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Analysis Report invoicepdf.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	invoicepdf.exe
Analysis ID:	358289
MD5:	6f98206e6905f1f727e255d114d3c0ac
SHA1:	71f6208364a668e72f8109a373c6c83c90b7999f
SHA256:	97069c864ebe6a1a3e6e85bd1ff54351810cc32de3cdfe34f7fef15f04da0b87
Tags:	AgentTeslaexe
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

AgentTesla

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Yara detected AgentTesla

Yara detected AntiVM_3

.NET source code contains very large strings

Found evasive API chain (trying to detect sleep duration tampering with parallel thread)

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Installs a global keyboard hook

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to detect virtual machines (STR)

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Detected potential crypto function

Drops PE files

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)

PE file contains strange resources

Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Tries to load missing DLLs

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses SMTP (mail sending)

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara detected Credential Stealer

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

invoicepdf.exe (PID: 6812 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe' MD5: 6F98206E6905F1F727E255D114D3C0AC)

schtasks.exe (PID: 6932 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\EuegmryBXVkd' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 6984 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

invoicepdf.exe (PID: 7052 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe MD5: 6F98206E6905F1F727E255D114D3C0AC)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Agenttesla

{"Exfil Mode": "SMTP", "FTP Info": "nasir@com-cept.comkhan@980.pkmail.com-cept.comlight@redwevamaldives.com"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
00000005.00000002.594160867.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.337682468.0000000002ADC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000005.00000002.598124128.0000000002D9F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.338574835.0000000003B5E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 7052	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 7052	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 6812	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 6812	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Click to see the 6 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author
5.2.invoicepdf.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.invoicepdf.exe.2ac5f2c.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3d71aa0.2.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3d71aa0.2.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3c743f0.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3c187d0.4.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Click to see the 1 entries

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Joe Security: Data: Command: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\EuegmryBXVkd' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp', CommandLine: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\EuegmryBXVkd' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp', CommandLine|base64offset|contains: *j, Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe, ParentProcessId: 6812, ProcessCommandLine: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\EuegmryBXVkd' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp', ProcessId: 6932

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3d71aa0.2.unpack

Malware Configuration Extractor: Agenttesla {"Exfil Mode": "SMTP", "FTP Info": "nasir@com-cept.comkhan@980.pkmail.com-cept.comlight@redwevamaldives.com"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\EuegmryBXVkd.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 10%

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: invoicepdf.exe

Virustotal: Detection: 17%

Perma Link

Source: 5.2.invoicepdf.exe.400000.0.unpack

Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen8

Compliance:

Uses 32bit PE files

Show sources

Source: invoicepdf.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Uses new MSVCR Dlls

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.9445_none_d08c58b4442ba54f\MSVCR80.dll

Contains modern PE file flags such as dynamic base (ASLR) or NX

Show sources

Source: invoicepdf.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Binary contains paths to debug symbols

Show sources

Source:

Binary string: mscorrc.pdb source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.339404912.0000000004D20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp, invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595636054.0000000000D30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp

Software Vulnerabilities:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-1Ch], 00000000h

Networking:

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.6:49754 -> 185.221.216.77:587

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: HOST4GEEKS-LLCUS HOST4GEEKS-LLCUS

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.6:49754 -> 185.221.216.77:587

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: mail.com-cept.com

Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://DynDns.comDynDNS
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://HtsCZk.com
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.ipify.org%
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.ipify.org%GETMozilla/5.0
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.0/css/bootstrap.min.css
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.338574835.0000000003B5E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.594160867.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.598124128.0000000002D9F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://x4UtAvxhwOMMhTg.org

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

Installs a global keyboard hook

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Windows user hook set: 0 keyboard low level C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Window created: window name: CLIPBRDWNDCLASS

System Summary:

.NET source code contains very large strings

Show sources

Source: invoicepdf.exe, frmSplashScreen.cs	Long String: Length: 13656
Source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.2c0000.0.unpack, frmSplashScreen.cs	Long String: Length: 13656

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: invoicepdf.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_051E111E NtQuerySystemInformation,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_00CCB0BA NtQuerySystemInformation,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_00CCB089 NtQuerySystemInformation,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_002C52E6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_04C846D8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_04C848E0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_04C846C8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_04C855E8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_04C85390
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_04C853A0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_004852E6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_029B9690
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_029B7A94
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_029BD0F0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_029B9248
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_029BBF90
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_0570DD78
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_0570F3F8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_0570BDE0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_057007D6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_05707B98
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_0570D220

Source: invoicepdf.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: EuegmryBXVkd.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: invoicepdf.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.340371010.0000000005960000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: System.OriginalFileName vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAsyncState.dllF vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.339404912.0000000004D20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337682468.0000000002ADC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamexFMBnjPOeEEgNCcCePpgxKGYA.exe4 vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.340040627.0000000005180000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameLegacyPathHandling.dllN vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.341740011.0000000005A60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: originalfilename vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.341740011.0000000005A60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamepropsys.dll.mui@ vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000000.324546289.00000000002C2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameSubcategoryMembershipEntry.exe< vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.594160867.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamexFMBnjPOeEEgNCcCePpgxKGYA.exe4 vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000000.333970485.0000000000482000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameSubcategoryMembershipEntry.exe< vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.600207758.0000000005440000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamewshom.ocx.mui vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595816838.0000000000E60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamewshom.ocx vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.599846996.0000000004F20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameKernelbase.dll.muij% vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595636054.0000000000D30000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs invoicepdf.exe
Source: invoicepdf.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameSubcategoryMembershipEntry.exe< vs invoicepdf.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Section loaded: windows.staterepositoryps.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Section loaded: security.dll

Source: invoicepdf.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: invoicepdf.exe, frmSplashScreen.cs	Base64 encoded string: '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
Source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.2c0000.0.unpack, frmSplashScreen.cs	Base64 encoded string: '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

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@6/4@1/2

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_051E0FA2 AdjustTokenPrivileges,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_00CCAF3E AdjustTokenPrivileges,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_00CCAF07 AdjustTokenPrivileges,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\EuegmryBXVkd.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\zpWvzg
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6984:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\.net clr networking

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: invoicepdf.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\mscorlib\9603718106bd57ecfbb18fefd769cab4\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sorttbls.nlp
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sortkey.nlp
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\mscorlib\9603718106bd57ecfbb18fefd769cab4\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sorttbls.nlp
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sortkey.nlp

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: INSERT INTO Itens_Aluguel VALUES(@aluguelID, @aviaoID, @validade);
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Insert into Clientes values (@nome, @cpf, @rg, @cidade, @endereco, @uf, @telefone);

Source: invoicepdf.exe

Virustotal: Detection: 17%

Source: invoicepdf.exe	String found in binary or memory: ble> <IdleSettings> <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd> <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle> </IdleSettings> <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand> <Enabled>true</Enabled> <Hidden>false</Hidden> <RunOnlyIfIdle
Source: invoicepdf.exe	String found in binary or memory: ble> <IdleSettings> <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd> <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle> </IdleSettings> <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand> <Enabled>true</Enabled> <Hidden>false</Hidden> <RunOnlyIfIdle
Source: invoicepdf.exe	String found in binary or memory: es>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries> <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries> <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate> <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable> <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvail
Source: invoicepdf.exe	String found in binary or memory: es>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries> <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries> <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate> <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable> <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvail

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\EuegmryBXVkd' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\EuegmryBXVkd' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{95E15D0A-66E6-93D9-C53C-76E6219D3341}\InProcServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\mscorrc.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676

Source: invoicepdf.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.9445_none_d08c58b4442ba54f\MSVCR80.dll

Source: invoicepdf.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:

Data Obfuscation:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_002CD32B push 6F060001h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_002CD381 push 6F060001h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_002CD399 push 6F060001h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_02553210 pushad ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_02552E09 push eax; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_0048D381 push 6F060001h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_0048D399 push 6F060001h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_0048D32B push 6F060001h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_055F4344 push cs; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_055F43B8 push cs; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Code function: 5_2_055F42D0 push cs; retf

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.06854919564
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.06854919564

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\EuegmryBXVkd.exe

Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival:

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Show sources

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\EuegmryBXVkd' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp'

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Registry key monitored for changes: HKEY_CURRENT_USER_Classes

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM_3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.337682468.0000000002ADC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 6812, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.2ac5f2c.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Found evasive API chain (trying to detect sleep duration tampering with parallel thread)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Function Chain: systemQueried,threadCreated,threadResumed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,systemQueried,systemQueried,systemQueried,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,systemQueried,systemQueried,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,processSet,processSet,memAlloc,memAlloc,memAlloc,memAlloc,memAlloc,memAlloc

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_BaseBoard

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: KERNEL32.DLL.WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

File opened / queried: SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Code function: 0_2_0255833A str word ptr [eax+40h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Window / User API: threadDelayed 645

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 6816	Thread sleep time: -100358s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 6836	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 1688	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 1688	Thread sleep count: 645 > 30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 1688	Thread sleep time: -19350000s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 1688	Thread sleep time: -30000s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe TID: 1688	Thread sleep time: -30000s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPathJC:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.599846996.0000000004F20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A Virtual Machine could not be started because Hyper-V is not installed.
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.599846996.0000000004F20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A communication protocol error has occurred between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Service.
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.599846996.0000000004F20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: The communication protocol version between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Services is not supported.
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWAREDSOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.599846996.0000000004F20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: An unknown internal message was received by the Hyper-V Compute Service.

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Anti Debugging:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Code function: 5_2_029B3A88 LdrInitializeThunk,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Memory written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\EuegmryBXVkd' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595866413.0000000001200000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595866413.0000000001200000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595866413.0000000001200000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: &Program Manager
Source: invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.595866413.0000000001200000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\2.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\2.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Code function: 0_2_00B5B0BE GetUserNameW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.594160867.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.598124128.0000000002D9F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.338574835.0000000003B5E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 7052, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 6812, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.invoicepdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3d71aa0.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3d71aa0.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3c743f0.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3c187d0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Martin Prikryl\WinSCP 2\Sessions

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\profiles.ini

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\FileZilla\recentservers.xml
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\SmartFTP\Client 2.0\Favorites\Quick Connect\

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\IncrediMail\Identities
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 7052, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.594160867.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.598124128.0000000002D9F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.338574835.0000000003B5E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 7052, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: invoicepdf.exe PID: 6812, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.invoicepdf.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3d71aa0.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3d71aa0.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3c743f0.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.invoicepdf.exe.3c187d0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation211	DLL Side-Loading1	DLL Side-Loading1	Disable or Modify Tools11	OS Credential Dumping2	Account Discovery1	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Native API1	Scheduled Task/Job1	Access Token Manipulation1	Obfuscated Files or Information31	Input Capture11	File and Directory Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Local System2	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Non-Standard Port1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	Command and Scripting Interpreter2	Logon Script (Windows)	Process Injection112	Software Packing2	Credentials in Registry1	System Information Discovery114	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Email Collection1	Automated Exfiltration	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Logon Script (Mac)	Scheduled Task/Job1	DLL Side-Loading1	NTDS	Query Registry1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture11	Scheduled Transfer	Application Layer Protocol11	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Masquerading1	LSA Secrets	Security Software Discovery321	SSH	Clipboard Data1	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion15	Cached Domain Credentials	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion15	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Access Token Manipulation1	DCSync	Process Discovery2	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Process Injection112	Proc Filesystem	Application Window Discovery1	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue
Exploit Public-Facing Application	PowerShell	At (Linux)	At (Linux)	Masquerading	/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow	System Owner/User Discovery1	Software Deployment Tools	Data Staged	Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Web Protocols	Rogue Cellular Base Station		Data Destruction
Supply Chain Compromise	AppleScript	At (Windows)	At (Windows)	Invalid Code Signature	Network Sniffing	Remote System Discovery1	Taint Shared Content	Local Data Staging	Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol	File Transfer Protocols			Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
invoicepdf.exe	17%	Virustotal		Browse

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\EuegmryBXVkd.exe	10%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Wacatac

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
5.2.invoicepdf.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen8		Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://api.ipify.org%GETMozilla/5.0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://api.ipify.org%GETMozilla/5.0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://api.ipify.org%GETMozilla/5.0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://x4UtAvxhwOMMhTg.org	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://api.ipify.org%	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://api.ipify.org%	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://api.ipify.org%	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://HtsCZk.com	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
mail.com-cept.com	185.221.216.77	true	true		unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
https://api.ipify.org%GETMozilla/5.0	invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	low
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://x4UtAvxhwOMMhTg.org	invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.598124128.0000000002D9F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://api.ipify.org%	invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	low
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.338574835.0000000003B5E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.594160867.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://HtsCZk.com	invoicepdf.exe, 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.0/css/bootstrap.min.css	invoicepdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
185.221.216.77	unknown	United Kingdom		393960	HOST4GEEKS-LLCUS	true

Private

IP
192.168.2.1

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	358289
Start date:	25.02.2021
Start time:	11:41:09
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 9m 6s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	invoicepdf.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	26
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@6/4@1/2
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 4.6% (good quality ratio 3.2%) Quality average: 56.4% Quality standard deviation: 42.1%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 91% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, HxTsr.exe, RuntimeBroker.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 104.42.151.234, 131.253.33.200, 13.107.22.200, 23.211.6.115, 52.147.198.201, 51.104.139.180, 2.20.142.209, 2.20.142.210, 67.26.73.254, 8.248.143.254, 8.253.95.249, 8.253.95.120, 67.26.83.254, 51.103.5.159, 52.155.217.156, 20.54.26.129, 92.122.213.194, 92.122.213.247, 184.30.20.56 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): au.download.windowsupdate.com.edgesuite.net, arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, arc.msn.com, vip1-par02p.wns.notify.trafficmanager.net, db5eap.displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, wns.notify.trafficmanager.net, www-bing-com.dual-a-0001.a-msedge.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, auto.au.download.windowsupdate.com.c.footprint.net, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net, www.bing.com, displaycatalog-europeeap.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, client.wns.windows.com, fs.microsoft.com, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, a767.dscg3.akamai.net, dual-a-0001.dc-msedge.net, skypedataprdcoleus16.cloudapp.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, a-0001.a-afdentry.net.trafficmanager.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, skypedataprdcolwus16.cloudapp.net, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
11:41:59	API Interceptor	946x Sleep call for process: invoicepdf.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
185.221.216.77	invoice.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
185.221.216.77	invoice copys.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
mail.com-cept.com	invoice.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.221.216.77
mail.com-cept.com	invoice copys.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.221.216.77

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
HOST4GEEKS-LLCUS	invoice.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.221.216.77
	synchronossTicket#513473.htm	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.221.216.34
	invoice copys.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.221.216.77
	55-2912.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	DAT_G_0259067.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	DAT_G_0259067.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	5349 TED_04235524.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	5349 TED_04235524.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	FILE_122020_VVY_591928.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	Archivo_29_48214503.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	Adjunto 29 886_473411.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	Informacion_29.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	Informacion_29.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	Informacion_122020_EUH-4262717.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	1923620_YY-5094713.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	Doc 2912 75513.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	DAT.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	ARCHIVOFile_762-36284.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	4640-2912-122020.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76
	MENSAJE_29_2020.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	66.85.46.76

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v2.0_32\UsageLogs\invoicepdf.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	664
Entropy (8bit):	5.288448637977022
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:Q3LaJU20NaL10Ug+9Yz9t0U29hJ5g1B0U2ukyrFk70U2xANlW3ANv:MLF20NaL3z2p29hJ5g522rW2xAi3A9
MD5:	B1DB55991C3DA14E35249AEA1BC357CA
SHA1:	0DD2D91198FDEF296441B12F1A906669B279700C
SHA-256:	34D3E48321D5010AD2BD1F3F0B728077E4F5A7F70D66FA36B57E5209580B6BDC
SHA-512:	BE38A31888C9C2F8047FA9C99672CB985179D325107514B7500DDA9523AE3E1D20B45EACC4E6C8A5D096360D0FBB98A120E63F38FFE324DF8A0559F6890CC801
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..3,"C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\System\1ffc437de59fb69ba2b865ffdc98ffd1\System.ni.dll",0..3,"C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\Microsoft.VisualBas#\cd7c74fce2a0eab72cd25cbe4bb61614\Microsoft.VisualBasic.ni.dll",0..3,"C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\System.Drawing\54d944b3ca0ea1188d700fbd8089726b\System.Drawing.ni.dll",0..3,"C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\System.Windows.Forms\bd8d59c984c9f5f2695f64341115cdf0\System.Windows.Forms.ni.dll",0..3,"C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\System.Runtime.Remo#\35774dc3cd31b4550ab06c3354cf4ba5\System.Runtime.Remoting.ni.dll",0..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1657
Entropy (8bit):	5.161993843403802
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+SEqC/S7h2ulNMFp2O/rlMhEMjnGpwjpIgUYODOLD9RJh7h8gKB3stn:cbha7JlNQV/rydbz9I3YODOLNdq3s
MD5:	9149142410DC43256D3D9AF56DBDEEAA
SHA1:	3A42048F278DEF0A3CA6033B90E5BF6ABF15480B
SHA-256:	8E67B925715A8CD51CAC18764A72B58A3547345A896B05AF84EA811FBF3DEBBC
SHA-512:	B0AF46671E2D5EC56FF9038E7E3F5F394BF4D14D0120244B623A13FA0786C91EE81464F66F6023617E7A66B4E1B81E90D0B6782CA2E8455E406B099E97ECAFF1
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo>.. <Date>2014-10-25T14:27:44.8929027</Date>.. <Author>computer\user</Author>.. </RegistrationInfo>.. <Triggers>.. <LogonTrigger>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. </LogonTrigger>.. <RegistrationTrigger>.. <Enabled>false</Enabled>.. </RegistrationTrigger>.. </Triggers>.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvail

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\EuegmryBXVkd.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	788992
Entropy (8bit):	7.074594045321417
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12288:ZSprUPZb4NuAvlTwvtonQkJzUOBjgQQiq62fo1:ZEU4NuA9QkyO2im2
MD5:	6F98206E6905F1F727E255D114D3C0AC
SHA1:	71F6208364A668E72F8109A373C6C83C90B7999F
SHA-256:	97069C864EBE6A1A3E6E85BD1FF54351810CC32DE3CDFE34F7FEF15F04DA0B87
SHA-512:	53E6E020FD5DF48E7909C42C01E1FD565FE0107C0248C359B22394F67C0F3E8A67C1C7A59C70D9C964AD3D44963735505C69B7D242C3E688C9DB4758DB407703
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 10%
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L....t7`..............P......N......r.... ........@.. .......................`............@................................. ...O.......LK...................@....................................................... ............... ..H............text...x.... ...................... ..`.rsrc...LK.......L..................@..@.reloc.......@......................@..B................T.......H..........TO..........0................................................0............(....(..........(.....o..........................(.......( ......(!......("......(#....N..(....oL...($....&..(%.....s&........s'........s(........s)........s............0...........~....o+....+...0...........~....o,....+...0...........~....o-....+...0...........~....o.....+...0...........~....o/....+...0..<........~.....(0.....,!r...p.....(1...o2...s3............~.....+...0......

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\EuegmryBXVkd.exe:Zone.Identifier Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	26
Entropy (8bit):	3.95006375643621
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ggPYV:rPYV
MD5:	187F488E27DB4AF347237FE461A079AD
SHA1:	6693BA299EC1881249D59262276A0D2CB21F8E64
SHA-256:	255A65D30841AB4082BD9D0EEA79D49C5EE88F56136157D8D6156AEF11C12309
SHA-512:	89879F237C0C051EBE784D0690657A6827A312A82735DA42DAD5F744D734FC545BEC9642C19D14C05B2F01FF53BC731530C92F7327BB7DC9CDE1B60FB21CD64E
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	[ZoneTransfer]....ZoneId=0

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.074594045321417
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.80% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.75% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	invoicepdf.exe
File size:	788992
MD5:	6f98206e6905f1f727e255d114d3c0ac
SHA1:	71f6208364a668e72f8109a373c6c83c90b7999f
SHA256:	97069c864ebe6a1a3e6e85bd1ff54351810cc32de3cdfe34f7fef15f04da0b87
SHA512:	53e6e020fd5df48e7909c42c01e1fd565fe0107c0248c359b22394f67c0f3e8a67c1c7a59c70d9c964ad3d44963735505c69b7d242c3e688c9db4758db407703
SSDEEP:	12288:ZSprUPZb4NuAvlTwvtonQkJzUOBjgQQiq62fo1:ZEU4NuA9QkyO2im2
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L....t7`..............P......N......r.... ........@.. .......................`............@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	f8c492aaaa92dcfe

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4bd872
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x6037748A [Thu Feb 25 09:57:30 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v2.0.50727
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xbd820	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xbe000	0x4b4c	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0xc4000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0xbb878	0xbba00	False	0.608667138574	data	7.06854919564	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xbe000	0x4b4c	0x4c00	False	0.487201891447	data	5.74193482381	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0xc4000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type
RT_ICON	0xbe1c0	0x468	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_ICON	0xbe628	0x10a8	dBase IV DBT of @.DBF, block length 4096, next free block index 40, next free block 4275388049, next used block 4258479509
RT_ICON	0xbf6d0	0x25a8	dBase IV DBT of `.DBF, block length 9216, next free block index 40, next free block 3771611807, next used block 3167566498
RT_GROUP_ICON	0xc1c78	0x30	data
RT_GROUP_ICON	0xc1ca8	0x14	data
RT_VERSION	0xc1cbc	0x378	data
RT_MANIFEST	0xc2034	0xb15	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF, LF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright 2014
Assembly Version	3.0.0.0
InternalName	SubcategoryMembershipEntry.exe
FileVersion	3.0.0.0
CompanyName	KTV
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName	KTVManagement
ProductVersion	3.0.0.0
FileDescription	KTVManagement
OriginalFilename	SubcategoryMembershipEntry.exe

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.370840073 CET	49754	587	192.168.2.6	185.221.216.77
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.428172112 CET	587	49754	185.221.216.77	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.429424047 CET	49754	587	192.168.2.6	185.221.216.77
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.562700033 CET	587	49754	185.221.216.77	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.565654993 CET	49754	587	192.168.2.6	185.221.216.77
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.623167992 CET	587	49754	185.221.216.77	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.624363899 CET	49754	587	192.168.2.6	185.221.216.77
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.683339119 CET	587	49754	185.221.216.77	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.715395927 CET	49754	587	192.168.2.6	185.221.216.77
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.773184061 CET	587	49754	185.221.216.77	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.773322105 CET	49754	587	192.168.2.6	185.221.216.77

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:49.699194908 CET	54513	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:49.734250069 CET	62044	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:49.747864962 CET	53	54513	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:49.785949945 CET	53	62044	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:51.229141951 CET	63791	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:51.281054974 CET	53	63791	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:51.926170111 CET	64267	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:51.985377073 CET	53	64267	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:52.386835098 CET	49448	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:52.449146986 CET	53	49448	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:53.526319027 CET	60342	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:53.575036049 CET	53	60342	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:54.992599964 CET	61346	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:55.043550968 CET	53	61346	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:55.847457886 CET	51774	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:56.861562967 CET	51774	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:57.876817942 CET	51774	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:57.928577900 CET	53	51774	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:59.229866028 CET	56023	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:41:59.278750896 CET	53	56023	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:01.666904926 CET	58384	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:01.715954065 CET	53	58384	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:02.539083958 CET	60261	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:02.588154078 CET	53	60261	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:03.722847939 CET	56061	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:03.774718046 CET	53	56061	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:05.102363110 CET	58336	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:05.161025047 CET	53	58336	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:06.278151989 CET	53781	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:06.327392101 CET	53	53781	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:07.443907022 CET	54064	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:07.493066072 CET	53	54064	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:08.589304924 CET	52811	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:08.639059067 CET	53	52811	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:09.869546890 CET	55299	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:09.921233892 CET	53	55299	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:11.277381897 CET	63745	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:11.326066971 CET	53	63745	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:12.736093998 CET	50055	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:12.784821987 CET	53	50055	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:15.552386999 CET	61374	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:15.601363897 CET	53	61374	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:25.583460093 CET	50339	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:25.632186890 CET	53	50339	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:45.148912907 CET	63307	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:45.210259914 CET	53	63307	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:45.310525894 CET	49694	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:45.361241102 CET	53	49694	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:47.312665939 CET	54982	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:47.364840984 CET	53	54982	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:47.882683039 CET	50010	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:47.967247009 CET	53	50010	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:48.884064913 CET	63718	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:48.944849014 CET	53	63718	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:49.664988995 CET	62116	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:49.730720043 CET	53	62116	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:50.479805946 CET	63816	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:50.539237022 CET	53	63816	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:51.013923883 CET	55014	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:51.071263075 CET	53	55014	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:52.064951897 CET	62208	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:52.129256010 CET	53	62208	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:53.159595013 CET	57574	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:53.228266954 CET	53	57574	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:54.146301985 CET	51818	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:54.218048096 CET	53	51818	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:54.380764008 CET	56628	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:54.440798044 CET	53	56628	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:56.036001921 CET	60778	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:56.087968111 CET	53	60778	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:56.758483887 CET	53799	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:56.815855980 CET	53	53799	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:59.353415966 CET	54683	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:42:59.414673090 CET	53	54683	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:30.139228106 CET	59329	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:30.187971115 CET	53	59329	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:30.871164083 CET	64021	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:30.939100981 CET	53	64021	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.287022114 CET	56129	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.352623940 CET	53	56129	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:32.426588058 CET	58177	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:32.491616964 CET	53	58177	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.287022114 CET	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x73d0	Standard query (0)	mail.com-cept.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.352623940 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x73d0	No error (0)	mail.com-cept.com		185.221.216.77	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

SMTP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP	Commands
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.562700033 CET	587	49754	185.221.216.77	192.168.2.6	220-uksrv3.websiteserverbox.com ESMTP Exim 4.93 #2 Thu, 25 Feb 2021 05:43:30 -0500 220-We do not authorize the use of this system to transport unsolicited, 220 and/or bulk e-mail.
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.565654993 CET	49754	587	192.168.2.6	185.221.216.77	EHLO 123716
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.623167992 CET	587	49754	185.221.216.77	192.168.2.6	250-uksrv3.websiteserverbox.com Hello 123716 [84.17.52.78] 250-SIZE 52428800 250-8BITMIME 250-PIPELINING 250-AUTH PLAIN LOGIN 250-STARTTLS 250 HELP
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.624363899 CET	49754	587	192.168.2.6	185.221.216.77	STARTTLS
Feb 25, 2021 11:43:31.683339119 CET	587	49754	185.221.216.77	192.168.2.6	220 TLS go ahead

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: invoicepdf.exe PID: 6812 Parent PID: 5916

General

Start time:	11:41:58
Start date:	25/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe'
Imagebase:	0x2c0000
File size:	788992 bytes
MD5 hash:	6F98206E6905F1F727E255D114D3C0AC
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.337569981.0000000002AB1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.337682468.0000000002ADC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000000.00000002.338574835.0000000003B5E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 6932 Parent PID: 6812

General

Start time:	11:42:01
Start date:	25/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\EuegmryBXVkd' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5A9C.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x1120000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 6984 Parent PID: 6932

General

Start time:	11:42:02
Start date:	25/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff61de10000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: invoicepdf.exe PID: 7052 Parent PID: 6812

General

Start time:	11:42:02
Start date:	25/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\invoicepdf.exe
Imagebase:	0x480000
File size:	788992 bytes
MD5 hash:	6F98206E6905F1F727E255D114D3C0AC
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000005.00000002.594160867.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000005.00000002.598124128.0000000002D9F000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 00000005.00000002.597890821.0000000002D11000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

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Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Tactics:	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of accounts on a system or within an environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Azure activity logs, Office 365 account logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading ...

Warning!

Analysis Report invoicepdf.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Agenttesla

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

Private

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping . The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Email gateway, File monitoring, Mail server, Office 365 trace logs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	API monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre