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Analysis Report TNT Delivery Document.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	TNT Delivery Document.exe
Analysis ID:	358381
MD5:	cbaf832b5ff679eb876d12d89d337231
SHA1:	b95263edbe7c523e7d51396093209c187919257b
SHA256:	0b725a075b7e61c937650e5f643b40858563fa2f296e37f7d75d60ab35c28a33
Tags:	exeGuLoader
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	96
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Potential malicious icon found

Yara detected GuLoader

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Executable has a suspicious name (potential lure to open the executable)

Hides threads from debuggers

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Tries to detect Any.run

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Writes to foreign memory regions

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

PE file contains strange resources

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Tries to load missing DLLs

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

TNT Delivery Document.exe (PID: 6288 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe' MD5: CBAF832B5FF679EB876D12D89D337231)

RegAsm.exe (PID: 6392 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe' MD5: 6FD7592411112729BF6B1F2F6C34899F)

conhost.exe (PID: 4932 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
Process Memory Space: RegAsm.exe PID: 6392	JoeSecurity_GuLoader	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: TNT Delivery Document.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 39%			Perma Link
Source: TNT Delivery Document.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 17%

Compliance:

Uses 32bit PE files

Show sources

Source: TNT Delivery Document.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

System Summary:

Potential malicious icon found

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Icon embedded in PE file: bad icon match: 20047c7c70f0e004

Executable has a suspicious name (potential lure to open the executable)

Show sources

Source: TNT Delivery Document.exe

Static file information: Suspicious name

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: TNT Delivery Document.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D037D NtSetInformationThread,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D03A3 NtSetInformationThread,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D1BCA NtWriteVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D4575 NtProtectVirtualMemory,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403C44
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403845
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403812
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_0040343E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_004034D5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_004038DC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_0040348C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403896
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_0040357E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403522
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403926
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_004031EE
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_004031A1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_004035B8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403650
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403604
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403A04
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_0040323B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_004032CC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_004036D7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403287
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403A8B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403693
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403B5E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_0040335F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403773
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403B11
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_0040331C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_0040373A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_004033F6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_004037FD
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00403BA1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_004033A3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_004037BE

Source: TNT Delivery Document.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: TNT Delivery Document.exe, 00000002.00000002.498209731.0000000000415000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameDitikeres4.exe vs TNT Delivery Document.exe
Source: TNT Delivery Document.exe, 00000002.00000002.535385883.00000000020A0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameuser32j% vs TNT Delivery Document.exe
Source: TNT Delivery Document.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameDitikeres4.exe vs TNT Delivery Document.exe

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Section loaded: sfc.dll

Source: TNT Delivery Document.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal96.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@4/0@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:4932:120:WilError_01

Source: TNT Delivery Document.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: TNT Delivery Document.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 39%
Source: TNT Delivery Document.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 17%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe'

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: Process Memory Space: RegAsm.exe PID: 6392, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00408812 pushad ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_004038DC push 0FE1DEC2h; retn E1DEh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_004080EF push es; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00405894 pushad ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00404DAE push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_00408B53 pushfd ; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D0236 pushad ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D4249 push eax; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D426B push eax; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D4271 push esi; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D4285 push ecx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D42A7 push esi; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D3F36 push es; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D3768 push es; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D377D push es; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D377F push es; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D03CB push FFFFFFE9h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D347A pushad ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D148B push edi; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D14F7 push edi; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D1507 push edi; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D151D push edi; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D1572 push edi; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Code function: 2_2_020D45AE push esi; iretd

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D1F67 second address: 00000000020D1F67 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007FABAC75B868h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d cmp al, al 0x0000001f cmp bh, 00000064h 0x00000022 pop ecx 0x00000023 test cx, AFDEh 0x00000028 add edi, edx 0x0000002a dec ecx 0x0000002b cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x0000002e jne 00007FABAC75B849h 0x00000030 push ecx 0x00000031 call 00007FABAC75B886h 0x00000036 call 00007FABAC75B878h 0x0000003b lfence 0x0000003e mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000044 lfence 0x00000047 ret 0x00000048 mov esi, edx 0x0000004a pushad 0x0000004b rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D218D second address: 00000000020D218D instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D47CB second address: 00000000020D47CB instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D33C7 second address: 00000000020D33C7 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D3489 second address: 00000000020D3489 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D1DFF second address: 00000000020D1DFF instructions:

Tries to detect Any.run

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\qga\qga.exe

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000E.00000002.494187486.0000000000D00000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\QEMU-GA\QEMU-GA.EXE

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D1F67 second address: 00000000020D1F67 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007FABAC75B868h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d cmp al, al 0x0000001f cmp bh, 00000064h 0x00000022 pop ecx 0x00000023 test cx, AFDEh 0x00000028 add edi, edx 0x0000002a dec ecx 0x0000002b cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x0000002e jne 00007FABAC75B849h 0x00000030 push ecx 0x00000031 call 00007FABAC75B886h 0x00000036 call 00007FABAC75B878h 0x0000003b lfence 0x0000003e mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000044 lfence 0x00000047 ret 0x00000048 mov esi, edx 0x0000004a pushad 0x0000004b rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D2074 second address: 00000000020D2074 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a ret 0x0000000b mov esi, edx 0x0000000d pushad 0x0000000e xor eax, eax 0x00000010 inc eax 0x00000011 cpuid 0x00000013 bt ecx, 1Fh 0x00000017 jc 00007FABACBD10D3h 0x0000001d popad 0x0000001e call 00007FABACBCF648h 0x00000023 lfence 0x00000026 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D218D second address: 00000000020D218D instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D47CB second address: 00000000020D47CB instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D0623 second address: 00000000020D067E instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b cmp ah, 00000013h 0x0000000e add edi, 04h 0x00000011 push edi 0x00000012 cmp dl, bl 0x00000014 jmp 00007FABAC75B89Ch 0x00000016 push 0003E800h 0x0000001b pushad 0x0000001c mov esi, 000000CAh 0x00000021 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D067E second address: 00000000020D3CFB instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 popad 0x00000003 add edi, 04h 0x00000006 cmp esi, F1A58B31h 0x0000000c push edi 0x0000000d push 00000003h 0x0000000f cmp eax, ebx 0x00000011 push 00000030h 0x00000013 cmp dl, dl 0x00000015 test cl, cl 0x00000017 push dword ptr [ebp+0000009Ch] 0x0000001d push eax 0x0000001e cmp ax, bx 0x00000021 call 00007FABACBD35DAh 0x00000026 call 00007FABACBCF625h 0x0000002b pop ebx 0x0000002c sub ebx, 05h 0x0000002f inc ebx 0x00000030 dec ebx 0x00000031 xor edx, edx 0x00000033 mov eax, ebx 0x00000035 mov ecx, 00000004h 0x0000003a div ecx 0x0000003c cmp edx, 00000000h 0x0000003f jne 00007FABACBCF611h 0x00000041 dec ebx 0x00000042 xor edx, edx 0x00000044 mov eax, ebx 0x00000046 mov ecx, 00000004h 0x0000004b div ecx 0x0000004d cmp edx, 00000000h 0x00000050 jne 00007FABACBCF611h 0x00000052 movd mm3, ebx 0x00000055 jmp 00007FABACBCF636h 0x00000057 cmp edx, eax 0x00000059 jmp 00007FABACBCF636h 0x0000005b test al, bl 0x0000005d pop eax 0x0000005e movd mm1, eax 0x00000061 call 00007FABACBCEC6Ch 0x00000066 pushad 0x00000067 lfence 0x0000006a rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D0825 second address: 00000000020D087F instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b cmp ah, FFFFFFE8h 0x0000000e mov ecx, dword ptr [ebp+1Ch] 0x00000011 cmp dl, bl 0x00000013 jmp 00007FABAC75B89Ch 0x00000015 mov edx, D034FC62h 0x0000001a pushad 0x0000001b mov esi, 00000077h 0x00000020 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D33C7 second address: 00000000020D33C7 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D3489 second address: 00000000020D3489 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020D1DFF second address: 00000000020D1DFF instructions:

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 14_2_00D00ACB rdtsc

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000E.00000002.494187486.0000000000D00000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Binary or memory string: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe

Anti Debugging:

Hides threads from debuggers

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe

Thread information set: HideFromDebugger

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe

Process queried: DebugPort

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 14_2_00D00ACB rdtsc

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 14_2_00D01E93 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 14_2_00D03E81 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 14_2_00D03EB0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 14_2_00D038A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 14_2_00D035D3 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 14_2_00D00FBA mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 14_2_00D0151D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Writes to foreign memory regions

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe

Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe base: D00000

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe'

Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000E.00000002.524161760.0000000001540000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: uProgram Manager
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000E.00000002.524161760.0000000001540000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000E.00000002.524161760.0000000001540000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000E.00000002.524161760.0000000001540000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 14_2_00D02220 cpuid

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	DLL Side-Loading1	Process Injection112	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion21	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery521	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	DLL Side-Loading1	Process Injection112	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion21	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	DLL Side-Loading1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	NTDS	System Information Discovery211	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
TNT Delivery Document.exe	39%	Virustotal		Browse
TNT Delivery Document.exe	17%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Generic

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	358381
Start date:	25.02.2021
Start time:	15:00:11
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 2s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	TNT Delivery Document.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	28
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal96.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@4/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 31.2% (good quality ratio 12.2%) Quality average: 27.4% Quality standard deviation: 37.1%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.965175275325986
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	TNT Delivery Document.exe
File size:	86016
MD5:	cbaf832b5ff679eb876d12d89d337231
SHA1:	b95263edbe7c523e7d51396093209c187919257b
SHA256:	0b725a075b7e61c937650e5f643b40858563fa2f296e37f7d75d60ab35c28a33
SHA512:	7945bb795afea268c020de30e1f57f2aac723e709c2dc97e8dc003c570d11257363ef82b922310c28732a836e551e1fe484962cf4179f09822baa896e1bdc327
SSDEEP:	768:sIuaeV9jhbnf4oEh/VgnruMFG8xJ43ptv37FTQDEJg/agbbf0WcmCp+5yS4AyW5X:KVFRQougnSoif35aMrFKg3AXKvitnf
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........#...B...B...B..L^...B...`...B...d...B..Rich.B..........PE..L...sP7`................. ...0...............0....@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	20047c7c70f0e004

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4014bc
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x60375073 [Thu Feb 25 07:23:31 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	3a6673b23cf9b03cd6b926c02ab84460

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 0040178Ch
call 00007FABACD2B173h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edi+56AD29B0h], cl
nop
and cl, byte ptr [edi-5Dh]
dec esi
or eax, 997B82A2h
rol byte ptr [eax], 1
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], ah
and byte ptr [eax], ah
push edi
imul esp, dword ptr [eax+ecx*2+61h], 62656E76h
popad
jnc 00007FABACD2B1F5h
imul ebp, dword ptr [esi+65h], 20007374h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec esp
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
or ebx, esp
or al, 05h
daa
and edx, ebp
test dword ptr [ecx+eax*4+34h], ecx
or dh, byte ptr [8092E160h]
fcom dword ptr [ecx+7Bh]
loope 00007FABACD2B1C9h
nop
dec byte ptr [esi-5Fh]
movsb
cmp al, cl
loope 00007FABACD2B1A8h
dec esp
test byte ptr [edx], bh
dec edi
lodsd
xor ebx, dword ptr [ecx-48EE309Ah]
or al, 00h
stosb
add byte ptr [eax-2Dh], ah
xchg eax, ebx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
pop ds
add al, byte ptr [eax]
add byte ptr [ebx+00h], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edi], al
add byte ptr [ebx+79h], dl
arpl word ptr [edi+6Eh], bp
jnc 00007FABACD2B183h
or eax, 4C000701h
dec ecx
dec esi
inc esp
inc ebp
dec esi
inc ebp

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x12554	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x15000	0xa48	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x120	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x11a60	0x12000	False	0.456271701389	data	6.50422226854	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x13000	0x11bc	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x15000	0xa48	0x1000	False	0.18798828125	data	2.2532231996	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x15918	0x130	data
RT_ICON	0x15630	0x2e8	data
RT_ICON	0x15508	0x128	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x154d8	0x30	data
RT_VERSION	0x15150	0x388	data	English	United States

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaHresultCheckObj, __vbaLenBstrB, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaObjSet, __vbaOnError, _adj_fdiv_m16i, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaVarTstLt, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaVarTstEq, _adj_fpatan, __vbaLateIdCallLd, __vbaRedim, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaI2Str, __vbaFPException, __vbaInStrVar, _CIlog, __vbaNew2, __vbaR8Str, __vbaInStr, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaFreeStrList, __vbaDerefAry1, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaI4Var, __vbaVarAdd, __vbaLateMemCall, __vbaVarDup, __vbaFpI4, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, __vbaCastObj, _allmul, __vbaLateIdSt, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeObj, __vbaFreeStr

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0409 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright 2016-2021 Proton Clear
InternalName	Ditikeres4
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	Proton Clear Inc.
LegalTrademarks	Copyright 2016-2021 Proton Clear
Comments	Proton Clear
ProductName	Proton Clear
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	ProtonClear
OriginalFilename	Ditikeres4.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: TNT Delivery Document.exe PID: 6288 Parent PID: 5712

General

Start time:	15:00:57
Start date:	25/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	86016 bytes
MD5 hash:	CBAF832B5FF679EB876D12D89D337231
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 6392 Parent PID: 6288

General

Start time:	15:02:03
Start date:	25/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\TNT Delivery Document.exe'
Imagebase:	0x8f0000
File size:	64616 bytes
MD5 hash:	6FD7592411112729BF6B1F2F6C34899F
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 4932 Parent PID: 6392

General

Start time:	15:02:04
Start date:	25/02/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff774ee0000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report TNT Delivery Document.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: TNT Delivery Document.exe PID: 6288 Parent PID: 5712

General

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 6392 Parent PID: 6288

General

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 4932 Parent PID: 6392

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis