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Analysis Report 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Analysis ID:	362120
MD5:	a67f05d542bcee462ecc03ae4d8195d6
SHA1:	eeb590aaa3c47851ae6f678c29aec2ba1b54df8f
SHA256:	1e96629ba4b537932150cc517455a0cfddcb7c35a4a0998d107643dc887b31c3
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

HawkEye MailPassView

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Detected HawkEye Rat

Found malware configuration

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Sigma detected: Suspicious Double Extension

Yara detected AntiVM_3

Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger

Yara detected MailPassView

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

.NET source code references suspicious native API functions

Changes the view of files in windows explorer (hidden files and folders)

Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Machine Learning detection for sample

Opens the same file many times (likely Sandbox evasion)

Sample uses process hollowing technique

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)

Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)

Writes to foreign memory regions

Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard

Contains functionality to detect virtual machines (SLDT)

Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

Enables debug privileges

Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)

Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)

Found potential string decryption / allocating functions

May infect USB drives

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

One or more processes crash

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Tries to resolve domain names, but no domain seems valid (expired dropper behavior)

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe (PID: 3468 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe' MD5: A67F05D542BCEE462ECC03AE4D8195D6)

5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe (PID: 5444 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe MD5: A67F05D542BCEE462ECC03AE4D8195D6)

vbc.exe (PID: 6732 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holderwb.txt' MD5: C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E)

WerFault.exe (PID: 6844 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6732 -s 516 MD5: 9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B)

vbc.exe (PID: 6724 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holdermail.txt' MD5: C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: HawkEye

{"Modules": ["mailpv", "WebBrowserPassView", "Mail PassView"], "Version": ""}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.784876138.0000000008720000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer	Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid	Arnim Rupp	0x101b:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df
00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	RAT_HawkEye	Detects HawkEye RAT	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x7b719:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0x7d917:$salt: 099u787978786 0x7bd32:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7cb85:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7d877:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7c11b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x7c13b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x7c05d:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7c075:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7c08b:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7d459:$string4: Keylog Records 0x7d771:$string4: Keylog Records 0x7d96f:$string5: do not script --> 0x7b701:$string6: \pidloc.txt 0x7b767:$string7: BSPLIT 0x7b777:$string7: BSPLIT
00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Hawkeye	detect HawkEye in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x7bd8a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7cbcb:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7cefa:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7d055:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7d1b8:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7d431:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7b918:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7cf4d:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7d0a4:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7d20b:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7ba39:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
00000007.00000002.275551658.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
00000008.00000002.262898420.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.778097540.00000000041A9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.778097540.00000000041A9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	RAT_HawkEye	Detects HawkEye RAT	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x4c4f29:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0x546f49:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0x4c7127:$salt: 099u787978786 0x549147:$salt: 099u787978786 0x4c5542:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x4c6395:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x4c7087:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x547562:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x5483b5:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x5490a7:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x4c592b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x4c594b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x54794b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x54796b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x4c586d:$string3: wallet.dat 0x4c5885:$string3: wallet.dat 0x4c589b:$string3: wallet.dat 0x54788d:$string3: wallet.dat 0x5478a5:$string3: wallet.dat 0x5478bb:$string3: wallet.dat 0x4c6c69:$string4: Keylog Records
00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Hawkeye	detect HawkEye in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x4c559a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x4c63db:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x4c670a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x4c6865:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x4c69c8:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x4c6c41:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x5475ba:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x5483fb:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x54872a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x548885:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x5489e8:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x548c61:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x4c5128:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x4c675d:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x4c68b4:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x4c6a1b:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x547148:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x54877d:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x5488d4:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x548a3b:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x4c5249:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
00000002.00000002.785047145.0000000008890000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer	Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid	Arnim Rupp	0x101b:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df
00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Hawkeye	detect HawkEye in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x37eb4:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x3a820:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x3aba0:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x3dd04:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x40a58:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x3796c:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x3a880:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x3ac00:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x40ab4:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x37a9a:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 5444	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 5444	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 5444	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: vbc.exe PID: 6732	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 3468	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 3468	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 3468	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 3468	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: vbc.exe PID: 6724	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
Click to see the 23 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
8.2.vbc.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.8890000.12.raw.unpack	HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer	Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid	Arnim Rupp	0x101b:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.8720000.11.raw.unpack	HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer	Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid	Arnim Rupp	0x101b:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.41a9930.7.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.41a9930.7.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
8.2.vbc.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
7.2.vbc.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack	HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer	Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid	Arnim Rupp	0x5623:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack	RAT_HawkEye	Detects HawkEye RAT	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x79b19:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0x7bd17:$salt: 099u787978786 0x7a132:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7af85:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7bc77:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7a51b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x7a53b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x7a45d:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7a475:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7a48b:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7b859:$string4: Keylog Records 0x7bb71:$string4: Keylog Records 0x7bd6f:$string5: do not script --> 0x79b01:$string6: \pidloc.txt 0x79b67:$string7: BSPLIT 0x79b77:$string7: BSPLIT
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack	Hawkeye	detect HawkEye in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x7a18a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7afcb:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7b2fa:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7b455:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7b5b8:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7b831:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x79d18:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7b34d:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7b4a4:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7b60b:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x79e39:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.unpack	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.41c1b50.8.unpack	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
7.2.vbc.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.unpack	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.2804130.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer	Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid	Arnim Rupp	0x7423:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	RAT_HawkEye	Detects HawkEye RAT	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x7b919:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0x7db17:$salt: 099u787978786 0x7bf32:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7cd85:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7da77:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7c31b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x7c33b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x7c25d:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7c275:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7c28b:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7d659:$string4: Keylog Records 0x7d971:$string4: Keylog Records 0x7db6f:$string5: do not script --> 0x7b901:$string6: \pidloc.txt 0x7b967:$string7: BSPLIT 0x7b977:$string7: BSPLIT
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	Hawkeye	detect HawkEye in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x7bf8a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7cdcb:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7d0fa:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7d255:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7d3b8:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7d631:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7bb18:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7d14d:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7d2a4:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7d40b:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7bc39:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack	HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer	Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid	Arnim Rupp	0x101b:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack	RAT_HawkEye	Detects HawkEye RAT	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x75511:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0x7770f:$salt: 099u787978786 0x75b2a:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7697d:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7766f:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x75f13:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x75f33:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x75e55:$string3: wallet.dat 0x75e6d:$string3: wallet.dat 0x75e83:$string3: wallet.dat 0x77251:$string4: Keylog Records 0x77569:$string4: Keylog Records 0x77767:$string5: do not script --> 0x754f9:$string6: \pidloc.txt 0x7555f:$string7: BSPLIT 0x7556f:$string7: BSPLIT
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack	Hawkeye	detect HawkEye in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x75b82:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x769c3:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x76cf2:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x76e4d:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x76fb0:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x77229:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x75710:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x76d45:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x76e9c:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x77003:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x75831:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.raw.unpack	RAT_HawkEye	Detects HawkEye RAT	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x1dca7:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0x1fea5:$salt: 099u787978786 0x1e2c0:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x1f113:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x1fe05:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x1e6a9:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x1e6c9:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x1e5eb:$string3: wallet.dat 0x1e603:$string3: wallet.dat 0x1e619:$string3: wallet.dat 0x1f9e7:$string4: Keylog Records 0x1fcff:$string4: Keylog Records 0x1fefd:$string5: do not script --> 0x1dc8f:$string6: \pidloc.txt 0x1dcf5:$string7: BSPLIT 0x1dd05:$string7: BSPLIT
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.raw.unpack	Hawkeye	detect HawkEye in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x1e318:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x1f159:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x1f488:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x1f5e3:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x1f746:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x1f9bf:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x1dea6:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x1f4db:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x1f632:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x1f799:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x1dfc7:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack	HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer	Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid	Arnim Rupp	0x7423:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df 0x89443:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack	RAT_HawkEye	Detects HawkEye RAT	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x7b919:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0xfd939:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0x7db17:$salt: 099u787978786 0xffb37:$salt: 099u787978786 0x7bf32:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7cd85:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7da77:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0xfdf52:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0xfeda5:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0xffa97:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7c31b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x7c33b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0xfe33b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0xfe35b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x7c25d:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7c275:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7c28b:$string3: wallet.dat 0xfe27d:$string3: wallet.dat 0xfe295:$string3: wallet.dat 0xfe2ab:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7d659:$string4: Keylog Records
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack	Hawkeye	detect HawkEye in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x7bf8a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7cdcb:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7d0fa:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7d255:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7d3b8:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7d631:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0xfdfaa:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0xfedeb:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0xff11a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0xff275:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0xff3d8:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0xff651:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x7bb18:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7d14d:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7d2a4:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7d40b:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0xfdb38:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0xff16d:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0xff2c4:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0xff42b:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x7bc39:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.41c1b50.8.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.41a9930.7.unpack	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack	RAT_HawkEye	Detects HawkEye RAT	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x73b0c:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0x75d0a:$salt: 099u787978786 0x74125:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x74f78:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x75c6a:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x7450e:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x7452e:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x74450:$string3: wallet.dat 0x74468:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7447e:$string3: wallet.dat 0x7584c:$string4: Keylog Records 0x75b64:$string4: Keylog Records 0x75d62:$string5: do not script --> 0x73af4:$string6: \pidloc.txt 0x73b5a:$string7: BSPLIT 0x73b6a:$string7: BSPLIT
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack	Hawkeye	detect HawkEye in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x7417d:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x74fbe:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x752ed:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x75448:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x755ab:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x75824:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x73d0b:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x75340:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x75497:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x755fe:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x73e2c:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack	HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer	Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid	Arnim Rupp	0x1b5ea3:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df 0x237ec3:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack	RAT_HawkEye	Detects HawkEye RAT	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x22a399:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0x2ac3b9:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0x22c597:$salt: 099u787978786 0x2ae5b7:$salt: 099u787978786 0x22a9b2:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x22b805:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x22c4f7:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x2ac9d2:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x2ad825:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x2ae517:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x22ad9b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x22adbb:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x2acdbb:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x2acddb:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x22acdd:$string3: wallet.dat 0x22acf5:$string3: wallet.dat 0x22ad0b:$string3: wallet.dat 0x2accfd:$string3: wallet.dat 0x2acd15:$string3: wallet.dat 0x2acd2b:$string3: wallet.dat 0x22c0d9:$string4: Keylog Records
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack	Hawkeye	detect HawkEye in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x22aa0a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x22b84b:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x22bb7a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x22bcd5:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x22be38:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x22c0b1:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x2aca2a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x2ad86b:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x2adb9a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x2adcf5:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x2ade58:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x2ae0d1:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x22a598:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x22bbcd:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x22bd24:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x22be8b:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x2ac5b8:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x2adbed:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x2add44:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x2adeab:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x22a6b9:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack	HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer	Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid	Arnim Rupp	0x3ade83:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df 0x42fea3:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack	RAT_HawkEye	Detects HawkEye RAT	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x422379:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0x4a4399:$key: HawkEyeKeylogger 0x424577:$salt: 099u787978786 0x4a6597:$salt: 099u787978786 0x422992:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x4237e5:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x4244d7:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x4a49b2:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x4a5805:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x4a64f7:$string1: HawkEye_Keylogger 0x422d7b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x422d9b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x4a4d9b:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x4a4dbb:$string2: holdermail.txt 0x422cbd:$string3: wallet.dat 0x422cd5:$string3: wallet.dat 0x422ceb:$string3: wallet.dat 0x4a4cdd:$string3: wallet.dat 0x4a4cf5:$string3: wallet.dat 0x4a4d0b:$string3: wallet.dat 0x4240b9:$string4: Keylog Records
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_MailPassView	Yara detected MailPassView	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView	Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool	Joe Security
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack	Hawkeye	detect HawkEye in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x4229ea:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x42382b:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x423b5a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x423cb5:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x423e18:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x424091:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x4a4a0a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x4a584b:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x4a5b7a:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x4a5cd5:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x4a5e38:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x4a60b1:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x422578:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x423bad:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x423d04:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x423e6b:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x4a4598:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x4a5bcd:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x4a5d24:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x4a5e8b:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x422699:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.31cb310.6.raw.unpack	HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer	Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid	Arnim Rupp	0x101b:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df 0x14ca7:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.31cb310.6.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_HawkEye	Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger	Joe Security
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.31cb310.6.raw.unpack	Hawkeye	detect HawkEye in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0xdba4:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x10510:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x10890:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x139f4:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0x16748:$hawkstr1: HawkEye Keylogger 0xd65c:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x10570:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x108f0:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0x167a4:$hawkstr2: Dear HawkEye Customers! 0xd78a:$hawkstr3: HawkEye Logger Details:
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.31def9c.5.raw.unpack	HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer	Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid	Arnim Rupp	0x101b:$typelibguid0: 8fcd4931-91a2-4e18-849b-70de34ab75df
Click to see the 58 entries

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: Suspicious Double Extension

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth (rule), @blu3_team (idea): Data: Command: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, CommandLine: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, ParentProcessId: 3468, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, ProcessId: 5444

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.5444.2.memstr

Malware Configuration Extractor: HawkEye {"Modules": ["mailpv", "WebBrowserPassView", "Mail PassView"], "Version": ""}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 23%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/AD.MExecute.lzrac
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: SPR/Tool.MailPassView.473
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Inject.vcoldi

Compliance:

Uses 32bit PE files

Show sources

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Contains modern PE file flags such as dynamic base (ASLR) or NX

Show sources

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Binary contains paths to debug symbols

Show sources

Source:	Binary string: C:\Users\Jovan\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\Stealer\CMemoryExecute\CMemoryExecute\obj\Release\CMemoryExecute.pdb source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: f:\Projects\VS2005\mailpv\Release\mailpv.pdb source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, vbc.exe
Source:	Binary string: f:\Projects\VS2005\WebBrowserPassView\Release\WebBrowserPassView.pdb source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, vbc.exe

Spreading:

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: autorun.inf
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: [autorun]
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: autorun.inf
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: [autorun]

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00408441 FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,wcslen,wcslen,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00407E0E FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 8_2_00406EC3 FindFirstFileA,FindNextFileA,strlen,strlen,

Software Vulnerabilities:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Code function: 4x nop then lea esp, dword ptr [ebp-08h]

Networking:

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: query: 203.215.12.0.in-addr.arpa replaycode: Name error (3)

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, vbc.exe, 00000007.00000002.275551658.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: @nss3.dllSOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\seamonkey.exe%programfiles%\Sea MonkeySOFTWARE\Mozillamozilla%s\binPathToExe%programfiles%\Mozilla FirefoxSELECT id, hostname, httpRealm, formSubmitURL, usernameField, passwordField, encryptedUsername, encryptedPassword FROM moz_logins.---signons.txtsignons2.txtsignons3.txtsignons.sqlitenetmsg.dllUnknown Error\Error %d: %seditkernel32.dll... open %2.2X %s (%s)Microsoft_WinInetMicrosoft_WinInet_u7@dllhost.exetaskhost.exetaskhostex.exebhvContainersContainerIdNameHistoryContainer_%I64dAccessCountCreationTimeExpiryTimeAccessedTimeModifiedTimeUrlEntryIDvisited:Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV01.datMicrosoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV24.dat0123456789ABCDEFURL index.datSoftware\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\IntelliForms\Storage2https://www.google.com/accounts/serviceloginhttp://www.facebook.com/https://login.yahoo.com/config/login equals www.facebook.com (Facebook)
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, vbc.exe, 00000007.00000002.275551658.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: @nss3.dllSOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\seamonkey.exe%programfiles%\Sea MonkeySOFTWARE\Mozillamozilla%s\binPathToExe%programfiles%\Mozilla FirefoxSELECT id, hostname, httpRealm, formSubmitURL, usernameField, passwordField, encryptedUsername, encryptedPassword FROM moz_logins.---signons.txtsignons2.txtsignons3.txtsignons.sqlitenetmsg.dllUnknown Error\Error %d: %seditkernel32.dll... open %2.2X %s (%s)Microsoft_WinInetMicrosoft_WinInet_u7@dllhost.exetaskhost.exetaskhostex.exebhvContainersContainerIdNameHistoryContainer_%I64dAccessCountCreationTimeExpiryTimeAccessedTimeModifiedTimeUrlEntryIDvisited:Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV01.datMicrosoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV24.dat0123456789ABCDEFURL index.datSoftware\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\IntelliForms\Storage2https://www.google.com/accounts/serviceloginhttp://www.facebook.com/https://login.yahoo.com/config/login equals www.yahoo.com (Yahoo)
Source: vbc.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.facebook.com/ equals www.facebook.com (Facebook)

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: 203.215.12.0.in-addr.arpa

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.comodoca.com/COMODOCodeSigningCA2.crl0r
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224554700.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://en.w
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.comodoca.com0
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://whatismyipaddress.com/-
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.243737730.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.agfamonotype.0
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224185573.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.com
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.223882735.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.com/
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comTC
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224185573.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comTC/
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comTC1
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224554700.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comTC3
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comadeh
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224323142.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comark
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224554700.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comb
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.227770906.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comf
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comghtv
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224554700.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comht
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comies
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comitk
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.commpa
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comn
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.comsof
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.243602370.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.243672472.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.229567284.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.229591196.0000000006278000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/O
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.231534012.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.231609808.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers:
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.232516116.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersW
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.232557212.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersr
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.233214847.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designerst
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.772908055.00000000014F7000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.coma
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.772908055.00000000014F7000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comceTF
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.772908055.00000000014F7000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.come.com
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222841537.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.223199362.0000000006265000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn&
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.223388192.0000000006265000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/X
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222841537.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cnO
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.223199362.0000000006265000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cnr-c
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.235768370.0000000006278000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.235768370.0000000006278000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/9
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.236539415.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htmR
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222340087.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222340087.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.krF
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222340087.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.krny
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.238156321.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.monotype.
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.234952955.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.monotype.-
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.240555318.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.monotype.t
Source: vbc.exe, vbc.exe, 00000008.00000002.262898420.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.nirsoft.net/
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.227490771.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.227490771.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com8
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222273989.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222652479.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.krn
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222340087.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.krn-u
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.site.com/logs.php
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn
Source: vbc.exe	String found in binary or memory: https://login.yahoo.com/config/login
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.0/css/bootstrap.min.css
Source: vbc.exe	String found in binary or memory: https://www.google.com/accounts/servicelogin

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 5444, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 3468, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.31cb310.6.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)

Show sources

Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, Form1.cs

.Net Code: HookKeyboard

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Code function: 7_2_0040D674 OpenClipboard,GetLastError,DeleteFileW,

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detects HawkEye RAT Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect HawkEye in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detects HawkEye RAT Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect HawkEye in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect HawkEye in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects HawkEye RAT Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect HawkEye in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects HawkEye RAT Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect HawkEye in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects HawkEye RAT Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect HawkEye in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects HawkEye RAT Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect HawkEye in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects HawkEye RAT Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect HawkEye in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects HawkEye RAT Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect HawkEye in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects HawkEye RAT Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect HawkEye in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects HawkEye RAT Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect HawkEye in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.31cb310.6.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect HawkEye in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_0267E330
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_0267C690
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_02679D78
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_0151B29C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_0151C310
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_0151B290
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_015199D0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_0151DFD0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_073DB4E0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_073DEEC8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_073DBDB0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_073DB198
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_073D0006
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00404419
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00404516
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00413538
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_004145A1
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_0040E639
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_004337AF
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_004399B1
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_0043DAE7
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00405CF6
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00403F85
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00411F99
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 8_2_00404DDB
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 8_2_0040BD8A
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 8_2_00404E4C
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 8_2_00404EBD
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 8_2_00404F4E

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: String function: 00413F8E appears 66 times
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: String function: 00413E2D appears 34 times
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: String function: 00442A90 appears 36 times
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: String function: 004141D6 appears 88 times
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: String function: 00411538 appears 35 times

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6732 -s 516

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.223255879.0000000005980000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameLegacyPathHandling.dllN vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAsyncState.dllF vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamePhulli.exe0 vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000000.210356525.0000000000342000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameNotSupportedException.exe6 vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameCMemoryExecute.dll@ vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameWebBrowserPassView.exeF vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemailpv.exe< vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000000.216226088.0000000000CA2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameNotSupportedException.exe6 vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameCMemoryExecute.dll@ vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameWebBrowserPassView.exeF vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemailpv.exe< vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.768924491.0000000000482000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamePhulli.exe0 vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameNotSupportedException.exe6 vs 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 00000002.00000002.784876138.0000000008720000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer date = 2020-12-29, author = Arnim Rupp, description = Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, reference = https://github.com/malwares/Stealer, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: RAT_HawkEye date = 01.06.2015, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = KeyLogger, description = Detects HawkEye RAT, reference = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/HawkEye
Source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Hawkeye author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect HawkEye in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: RAT_HawkEye date = 01.06.2015, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = KeyLogger, description = Detects HawkEye RAT, reference = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/HawkEye
Source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Hawkeye author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect HawkEye in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000002.00000002.785047145.0000000008890000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer date = 2020-12-29, author = Arnim Rupp, description = Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, reference = https://github.com/malwares/Stealer, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Hawkeye author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect HawkEye in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.8890000.12.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer date = 2020-12-29, author = Arnim Rupp, description = Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, reference = https://github.com/malwares/Stealer, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.8720000.11.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer date = 2020-12-29, author = Arnim Rupp, description = Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, reference = https://github.com/malwares/Stealer, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer date = 2020-12-29, author = Arnim Rupp, description = Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, reference = https://github.com/malwares/Stealer, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: RAT_HawkEye date = 01.06.2015, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = KeyLogger, description = Detects HawkEye RAT, reference = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/HawkEye
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Hawkeye author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect HawkEye in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer date = 2020-12-29, author = Arnim Rupp, description = Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, reference = https://github.com/malwares/Stealer, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: RAT_HawkEye date = 01.06.2015, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = KeyLogger, description = Detects HawkEye RAT, reference = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/HawkEye
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Hawkeye author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect HawkEye in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer date = 2020-12-29, author = Arnim Rupp, description = Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, reference = https://github.com/malwares/Stealer, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: RAT_HawkEye date = 01.06.2015, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = KeyLogger, description = Detects HawkEye RAT, reference = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/HawkEye
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Hawkeye author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect HawkEye in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: RAT_HawkEye date = 01.06.2015, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = KeyLogger, description = Detects HawkEye RAT, reference = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/HawkEye
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Hawkeye author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect HawkEye in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer date = 2020-12-29, author = Arnim Rupp, description = Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, reference = https://github.com/malwares/Stealer, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: RAT_HawkEye date = 01.06.2015, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = KeyLogger, description = Detects HawkEye RAT, reference = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/HawkEye
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Hawkeye author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect HawkEye in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: RAT_HawkEye date = 01.06.2015, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = KeyLogger, description = Detects HawkEye RAT, reference = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/HawkEye
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Hawkeye author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect HawkEye in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer date = 2020-12-29, author = Arnim Rupp, description = Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, reference = https://github.com/malwares/Stealer, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: RAT_HawkEye date = 01.06.2015, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = KeyLogger, description = Detects HawkEye RAT, reference = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/HawkEye
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Hawkeye author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect HawkEye in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer date = 2020-12-29, author = Arnim Rupp, description = Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, reference = https://github.com/malwares/Stealer, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: RAT_HawkEye date = 01.06.2015, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = KeyLogger, description = Detects HawkEye RAT, reference = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/HawkEye
Source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Hawkeye author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect HawkEye in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.31cb310.6.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer date = 2020-12-29, author = Arnim Rupp, description = Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, reference = https://github.com/malwares/Stealer, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.31cb310.6.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Hawkeye author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect HawkEye in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.31def9c.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer date = 2020-12-29, author = Arnim Rupp, description = Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, reference = https://github.com/malwares/Stealer, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, Form1.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'CreateDecryptor', 'TransformFinalBlock'
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, Form1.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'CreateDecryptor', 'TransformFinalBlock'
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, Form1.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'CreateDecryptor', 'TransformFinalBlock'
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, Form1.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'CreateDecryptor'

Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, Form1.cs

Base64 encoded string: 'xZv2KTjDOGwMPewlL06/2/+cBh+3YNzZLNYqWwxyouAodILYLJV9xZ9CGhDaO0jH', 'G9O9EXxYbTKbu/JIqZ4FXWAEsGCT7RJ+/SHmPiE44HoRMOAUDNTRY4dL0xxXj+PX', 'yFzOCZnSHgqZgbtRiX7zTTL1Qt6D+8cCFAWN8MP9eKKls7OaJo1TF2n4j++JkQX9', 'O6ZQ7J5ocLxf6RhQQpNSk/JzuZPUi9E0JuztOnaE/Qd705fOtAkyZW1GYthg8J6YkNuszS5M9pYlCk2wrogMRg==', 'PN4TW3peZ3UeXi7asDB56E4dMEf6JrdkxXNUlrUjLlWcjHK1wZ5CpLZZKB/ocuFWy9Kw0Q8tIc1Qv7OEgqzD+w=='

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.phis.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@8/7@1/1

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Code function: 7_2_00415AFD GetLastError,FormatMessageW,FormatMessageA,LocalFree,free,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Code function: 7_2_00415F87 GetDiskFreeSpaceW,GetDiskFreeSpaceA,free,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Code function: 7_2_00411196 CreateToolhelp32Snapshot,memset,Process32FirstW,OpenProcess,memset,GetModuleHandleW,GetProcAddress,CloseHandle,free,Process32NextW,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Code function: 7_2_00411EF8 FindResourceW,SizeofResource,LoadResource,LockResource,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.log

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\WERReportingForProcess6732

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holdermail.txt

Jump to behavior

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, vbc.exe	Binary or memory string: SELECT 'INSERT INTO vacuum_db.' \|\| quote(name) \|\| ' SELECT * FROM main.' \|\| quote(name) \|\| ';' FROM vacuum_db.sqlite_master WHERE name=='sqlite_sequence';
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, vbc.exe	Binary or memory string: INSERT INTO %Q.%s VALUES('index',%Q,%Q,#%d,%Q);
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, vbc.exe, 00000007.00000002.275551658.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: UPDATE %Q.%s SET sql = CASE WHEN type = 'trigger' THEN sqlite_rename_trigger(sql, %Q)ELSE sqlite_rename_table(sql, %Q) END, tbl_name = %Q, name = CASE WHEN type='table' THEN %Q WHEN name LIKE 'sqlite_autoindex%%' AND type='index' THEN 'sqlite_autoindex_' \|\| %Q \|\| substr(name,%d+18) ELSE name END WHERE tbl_name=%Q AND (type='table' OR type='index' OR type='trigger');
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, vbc.exe	Binary or memory string: SELECT 'INSERT INTO vacuum_db.' \|\| quote(name) \|\| ' SELECT * FROM main.' \|\| quote(name) \|\| ';'FROM main.sqlite_master WHERE type = 'table' AND name!='sqlite_sequence' AND rootpage>0
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: INSERT INTO Itens_Aluguel VALUES(@aluguelID, @aviaoID, @validade);
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, vbc.exe	Binary or memory string: UPDATE "%w".%s SET sql = sqlite_rename_parent(sql, %Q, %Q) WHERE %s;
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, vbc.exe	Binary or memory string: UPDATE sqlite_temp_master SET sql = sqlite_rename_trigger(sql, %Q), tbl_name = %Q WHERE %s;
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Insert into Clientes values (@nome, @cpf, @rg, @cidade, @endereco, @uf, @telefone);
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, vbc.exe	Binary or memory string: SELECT 'DELETE FROM vacuum_db.' \|\| quote(name) \|\| ';' FROM vacuum_db.sqlite_master WHERE name='sqlite_sequence'

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 23%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holderwb.txt'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holdermail.txt'
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6732 -s 516
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holderwb.txt'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holdermail.txt'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{CF4CC405-E2C5-4DDD-B3CE-5E7582D8C9FA}\InprocServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\OMI Account Manager\Accounts

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Static PE information: Virtual size of .text is bigger than: 0x100000

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Static file information: File size 1057280 > 1048576

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Static PE information: Raw size of .text is bigger than: 0x100000 < 0x101800

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: C:\Users\Jovan\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\Stealer\CMemoryExecute\CMemoryExecute\obj\Release\CMemoryExecute.pdb source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: f:\Projects\VS2005\mailpv\Release\mailpv.pdb source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, vbc.exe
Source:	Binary string: f:\Projects\VS2005\WebBrowserPassView\Release\WebBrowserPassView.pdb source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, vbc.exe

Data Obfuscation:

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Show sources

Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, Form1.cs	.Net Code: IsDotNet System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, Form1.cs	.Net Code: run System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, Form1.cs	.Net Code: stealMail System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, Form1.cs	.Net Code: stealWebroswers System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Code function: 7_2_004121C3 LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_0267881C push 5F5E5B6Bh; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Code function: 2_2_0151E672 push esp; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00442871 push ecx; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00442A90 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00442A90 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00446E54 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 8_2_00411879 push ecx; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 8_2_004118A0 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 8_2_004118A0 push eax; ret

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.64304839327

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Changes the view of files in windows explorer (hidden files and folders)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Key value created or modified: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced Hidden

Jump to behavior

Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)

Show sources

Source: Possible double extension: pdf.exe

Static PE information: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Code function: 7_2_00441975 memset,wcscpy,memset,wcscpy,wcscat,wcscpy,wcscat,wcscpy,wcscat,GetModuleHandleW,LoadLibraryExW,LoadLibraryW,LoadLibraryW,LoadLibraryW,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: FAILCRITICALERRORS \| NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM_3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 3468, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.2804130.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Opens the same file many times (likely Sandbox evasion)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holderwb.txt count: 306885

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: KERNEL32.DLL.WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Code function: 0_2_003448FF sldt word ptr [eax]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 180000

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe TID: 2168	Thread sleep time: -100483s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe TID: 4228	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe TID: 4952	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe TID: 6540	Thread sleep time: -120000s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe TID: 6544	Thread sleep time: -140000s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe TID: 6928	Thread sleep time: -180000s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00408441 FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,wcslen,wcslen,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 7_2_00407E0E FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: 8_2_00406EC3 FindFirstFileA,FindNextFileA,strlen,strlen,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Code function: 7_2_004161B0 memset,GetSystemInfo,

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPathJC:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWAREDSOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Anti Debugging:

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Process queried: DebugPort

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Code function: 7_2_004121C3 LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

.NET source code references suspicious native API functions

Show sources

Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, Form1.cs	Reference to suspicious API methods: ('GetAsyncKeyState', 'GetAsyncKeyState@user32')
Source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, RunPE.cs	Reference to suspicious API methods: ('ReadProcessMemory', 'ReadProcessMemory@kernel32'), ('WriteProcessMemory', 'WriteProcessMemory@kernel32'), ('VirtualProtectEx', 'VirtualProtectEx@kernel32'), ('VirtualAllocEx', 'VirtualAllocEx@kernel32')

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Sample uses process hollowing technique

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Section unmapped: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base address: 400000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Section unmapped: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base address: 400000

Writes to foreign memory regions

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base: 400000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base: 401000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base: 412000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base: 416000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base: 418000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base: 400000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base: 401000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base: 443000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base: 44F000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe base: 452000

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holderwb.txt'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holdermail.txt'

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.773337161.0000000001AC0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.773337161.0000000001AC0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.773337161.0000000001AC0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.773337161.0000000001AC0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Runtime.Remoting\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Runtime.Remoting.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Runtime.Remoting\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Runtime.Remoting.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arial.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariali.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariblk.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\bahnschrift.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BERNHC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_PSTC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRITANIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BROADW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRUSHSCI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTAUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CHILLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COLONNA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COOPBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FTLTLT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARLOWSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARNGTON.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JOKERMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\KUNSTLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITED.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LCALLIG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAGNETOB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MATURASC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MOD20.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGENG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGSOL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OLDENGL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ONYX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PARCHM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PLAYBILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\POORICH.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAVIE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\INFROMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SHOWG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SNAP____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\STENCIL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VINERITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VIVALDII.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VLADIMIR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LATINWD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCM_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCMI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCB_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCBI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCM____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCRIPTBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCCB___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAGE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTILI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTIBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PER_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PALSCRI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OCRAEXT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAIAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEBO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\IMPRISHA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HATTEN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDYSTO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIL_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLSNECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIGI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABKIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FORTE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FELIXTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASMD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASLGHT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASDEMI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ENGR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCEDSCR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CURLZ___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENSCBK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CASTELAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_R.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_I.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_B.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCBLKAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARLRDBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BSSYM7.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSPCL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTEXTRA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\marlett.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Management.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Code function: 7_2_0041604B GetSystemTime,memcpy,GetCurrentProcessId,memcpy,GetTickCount,memcpy,QueryPerformanceCounter,memcpy,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Code function: 8_2_0040724C memset,memset,memset,memset,GetComputerNameA,GetUserNameA,MultiByteToWideChar,MultiByteToWideChar,MultiByteToWideChar,strlen,strlen,memcpy,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe

Code function: 7_2_00407674 GetVersionExW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT * FROM AntivirusProduct
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT * FROM FirewallProduct

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 5444, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 3468, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.31cb310.6.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Yara detected MailPassView

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000008.00000002.262898420.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.778097540.00000000041A9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 5444, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 3468, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: vbc.exe PID: 6724, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 8.2.vbc.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.41a9930.7.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 8.2.vbc.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.41a9930.7.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Google\Google Talk\Accounts
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Dynamic Salt

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\OMI Account Manager\Accounts
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\IncrediMail\Identities
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows Live Mail

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: strcpy,strcpy,strcpy,strcpy,RegCloseKey, PopPassword
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: strcpy,strcpy,strcpy,strcpy,RegCloseKey, SMTPPassword
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe	Code function: ESMTPPassword

Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.275551658.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.778097540.00000000041A9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 5444, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: vbc.exe PID: 6732, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 3468, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.41a9930.7.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.vbc.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.41c1b50.8.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.vbc.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.41c1b50.8.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Remote Access Functionality:

Detected HawkEye Rat

Show sources

Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: \pidloc.txt!HawkEyeKeylogger
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: Installed Firewall: MHawkEye_Keylogger_Execution_Confirmed_.txtUHawkEye Keylogger \| Execution Confirmed \|
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: ==============================================EHawkEye_Keylogger_Stealer_Records_MHawkEye Keylogger \| Stealer Records \|
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: .jpegCHawkEye_Keylogger_Keylog_Records_
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: HawkEyeKeylogger
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: l&HawkEye_Keylogger_Execution_Confirmed_
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: l"HawkEye_Keylogger_Stealer_Records_
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: \pidloc.txt!HawkEyeKeylogger
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: Installed Firewall: MHawkEye_Keylogger_Execution_Confirmed_.txtUHawkEye Keylogger \| Execution Confirmed \|
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: ==============================================EHawkEye_Keylogger_Stealer_Records_MHawkEye Keylogger \| Stealer Records \|
Source: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: .jpegCHawkEye_Keylogger_Keylog_Records_

Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 5444, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 3468, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.408208.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.45fa72.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.409c0d.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3a73b90.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.387bbb0.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.31cb310.6.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Replication Through Removable Media1	Windows Management Instrumentation1	Application Shimming1	Application Shimming1	Disable or Modify Tools1	Input Capture1	System Time Discovery1	Replication Through Removable Media1	Archive Collected Data11	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Native API11	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection312	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information11	Credentials in Registry2	Peripheral Device Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Email Collection1	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Remote Access Software1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	Shared Modules1	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information141	Credentials In Files1	Account Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Input Capture1	Automated Exfiltration	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Software Packing13	NTDS	File and Directory Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data1	Scheduled Transfer	Application Layer Protocol1	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Masquerading11	LSA Secrets	System Information Discovery17	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion14	Cached Domain Credentials	Security Software Discovery121	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Process Injection312	DCSync	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion14	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Hidden Files and Directories1	Proc Filesystem	Process Discovery3	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue
Exploit Public-Facing Application	PowerShell	At (Linux)	At (Linux)	Masquerading	/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow	System Owner/User Discovery1	Software Deployment Tools	Data Staged	Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Web Protocols	Rogue Cellular Base Station		Data Destruction
Supply Chain Compromise	AppleScript	At (Windows)	At (Windows)	Invalid Code Signature	Network Sniffing	Remote System Discovery1	Taint Shared Content	Local Data Staging	Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol	File Transfer Protocols			Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	24%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.AgentTesla
5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
7.2.vbc.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1125438	Download File
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/AD.MExecute.lzrac	Download File
2.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	SPR/Tool.MailPassView.473	Download File
0.2.5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.3c22610.5.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Inject.vcoldi	Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnO	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comadeh	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.com/	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comceTF	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnr-c	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.monotype.t	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/X	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comht	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comTC1	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comTC/	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comitk	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.krny	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comTC3	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htmR	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.commpa	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comb	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comf	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comsof	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comTC	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comTC	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comTC	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.krn	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.fontbureau.coma	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.coma	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.coma	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.come.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.come.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.come.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com8	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://en.w	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://en.w	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://en.w	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comn	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.krF	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comghtv	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.monotype.	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.monotype.	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.monotype.	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.monotype.-	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/9	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.agfamonotype.0	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.krn-u	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comark	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn&	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.comies	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
203.215.12.0.in-addr.arpa	unknown	unknown	false		unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnO	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222841537.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.carterandcone.comadeh	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersW	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.232516116.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.tiro.com	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.com/	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.223882735.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.243602370.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.243672472.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/O	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.229591196.0000000006278000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222340087.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.com	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224185573.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comceTF	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.772908055.00000000014F7000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.0/css/bootstrap.min.css	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnr-c	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.223199362.0000000006265000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.monotype.t	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.240555318.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/X	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.223388192.0000000006265000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.comht	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224554700.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://whatismyipaddress.com/-	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.carterandcone.comTC1	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.comTC/	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224185573.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.comitk	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://login.yahoo.com/config/login	vbc.exe	false		high
http://www.fonts.com	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.goodfont.co.krny	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222340087.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222273989.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.site.com/logs.php	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.carterandcone.comTC3	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224554700.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.nirsoft.net/	vbc.exe, vbc.exe, 00000008.00000002.262898420.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htmR	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.236539415.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sakkal.com	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.227490771.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.commpa	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designerst	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.233214847.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersr	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.232557212.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.carterandcone.comb	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224554700.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.235768370.0000000006278000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.comf	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.227770906.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.comsof	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.comTC	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sandoll.co.krn	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222652479.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.coma	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.772908055.00000000014F7000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.come.com	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.772908055.00000000014F7000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sakkal.com8	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.227490771.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://en.w	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224554700.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.comn	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.goodfont.co.krF	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222340087.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.coml	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222841537.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.231534012.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.carterandcone.comghtv	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.monotype.	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.238156321.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.monotype.-	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.234952955.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/9	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.235768370.0000000006278000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000002.782376344.0000000007452000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.agfamonotype.0	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.243737730.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://www.sandoll.co.krn-u	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.222340087.000000000626E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers:	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.231609808.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.carterandcone.comark	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224323142.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn&	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.223199362.0000000006265000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.229567284.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.carterandcone.comies	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe, 00000002.00000003.224083852.0000000006268000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious

Private

IP
192.168.2.1

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	362120
Start date:	03.03.2021
Start time:	17:13:51
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 14m 9s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	35
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.phis.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@8/7@1/1
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 75%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 4.1% (good quality ratio 3.9%) Quality average: 85.1% Quality standard deviation: 23.6%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information. Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WerFault.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 168.61.161.212, 131.253.33.200, 13.107.22.200, 51.11.168.160, 184.30.21.219, 104.43.193.48, 40.88.32.150, 23.211.6.115, 104.42.151.234, 52.255.188.83, 184.30.20.56, 8.248.135.254, 8.241.122.254, 8.241.11.126, 8.241.123.254, 8.248.131.254, 2.20.142.209, 2.20.142.210, 51.104.139.180, 92.122.213.247, 92.122.213.194, 20.54.26.129, 52.155.217.156 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): storeedgefd.dsx.mp.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, au.download.windowsupdate.com.edgesuite.net, arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, storeedgefd.xbetservices.akadns.net, db5eap.displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, skypedataprdcoleus15.cloudapp.net, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, www-bing-com.dual-a-0001.a-msedge.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, auto.au.download.windowsupdate.com.c.footprint.net, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net, storeedgefd.dsx.mp.microsoft.com, www.bing.com, displaycatalog-europeeap.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, fs.microsoft.com, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, db3p-ris-pf-prod-atm.trafficmanager.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, skypedataprdcolcus17.cloudapp.net, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, a767.dscg3.akamai.net, storeedgefd.dsx.mp.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, skypedataprdcolcus15.cloudapp.net, dual-a-0001.dc-msedge.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, skypedataprdcoleus17.cloudapp.net, a-0001.a-afdentry.net.trafficmanager.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, e16646.dscg.akamaiedge.net, skypedataprdcolwus16.cloudapp.net, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Execution Graph export aborted for target vbc.exe, PID 6732 because there are no executed function Report size exceeded maximum capacity and may have missing behavior information. Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtDeviceIoControlFile calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
17:14:43	API Interceptor	6x Sleep call for process: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe modified
17:15:12	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: WerFault.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\AppCrash_vbc.exe_29b1fd91934ca85fd856bebf7e23b59544bb3f14_6c16ead4_1afe9588\Report.wer Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	Little-endian UTF-16 Unicode text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	10936
Entropy (8bit):	3.773645507675144
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	192:+oRmKDX5HBUZMXQf9jU3//u7swS274ItE7GDBh:NbDZBUZMXojM/u7swX4ItEOn
MD5:	B990CB6AF75858E6F2C29C7A53953022
SHA1:	43D20E7FF25881476A44DBA8066C662B9D6F9D65
SHA-256:	840F9558BFC0DF3028B17747557F6164B8E047E9731644A87B3141550915A256
SHA-512:	B71B19F6D1A887457695FDBF710EC4A5ED4592B19D9573FBA4F01DF34C7704113E762817D7E0284146318D75CB699EA51A259192A717D09A17956343104F77E3
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	..V.e.r.s.i.o.n.=.1.....E.v.e.n.t.T.y.p.e.=.A.P.P.C.R.A.S.H.....E.v.e.n.t.T.i.m.e.=.1.3.2.5.9.2.9.4.1.0.9.1.1.4.0.7.2.3.....R.e.p.o.r.t.T.y.p.e.=.2.....C.o.n.s.e.n.t.=.1.....U.p.l.o.a.d.T.i.m.e.=.1.3.2.5.9.2.9.4.1.1.0.3.1.7.1.9.7.6.....R.e.p.o.r.t.S.t.a.t.u.s.=.2.6.8.4.3.5.4.5.6.....R.e.p.o.r.t.I.d.e.n.t.i.f.i.e.r.=.5.d.d.e.a.9.d.1.-.6.f.0.4.-.4.2.8.b.-.9.b.7.2.-.7.d.1.1.7.3.0.7.d.6.d.c.....I.n.t.e.g.r.a.t.o.r.R.e.p.o.r.t.I.d.e.n.t.i.f.i.e.r.=.f.e.7.4.c.3.7.e.-.b.e.f.5.-.4.5.b.1.-.8.d.0.c.-.7.a.f.0.5.a.f.f.2.7.3.1.....W.o.w.6.4.H.o.s.t.=.3.4.4.0.4.....W.o.w.6.4.G.u.e.s.t.=.3.3.2.....N.s.A.p.p.N.a.m.e.=.v.b.c...e.x.e.....O.r.i.g.i.n.a.l.F.i.l.e.n.a.m.e.=.v.b.c...e.x.e.....A.p.p.S.e.s.s.i.o.n.G.u.i.d.=.0.0.0.0.1.a.4.c.-.0.0.0.1.-.0.0.1.7.-.7.6.a.0.-.3.8.c.f.9.3.1.0.d.7.0.1.....T.a.r.g.e.t.A.p.p.I.d.=.W.:.0.0.0.0.f.5.1.9.f.e.e.c.4.8.6.d.e.8.7.e.d.7.3.c.b.9.2.d.3.c.a.c.8.0.2.4.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.!.0.0.0.0.7.8.7.d.9.a.6.e.c.3.f.2.6.2.e.8.b.7.1.d.1.9.a.c.1.5.7.c.2.a.2.8.6.a.0.f.5.9.d.d.!.v.b.c.

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER89A1.tmp.dmp Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	Mini DuMP crash report, 14 streams, Thu Mar 4 01:15:09 2021, 0x1205a4 type
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	37050
Entropy (8bit):	2.0647926238959364
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	192:mrNMAoQcWWXDPJk2Y+CVRd5AveQFkJQHN:mxLD1MDPJNYpVRYVFtN
MD5:	A2F4BCACEA6B487455496EC0281A8FE7
SHA1:	4AE0F67C760C25F5A15ADB46BC37FECC07E2B965
SHA-256:	29A4BB5E95C231AB869D21CC52C38715C301C284C929A6373ECA620166B6370F
SHA-512:	C801CDEE2BD1999FE06174664428CEB3C6C898F1D4782F3F6D327D5BA3497297CC4F079337CAD4B07D3D14FE8A462CDC8681F9A5C69508C391A1E8E3091CA4A2
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MDMP....... ........4@`...................U...........B..............GenuineIntelW...........T.......L....4@`.............................0..2...............P.a.c.i.f.i.c. .S.t.a.n.d.a.r.d. .T.i.m.e...........................................P.a.c.i.f.i.c. .D.a.y.l.i.g.h.t. .T.i.m.e...........................................1.7.1.3.4...1...x.8.6.f.r.e...r.s.4._.r.e.l.e.a.s.e...1.8.0.4.1.0.-.1.8.0.4.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................d.b.g.c.o.r.e...i.3.8.6.,.1.0...0...1.7.1.3.4...1.........................................................................................................

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER8BF4.tmp.WERInternalMetadata.xml Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, Little-endian UTF-16 Unicode text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	8344
Entropy (8bit):	3.703927038018695
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	192:Rrl7r3GLNimG6A76Yqy6fFgmf5BSMCprY89bof7wsftv4m:RrlsNi36O6Yn69gmfPSRovfP
MD5:	9945E1B9A8D937B18F9DC31E975F1215
SHA1:	D61DCA56AAB3B6A1EE3B673D21BFA85086BDECAD
SHA-256:	0524E26D1CAA772616E33EBE260F28969494A6005A7ECECF6C563FCFCDBEB0EE
SHA-512:	62A8E6240F47C58371DF1B8E99872777F0C9B6832AAE413A9F7FEED95CF45E9BBC91D4934372DD7C587392E54A576D2FF5A49112D950B42889DBDA386BDE76CB
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	..<.?.x.m.l. .v.e.r.s.i.o.n.=.".1...0.". .e.n.c.o.d.i.n.g.=.".U.T.F.-.1.6.".?.>.....<.W.E.R.R.e.p.o.r.t.M.e.t.a.d.a.t.a.>.......<.O.S.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.I.n.f.o.r.m.a.t.i.o.n.>.........<.W.i.n.d.o.w.s.N.T.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.>.1.0...0.<./.W.i.n.d.o.w.s.N.T.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.>.........<.B.u.i.l.d.>.1.7.1.3.4.<./.B.u.i.l.d.>.........<.P.r.o.d.u.c.t.>.(.0.x.3.0.).:. .W.i.n.d.o.w.s. .1.0. .P.r.o.<./.P.r.o.d.u.c.t.>.........<.E.d.i.t.i.o.n.>.P.r.o.f.e.s.s.i.o.n.a.l.<./.E.d.i.t.i.o.n.>.........<.B.u.i.l.d.S.t.r.i.n.g.>.1.7.1.3.4...1...a.m.d.6.4.f.r.e...r.s.4._.r.e.l.e.a.s.e...1.8.0.4.1.0.-.1.8.0.4.<./.B.u.i.l.d.S.t.r.i.n.g.>.........<.R.e.v.i.s.i.o.n.>.1.<./.R.e.v.i.s.i.o.n.>.........<.F.l.a.v.o.r.>.M.u.l.t.i.p.r.o.c.e.s.s.o.r. .F.r.e.e.<./.F.l.a.v.o.r.>.........<.A.r.c.h.i.t.e.c.t.u.r.e.>.X.6.4.<./.A.r.c.h.i.t.e.c.t.u.r.e.>.........<.L.C.I.D.>.1.0.3.3.<./.L.C.I.D.>.......<./.O.S.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.I.n.f.o.r.m.a.t.i.o.n.>.......<.P.r.o.c.e.s.s.I.n.f.o.r.m.a.t.i.o.n.>.........<.P.i.d.>.6.7.3.2.<./.P.i.d.>.......

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER8D8B.tmp.xml Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	4643
Entropy (8bit):	4.480489970942812
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	48:cvIwSD8zs8iJgtWI9q0WSC8Bg8fm8M4JlEZFqXK+q8VUwlMSHOd:uITfh9tSNTJauXKJwlTHOd
MD5:	9CCE89CAAB7F11B1DC13431E291B8398
SHA1:	365BDCF2293020750BFFB7F152B6834BE896D161
SHA-256:	DEF6B8F3897C80489FA0764A912542D8A4340DCB5ED74E6FB6115CC0C3550F1B
SHA-512:	1E2ED9E04CE0E1FA1900BE7C60346E40A1D089A02DC0E97DF8434657067F4185092A361EFE2FCDDD794CFCD028326A264217C1C92E6954EB115731B52951CFEB
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>..<req ver="2">.. <tlm>.. <src>.. <desc>.. <mach>.. <os>.. <arg nm="vermaj" val="10" />.. <arg nm="vermin" val="0" />.. <arg nm="verbld" val="17134" />.. <arg nm="vercsdbld" val="1" />.. <arg nm="verqfe" val="1" />.. <arg nm="csdbld" val="1" />.. <arg nm="versp" val="0" />.. <arg nm="arch" val="9" />.. <arg nm="lcid" val="1033" />.. <arg nm="geoid" val="244" />.. <arg nm="sku" val="48" />.. <arg nm="domain" val="0" />.. <arg nm="prodsuite" val="256" />.. <arg nm="ntprodtype" val="1" />.. <arg nm="platid" val="2" />.. <arg nm="tmsi" val="886225" />.. <arg nm="osinsty" val="1" />.. <arg nm="iever" val="11.1.17134.0-11.0.47" />.. <arg nm="portos" val="0" />.. <arg nm="ram" val="4096" />..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1314
Entropy (8bit):	5.350128552078965
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:MLU84jE4K5E4Ks2E1qE4qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4sAmEw:MgvjHK5HKXE1qHiYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHR
MD5:	1DC1A2DCC9EFAA84EABF4F6D6066565B
SHA1:	B7FCF805B6DD8DE815EA9BC089BD99F1E617F4E9
SHA-256:	28D63442C17BF19558655C88A635CB3C3FF1BAD1CCD9784090B9749A7E71FCEF
SHA-512:	95DD7E2AB0884A3EFD9E26033B337D1F97DDF9A8E9E9C4C32187DCD40622D8B1AC8CCDBA12A70A6B9075DF5E7F68DF2F8FBA4AB33DB4576BE9806B8E191802B7
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"Microsoft.VisualBasic, Version=10.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\pid.txt Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	4
Entropy (8bit):	0.8112781244591328
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:E3n:E3n
MD5:	587B7B833034299FDD5F4B10E7DC9FCA
SHA1:	4B9F94F92A6FFAEE7BF14533AE679C1D396EBBB7
SHA-256:	739B312AE914CFC44AB85100D93F3BA28C22DFE7FBBD4CEE9072C19A11D87411
SHA-512:	767B4ACB5EAA5C81E7810C3571818BA44BF35934991D46D80B3AAF4F33F73B313861D5AE58F0BFFBA2DE7FAD455D62923D4EDC5DC1AEAF30B12C652D7EC96223
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	5444

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\pidloc.txt Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	54
Entropy (8bit):	4.712949307598833
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:oNWXp5vQqhWfR88XukA:oNWXpFQSWxDA
MD5:	CCDB3AB1EE56552E9E8D0D47D18B1C78
SHA1:	8B56F93FB2AC5E73F461E8742C26062E9B82B22D
SHA-256:	A6884B2FA05A5C130256A76EC80C1B88F854A967A4B1DC966774A94DB0C0A4AB
SHA-512:	C6E1F1815014566DDF8AA8973431B85A713E94D7008A2B403F9A4995F72FA89C55EBBF740F1860F6E115219460621291A7255EE6D250592AD27A3CE8FC7C6C4D
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.637398703052732
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.79% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.75% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Win16/32 Executable Delphi generic (2074/23) 0.01%
File name:	5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
File size:	1057280
MD5:	a67f05d542bcee462ecc03ae4d8195d6
SHA1:	eeb590aaa3c47851ae6f678c29aec2ba1b54df8f
SHA256:	1e96629ba4b537932150cc517455a0cfddcb7c35a4a0998d107643dc887b31c3
SHA512:	270f31f9481dd1259a890de29b22c59adc21fbeaad17ff3c22ed739214d3ea490b086dd0ec8b92fa9f1e9d3cbda5e3ca97406d2d4f18e4a87ba09e0ac83deaa5
SSDEEP:	24576:c4ZIZrK3Orlv80WSRbvuvDzAolFCdNtIEBIQxBwqA:3Zd3xSRK4olkdQE
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...x.>`..............P.............N7... ........@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x50374e
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x603EE278 [Wed Mar 3 01:12:24 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x103700	0x4b	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x104000	0x600	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x106000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x101754	0x101800	False	0.826626972087	data	7.64304839327	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x104000	0x600	0x600	False	0.434244791667	data	4.20816553114	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x106000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0x104090	0x370	data
RT_MANIFEST	0x104410	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright 2020 - 2021
Assembly Version	1.0.0.0
InternalName	NotSupportedException.exe
FileVersion	1.0.0.0
CompanyName	Agario
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName	Snake Game
ProductVersion	1.0.0.0
FileDescription	Snake Game
OriginalFilename	NotSupportedException.exe

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:33.214509964 CET	49873	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:33.260349989 CET	53	49873	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:33.709773064 CET	53196	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:33.758582115 CET	53	53196	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:33.914417982 CET	56777	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:33.960149050 CET	53	56777	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:34.240216017 CET	58643	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:34.321981907 CET	53	58643	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:34.408603907 CET	60985	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:34.456425905 CET	53	60985	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:35.405508041 CET	50200	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:35.451615095 CET	53	50200	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:36.435086966 CET	51281	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:36.491914988 CET	53	51281	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:37.438740969 CET	49199	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:37.483431101 CET	50620	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:37.484256983 CET	53	49199	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:37.543839931 CET	53	50620	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:39.445708990 CET	64938	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:39.491714954 CET	53	64938	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:40.667319059 CET	60152	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:40.716125965 CET	53	60152	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:41.989645958 CET	57544	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:42.037026882 CET	53	57544	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:58.696459055 CET	55984	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:14:58.753180027 CET	53	55984	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:01.106949091 CET	64185	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:01.152890921 CET	53	64185	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:01.163681030 CET	65110	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:01.214071035 CET	53	65110	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:02.767374039 CET	58361	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:02.813678980 CET	53	58361	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:04.194222927 CET	63492	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:04.240705967 CET	53	63492	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:05.250946045 CET	60831	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:05.299650908 CET	53	60831	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:06.904519081 CET	60100	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:06.950258017 CET	53	60100	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:08.590962887 CET	53195	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:08.636954069 CET	53	53195	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:09.509015083 CET	50141	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:09.568008900 CET	53	50141	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:10.655904055 CET	53023	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:10.701605082 CET	53	53023	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:11.877171993 CET	49563	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:11.922899961 CET	53	49563	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:12.121400118 CET	51352	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:12.171503067 CET	53	51352	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:13.808252096 CET	59349	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:13.857146978 CET	53	59349	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:14.778565884 CET	57084	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:14.824393034 CET	53	57084	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:20.228868008 CET	58823	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:20.274827003 CET	53	58823	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:29.668606043 CET	57568	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:29.716171026 CET	53	57568	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:29.807586908 CET	50540	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:29.863745928 CET	53	50540	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:48.932668924 CET	54366	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:48.981421947 CET	53	54366	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:16:01.827075958 CET	53034	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:16:01.872833967 CET	53	53034	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:16:20.140646935 CET	57762	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:16:20.196206093 CET	53	57762	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:16:53.634814978 CET	55435	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:16:53.682331085 CET	53	55435	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:12.506916046 CET	50713	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:12.556099892 CET	53	50713	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:30.583940029 CET	56132	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:30.643706083 CET	53	56132	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:32.108513117 CET	58987	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:32.167363882 CET	53	58987	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:32.696746111 CET	56579	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:32.742829084 CET	53	56579	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:33.303934097 CET	60633	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:33.375474930 CET	53	60633	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:34.003638983 CET	61292	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:34.068038940 CET	53	61292	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:38.208647966 CET	63619	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:38.269738913 CET	53	63619	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:38.780533075 CET	64938	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:38.835195065 CET	53	64938	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:39.593573093 CET	61946	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:39.642622948 CET	53	61946	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:40.453255892 CET	64910	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:40.512172937 CET	53	64910	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:41.080837965 CET	52123	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:41.153503895 CET	53	52123	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:54.798070908 CET	56130	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Mar 3, 2021 17:17:54.860306978 CET	53	56130	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:01.163681030 CET	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x589c	Standard query (0)	203.215.12.0.in-addr.arpa	PTR (Pointer record)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Mar 3, 2021 17:15:01.214071035 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x589c	Name error (3)	203.215.12.0.in-addr.arpa	none	none	PTR (Pointer record)	IN (0x0001)

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 3468 Parent PID: 5832

General

Start time:	17:14:41
Start date:	03/03/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe'
Imagebase:	0x340000
File size:	1057280 bytes
MD5 hash:	A67F05D542BCEE462ECC03AE4D8195D6
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.218552903.00000000027D1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: RAT_HawkEye, Description: Detects HawkEye RAT, Source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_MailPassView, Description: Yara detected MailPassView, Source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_HawkEye, Description: Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger, Source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView, Description: Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool, Source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Hawkeye, Description: detect HawkEye in memory, Source: 00000000.00000002.219158430.00000000037D9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe PID: 5444 Parent PID: 3468

General

Start time:	17:14:44
Start date:	03/03/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe
Imagebase:	0xca0000
File size:	1057280 bytes
MD5 hash:	A67F05D542BCEE462ECC03AE4D8195D6
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer, Description: Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, Source: 00000002.00000002.784876138.0000000008720000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Arnim Rupp Rule: RAT_HawkEye, Description: Detects HawkEye RAT, Source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_MailPassView, Description: Yara detected MailPassView, Source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_HawkEye, Description: Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger, Source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView, Description: Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool, Source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Hawkeye, Description: detect HawkEye in memory, Source: 00000002.00000002.767924598.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_MailPassView, Description: Yara detected MailPassView, Source: 00000002.00000002.778097540.00000000041A9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView, Description: Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool, Source: 00000002.00000002.778097540.00000000041A9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: HKTL_NET_GUID_Stealer, Description: Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid, Source: 00000002.00000002.785047145.0000000008890000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Arnim Rupp Rule: JoeSecurity_HawkEye, Description: Yara detected HawkEye Keylogger, Source: 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Hawkeye, Description: detect HawkEye in memory, Source: 00000002.00000002.774686882.00000000031A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: vbc.exe PID: 6732 Parent PID: 5444

General

Start time:	17:15:05
Start date:	03/03/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holderwb.txt'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	1171592 bytes
MD5 hash:	C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_WebBrowserPassView, Description: Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool, Source: 00000007.00000002.275551658.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: vbc.exe PID: 6724 Parent PID: 5444

General

Start time:	17:15:05
Start date:	03/03/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\vbc.exe /stext 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\holdermail.txt'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	1171592 bytes
MD5 hash:	C63ED21D5706A527419C9FBD730FFB2E
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_MailPassView, Description: Yara detected MailPassView, Source: 00000008.00000002.262898420.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: WerFault.exe PID: 6844 Parent PID: 6732

General

Start time:	17:15:07
Start date:	03/03/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6732 -s 516
Imagebase:	0xed0000
File size:	434592 bytes
MD5 hash:	9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.
Tactics:	Initial Access, Lateral Movement
Data Sources:	Data loss prevention, File monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like `CreateProcess` , `LoadLibrary` , etc. of the Win32 API.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches ( `dir /a` for Windows and `ls –a` for Linux and macOS).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of accounts on a system or within an environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Azure activity logs, Office 365 account logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading ...

Warning!

Analysis Report 5O857649056366403032021.PDF.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: HawkEye

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Spreading:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

Private

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping . The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Email gateway, File monitoring, Mail server, Office 365 trace logs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	API monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre