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Analysis Report executable.4080.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	executable.4080.exe
Analysis ID:	358585
MD5:	9b6886089b69bc227e48accb63231096
SHA1:	3794deb61672f08dcd4997b18780d3a0b81340fb
SHA256:	f7c242fef888f7129e510c5a2c2a9a3ada69891304017e93a235cd3148d0dde4
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Citadel

Score:	80
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected Citadel

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking mutex)

Machine Learning detection for sample

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to create guard pages, often used to hinder reverse engineering and debugging

Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls

Contains functionality to enumerate network shares

Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user

Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Contains functionality to read the clipboard data

Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes

Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system

Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)

Detected potential crypto function

Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking a module file name)

Found evasive API chain checking for process token information

Found large amount of non-executed APIs

May initialize a security null descriptor

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

executable.4080.exe (PID: 5424 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe' MD5: 9B6886089B69BC227E48ACCB63231096)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
executable.4080.exe	JoeSecurity_Citadel	Yara detected Citadel	Joe Security

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.198011061.0000000000401000.00000020.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Citadel	Yara detected Citadel	Joe Security
00000000.00000000.197550286.0000000000401000.00000020.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Citadel	Yara detected Citadel	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: executable.4080.exe PID: 5424	JoeSecurity_Citadel	Yara detected Citadel	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: executable.4080.exe PID: 5424	citadel13xy	Citadel 1.5.x.y trojan banker	Jean-Philippe Teissier / @Jipe_	0x1b8a:$f: bc_remove 0x8786:$f: bc_remove 0x10a3b:$f: bc_remove 0x2298:$g: bc_add 0x8793:$g: bc_add 0x10a48:$g: bc_add 0x2987:$ggurl: http://www.google.com/webhp 0x4b85:$ggurl: http://www.google.com/webhp 0x7ed0:$ggurl: http://www.google.com/webhp 0x8022:$ggurl: http://www.google.com/webhp 0x10185:$ggurl: http://www.google.com/webhp 0x102d7:$ggurl: http://www.google.com/webhp

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
0.2.executable.4080.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_Citadel	Yara detected Citadel	Joe Security
0.0.executable.4080.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_Citadel	Yara detected Citadel	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: executable.4080.exe

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: executable.4080.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 84%			Perma Link
Source: executable.4080.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 82%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: executable.4080.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 0.1.executable.4080.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen2
Source: 0.2.executable.4080.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen
Source: 0.0.executable.4080.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen

Cryptography:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040B74D CryptAcquireContextW,CryptCreateHash,CryptHashData,CryptGetHashParam,CryptDestroyHash,CryptReleaseContext,

Compliance:

Uses 32bit PE files

Show sources

Source: executable.4080.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED

Spreading:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_00408C33 GetFileAttributesExW,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,SHGetFolderPathW,StrCmpNIW,FreeLibrary,ReadProcessMemory,NetUserEnum,NetUserGetInfo,NetApiBufferFree,NetApiBufferFree,SHGetFolderPathW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040B41D FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040B4D8 FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,

Networking:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040AC31 CreateFileW,HeapAlloc,WaitForSingleObject,InternetReadFile,WriteFile,FlushFileBuffers,CloseHandle,

Source: executable.4080.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.google.com/webhp
Source: executable.4080.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.google.com/webhpbccerts

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

Yara detected Citadel

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: executable.4080.exe, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.198011061.0000000000401000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000000.197550286.0000000000401000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: executable.4080.exe PID: 5424, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.executable.4080.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.0.executable.4080.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_00412C03 GetClipboardData,GlobalLock,EnterCriticalSection,LeaveCriticalSection,GlobalUnlock,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_00412AC1 EnterCriticalSection,GetTickCount,LeaveCriticalSection,GetKeyboardState,ToUnicode,TranslateMessage,

E-Banking Fraud:

Yara detected Citadel

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: executable.4080.exe, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.198011061.0000000000401000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000000.197550286.0000000000401000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: executable.4080.exe PID: 5424, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.executable.4080.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.0.executable.4080.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: Process Memory Space: executable.4080.exe PID: 5424, type: MEMORY

Matched rule: Citadel 1.5.x.y trojan banker Author: Jean-Philippe Teissier / @Jipe_

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040344C NtQueryInformationProcess,CloseHandle,NtCreateThread,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404CCE NtCreateUserProcess,NtCreateThread,LdrLoadDll,GetFileAttributesExW,HttpSendRequestW,HttpSendRequestA,HttpSendRequestExW,HttpSendRequestExA,InternetCloseHandle,InternetReadFile,InternetReadFileExA,InternetQueryDataAvailable,HttpQueryInfoA,closesocket,send,WSASend,TranslateMessage,GetClipboardData,PFXImportCertStore,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_004034F6 NtCreateUserProcess,GetProcessId,GetThreadContext,SetThreadContext,VirtualFreeEx,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040F61D LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,CreateProcessAsUserW,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_00415300 InitiateSystemShutdownExW,ExitWindowsEx,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040C570
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040B65A

Source: executable.4080.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED

Source: Process Memory Space: executable.4080.exe PID: 5424, type: MEMORY

Matched rule: citadel13xy date = 2013-01-12, filetype = memory, author = Jean-Philippe Teissier / @Jipe_, description = Citadel 1.5.x.y trojan banker, version = 1.0

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal80.bank.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041267A CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,CharLowerW,GetSystemTime,CertCloseStore,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_004127BF CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertDuplicateCertificateContext,CertDeleteCertificateFromStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertCloseStore,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040F3C3 GetCurrentThread,OpenThreadToken,OpenProcessToken,LookupPrivilegeValueW,AdjustTokenPrivileges,GetLastError,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040F36F CreateToolhelp32Snapshot,Thread32First,Thread32Next,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_0041000E CoCreateInstance,

Source: executable.4080.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: executable.4080.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 84%
Source: executable.4080.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 82%

Data Obfuscation:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_00411408 LoadLibraryA,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,LoadImageW,GetIconInfo,GetCursorPos,DrawIcon,lstrcmpiW,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_00408610 push ss; ret

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_00405841 HeapAlloc,HeapAlloc,GetPrivateProfileStringW,GetPrivateProfileStringW,HeapAlloc,StrStrIW,StrStrIW,StrStrIW,GetPrivateProfileStringW,GetPrivateProfileStringW,GetPrivateProfileStringW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040540A HeapAlloc,HeapAlloc,GetPrivateProfileStringW,GetPrivateProfileStringW,HeapAlloc,GetPrivateProfileStringW,GetPrivateProfileIntW,GetPrivateProfileStringW,GetPrivateProfileStringW,

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking mutex)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Evasive API call chain: CreateMutex,DecisionNodes,ExitProcess
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Evasive API call chain: CreateMutex,DecisionNodes,Sleep

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Evasive API call chain: GetModuleFileName,DecisionNodes,ExitProcess

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Check user administrative privileges: GetTokenInformation,DecisionNodes

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

API coverage: 2.1 %

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040B41D FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040B4D8 FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,

Anti Debugging:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_00404CCE NtCreateUserProcess,NtCreateThread,LdrLoadDll,GetFileAttributesExW,HttpSendRequestW,HttpSendRequestA,HttpSendRequestExW,HttpSendRequestExA,InternetCloseHandle,InternetReadFile,InternetReadFileExA,InternetQueryDataAvailable,HttpQueryInfoA,closesocket,send,WSASend,TranslateMessage,GetClipboardData,PFXImportCertStore,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_00404ACF VirtualProtectEx 000000FF,0774C084,0000001E,00407798,00407798

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040EBCB mov edx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040779B HeapCreate,GetProcessHeap,InitializeCriticalSection,WSAStartup,GetLengthSid,GetCurrentProcessId,

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040DB47 InitializeSecurityDescriptor,SetSecurityDescriptorDacl,ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW,GetSecurityDescriptorSacl,SetSecurityDescriptorSacl,LocalFree,

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_0041280F PFXImportCertStore,GetSystemTime,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_00411A9D GetTickCount,GetUserDefaultUILanguage,GetModuleFileNameW,GetUserNameExW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_00409921 GetTimeZoneInformation,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040F810 GetVersionExW,GetNativeSystemInfo,

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Source: executable.4080.exe

Binary or memory string: S:(ML;;NRNWNX;;;LW)

Remote Access Functionality:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040CC51 HeapAlloc,socket,bind,closesocket,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040C961 socket,bind,listen,closesocket,

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts1	Native API13	Valid Accounts1	Valid Accounts1	Valid Accounts1	Input Capture11	Network Share Discovery1	Remote Services	Input Capture11	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel2	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	System Shutdown/Reboot1
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Application Shimming1	Access Token Manipulation11	Disable or Modify Tools1	LSASS Memory	System Time Discovery2	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Ingress Tool Transfer1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Application Shimming1	Access Token Manipulation11	Security Account Manager	Security Software Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Clipboard Data1	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	NTDS	Process Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Install Root Certificate1	LSA Secrets	Account Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Software Packing1	Cached Domain Credentials	System Owner/User Discovery1	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Compile After Delivery	DCSync	File and Directory Discovery1	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Indicator Removal from Tools	Proc Filesystem	System Information Discovery3	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
executable.4080.exe	84%	Virustotal		Browse
executable.4080.exe	82%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Zeus
executable.4080.exe	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen
executable.4080.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
0.1.executable.4080.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen2	Download File
0.2.executable.4080.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen	Download File
0.0.executable.4080.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen	Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	358585
Start date:	25.02.2021
Start time:	21:50:45
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 31s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	executable.4080.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	2
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal80.bank.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 99.8% (good quality ratio 95.5%) Quality average: 86.7% Quality standard deviation: 24.9%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): svchost.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	MS-DOS executable
Entropy (8bit):	6.281631730900597
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.94% DOS Executable Borland Pascal 7.0x (2037/25) 0.02% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% VXD Driver (31/22) 0.00%
File name:	executable.4080.exe
File size:	118784
MD5:	9b6886089b69bc227e48accb63231096
SHA1:	3794deb61672f08dcd4997b18780d3a0b81340fb
SHA256:	f7c242fef888f7129e510c5a2c2a9a3ada69891304017e93a235cd3148d0dde4
SHA512:	7aec380c70624cd5336f23421aa2e2899d75b9b2098deb1dc8045ad27411919c032173662ccea468c68aa0702d8f9f373030eb821fea9e50e17759e8a9df9e7e
SSDEEP:	1536:D1fuot6xHoU2Qw6bQLsUPJEqz6ohfUOcgrZi0NwuMoVEcO9fipsdtAe1zIq3/VzD:hLIxHZRbMsZ/oh8/wlNhidtA8I8VzD
File Content Preview:	MZ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................PE..L......K.................~.

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x407f7f
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:	TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x4BDF10B5 [Mon May 3 18:06:45 2010 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	5
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	5
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	5
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	b14de3ce0d2ae45019008e4128864503

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push ebp
lea ebp, dword ptr [esp-78h]
sub esp, 00000298h
push ebx
xor ebx, ebx
push ebx
mov byte ptr [ebp+77h], bl
call 00007F0D3CB9271Ah
test al, al
je 00007F0D3CB93247h
push 00008007h
mov byte ptr [ebp+5Ch], bl
mov byte ptr [ebp+76h], 00000001h
call dword ptr [004011D4h]
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp+6Ch]
push eax
call dword ptr [004011D8h]
push eax
call dword ptr [00401260h]
cmp eax, ebx
je 00007F0D3CB92F4Ah
xor edx, edx
cmp dword ptr [ebp+6Ch], ebx
jle 00007F0D3CB92F3Ch
mov ecx, dword ptr [eax+edx*4]
cmp ecx, ebx
je 00007F0D3CB92F2Fh
cmp word ptr [ecx], 002Dh
jne 00007F0D3CB92F29h
movzx ecx, word ptr [ecx+02h]
cmp ecx, 66h
je 00007F0D3CB92F1Ch
cmp ecx, 6Eh
jne 00007F0D3CB92F1Bh
mov byte ptr [ebp+76h], bl
jmp 00007F0D3CB92F16h
mov byte ptr [ebp+5Ch], 00000001h
inc edx
cmp edx, dword ptr [ebp+6Ch]
jl 00007F0D3CB92EE8h
push eax
call dword ptr [004011ACh]
push esi
push edi
push dword ptr [0041932Ch]
xor eax, eax
lea esi, dword ptr [ebp+60h]
call 00007F0D3CB95F4Ch
test al, al
je 00007F0D3CB92F2Ch
mov ecx, dword ptr [ebp+60h]
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp+70h]
push eax
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp+6Ch]
push eax
mov eax, dword ptr [ebp+64h]
call 00007F0D3CB92BF3h
mov eax, esi
call 00007F0D3CB95FD6h
cmp dword ptr [ebp+70h], 000001E6h
jne 00007F0D3CB92FAEh
push dword ptr [ebp+6Ch]
call 00007F0D3CB93776h
test al, al
je 00007F0D3CB92F75h

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x177c4	0x104	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x1b000	0xd5c	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x3e8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x18000	0x18000	False	0.610392252604	data	6.56580621678	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x19000	0x2000	0x2000	False	0.568969726562	data	5.33094975112	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x1b000	0x2000	0x2000	False	0.363159179688	data	3.6749722075	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.dll	lstrcmpiA, LoadLibraryA, WTSGetActiveConsoleSessionId, SetFileAttributesW, GetCurrentThread, SetThreadPriority, GetEnvironmentVariableW, FileTimeToDosDateTime, GetTempFileNameW, HeapReAlloc, CreateMutexW, FindFirstFileW, GetNativeSystemInfo, SetEndOfFile, CreateProcessW, HeapAlloc, SystemTimeToFileTime, SetFilePointerEx, HeapFree, GetComputerNameW, GetTickCount, GetProcessHeap, IsBadReadPtr, SetFileTime, VirtualQueryEx, WriteFile, OpenProcess, Thread32First, WideCharToMultiByte, ReadProcessMemory, GetVersionExW, CreateFileW, OpenEventW, Thread32Next, ReadFile, GetTimeZoneInformation, MultiByteToWideChar, FlushFileBuffers, GetTempPathW, GetFileSizeEx, OpenMutexW, GetLastError, SetLastError, VirtualProtectEx, VirtualAllocEx, FindClose, RemoveDirectoryW, FindNextFileW, VirtualProtect, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, GetFileTime, ReleaseMutex, FileTimeToLocalFileTime, GetVolumeNameForVolumeMountPointW, DeleteFileW, GetFileInformationByHandle, MoveFileExW, GetUserDefaultUILanguage, GlobalLock, GlobalUnlock, CreateRemoteThread, Process32FirstW, Process32NextW, GetFileAttributesW, CreateDirectoryW, FreeLibrary, WriteProcessMemory, LocalFree, GetCurrentProcessId, HeapDestroy, DuplicateHandle, WaitForMultipleObjects, CreateEventW, GetModuleFileNameW, Sleep, VirtualFree, WaitForSingleObject, SetErrorMode, GetCommandLineW, ExitProcess, ExpandEnvironmentStringsW, GetPrivateProfileIntW, GetPrivateProfileStringW, lstrcmpiW, GetThreadContext, ResetEvent, GetProcAddress, GetModuleHandleW, SetEvent, CreateThread, GetSystemTime, GetLocalTime, CloseHandle, GetFileAttributesExW, GetProcessId, EnterCriticalSection, VirtualAlloc, LeaveCriticalSection, VirtualFreeEx, InitializeCriticalSection, SetThreadContext, HeapCreate
USER32.dll	GetCursorPos, GetIconInfo, DrawIcon, LoadImageW, CharLowerW, ToUnicode, GetKeyboardState, ExitWindowsEx, MsgWaitForMultipleObjects, GetClipboardData, TranslateMessage, CharToOemW, CharLowerBuffA, DispatchMessageW, CharUpperW, PeekMessageW, CharLowerA
ADVAPI32.dll	GetLengthSid, LookupPrivilegeValueW, SetNamedSecurityInfoW, SetSecurityDescriptorDacl, InitializeSecurityDescriptor, CreateProcessAsUserW, RegQueryValueExW, CryptReleaseContext, RegCreateKeyExW, GetTokenInformation, GetSidSubAuthorityCount, OpenThreadToken, CryptAcquireContextW, GetSidSubAuthority, OpenProcessToken, CryptGetHashParam, EqualSid, IsWellKnownSid, RegCloseKey, RegEnumKeyExW, RegOpenKeyExW, ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW, GetSecurityDescriptorSacl, SetSecurityDescriptorSacl, CryptDestroyHash, AdjustTokenPrivileges, ConvertSidToStringSidW, RegSetValueExW, CryptHashData, InitiateSystemShutdownExW, CryptCreateHash
SHLWAPI.dll	wvnsprintfW, PathIsDirectoryW, PathFindFileNameW, PathAddBackslashW, SHDeleteValueW, PathSkipRootW, SHDeleteKeyW, PathRemoveFileSpecW, UrlUnescapeA, StrStrIA, PathMatchSpecW, StrCmpNIA, wvnsprintfA, PathUnquoteSpacesW, PathIsURLW, PathQuoteSpacesW, StrCmpNIW, PathRemoveBackslashW, PathAddExtensionW, StrStrIW, PathCombineW, PathRenameExtensionW
SHELL32.dll	CommandLineToArgvW, SHGetFolderPathW, ShellExecuteW
Secur32.dll	GetUserNameExW
ole32.dll	StringFromGUID2, CLSIDFromString, CoUninitialize, CoCreateInstance, CoInitializeEx
WS2_32.dll	accept, listen, WSASend, WSASetLastError, socket, recv, bind, WSAEventSelect, WSAIoctl, connect, WSAAddressToStringW, WSAStartup, recvfrom, getaddrinfo, select, WSAGetLastError, getsockname, shutdown, setsockopt, sendto, getpeername, closesocket, send, freeaddrinfo
CRYPT32.dll	PFXImportCertStore, CertOpenSystemStoreW, CertCloseStore, CertEnumCertificatesInStore, CertDuplicateCertificateContext, PFXExportCertStoreEx, CertDeleteCertificateFromStore
WININET.dll	InternetCrackUrlA, HttpAddRequestHeadersW, InternetSetStatusCallbackW, GetUrlCacheEntryInfoW, InternetQueryOptionA, InternetSetOptionA, HttpSendRequestW, InternetReadFile, InternetReadFileExA, InternetQueryDataAvailable, HttpSendRequestExW, HttpSendRequestExA, InternetCloseHandle, InternetOpenA, HttpSendRequestA, HttpAddRequestHeadersA, HttpOpenRequestA, InternetConnectA, HttpQueryInfoA
OLEAUT32.dll	VariantInit, VariantClear, SysAllocString, SysFreeString
NETAPI32.dll	NetUserEnum, NetApiBufferFree, NetUserGetInfo

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: executable.4080.exe PID: 5424 Parent PID: 5524

General

Start time:	21:51:29
Start date:	25/02/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\executable.4080.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	118784 bytes
MD5 hash:	9B6886089B69BC227E48ACCB63231096
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_Citadel, Description: Yara detected Citadel, Source: 00000000.00000002.198011061.0000000000401000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_Citadel, Description: Yara detected Citadel, Source: 00000000.00000000.197550286.0000000000401000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Digital certificate logs, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping . The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	API monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.
Tactics:	Impact
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading ...

Warning!

Analysis Report executable.4080.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Initial Sample

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Cryptography:

Compliance:

Spreading:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Imports

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: executable.4080.exe PID: 5424 Parent PID: 5524

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis