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Analysis Report Orden de Compra.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Orden de Compra.exe
Analysis ID:	383316
MD5:	e6dcf6b66b611ffb7d2bc1a8045bf41f
SHA1:	7b3871b1b077f764175c6d387e846372128a89ee
SHA256:	280e118484090c0a9788dcad52f37995822757f44d230c9ff042c3507d8e20a3
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Score:	64
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Machine Learning detection for sample

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Detected potential crypto function

Found large amount of non-executed APIs

PE file contains an invalid checksum

PE file contains strange resources

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

Orden de Compra.exe (PID: 6532 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe' MD5: E6DCF6B66B611FFB7D2BC1A8045BF41F)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

No yara matches

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: Orden de Compra.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 48%			Perma Link
Source: Orden de Compra.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 10%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: Orden de Compra.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: Orden de Compra.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_00408F7E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040904E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040942F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_004090D1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_00409158
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040D5E2
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_004095E7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040959E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_00409672
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_004092D3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_004096FD
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040931B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_00409796
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_004093A0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_00408FBB

Source: Orden de Compra.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: Orden de Compra.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: Orden de Compra.exe, 00000001.00000002.1048423132.0000000002260000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameuser32j% vs Orden de Compra.exe
Source: Orden de Compra.exe, 00000001.00000000.649686134.0000000000416000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameGulvhoejde9.exe vs Orden de Compra.exe
Source: Orden de Compra.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameGulvhoejde9.exe vs Orden de Compra.exe

Source: Orden de Compra.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal64.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DF03F3B1BA238AA763.TMP

Jump to behavior

Source: Orden de Compra.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: Orden de Compra.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 48%
Source: Orden de Compra.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 10%

Source: Orden de Compra.exe

Static PE information: real checksum: 0x267f4 should be: 0x2673a

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_00402027 push ss; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_00404569 push FFFFFFCDh; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040753C push ebx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040D5E2 pushfd ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_00404671 push FFFFFFCDh; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040BA18 push 7600FFCEh; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040DAC0 push ss; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	Code function: 1_2_00407AF1 push FFFFFF85h; ret

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000465B81 second address: 0000000000465B81 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000463395 second address: 0000000000463395 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007F2E6436BD88h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d cld 0x0000001e pop ecx 0x0000001f add edi, edx 0x00000021 jmp 00007F2E6436BD9Ah 0x00000023 cmp bx, dx 0x00000026 dec ecx 0x00000027 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x0000002a jne 00007F2E6436BD50h 0x0000002c test al, cl 0x0000002e push ecx 0x0000002f test bl, FFFFFFB4h 0x00000032 call 00007F2E6436BDDDh 0x00000037 call 00007F2E6436BD98h 0x0000003c lfence 0x0000003f mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000045 lfence 0x00000048 ret 0x00000049 mov esi, edx 0x0000004b pushad 0x0000004c rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000463468 second address: 00000000004635BF instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a test ch, dh 0x0000000c xor edi, edi 0x0000000e cmp cl, cl 0x00000010 cld 0x00000011 mov ecx, 000186A0h 0x00000016 push ecx 0x00000017 jmp 00007F2E6436BD9Ah 0x00000019 cmp bx, 495Bh 0x0000001e cmp eax, eax 0x00000020 call 00007F2E6436BE16h 0x00000025 call 00007F2E6436BE06h 0x0000002a lfence 0x0000002d rdtsc

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000046054A second address: 0000000000465F85 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b push 2D9CC76Ch 0x00000010 test dl, dl 0x00000012 test bl, cl 0x00000014 test eax, eax 0x00000016 call 00007F2E64371D9Bh 0x0000001b cmp edi, 0DCBE3ACh 0x00000021 cmp ecx, edx 0x00000023 cmp edx, edx 0x00000025 jmp 00007F2E6436C3BAh 0x00000027 pushad 0x00000028 mov ebx, 000000C5h 0x0000002d rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000465B81 second address: 0000000000465B81 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000463395 second address: 0000000000463395 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007F2E6436BD88h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d cld 0x0000001e pop ecx 0x0000001f add edi, edx 0x00000021 jmp 00007F2E6436BD9Ah 0x00000023 cmp bx, dx 0x00000026 dec ecx 0x00000027 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x0000002a jne 00007F2E6436BD50h 0x0000002c test al, cl 0x0000002e push ecx 0x0000002f test bl, FFFFFFB4h 0x00000032 call 00007F2E6436BDDDh 0x00000037 call 00007F2E6436BD98h 0x0000003c lfence 0x0000003f mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000045 lfence 0x00000048 ret 0x00000049 mov esi, edx 0x0000004b pushad 0x0000004c rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000463437 second address: 0000000000463468 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 popad 0x00000003 jmp 00007F2E6439AACAh 0x00000005 test cx, dx 0x00000008 mov dword ptr [ebp+0000009Ch], 00000000h 0x00000012 test esi, 206C76DAh 0x00000018 pushad 0x00000019 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000463468 second address: 00000000004635BF instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a test ch, dh 0x0000000c xor edi, edi 0x0000000e cmp cl, cl 0x00000010 cld 0x00000011 mov ecx, 000186A0h 0x00000016 push ecx 0x00000017 jmp 00007F2E6436BD9Ah 0x00000019 cmp bx, 495Bh 0x0000001e cmp eax, eax 0x00000020 call 00007F2E6436BE16h 0x00000025 call 00007F2E6436BE06h 0x0000002a lfence 0x0000002d rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000004635BF second address: 00000000004635BF instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a ret 0x0000000b mov esi, edx 0x0000000d pushad 0x0000000e xor eax, eax 0x00000010 inc eax 0x00000011 cpuid 0x00000013 bt ecx, 1Fh 0x00000017 jc 00007F2E6439D736h 0x0000001d popad 0x0000001e jmp 00007F2E6439AACAh 0x00000020 cmp bx, ax 0x00000023 call 00007F2E6439AB01h 0x00000028 lfence 0x0000002b rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe

Code function: 1_2_00408F7E rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe

API coverage: 9.3 %

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe

Code function: 1_2_00408F7E rdtsc

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: Orden de Compra.exe, 00000001.00000002.1048376638.0000000000DC0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: Orden de Compra.exe, 00000001.00000002.1048376638.0000000000DC0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: Orden de Compra.exe, 00000001.00000002.1048376638.0000000000DC0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: Orden de Compra.exe, 00000001.00000002.1048376638.0000000000DC0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery31	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Information Discovery21	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Orden de Compra.exe	49%	Virustotal		Browse
Orden de Compra.exe	10%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Worm.GenericML
Orden de Compra.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	383316
Start date:	07.04.2021
Start time:	16:23:43
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 5m 58s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Orden de Compra.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Run name:	Run with higher sleep bypass
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	18
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal64.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 96.1% (good quality ratio 38.6%) Quality average: 20.6% Quality standard deviation: 28.6%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Sleeps bigger than 120000ms are automatically reduced to 1000ms Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.606827135921854
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	Orden de Compra.exe
File size:	110592
MD5:	e6dcf6b66b611ffb7d2bc1a8045bf41f
SHA1:	7b3871b1b077f764175c6d387e846372128a89ee
SHA256:	280e118484090c0a9788dcad52f37995822757f44d230c9ff042c3507d8e20a3
SHA512:	93f10041774b09d0789c388c1fb1c6643e573efae1a68937c6fdb323d01b535ab6585b64badd43ec095d74573ff8d3ad887788a02d0732b928bfc4318571c10b
SSDEEP:	1536:e5+vV32eex7a2I2vL2M/FPVm9vscwkpKcWe7yPVm9vDd2Mf2v:eo932eQk8Vmz/pr17uVmy
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........#...B...B...B..L^...B...`...B...d...B..Rich.B..........PE..L......Y.................0...................@....@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	c0c6f2e0e4fefe3f

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4013e8
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x59D2AEA6 [Mon Oct 2 21:24:54 2017 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	d1ed0dda3501483d16a7ad09b76f3b08

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 00411024h
call 00007F2E6481AC33h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add dh, dl
cmp al, B9h
jnc 00007F2E6481AC8Eh
in al, 4Fh
dec esp
call far B6B4h : 1BC6E520h
add dword ptr [eax], 00000000h
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx+00h], al
push es
push eax
xchg eax, ebx
add al, byte ptr [ebx+41h]
dec esi
dec ecx
inc ebx
dec eax
inc ecx
dec esi
inc ecx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx+ebp+000002FFh], ah
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec esp
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
or ebp, dword ptr [esi-683F24C6h]
adc ebp, edx
inc ebp
mov bh, byte ptr [eax+13h]
retf D69Dh
jl 00007F2E6481AC42h
cmp eax, EBFEFE9Fh
movsd
jnl 00007F2E6481AC8Bh
mov seg?, word ptr [ebx+ecx+00718674h]
aam 3Ah
dec edi
lodsd
xor ebx, dword ptr [ecx-48EE309Ah]
or al, 00h
stosb
add byte ptr [eax-2Dh], ah
xchg eax, ebx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
mov ebx, edi
add byte ptr [eax], al
test al, F9h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], cl
add byte ptr [ecx+edi*2+74h], ch
je 00007F2E6481ACA7h
jc 00007F2E6481ACB0h
add byte ptr [41000B01h], cl
insb
je 00007F2E6481ACAFh
outsd
imul eax, dword ptr fs:[eax], 00000000h

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x134e4	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x16000	0x5c42	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x108	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x1298c	0x13000	False	0.421450966283	data	6.01111486713	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x14000	0x117c	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x16000	0x5c42	0x6000	False	0.360026041667	data	5.27238648737	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x1ad9a	0xea8	data
RT_ICON	0x1a4f2	0x8a8	data
RT_ICON	0x19f8a	0x568	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_ICON	0x179e2	0x25a8	dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 40
RT_ICON	0x1693a	0x10a8	data
RT_ICON	0x164d2	0x468	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x16478	0x5a	data
RT_VERSION	0x161e0	0x298	data	Guarani	Paraguay

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaLineInputStr, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, _adj_fprem1, __vbaHresultCheckObj, __vbaLenBstrB, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaOnError, _adj_fdiv_m16i, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaFpR8, __vbaVarTstLt, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, __vbaFileClose, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaGenerateBoundsError, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaAryConstruct2, __vbaObjVar, _adj_fpatan, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, _CIlog, __vbaFileOpen, __vbaNew2, __vbaR8Str, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaLateMemCall, __vbaVarAdd, __vbaVarDup, __vbaFpI4, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeStr, __vbaFreeObj

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0474 0x04b0
InternalName	Gulvhoejde9
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	Pana-sonic
Comments	Pana-sonic
ProductName	Pana-sonic
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	Pana-sonic
OriginalFilename	Gulvhoejde9.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
Guarani	Paraguay

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Orden de Compra.exe PID: 6532 Parent PID: 6016

General

Start time:	16:24:58
Start date:	07/04/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Orden de Compra.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	110592 bytes
MD5 hash:	E6DCF6B66B611FFB7D2BC1A8045BF41F
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

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Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report Orden de Compra.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Orden de Compra.exe PID: 6532 Parent PID: 6016

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis