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Analysis Report RFlc8JHObG

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	RFlc8JHObG (renamed file extension from none to exe)
Analysis ID:	372416
MD5:	9babe52f985b2b4193113d5c260eb195
SHA1:	b4b4772d485d7d4192774aca3a9c594f82717adb
SHA256:	ca2ab2eb8249afceb6b9f42bac54fe8635fb5ccbf4e497c35ed700d9dae1c2d1
Tags:	unnamed9
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Score:	76
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Machine Learning detection for sample

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls

Contains functionality to enumerate network shares

Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user

Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system

Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)

Detected potential crypto function

May initialize a security null descriptor

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

RFlc8JHObG.exe (PID: 5988 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe' MD5: 9BABE52F985B2B4193113D5C260EB195)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

No yara matches

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: RFlc8JHObG.exe

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: RFlc8JHObG.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 84%			Perma Link
Source: RFlc8JHObG.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 88%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: RFlc8JHObG.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 1.2.RFlc8JHObG.exe.2bd0000.2.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Kazy.MK
Source: 1.2.RFlc8JHObG.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Kazy.MK

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_00409D29 CryptUnprotectData,LocalFree,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_004123AB CryptAcquireContextW,CryptCreateHash,CryptHashData,CryptGetHashParam,CryptDestroyHash,CryptReleaseContext,

Compliance:

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Unpacked PE file: 1.2.RFlc8JHObG.exe.400000.0.unpack

Source: RFlc8JHObG.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source:

Binary string: T:\fbgFd\faQgZ\bvjZalie\jRgyey\zBPowcgb.pdb source: RFlc8JHObG.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_004054D0 GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,SHGetFolderPathW,StrCmpNIW,FreeLibrary,NetUserEnum,NetUserGetInfo,NetApiBufferFree,NetApiBufferFree,SHGetFolderPathW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0041652E PathRemoveFileSpecW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_004165E9 FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_0041404D select,recv,

Source: RFlc8JHObG.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.internic.net/images/internic.gif
Source: RFlc8JHObG.exe, 00000001.00000002.200757968.0000000002BD0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.internic.net/images/internic.gifbclih6h5h4h3h2h1divtdtrhrbr

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040ED74 NtCreateUserProcess,NtCreateThread,LdrLoadDll,GetFileAttributesExW,HttpSendRequestW,HttpSendRequestA,HttpSendRequestExW,HttpSendRequestExA,InternetCloseHandle,InternetReadFile,InternetReadFileExA,InternetQueryDataAvailable,HttpQueryInfoA,closesocket,send,WSASend,OpenInputDesktop,SwitchDesktop,DefWindowProcW,DefWindowProcA,DefDlgProcW,DefDlgProcA,DefFrameProcW,DefFrameProcA,DefMDIChildProcW,DefMDIChildProcA,CallWindowProcW,CallWindowProcA,RegisterClassW,RegisterClassA,RegisterClassExW,RegisterClassExA,BeginPaint,EndPaint,GetDCEx,GetDC,GetWindowDC,ReleaseDC,GetUpdateRect,GetUpdateRgn,GetMessagePos,GetCursorPos,SetCursorPos,SetCapture,ReleaseCapture,GetCapture,GetMessageW,GetMessageA,PeekMessageW,PeekMessageA,PFXImportCertStore,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040E904 NtQueryInformationProcess,CloseHandle,NtCreateThread,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040E9BB NtCreateUserProcess,GetProcessId,GetThreadContext,SetThreadContext,VirtualFreeEx,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_00412A28 LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,CreateProcessAsUserW,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040716E CreateMutexW,GetLastError,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,ExitWindowsEx,OpenEventW,SetEvent,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,Sleep,IsWellKnownSid,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,VirtualFree,CreateEventW,WaitForSingleObject,WaitForMultipleObjects,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040D61F InitiateSystemShutdownExW,ExitWindowsEx,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_00413E5D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040168B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_004122B7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_02442209
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_02457E13
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_02459A29
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_02442699
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_024590B3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_024595E0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0244266E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_02442F44
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0245AB1C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_024413C7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_02459F88
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0245AC60
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_02441000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_024598C3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0245B0E3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0245890F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0245A912
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0245A9BA

Source: RFlc8JHObG.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: RFlc8JHObG.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal76.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040D4F4 CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertDuplicateCertificateContext,CertDeleteCertificateFromStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertCloseStore,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040760C CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,CharLowerW,GetSystemTime,CertCloseStore,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_004127D2 GetCurrentThread,OpenThreadToken,OpenProcessToken,LookupPrivilegeValueW,AdjustTokenPrivileges,GetLastError,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_0040CC7E CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CreateToolhelp32Snapshot,Process32FirstW,OpenProcess,CloseHandle,GetLengthSid,CloseHandle,Process32NextW,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_0040A448 CoCreateInstance,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: RFlc8JHObG.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 84%
Source: RFlc8JHObG.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 88%

Source:

Binary string: T:\fbgFd\faQgZ\bvjZalie\jRgyey\zBPowcgb.pdb source: RFlc8JHObG.exe

Data Obfuscation:

Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Unpacked PE file: 1.2.RFlc8JHObG.exe.400000.0.unpack .text:ER;.data:EW;.itext:R;.rsrc:R;.idata:R; vs .text:ER;.data:W;.reloc:R;

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Unpacked PE file: 1.2.RFlc8JHObG.exe.400000.0.unpack

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_00414CC6 LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,HeapCreate,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401915 push es; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401FE1 push cs; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401FAB push cs; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_02447857 push esi; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_024445E5 pushfd ; iretd

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 6.99040926415
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .data entropy: 7.18553169486

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_0041652E PathRemoveFileSpecW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_004165E9 FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_0040ED74 NtCreateUserProcess,NtCreateThread,LdrLoadDll,GetFileAttributesExW,HttpSendRequestW,HttpSendRequestA,HttpSendRequestExW,HttpSendRequestExA,InternetCloseHandle,InternetReadFile,InternetReadFileExA,InternetQueryDataAvailable,HttpQueryInfoA,closesocket,send,WSASend,OpenInputDesktop,SwitchDesktop,DefWindowProcW,DefWindowProcA,DefDlgProcW,DefDlgProcA,DefFrameProcW,DefFrameProcA,DefMDIChildProcW,DefMDIChildProcA,CallWindowProcW,CallWindowProcA,RegisterClassW,RegisterClassA,RegisterClassExW,RegisterClassExA,BeginPaint,EndPaint,GetDCEx,GetDC,GetWindowDC,ReleaseDC,GetUpdateRect,GetUpdateRgn,GetMessagePos,GetCursorPos,SetCursorPos,SetCapture,ReleaseCapture,GetCapture,GetMessageW,GetMessageA,PeekMessageW,PeekMessageA,PFXImportCertStore,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_00414CC6 LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,HeapCreate,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_004061F9 mov edx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_00406532 GetModuleHandleW,GetModuleHandleW,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,HeapCreate,GetProcessHeap,InitializeCriticalSection,WSAStartup,CreateEventW,GetLengthSid,GetCurrentProcessId,

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_004145CF InitializeSecurityDescriptor,SetSecurityDescriptorDacl,ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW,GetSecurityDescriptorSacl,SetSecurityDescriptorSacl,LocalFree,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_00411208 GetSystemTime,SystemTimeToFileTime,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_004104D7 GetTickCount,GetUserDefaultUILanguage,GetModuleFileNameW,GetUserNameExW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_00411230 GetTimeZoneInformation,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe

Code function: 1_2_004078CA GetProcAddress,GetVersionExW,

Source: RFlc8JHObG.exe

Binary or memory string: S:(ML;;NRNWNX;;;LW)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_00414400 socket,bind,closesocket,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe	Code function: 1_2_00414164 socket,bind,listen,closesocket,

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts1	Native API1	Valid Accounts1	Valid Accounts1	Valid Accounts1	OS Credential Dumping	Network Share Discovery1	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel2	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	System Shutdown/Reboot1
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Access Token Manipulation11	Access Token Manipulation11	LSASS Memory	System Time Discovery2	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Ingress Tool Transfer1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information2	Security Account Manager	Security Software Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Install Root Certificate1	NTDS	Process Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Software Packing23	LSA Secrets	Account Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Steganography	Cached Domain Credentials	System Owner/User Discovery1	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Compile After Delivery	DCSync	File and Directory Discovery1	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Indicator Removal from Tools	Proc Filesystem	System Information Discovery3	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
RFlc8JHObG.exe	85%	Virustotal		Browse
RFlc8JHObG.exe	88%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Zeus
RFlc8JHObG.exe	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen
RFlc8JHObG.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
1.0.RFlc8JHObG.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
1.2.RFlc8JHObG.exe.2bd0000.2.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Kazy.MK	Download File
1.2.RFlc8JHObG.exe.2440000.1.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
1.2.RFlc8JHObG.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Kazy.MK	Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.internic.net/images/internic.gif	RFlc8JHObG.exe	false		high
http://www.internic.net/images/internic.gifbclih6h5h4h3h2h1divtdtrhrbr	RFlc8JHObG.exe, 00000001.00000002.200757968.0000000002BD0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	372416
Start date:	20.03.2021
Start time:	14:07:10
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 31s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	RFlc8JHObG (renamed file extension from none to exe)
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	2
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal76.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 56.5% (good quality ratio 48%) Quality average: 71.2% Quality standard deviation: 37.2%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 59% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): svchost.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.186773887815174
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.96% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	RFlc8JHObG.exe
File size:	130560
MD5:	9babe52f985b2b4193113d5c260eb195
SHA1:	b4b4772d485d7d4192774aca3a9c594f82717adb
SHA256:	ca2ab2eb8249afceb6b9f42bac54fe8635fb5ccbf4e497c35ed700d9dae1c2d1
SHA512:	61f41678334ea638dd3dc02d280739910d4b64cc31289c3f99bf41067bdfee1a9ab2114920b7b162862046b06d59d2bb6168557cc1a4463113a2ad00f526af8b
SSDEEP:	3072:WhBFnGu6BYxbu75pZlgpXor85hfuHwhxqn9fI2uW+It:WhHGzK475pUpXiwgxExIt
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$..........9@d.j@d.j@d.j@d.jMd.jI..jQd.j[.9jOd.j[..jAd.j[..jAd.j[..jAd.jRich@d.j........PE..L....!.M...................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x401ee0
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x4D8C21A2 [Fri Mar 25 05:01:22 2011 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	5
OS Version Minor:	1
File Version Major:	5
File Version Minor:	1
Subsystem Version Major:	5
Subsystem Version Minor:	1
Import Hash:	d2d0d8d094caedbfe934e30be29bea57

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
xor eax, eax
xor eax, 000077A8h
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
sub esp, 10h
push esi
inc esi
mov esi, dword ptr [0043C00Ch]
and dword ptr [0040978Dh], 004097FDh
mov dword ptr [ebp-0Ch], C6F8E435h
sub dword ptr [00409741h], 00000A4Ch
push 004092F8h
mov dword ptr [ebp-0Ch], C6F8E434h
or dword ptr [0040974Dh], 0000382Ch
call esi
mov dword ptr [00409811h], 00003433h
cmp eax, 00000498h
jng 00007F2C58B3B831h
sbb dword ptr [00409805h], 004097CDh
xor eax, eax
mov dword ptr [00409811h], 00001618h
jmp 00007F2C58B3BA71h
mov dword ptr [00409861h], 00001374h
push 00409318h
or dword ptr [00409839h], 00409815h
call esi
mov dword ptr [0040974Dh], 00005BB7h
cmp eax, 00000837h
jnl 00007F2C58B3B7CBh
mov eax, dword ptr [0040977Dh]
mov eax, dword ptr [0040942Ch]
cmp eax, 919D6EFDh
mov dword ptr [0040978Dh], 00006584h
jne 00007F2C58B3B82Ah

Rich Headers

Programming Language:

[LNK] VS2010 SP1 build 40219
[RES] VS2010 SP1 build 40219
[EXP] VS2010 SP1 build 40219
[IMP] VS2008 SP1 build 30729

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x3c014	0x257	.itext
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x3e664	0x23c
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x3d000	0x8e8	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x3e000	0x638	.idata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x3c000	0x14	.itext
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x7029	0x7200	False	0.791563870614	data	6.99040926415	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x9000	0x32f3e	0x17200	False	0.825274493243	data	7.18553169486	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.itext	0x3c000	0x26b	0x400	False	0.2412109375	data	3.78647081365	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x3d000	0x8e8	0xa00	False	0.459375	data	3.29475958072	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.idata	0x3e000	0x6fe	0x800	False	0.7529296875	data	6.17155304092	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_DIALOG	0x3d31c	0x27c	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0x3d598	0x350	data	English	United States

Imports

DLL	Import
USER32.dll	GetWindowDC, IsCharAlphaNumericW
KERNEL32.dll	lstrlenW

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: RFlc8JHObG.exe PID: 5988 Parent PID: 5904

General

Start time:	14:07:52
Start date:	20/03/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\RFlc8JHObG.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	130560 bytes
MD5 hash:	9BABE52F985B2B4193113D5C260EB195
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Digital certificate logs, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping . The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.
Tactics:	Impact
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report RFlc8JHObG

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Cryptography:

Compliance:

Spreading:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Rich Headers

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: RFlc8JHObG.exe PID: 5988 Parent PID: 5904

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis