5.=.^..Q.oy.=e@9.B...F..09u"3.. 0t..RDn_4d.....E...i......~...\|..fX_...Xf.p^......>a..$...e.6:7d.(a.A...=.).....{B.[...y%...i.Q.<..xt.X..H.. ..HF7g...I.3.{.n....L.y;i..s-....(5i...........J.5b7}..fK..HV..,...0.... ....n.w6PMl.......v."".v.......#..X.a....../...cC...i..l{>5n.._+.e.d'...}...[..../...D.t..GVp.zz......(...o......b...+`J.{....hS1G.^I..v&.jm.#u..1..Mg!.E..U.T.....6.2>...6.l.K.w"o..E..."K%{....z.7....<...,....]t.:.....[.Z.u...3X8.QI..j_.&..N..q.e.2...6.R.~..9.Bq..A.v.6.G..#y.....O....Z)G...w..E..k(....+..O..........Vg.2xC......O...jc.....z..~.P...q../.-.'.h.._.cj.=..B.x.Q9.pu.\|i4...i...;O...n.?.,. ....v?.5}.OY@.dG\|<.._[.69@.2..m..I..oP=...xrK.?............b..5....i&...l.c\b}..Q..O+.V.mJ.....pz....>F.......H...6$...d...\|m...N..1.R..B.i..........$....$........CY}..$....r.....H...8...li.....7 P......?h....R.iF..6...q(.@LI.s..+K.....?m..H....*. l..&<}....`\|.B....3.....I..o...u1..8i=.z.W..7

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\task.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	49
Entropy (8bit):	4.5043757225526235
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:oNN2+WnU5Smghr:oNN2RAgt
MD5:	93C14289219843A7235690B344ADE36E
SHA1:	FF89BC91614F8ACF36ED4C203D781D6B590B1577
SHA-256:	09998F5BF070501F5208AE0AD6855E1FB7EF44ECC161944F278C634FD3992A77
SHA-512:	7A8C7758B2F130BA48F2DD84337EE951E9985FB04CEC20B4A0E7DE8DAEA9576104B07CEB8AA2F657846BD5523FEA4A6F7EBAE793087DABB763F2EC6764106667
Malicious:	false
Preview:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ihNagUDDVeQ.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	381440
Entropy (8bit):	7.912703799735133
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6144:IdLOyWI+/pOD6wzzMLDOsFnWTU607u94jQBGQgwQ+6kLhokTpQmqSvtyvu:JEL6wEfOsFWTU5SmjQBG1P+d3pZX
MD5:	2374BB6B2675413F13A74466B9325B97
SHA1:	143C5D4EF23CA231614A625971788275D9DAEE44
SHA-256:	4C2079F57E1ECB6DD303D37CBE6B7E84E44D987A3FC29EF1E351EBBA9FD5CC35
SHA-512:	819782C178CD37D0668EA40CC1B8EBD7EE6154D00388D86FBA4FA608A87C633C06093AB9F9E15A3C7C947B9B4FD79116CFA260A10812789C9987D1ECFA125CC8
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100% Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 40%
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L.....5`................................. ........@.. .......................@............@.....................................O............................ ....................................................... ............... ..H............text........ ...................... ..`.rsrc...............................@..@.reloc....... ......................@..B........................H.......@...\[...........g..h$..........................................r.(8......r...p(7.....o;........0............{.....+...0...........#............,...}....+..#........}.......0............{.....+...0...........#............,...}....+..#........}.......0............{.....+...0...........#............,...}....+..#........}.......0..M........#.......@.{.....{....ZZ#.......@.{.....{....ZZX#.......@.{.....{....ZZX.+......0............{.....{....Z.{....Z.+.....0..

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.912703799735133
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.98% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.93% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.01%
File name:	BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
File size:	381440
MD5:	2374bb6b2675413f13a74466b9325b97
SHA1:	143c5d4ef23ca231614a625971788275d9daee44
SHA256:	4c2079f57e1ecb6dd303d37cbe6b7e84e44d987a3fc29ef1e351ebba9fd5cc35
SHA512:	819782c178cd37d0668ea40cc1b8ebd7ee6154d00388d86fba4fa608a87c633c06093ab9f9e15a3c7c947b9b4fd79116cfa260a10812789c9987d1ecfa125cc8
SSDEEP:	6144:IdLOyWI+/pOD6wzzMLDOsFnWTU607u94jQBGQgwQ+6kLhokTpQmqSvtyvu:JEL6wEfOsFWTU5SmjQBG1P+d3pZX
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L.....5`................................. ........@.. .......................@............@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x45e7ee
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x60359F02 [Wed Feb 24 00:34:10 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x5e79c	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x60000	0x600	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x62000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x5c7f4	0x5c800	False	0.931579919764	data	7.92505185821	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x60000	0x600	0x600	False	0.442057291667	data	4.29994504602	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x62000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0x60090	0x36c	data
RT_MANIFEST	0x6040c	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright Neudesic 2017
Assembly Version	1.0.0.0
InternalName	GH5EC.exe
FileVersion	1.0.0.0
CompanyName	Neudesic
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName	VectorBasedDrawing
ProductVersion	1.0.0.0
FileDescription	VectorBasedDrawing
OriginalFilename	GH5EC.exe

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.697957993 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.719449997 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.719549894 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.796598911 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.823239088 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.845339060 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.866569042 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.889058113 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.963701963 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.975496054 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.975543976 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.975574970 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.975583076 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.975621939 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.975651979 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.996611118 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.996642113 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.996665001 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.996686935 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.996707916 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.996723890 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.996745110 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.996756077 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.996777058 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.996787071 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.996808052 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.996869087 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017303944 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017426968 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017452002 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017478943 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017505884 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017539978 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017566919 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017590046 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017601013 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017623901 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017636061 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017653942 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017668009 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017744064 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017767906 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017786026 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017802000 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017827988 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.017844915 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.018040895 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.018064976 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.018090010 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.018096924 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.018143892 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.029783010 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038485050 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038511038 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038527966 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038551092 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038568020 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038584948 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038599968 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038618088 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038635015 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038645029 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038660049 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038671017 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038708925 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038954973 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038980007 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.038996935 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039011955 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039028883 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039042950 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039062977 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039079905 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039098024 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039108992 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039114952 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039134979 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039151907 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039171934 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039180994 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039201975 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039215088 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039237022 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.039982080 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040050983 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040079117 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040082932 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040102959 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040127039 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040127039 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040149927 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040153980 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040174961 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040188074 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040201902 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040220022 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040225029 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040249109 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040249109 CET	9036	49728	91.212.153.84	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:48.040271044 CET	49728	9036	192.168.2.6	91.212.153.84

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:05.205404043 CET	49283	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:05.217932940 CET	53	49283	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:05.250516891 CET	58377	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:05.651149988 CET	55074	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:05.664232016 CET	53	55074	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:06.256783009 CET	58377	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:06.270220995 CET	53	58377	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:06.847357035 CET	54513	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:06.860454082 CET	53	54513	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:07.685013056 CET	62044	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:07.697124958 CET	53	62044	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:08.170537949 CET	63791	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:08.188425064 CET	53	63791	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:08.495271921 CET	64267	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:08.508690119 CET	53	64267	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:10.466887951 CET	49448	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:10.479806900 CET	53	49448	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:11.250217915 CET	60342	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:11.263050079 CET	53	60342	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:12.459167004 CET	61346	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:12.471975088 CET	53	61346	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:13.403403044 CET	51774	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:13.415361881 CET	53	51774	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:14.188536882 CET	56023	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:14.203088999 CET	53	56023	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:15.222028971 CET	58384	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:15.234819889 CET	53	58384	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:15.916160107 CET	60261	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:15.928978920 CET	53	60261	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:17.134922028 CET	56061	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:17.147279024 CET	53	56061	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:18.041114092 CET	58336	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:18.053656101 CET	53	58336	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:21.272644997 CET	53781	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:21.284456968 CET	53	53781	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:22.324059963 CET	54064	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:22.336911917 CET	53	54064	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:23.433034897 CET	52811	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:23.446010113 CET	53	52811	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:24.150922060 CET	55299	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:24.163077116 CET	53	55299	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:25.186011076 CET	63745	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:25.198486090 CET	53	63745	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:27.536396980 CET	50055	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:27.550003052 CET	53	50055	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:41.728310108 CET	61374	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:41.742105007 CET	53	61374	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.524568081 CET	50339	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.687066078 CET	53	50339	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:57.713361979 CET	63307	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:57.891199112 CET	53	63307	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:01.390185118 CET	49694	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:01.408746958 CET	53	49694	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:02.596286058 CET	54982	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:03.609375000 CET	54982	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:03.621659994 CET	53	54982	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:04.647655964 CET	50010	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:04.662698030 CET	53	50010	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:11.736670971 CET	63718	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:11.750356913 CET	53	63718	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:17.943790913 CET	62116	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:17.956743002 CET	53	62116	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:20.021786928 CET	63816	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:20.039413929 CET	53	63816	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:24.259593964 CET	55014	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:24.272880077 CET	53	55014	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:26.774240017 CET	62208	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:26.787739038 CET	53	62208	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:27.379511118 CET	57574	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:27.400059938 CET	53	57574	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:27.940001011 CET	51818	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:27.951958895 CET	53	51818	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:28.613869905 CET	56628	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:28.626753092 CET	53	56628	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:29.067420959 CET	60778	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:29.080293894 CET	53	60778	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:29.509764910 CET	53799	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:29.522228003 CET	53	53799	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:30.487044096 CET	54683	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:30.499699116 CET	53	54683	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:30.681929111 CET	59329	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:30.715142965 CET	53	59329	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:31.432158947 CET	64021	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:31.446798086 CET	53	64021	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:32.100343943 CET	56129	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:32.266587019 CET	53	56129	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:32.503792048 CET	58177	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:32.516326904 CET	53	58177	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:32.979120970 CET	50700	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:32.992527008 CET	53	50700	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:39.167280912 CET	54069	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:39.337960005 CET	53	54069	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:40.697551966 CET	61178	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:40.716012955 CET	53	61178	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:46.362746000 CET	57017	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:46.375458002 CET	53	57017	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:53.114048958 CET	56327	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:53.126672029 CET	53	56327	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:00.165194035 CET	50243	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:00.178086996 CET	53	50243	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:05.285968065 CET	62055	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:05.299699068 CET	53	62055	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:11.865730047 CET	61249	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:11.879116058 CET	53	61249	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:16.899044991 CET	65252	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:16.913017035 CET	53	65252	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.524568081 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x11e7	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:57.713361979 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x552a	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:04.647655964 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0xf647	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:11.736670971 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0xe229	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:17.943790913 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0xb1bb	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:24.259593964 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x2f7f	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:32.100343943 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x8851	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:39.167280912 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x1196	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:46.362746000 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x59db	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:53.114048958 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x7c93	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:00.165194035 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x5875	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:05.285968065 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x6886	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:11.865730047 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0xf877	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:16.899044991 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0xcaa8	Standard query (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	Address	Type	Class
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:47.687066078 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x11e7	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:57:57.891199112 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x552a	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:04.662698030 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0xf647	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:11.750356913 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0xe229	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:17.956743002 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0xb1bb	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:24.272880077 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x2f7f	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:32.266587019 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x8851	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:39.337960005 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x1196	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:46.375458002 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x59db	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:58:53.126672029 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x7c93	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:00.178086996 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x5875	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:05.299699068 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x6886	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:11.879116058 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0xf877	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Feb 24, 2021 12:59:16.913017035 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0xcaa8	No error (0)	shahzad73.casacam.net	91.212.153.84	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6836 Parent PID: 5856

General

Start time:	12:57:13
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe'
Imagebase:	0x550000
File size:	381440 bytes
MD5 hash:	2374BB6B2675413F13A74466B9325B97
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000001.00000002.403279843.0000000003849000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 4692 Parent PID: 6836

General

Start time:	12:57:40
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7646.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x1290000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 6292 Parent PID: 4692

General

Start time:	12:57:41
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff61de10000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6552 Parent PID: 6836

General

Start time:	12:57:41
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	{path}
Imagebase:	0xfd0000
File size:	381440 bytes
MD5 hash:	2374BB6B2675413F13A74466B9325B97
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 5556 Parent PID: 6552

General

Start time:	12:57:44
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp243E.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x1290000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 6556 Parent PID: 5556

General

Start time:	12:57:44
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff61de10000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 6428 Parent PID: 936

General

Start time:	12:57:46
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe' 0
Imagebase:	0x680000
File size:	381440 bytes
MD5 hash:	2374BB6B2675413F13A74466B9325B97
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 0000000B.00000002.474284915.0000000003A99000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 7084 Parent PID: 6428

General

Start time:	12:58:09
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ihNagUDDVeQ' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE53C.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x1290000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 7032 Parent PID: 7084

General

Start time:	12:58:11
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff61de10000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe PID: 7132 Parent PID: 6428

General

Start time:	12:58:12
Start date:	24/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	{path}
Imagebase:	0xdd0000
File size:	381440 bytes
MD5 hash:	2374BB6B2675413F13A74466B9325B97
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000012.00000002.483963807.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000012.00000002.485784066.0000000003161000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000012.00000002.485969919.0000000004169000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000012.00000002.485969919.0000000004169000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Tactics:	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches ( `dir /a` for Windows and `ls –a` for Linux and macOS).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report BILLING INVOICE.pdf.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

Private

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre