Analysis Report invoicepdf.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name: invoicepdf.exe
Analysis ID: 358289
MD5: 6f98206e6905f1f727e255d114d3c0ac
SHA1: 71f6208364a668e72f8109a373c6c83c90b7999f
SHA256: 97069c864ebe6a1a3e6e85bd1ff54351810cc32de3cdfe34f7fef15f04da0b87
Tags: AgentTeslaexe
Infos:

Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

AgentTesla
Score: 100
Range: 0 - 100
Whitelisted: false
Confidence: 100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location
Yara detected AgentTesla
Yara detected AntiVM_3
.NET source code contains very large strings
Found evasive API chain (trying to detect sleep duration tampering with parallel thread)
Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs a global keyboard hook
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to detect virtual machines (STR)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
PE file contains strange resources
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Tries to load missing DLLs
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses SMTP (mail sending)
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Yara detected Credential Stealer

Classification

AV Detection:

barindex
Found malware configuration
Source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3d71aa0.2.unpack Malware Configuration Extractor: Agenttesla {"Exfil Mode": "SMTP", "FTP Info": "nasir@com-cept.comkhan@980.pkmail.com-cept.comlight@redwevamaldives.com"}
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\EuegmryBXVkd.exe ReversingLabs: Detection: 10%
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Source: invoicepdf.exe Virustotal: Detection: 17% Perma Link
Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file
Source: 5.2.invoicepdf.exe.400000.0.unpack Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen8

Compliance:

barindex
Uses 32bit PE files
Source: invoicepdf.exe Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
Uses new MSVCR Dlls
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.9445_none_d08c58b4442ba54f\MSVCR80.dll Jump to behavior
Contains modern PE file flags such as dynamic base (ASLR) or NX
Source: invoicepdf.exe Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Binary contains paths to debug symbols
Source: Binary string: mscorrc.pdb source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.339404912.0000000004D20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595636054.0000000000D30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp

Software Vulnerabilities:

barindex
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-1Ch], 00000000h 0_2_04C8E2F0

Networking:

barindex
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Source: global traffic TCP traffic: 192.168.2.6:49754 -> 185.221.216.77:587
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
Source: Joe Sandbox View ASN Name: HOST4GEEKS-LLCUS HOST4GEEKS-LLCUS
Uses SMTP (mail sending)
Source: global traffic TCP traffic: 192.168.2.6:49754 -> 185.221.216.77:587
Source: unknown DNS traffic detected: queries for: mail.com-cept.com
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp String found in binary or memory: http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp String found in binary or memory: http://DynDns.comDynDNS
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp String found in binary or memory: http://HtsCZk.com
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp String found in binary or memory: https://api.ipify.org%
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp String found in binary or memory: https://api.ipify.org%GETMozilla/5.0
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp String found in binary or memory: https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.0/css/bootstrap.min.css
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.338574835.0000000003B5E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.594160867.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.598124128.0000000002D9F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp String found in binary or memory: https://x4UtAvxhwOMMhTg.org

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

barindex
Installs a global keyboard hook
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Windows user hook set: 0 keyboard low level C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Jump to behavior
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Window created: window name: CLIPBRDWNDCLASS Jump to behavior

System Summary:

barindex
.NET source code contains very large strings
Source: invoicepdf.exe, frmSplashScreen.cs Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.2c0000.0.unpack, frmSplashScreen.cs Long String: Length: 13656
Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name
Source: initial sample Static PE information: Filename: invoicepdf.exe
Contains functionality to call native functions
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_051E111E NtQuerySystemInformation, 0_2_051E111E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_00CCB0BA NtQuerySystemInformation, 5_2_00CCB0BA
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_00CCB089 NtQuerySystemInformation, 5_2_00CCB089
Detected potential crypto function
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_002C52E6 0_2_002C52E6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_04C846D8 0_2_04C846D8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_04C848E0 0_2_04C848E0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_04C846C8 0_2_04C846C8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_04C855E8 0_2_04C855E8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_04C85390 0_2_04C85390
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_04C853A0 0_2_04C853A0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_004852E6 5_2_004852E6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_029B9690 5_2_029B9690
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_029B7A94 5_2_029B7A94
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_029BD0F0 5_2_029BD0F0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_029B9248 5_2_029B9248
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_029BBF90 5_2_029BBF90
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_0570DD78 5_2_0570DD78
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_0570F3F8 5_2_0570F3F8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_0570BDE0 5_2_0570BDE0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_057007D6 5_2_057007D6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_05707B98 5_2_05707B98
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_0570D220 5_2_0570D220
PE file contains strange resources
Source: invoicepdf.exe Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: EuegmryBXVkd.exe.0.dr Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Source: invoicepdf.exe Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.340371010.0000000005960000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: System.OriginalFileName vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAsyncState.dllF vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.339404912.0000000004D20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337682468.0000000002ADC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamexFMBnjPOeEEgNCcCePpgxKGYA.exe4 vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.340040627.0000000005180000.00000004.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameLegacyPathHandling.dllN vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.341740011.0000000005A60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: originalfilename vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.341740011.0000000005A60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamepropsys.dll.mui@ vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000000.324546289.00000000002C2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameSubcategoryMembershipEntry.exe< vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.594160867.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamexFMBnjPOeEEgNCcCePpgxKGYA.exe4 vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000000.333970485.0000000000482000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameSubcategoryMembershipEntry.exe< vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.600207758.0000000005440000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamewshom.ocx.mui vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595816838.0000000000E60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamewshom.ocx vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.599846996.0000000004F20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameKernelbase.dll.muij% vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595636054.0000000000D30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameSubcategoryMembershipEntry.exe< vs invoicepdf.exe
Tries to load missing DLLs
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Section loaded: windows.staterepositoryps.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Section loaded: security.dll Jump to behavior
Uses 32bit PE files
Source: invoicepdf.exe Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
Source: invoicepdf.exe, frmSplashScreen.cs Base64 encoded string: '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
Source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.2c0000.0.unpack, frmSplashScreen.cs Base64 encoded string: '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
Source: classification engine Classification label: mal100.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@6/4@1/2
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_051E0FA2 AdjustTokenPrivileges, 0_2_051E0FA2
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_00CCAF3E AdjustTokenPrivileges, 5_2_00CCAF3E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_00CCAF07 AdjustTokenPrivileges, 5_2_00CCAF07
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\EuegmryBXVkd.exe Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\zpWvzg
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6984:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\.net clr networking
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp Jump to behavior
Source: invoicepdf.exe Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\mscorlib\9603718106bd57ecfbb18fefd769cab4\mscorlib.ni.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sorttbls.nlp Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sortkey.nlp Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\mscorlib\9603718106bd57ecfbb18fefd769cab4\mscorlib.ni.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sorttbls.nlp Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sortkey.nlp Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts Jump to behavior
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: INSERT INTO Itens_Aluguel VALUES(@aluguelID, @aviaoID, @validade);
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: Insert into Clientes values (@nome, @cpf, @rg, @cidade, @endereco, @uf, @telefone);
Source: invoicepdf.exe Virustotal: Detection: 17%
Source: invoicepdf.exe String found in binary or memory: ble> <IdleSettings> <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd> <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle> </IdleSettings> <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand> <Enabled>true</Enabled> <Hidden>false</Hidden> <RunOnlyIfIdle
Source: invoicepdf.exe String found in binary or memory: ble> <IdleSettings> <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd> <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle> </IdleSettings> <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand> <Enabled>true</Enabled> <Hidden>false</Hidden> <RunOnlyIfIdle
Source: invoicepdf.exe String found in binary or memory: es>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries> <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries> <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate> <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable> <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvail
Source: invoicepdf.exe String found in binary or memory: es>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries> <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries> <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate> <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable> <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvail
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Jump to behavior
Source: unknown Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe'
Source: unknown Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\EuegmryBXVkd' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp'
Source: unknown Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\EuegmryBXVkd' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp' Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{95E15D0A-66E6-93D9-C53C-76E6219D3341}\InProcServer32 Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\mscorrc.dll Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676 Jump to behavior
Source: invoicepdf.exe Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.9445_none_d08c58b4442ba54f\MSVCR80.dll Jump to behavior
Source: invoicepdf.exe Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Source: Binary string: mscorrc.pdb source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.339404912.0000000004D20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595636054.0000000000D30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp

Data Obfuscation:

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Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_002CD32B push 6F060001h; iretd 0_2_002CD340
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_002CD381 push 6F060001h; iretd 0_2_002CD396
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_002CD399 push 6F060001h; iretd 0_2_002CD3C8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_02553210 pushad ; retf 0_2_02553219
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_02552E09 push eax; retf 0_2_025531A5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_0048D381 push 6F060001h; iretd 5_2_0048D396
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_0048D399 push 6F060001h; iretd 5_2_0048D3C8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_0048D32B push 6F060001h; iretd 5_2_0048D340
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_055F4344 push cs; retf 5_2_055F435B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_055F43B8 push cs; retf 5_2_055F43CF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_055F42D0 push cs; retf 5_2_055F42E7
Source: initial sample Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.06854919564
Source: initial sample Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.06854919564

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

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Drops PE files
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\EuegmryBXVkd.exe Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival:

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Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Source: unknown Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\EuegmryBXVkd' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp'

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

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Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Registry key monitored for changes: HKEY_CURRENT_USER_Classes Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX Jump to behavior

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

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Yara detected AntiVM_3
Source: Yara match File source: 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 00000000.00000002.337682468.0000000002ADC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 6812, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.2ac5f2c.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Found evasive API chain (trying to detect sleep duration tampering with parallel thread)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Function Chain: systemQueried,threadCreated,threadResumed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,systemQueried,systemQueried,systemQueried,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,systemQueried,systemQueried,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,processSet,processSet,memAlloc,memAlloc,memAlloc,memAlloc,memAlloc,memAlloc
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_BaseBoard
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: KERNEL32.DLL.WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File opened / queried: SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b} Jump to behavior
Contains functionality to detect virtual machines (STR)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_0255833A str word ptr [eax+40h] 0_2_0255833A
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477 Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477 Jump to behavior
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Window / User API: threadDelayed 645 Jump to behavior
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 6816 Thread sleep time: -100358s >= -30000s Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 6836 Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 1688 Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 1688 Thread sleep count: 645 > 30 Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 1688 Thread sleep time: -19350000s >= -30000s Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 1688 Thread sleep time: -30000s >= -30000s Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 1688 Thread sleep time: -30000s >= -30000s Jump to behavior
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Last function: Thread delayed
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: InstallPathJC:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.599846996.0000000004F20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: A Virtual Machine could not be started because Hyper-V is not installed.
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.599846996.0000000004F20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: A communication protocol error has occurred between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Service.
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.599846996.0000000004F20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: The communication protocol version between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Services is not supported.
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: VMWAREDSOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.599846996.0000000004F20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: An unknown internal message was received by the Hyper-V Compute Service.
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process information queried: ProcessInformation Jump to behavior

Anti Debugging:

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Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 5_2_029B3A88 LdrInitializeThunk, 5_2_029B3A88
Enables debug privileges
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process token adjusted: Debug Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process token adjusted: Debug Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard Jump to behavior

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

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Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Memory written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A Jump to behavior
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\EuegmryBXVkd' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp' Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Jump to behavior
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595866413.0000000001200000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595866413.0000000001200000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595866413.0000000001200000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: &Program Manager
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595866413.0000000001200000.00000002.00000001.sdmp Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

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Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Queries volume information: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\2.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Queries volume information: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\2.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Code function: 0_2_00B5B0BE GetUserNameW, 0_2_00B5B0BE
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid Jump to behavior

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

barindex
Yara detected AgentTesla
Source: Yara match File source: 00000005.00000002.594160867.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 00000005.00000002.598124128.0000000002D9F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 00000000.00000002.338574835.0000000003B5E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 7052, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 6812, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 5.2.invoicepdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3d71aa0.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3d71aa0.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3c743f0.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3c187d0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Martin Prikryl\WinSCP 2\Sessions Jump to behavior
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\profiles.ini Jump to behavior
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\FileZilla\recentservers.xml Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\SmartFTP\Client 2.0\Favorites\Quick Connect\ Jump to behavior
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\IncrediMail\Identities Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676 Jump to behavior
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Source: Yara match File source: 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 7052, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality:

barindex
Yara detected AgentTesla
Source: Yara match File source: 00000005.00000002.594160867.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 00000005.00000002.598124128.0000000002D9F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 00000000.00000002.338574835.0000000003B5E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 7052, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 6812, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match File source: 5.2.invoicepdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3d71aa0.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3d71aa0.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3c743f0.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3c187d0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
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Legend:

  • Process
  • Signature
  • Created File
  • DNS/IP Info
  • Is Dropped
  • Is Windows Process
  • Number of created Registry Values
  • Number of created Files
  • Visual Basic
  • Delphi
  • Java
  • .Net C# or VB.NET
  • C, C++ or other language
  • Is malicious
  • Internet
behaviorgraph top1 signatures2 2 Behavior Graph ID: 358289 Sample: invoicepdf.exe Startdate: 25/02/2021 Architecture: WINDOWS Score: 100 29 Found malware configuration 2->29 31 Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file 2->31 33 Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location 2->33 35 7 other signatures 2->35 7 invoicepdf.exe 7 2->7         started        process3 file4 19 C:\Users\user\AppData\...uegmryBXVkd.exe, PE32 7->19 dropped 21 C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\...\tmp5A9C.tmp, XML 7->21 dropped 23 C:\Users\user\AppData\...\invoicepdf.exe.log, ASCII 7->23 dropped 37 Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines) 7->37 39 Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines) 7->39 41 Injects a PE file into a foreign processes 7->41 43 Found evasive API chain (trying to detect sleep duration tampering with parallel thread) 7->43 11 invoicepdf.exe 4 7->11         started        15 schtasks.exe 1 7->15         started        signatures5 process6 dnsIp7 25 mail.com-cept.com 185.221.216.77, 49754, 587 HOST4GEEKS-LLCUS United Kingdom 11->25 27 192.168.2.1 unknown unknown 11->27 45 Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc) 11->45 47 Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access) 11->47 49 Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials 11->49 51 2 other signatures 11->51 17 conhost.exe 15->17         started        signatures8 process9
  • No. of IPs < 25%
  • 25% < No. of IPs < 50%
  • 50% < No. of IPs < 75%
  • 75% < No. of IPs

Contacted Public IPs

IP Domain Country Flag ASN ASN Name Malicious
185.221.216.77
 unknown United Kingdom
393960 HOST4GEEKS-LLCUS true

Private
IP
192.168.2.1

Contacted Domains

Name IP Active
mail.com-cept.com 185.221.216.77 true