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Analysis Report E7CThb0bFa

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	E7CThb0bFa (renamed file extension from none to exe)
Analysis ID:	381780
MD5:	ba28a06e2aae1052319541d4124122c5
SHA1:	20613e49ee5b14dc04c7b045900f1d0e1b4173be
SHA256:	9738c7021fdded8bb03e1588d17386dc175328630ecb0f1a3d671dfc4fb18d46
Tags:	uncategorized
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

ZeusVM

Score:	80
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Detected ZeusVM e-Banking Trojan

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Contains VNC / remote desktop functionality (version string found)

Contains functionality to detect sleep reduction / modifications

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Machine Learning detection for sample

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)

Contains functionality to detect sandboxes (mouse cursor move detection)

Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls

Contains functionality to enumerate network shares

Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user

Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)

Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Contains functionality to read the clipboard data

Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes

Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system

Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)

Found potential string decryption / allocating functions

May check if the current machine is a sandbox (GetTickCount - Sleep)

May initialize a security null descriptor

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

E7CThb0bFa.exe (PID: 6988 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe' MD5: BA28A06E2AAE1052319541D4124122C5)

E7CThb0bFa.exe (PID: 7048 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe MD5: BA28A06E2AAE1052319541D4124122C5)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

No yara matches

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 84%			Perma Link
Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 92%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 1.2.E7CThb0bFa.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Kazy.MK
Source: 0.2.E7CThb0bFa.exe.24e0000.2.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Patched.Ren.Gen
Source: 1.1.E7CThb0bFa.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Kazy.MK

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_00408558 CryptUnprotectData,LocalFree,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_00412FA3 CryptAcquireContextW,CryptCreateHash,CryptHashData,CryptGetHashParam,CryptDestroyHash,CryptReleaseContext,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_00408558 CryptUnprotectData,LocalFree,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_00412FA3 CryptAcquireContextW,CryptCreateHash,CryptHashData,CryptGetHashParam,CryptDestroyHash,CryptReleaseContext,

Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, BYTES_REVERSED_LO, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, BYTES_REVERSED_HI, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_004113A5 GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,SHGetFolderPathW,StrCmpNIW,FreeLibrary,NetUserEnum,NetUserGetInfo,NetApiBufferFree,NetApiBufferFree,SHGetFolderPathW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_004113A5 GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,SHGetFolderPathW,StrCmpNIW,FreeLibrary,NetUserEnum,NetUserGetInfo,NetApiBufferFree,NetApiBufferFree,SHGetFolderPathW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_00405304 GetModuleHandleA,GetProcAddress,lstrcpyn,lstrcpyn,lstrcpyn,FindFirstFileA,FindClose,lstrlen,lstrcpyn,lstrlen,lstrcpyn,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_00417437 FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_0041737C FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_00417437 FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_0041737C FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 1_2_00414C41 select,recv,

Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.google.com/webhp
Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe, 00000000.00000002.637292990.00000000024E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, E7CThb0bFa.exe, 00000001.00000001.636690147.0000000000400000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.google.com/webhpbc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 1_2_0041047C GetClipboardData,GlobalLock,EnterCriticalSection,LeaveCriticalSection,GlobalUnlock,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 0_2_0042D190 GetKeyboardState,

E-Banking Fraud:

Detected ZeusVM e-Banking Trojan

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_00419084 lstrcmpiA,lstrcmpiA,lstrcmpiA,CloseHandle,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_00419084 lstrcmpiA,lstrcmpiA,lstrcmpiA,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 1_2_004108EC OpenWindowStationW,CreateWindowStationW,GetProcessWindowStation,OpenDesktopW,CreateDesktopW,GetCurrentThreadId,GetThreadDesktop,SetThreadDesktop,CloseDesktop,CloseWindowStation,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0044A56C NtdllDefWindowProc_A,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_00430020 NtdllDefWindowProc_A,GetCapture,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_00424C58 NtdllDefWindowProc_A,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0044AD10 IsIconic,SetActiveWindow,IsWindowEnabled,SetWindowPos,NtdllDefWindowProc_A,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0044ADC0 IsIconic,SetActiveWindow,IsWindowEnabled,NtdllDefWindowProc_A,SetWindowPos,SetFocus,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0043F83C GetSubMenu,SaveDC,RestoreDC,SaveDC,RestoreDC,NtdllDefWindowProc_A,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 1_2_00413620 LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,CreateProcessAsUserW,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_00418801 InitiateSystemShutdownExW,ExitWindowsEx,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_0041D21C CreateMutexW,GetLastError,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,ExitWindowsEx,OpenEventW,SetEvent,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,Sleep,IsWellKnownSid,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,VirtualFree,CreateEventW,WaitForSingleObject,WaitForMultipleObjects,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_00418801 InitiateSystemShutdownExW,ExitWindowsEx,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_0041D21C CreateMutexW,GetLastError,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,ExitWindowsEx,OpenEventW,SetEvent,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,Sleep,IsWellKnownSid,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,VirtualFree,CreateEventW,WaitForSingleObject,WaitForMultipleObjects,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_00444A1C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0043F83C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_00414A51
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040D6D4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_00412EAF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040171B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_00414A51
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_0040D6D4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_00412EAF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_0040171B

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: String function: 004041E0 appears 68 times
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: String function: 00406324 appears 61 times

Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe, 00000000.00000002.637101486.0000000000A90000.00000002.00000001.sdmp

Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameuser32j% vs E7CThb0bFa.exe

Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, BYTES_REVERSED_LO, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, BYTES_REVERSED_HI, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal80.bank.troj.evad.winEXE@3/0@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 0_2_0041DA04 GetLastError,FormatMessageA,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_00405554 CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertDuplicateCertificateContext,CertDeleteCertificateFromStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertCloseStore,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_004053DF CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,CharLowerW,GetSystemTime,CertCloseStore,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_00405554 CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertDuplicateCertificateContext,CertDeleteCertificateFromStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertCloseStore,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_004053DF CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,CharLowerW,GetSystemTime,CertCloseStore,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_004133CA GetCurrentThread,OpenThreadToken,OpenProcessToken,LookupPrivilegeValueW,AdjustTokenPrivileges,GetLastError,CloseHandle,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_004133CA GetCurrentThread,OpenThreadToken,OpenProcessToken,LookupPrivilegeValueW,AdjustTokenPrivileges,GetLastError,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 0_2_004085C0 GetDiskFreeSpaceA,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 1_2_0040647F CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CreateToolhelp32Snapshot,Process32FirstW,OpenProcess,CloseHandle,GetLengthSid,CloseHandle,Process32NextW,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 1_2_00408C77 CoCreateInstance,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 0_2_00406179 CompareStringA,RtlEnterCriticalSection,FindResourceA,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Borland\Delphi\Locales

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 84%
Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 92%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 0_2_00424218 LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232BE08 push FAF50000h; retn 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232CB68 push ds; retf 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232D354 push ds; retf 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_02327FA0 pushad ; retf 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232741D pushfd ; retn 0003h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_02329865 push edx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232ACA4 pushad ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_02328C9C push ss; retf 004Ch
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_02329100 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232E57F push ss; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232C550 pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232D9B3 push edx; retf 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232BDF4 push ds; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_023289E0 push ebx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_02329DEB push ebx; retf 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232BE08 push FAF50000h; retn 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232CB68 push ds; retf 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232D354 push ds; retf 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_02327FA0 pushad ; retf 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232741D pushfd ; retn 0003h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_02329865 push edx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232ACA4 pushad ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_02328C9C push ss; retf 004Ch
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_02329100 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232E57F push ss; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232C550 pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232D9B3 push edx; retf 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_0232BDF4 push ds; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_023289E0 push ebx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_3_02329DEB push ebx; retf 0000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_00437334 push 004373C1h; ret

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: UPX0
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: UPX1

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0044A5F4 PostMessageA,PostMessageA,SendMessageA,GetProcAddress,GetLastError,IsWindowEnabled,IsWindowVisible,GetFocus,SetFocus,SetFocus,IsIconic,GetFocus,SetFocus,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_004225DC IsIconic,GetWindowPlacement,GetWindowRect,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_00432878 IsIconic,GetWindowPlacement,GetWindowRect,GetWindowLongA,GetWindowLongA,ScreenToClient,ScreenToClient,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0044AD10 IsIconic,SetActiveWindow,IsWindowEnabled,SetWindowPos,NtdllDefWindowProc_A,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0044ADC0 IsIconic,SetActiveWindow,IsWindowEnabled,NtdllDefWindowProc_A,SetWindowPos,SetFocus,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_004475DC SendMessageA,ShowWindow,ShowWindow,CallWindowProcA,SendMessageA,ShowWindow,SetWindowPos,GetActiveWindow,IsIconic,SetWindowPos,SetActiveWindow,ShowWindow,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_00431744 IsIconic,GetCapture,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_00431FF8 IsIconic,SetWindowPos,GetWindowPlacement,SetWindowPlacement,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Contains functionality to detect sleep reduction / modifications

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 0_2_00426D88

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: GetCurrentThreadId,GetCursorPos,WaitForSingleObject,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 0_2_00426D88

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 0_2_00405304 GetModuleHandleA,GetProcAddress,lstrcpyn,lstrcpyn,lstrcpyn,FindFirstFileA,FindClose,lstrlen,lstrcpyn,lstrlen,lstrcpyn,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_00417437 FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_0041737C FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_00417437 FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_0041737C FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 0_2_0041DFA0 GetSystemInfo,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_0041C2AE mov edx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_1_0041C2AE mov edx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 1_2_0041C5F3 GetModuleHandleW,GetModuleHandleW,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,HeapCreate,GetProcessHeap,InitializeCriticalSection,WSAStartup,CreateEventW,GetLengthSid,GetCurrentProcessId,

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Memory written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 1_2_004152ED InitializeSecurityDescriptor,SetSecurityDescriptorDacl,ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW,GetSecurityDescriptorSacl,SetSecurityDescriptorSacl,LocalFree,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: GetModuleFileNameA,RegOpenKeyExA,RegOpenKeyExA,RegOpenKeyExA,RegQueryValueExA,RegQueryValueExA,RegCloseKey,lstrcpyn,GetThreadLocale,GetLocaleInfoA,lstrlen,lstrcpyn,LoadLibraryExA,lstrcpyn,LoadLibraryExA,lstrcpyn,LoadLibraryExA,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: GetLocaleInfoA,GetACP,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: GetLocaleInfoA,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: GetLocaleInfoA,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: GetLocaleInfoA,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 0_2_00409924 GetLocalTime,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 1_2_00407242 GetTickCount,GetUserDefaultUILanguage,GetModuleFileNameW,GetUserNameExW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 1_2_00411E28 GetTimeZoneInformation,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe

Code function: 0_2_00437334 GetVersion,

Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe, 00000000.00000002.637292990.00000000024E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Binary or memory string: S:(ML;;NRNWNX;;;LW)SeSecurityPrivilegeS:(ML;CIOI;NRNWNX;;;LW)?O?I?Tcabcabinet.dllFCICreateFCIAddFileFCIFlushCabinetFCIDestroybcdfghklmnpqrstvwxzaeiouyGlobal\Local\

Remote Access Functionality:

Contains VNC / remote desktop functionality (version string found)

Show sources

Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe, 00000000.00000002.637292990.00000000024E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: RFB 003.003
Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe, 00000000.00000002.637292990.00000000024E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: .exe-fSysListView32MDIClientCiceroUIWndFrameConsoleWindowClass#32768SysShadowFIXMERFB 003.003
Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe	String found in binary or memory: RFB 003.003
Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe	String found in binary or memory: RFB 003.003
Source: E7CThb0bFa.exe, 00000001.00000001.636690147.0000000000400000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: .exe-fSysListView32MDIClientCiceroUIWndFrameConsoleWindowClass#32768SysShadowFIXMERFB 003.003

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_0041511E socket,bind,closesocket,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe	Code function: 1_2_00414E40 socket,bind,listen,closesocket,

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts1	Native API1	Application Shimming1	Application Shimming1	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	Input Capture11	System Time Discovery2	Remote Desktop Protocol1	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Ingress Tool Transfer1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	System Shutdown/Reboot1
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Create Account1	Valid Accounts1	Obfuscated Files or Information21	LSASS Memory	Account Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Input Capture11	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Encrypted Channel2	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Valid Accounts1	Access Token Manipulation11	Install Root Certificate1	Security Account Manager	File and Directory Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Clipboard Data1	Automated Exfiltration	Remote Access Software1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection111	Software Packing11	NTDS	System Information Discovery15	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Valid Accounts1	LSA Secrets	Network Share Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Access Token Manipulation11	Cached Domain Credentials	Security Software Discovery13	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Process Injection111	DCSync	Process Discovery1	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Indicator Removal from Tools	Proc Filesystem	Application Window Discovery11	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue
Exploit Public-Facing Application	PowerShell	At (Linux)	At (Linux)	Masquerading	/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow	System Owner/User Discovery1	Software Deployment Tools	Data Staged	Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Web Protocols	Rogue Cellular Base Station		Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
E7CThb0bFa.exe	85%	Virustotal		Browse
E7CThb0bFa.exe	93%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Zeus
E7CThb0bFa.exe	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.ZPACK.Gen
E7CThb0bFa.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
1.0.E7CThb0bFa.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
0.2.E7CThb0bFa.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
1.2.E7CThb0bFa.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Kazy.MK	Download File
0.2.E7CThb0bFa.exe.24e0000.2.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Patched.Ren.Gen	Download File
1.1.E7CThb0bFa.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Kazy.MK	Download File
0.0.E7CThb0bFa.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	381780
Start date:	05.04.2021
Start time:	02:53:56
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 12s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	E7CThb0bFa (renamed file extension from none to exe)
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	6
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal80.bank.troj.evad.winEXE@3/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 83.4% (good quality ratio 78.9%) Quality average: 82.1% Quality standard deviation: 27.6%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 52% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, svchost.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows, UPX compressed
Entropy (8bit):	7.927240072544305
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.37% UPX compressed Win32 Executable (30571/9) 0.30% Win32 EXE Yoda's Crypter (26571/9) 0.26% Win16/32 Executable Delphi generic (2074/23) 0.02% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02%
File name:	E7CThb0bFa.exe
File size:	275968
MD5:	ba28a06e2aae1052319541d4124122c5
SHA1:	20613e49ee5b14dc04c7b045900f1d0e1b4173be
SHA256:	9738c7021fdded8bb03e1588d17386dc175328630ecb0f1a3d671dfc4fb18d46
SHA512:	9aaaa26c106043d56c48f89b3dd7b84ba9bbf7951c5e82a622d0eb93169e9520643bd5cb6b49dbd1cce7f5cd776e6b62b855266c099304acd3b9faa703187f25
SSDEEP:	3072:q4ep6/R4I4NdnFubGtt89Z0pVaCv86giQvBjR4DtHuLUGbcQTaQQ0tQPUy8xVFQR:qmGfubsi0pVaDL4B0bcQTXJxVsGhxMI0
File Content Preview:	MZP.....................@...............................................!..L.!..This program must be run under Win32..$7.......................................................................................................................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x48d160
Entrypoint Section:	UPX1
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, BYTES_REVERSED_LO, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, BYTES_REVERSED_HI, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x2A425E19 [Fri Jun 19 22:22:17 1992 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	92644df84cdbba7637462c128671f148

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
pushad
mov esi, 0044B000h
lea edi, dword ptr [esi-0004A000h]
mov dword ptr [edi+0007809Ch], 9DB73737h
push edi
or ebp, FFFFFFFFh
jmp 00007F094CCB2920h
nop
nop
nop
nop
mov al, byte ptr [esi]
inc esi
mov byte ptr [edi], al
inc edi
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F094CCB2919h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
jc 00007F094CCB28FFh
mov eax, 00000001h
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F094CCB2919h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
adc eax, eax
add ebx, ebx
jnc 00007F094CCB291Dh
jne 00007F094CCB293Ah
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
jc 00007F094CCB2931h
dec eax
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F094CCB2919h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
adc eax, eax
jmp 00007F094CCB28E6h
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F094CCB2919h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
adc ecx, ecx
jmp 00007F094CCB2964h
xor ecx, ecx
sub eax, 03h
jc 00007F094CCB2923h
shl eax, 08h
mov al, byte ptr [esi]
inc esi
xor eax, FFFFFFFFh
je 00007F094CCB2987h
sar eax, 1
mov ebp, eax
jmp 00007F094CCB291Dh
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F094CCB2919h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
jc 00007F094CCB28DEh
inc ecx
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F094CCB2919h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
jc 00007F094CCB28D0h
add ebx, ebx
jne 00007F094CCB2919h
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
adc ecx, ecx
add ebx, ebx
jnc 00007F094CCB2901h
jne 00007F094CCB291Bh
mov ebx, dword ptr [esi]
sub esi, FFFFFFFCh
adc ebx, ebx
jnc 00007F094CCB28F6h
add ecx, 02h
cmp ebp, 00000000h

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x8e9c8	0x1e8	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x8e000	0x9c8	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x8d318	0x18	UPX1
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
UPX0	0x1000	0x4a000	0x0	False	0	empty	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
UPX1	0x4b000	0x43000	0x42400	False	0.982060731132	data	7.9419130638	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x8e000	0x1000	0xc00	False	0.3330078125	data	3.33000850621	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type
RT_CURSOR	0x869c8	0x134	data
RT_CURSOR	0x86afc	0x134	data
RT_CURSOR	0x86c30	0x134	data
RT_CURSOR	0x86d64	0x134	data
RT_CURSOR	0x86e98	0x134	data
RT_CURSOR	0x86fcc	0x134	data
RT_CURSOR	0x87100	0x134	data
RT_BITMAP	0x87234	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x87404	0x1e4	data
RT_BITMAP	0x875e8	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x877b8	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x87988	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x87b58	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x87d28	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x87ef8	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x880c8	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x88298	0x1d0	data
RT_BITMAP	0x88468	0xe8	data
RT_DIALOG	0x88550	0x52	data
RT_STRING	0x885a4	0xfc	data
RT_STRING	0x886a0	0x1ec	data
RT_STRING	0x8888c	0x148	data
RT_STRING	0x889d4	0x274	data
RT_STRING	0x88c48	0x150	data
RT_STRING	0x88d98	0xec	data
RT_STRING	0x88e84	0x1b0	data
RT_STRING	0x89034	0x450	data
RT_STRING	0x89484	0x364	data
RT_STRING	0x897e8	0x440	data
RT_STRING	0x89c28	0x1b0	data
RT_STRING	0x89dd8	0xec	data
RT_STRING	0x89ec4	0x1e4	data
RT_STRING	0x8a0a8	0x3f4	data
RT_STRING	0x8a49c	0x340	data
RT_STRING	0x8a7dc	0x2c8	data
RT_RCDATA	0x8aaa4	0x10	Non-ISO extended-ASCII text, with no line terminators
RT_RCDATA	0x8aab4	0x25c	data
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x8ad10	0x14	data
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x8ad24	0x14	Non-ISO extended-ASCII text, with no line terminators
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x8ad38	0x14	data
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x8ad4c	0x14	data
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x8ad60	0x14	data
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x8ad74	0x14	data
RT_GROUP_CURSOR	0x8ad88	0x14	data

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.DLL	LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress, VirtualProtect, VirtualAlloc, VirtualFree, ExitProcess
advapi32.dll	RegCloseKey
comctl32.dll	ImageList_Add
gdi32.dll	SaveDC
oleaut32.dll	VariantCopy
user32.dll	GetDC
version.dll	VerQueryValueA

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: E7CThb0bFa.exe PID: 6988 Parent PID: 5952

General

Start time:	02:54:36
Start date:	05/04/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	275968 bytes
MD5 hash:	BA28A06E2AAE1052319541D4124122C5
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Borland Delphi
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: E7CThb0bFa.exe PID: 7048 Parent PID: 6988

General

Start time:	02:54:38
Start date:	05/04/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\E7CThb0bFa.exe
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	275968 bytes
MD5 hash:	BA28A06E2AAE1052319541D4124122C5
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Tactics:	Persistence
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Azure activity logs, Office 365 account logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Digital certificate logs, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of accounts on a system or within an environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Azure activity logs, Office 365 account logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping . The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Tactics:	Lateral Movement
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	API monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.
Tactics:	Impact
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report E7CThb0bFa

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Cryptography:

Compliance:

Spreading:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

E-Banking Fraud:

Protection of GUI:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: E7CThb0bFa.exe PID: 6988 Parent PID: 5952

General

Analysis Process: E7CThb0bFa.exe PID: 7048 Parent PID: 6988

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis