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Analysis Report factura.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	factura.exe
Analysis ID:	384277
MD5:	5950cbe94b3b5dedbf7b75fa1b95ac84
SHA1:	797bb1231483bb11279f6e63fbb5d675bda58f2a
SHA256:	73f2aa87dad06704e8bbd41fb7449a987dc089160a12ba5e13d7d7f6f4196a4f
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Score:	76
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Potential malicious icon found

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Hides threads from debuggers

Tries to detect Any.run

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Detected potential crypto function

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

PE file contains strange resources

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Tries to load missing DLLs

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

factura.exe (PID: 5932 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe' MD5: 5950CBE94B3B5DEDBF7B75FA1B95AC84)

RegAsm.exe (PID: 4404 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe' MD5: 529695608EAFBED00ACA9E61EF333A7C)

RegAsm.exe (PID: 5344 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe' MD5: 529695608EAFBED00ACA9E61EF333A7C)

conhost.exe (PID: 68 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

No yara matches

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: factura.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 27%			Perma Link
Source: factura.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 45%

Source: factura.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 27_2_00D036A8 InternetReadFile,

Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000001B.00000002.747456441.0000000000CFA000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=10SUfaVtm3h4B1EK

System Summary:

Potential malicious icon found

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Icon embedded in PE file: bad icon match: 20047c7c70f0e004

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe

Code function: 1_2_0040169C

Source: factura.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: factura.exe, 00000001.00000002.649560165.00000000021D0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameuser32j% vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe, 00000001.00000002.649247945.000000000040E000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exe vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe, 00000001.00000002.650059978.0000000002A50000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exeFE2XCollutionsCollutions vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe, 00000001.00000002.650059978.0000000002A50000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exeFE2XCollutions5>@ vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe, 00000001.00000002.650059978.0000000002A50000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exeFE2XCollutionsd?3 vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe, 00000001.00000002.650059978.0000000002A50000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exeFE2XCollutionsW8 vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe, 00000001.00000002.650059978.0000000002A50000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exeFE2XCollutions vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe, 00000001.00000002.650059978.0000000002A50000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exeFE2XCollutions(: vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe, 00000001.00000002.650059978.0000000002A50000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exeFE2XCollutionsJ$ vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exe vs factura.exe

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Section loaded: sfc.dll

Source: factura.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal76.rans.evad.winEXE@4/0@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:68:120:WilError_01

Source: factura.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: factura.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 27%
Source: factura.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 45%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe'
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 1_2_00403542 push ebx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040657D push FFFFFFC2h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 1_2_004065AB push FFFFFFC2h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 1_2_00403E6A pushad ; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401E38 push esp; retf 0040h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 1_2_00403ED0 push esp; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 1_2_00403E90 push esp; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 1_2_00403F18 push esp; retf
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 27_2_00D01E0F push es; iretd
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 27_2_00D0062C push 00000039h; retn 1F0Eh
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 27_2_00D02FE2 push cs; iretd
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 27_2_00D01082 push ecx; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 27_2_00D009B2 push D01F0600h; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 27_2_00D030B3 push ebx; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 27_2_00D02174 push esp; retf
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 27_2_00D01266 push ecx; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 27_2_00D02F00 push ebx; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 27_2_00D03032 push ebx; ret

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe

RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000551A41 second address: 0000000000551A41 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007FE76CA6A8B8h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d pop ecx 0x0000001e add edi, edx 0x00000020 dec ecx 0x00000021 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x00000024 jne 00007FE76CA6A8A1h 0x00000026 cmp ah, dh 0x00000028 push ecx 0x00000029 call 00007FE76CA6A8C9h 0x0000002e call 00007FE76CA6A8C8h 0x00000033 lfence 0x00000036 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x0000003c lfence 0x0000003f ret 0x00000040 mov esi, edx 0x00000042 pushad 0x00000043 rdtsc

Tries to detect Any.run

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\qga\qga.exe

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000552C6A second address: 0000000000552C0B instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b retn 0004h 0x0000000e cmp edx, dword ptr [esp+04h] 0x00000012 jne 00007FE76CA6A884h 0x00000014 cmp edx, edx 0x00000016 mov eax, dword ptr [eax] 0x00000018 pushad 0x00000019 lfence 0x0000001c rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000552B18 second address: 0000000000552A79 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b mov esi, dword ptr [ebp+14h] 0x0000000e add esi, dword ptr [ebp+04h] 0x00000011 mov esi, dword ptr [esi+eax*4] 0x00000014 add esi, dword ptr [ebp+04h] 0x00000017 mov dword ptr [ebp+08h], esi 0x0000001a retn 0004h 0x0000001d pushad 0x0000001e lfence 0x00000021 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000551A41 second address: 0000000000551A41 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007FE76CA6A8B8h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d pop ecx 0x0000001e add edi, edx 0x00000020 dec ecx 0x00000021 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x00000024 jne 00007FE76CA6A8A1h 0x00000026 cmp ah, dh 0x00000028 push ecx 0x00000029 call 00007FE76CA6A8C9h 0x0000002e call 00007FE76CA6A8C8h 0x00000033 lfence 0x00000036 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x0000003c lfence 0x0000003f ret 0x00000040 mov esi, edx 0x00000042 pushad 0x00000043 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000551B03 second address: 0000000000551B03 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a ret 0x0000000b mov esi, edx 0x0000000d pushad 0x0000000e xor eax, eax 0x00000010 inc eax 0x00000011 cpuid 0x00000013 bt ecx, 1Fh 0x00000017 jc 00007FE76CB8BDFAh 0x0000001d popad 0x0000001e call 00007FE76CB8AB5Bh 0x00000023 lfence 0x00000026 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000552BA9 second address: 0000000000552BA9 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b push dword ptr [eax+ecx] 0x0000000e pop dword ptr [ebx+ecx] 0x00000011 cmp bx, ax 0x00000014 test cx, 1B46h 0x00000019 inc ecx 0x0000001a inc ecx 0x0000001b inc ecx 0x0000001c inc ecx 0x0000001d cmp dl, bl 0x0000001f cmp ecx, 18h 0x00000022 jne 00007FE76CA6A888h 0x00000024 cmp edx, edx 0x00000026 pushad 0x00000027 lfence 0x0000002a rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000D02C6A second address: 0000000000D02C0B instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b retn 0004h 0x0000000e cmp edx, dword ptr [esp+04h] 0x00000012 jne 00007FE76CB8AB14h 0x00000014 cmp edx, edx 0x00000016 mov eax, dword ptr [eax] 0x00000018 pushad 0x00000019 lfence 0x0000001c rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000D02B18 second address: 0000000000D02A79 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b mov esi, dword ptr [ebp+14h] 0x0000000e add esi, dword ptr [ebp+04h] 0x00000011 mov esi, dword ptr [esi+eax*4] 0x00000014 add esi, dword ptr [ebp+04h] 0x00000017 mov dword ptr [ebp+08h], esi 0x0000001a retn 0004h 0x0000001d pushad 0x0000001e lfence 0x00000021 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000D01B03 second address: 0000000000D01B03 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a ret 0x0000000b mov esi, edx 0x0000000d pushad 0x0000000e xor eax, eax 0x00000010 inc eax 0x00000011 cpuid 0x00000013 bt ecx, 1Fh 0x00000017 jc 00007FE76CB8BDFAh 0x0000001d popad 0x0000001e call 00007FE76CB8AB5Bh 0x00000023 lfence 0x00000026 rdtsc

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe TID: 3260

Thread sleep time: -3490000s >= -30000s

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Hides threads from debuggers

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Thread information set: HideFromDebugger

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Process queried: DebugPort

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000001B.00000002.749330639.0000000001600000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: uProgram Manager
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000001B.00000002.749330639.0000000001600000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000001B.00000002.749330639.0000000001600000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000001B.00000002.749330639.0000000001600000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	DLL Side-Loading1	Process Injection2	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion321	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery51	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	DLL Side-Loading1	Process Injection2	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion321	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Ingress Tool Transfer1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	DLL Side-Loading1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	NTDS	System Information Discovery21	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Software Packing	LSA Secrets	Remote System Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
factura.exe	30%	Metadefender		Browse
factura.exe	46%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.GuLoader

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	384277
Start date:	08.04.2021
Start time:	20:35:18
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 36s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	factura.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	31
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal76.rans.evad.winEXE@4/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 95.3% (good quality ratio 66.4%) Quality average: 41.3% Quality standard deviation: 34.2%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 58% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information. Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 104.42.151.234, 13.64.90.137, 23.54.113.53, 40.88.32.150, 168.61.161.212, 104.43.139.144, 95.100.54.203, 205.185.216.10, 205.185.216.42, 20.50.102.62, 23.10.249.26, 23.10.249.43, 52.155.217.156, 20.54.26.129, 172.217.168.14 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, consumerrp-displaycatalog-aks2eap-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, db5eap.displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, skypedataprdcoleus15.cloudapp.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, au.download.windowsupdate.com.hwcdn.net, arc.trafficmanager.net, drive.google.com, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, consumerrp-displaycatalog-aks2eap.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog-europeeap.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, skypedataprdcolwus17.cloudapp.net, fs.microsoft.com, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, skypedataprdcolcus17.cloudapp.net, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, skypedataprdcolcus16.cloudapp.net, cds.d2s7q6s2.hwcdn.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, skypedataprdcolwus16.cloudapp.net, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found. VT rate limit hit for: /opt/package/joesandbox/database/analysis/384277/sample/factura.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
20:38:30	API Interceptor	350x Sleep call for process: RegAsm.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.437166061311082
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	factura.exe
File size:	57344
MD5:	5950cbe94b3b5dedbf7b75fa1b95ac84
SHA1:	797bb1231483bb11279f6e63fbb5d675bda58f2a
SHA256:	73f2aa87dad06704e8bbd41fb7449a987dc089160a12ba5e13d7d7f6f4196a4f
SHA512:	6e1f38b5f3d257a2d7926213a4ec6947882b6f38bbac8f42e9d0b3a92762494eeec21920e9ef6cf8440e7298aa2fe1eb73c51ce1c8ec1bc4abae14b2d32b1811
SSDEEP:	768:1hk5+yYZnkRUpyncqBRccge9kk1nA36yY1SoqOiiy:1a5+yk/AnbBTbkmA33RoqOe
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........#...B...B...B..L^...B...`...B...d...B..Rich.B..........PE..L....-l`.....................0....................@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	20047c7c70f0e004

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x40169c
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x606C2D85 [Tue Apr 6 09:44:37 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	b983fc96c0bd34be8388eeea33042759

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 0040192Ch
call 00007FE76CA428C5h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [esi], bl
mov word ptr [edi], cs
mov eax, 4C003ABAh
lahf
js 00007FE76CA42868h
push es
stosd
or dh, byte ptr [ecx]
add dword ptr [eax], 00000000h
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx+00h], al
xchg byte ptr [eax-7Eh], dl
add dword ptr [ebx+4Bh], edx
inc ebp
dec ebp
inc ecx
inc esi
dec edi
push edx
dec ebp
inc ebp
push edx
add byte ptr [ecx+ebp+00000312h], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec esp
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
add eax, 02836AD0h
fmul qword ptr [ecx-66h]
dec edi
cdq
mov seg?, word ptr [esi]
call far B4BBh : 29F2388Ch
mov al, E7h
in al, 5Eh
dec esp
cdq
xchg eax, ebx
push ebx
push eax
fcmovu st(0), st(6)
jp 00007FE76CA42887h
cmp cl, byte ptr [edi-53h]
xor ebx, dword ptr [ecx-48EE309Ah]
or al, 00h
stosb
add byte ptr [eax-2Dh], ah
xchg eax, ebx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [ebx+00h], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], cl
add byte ptr [ecx+ebp*2+73h], al
insd
imul ebp, dword ptr [esi+69h], 0D006E6Fh
add dword ptr [edx], ecx
add byte ptr [eax+61h], dh
imul esi, dword ptr [edx+70h], 00000069h

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xada4	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xe000	0x9f0	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x1ac	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0xa3b8	0xb000	False	0.535866477273	data	6.30476552767	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0xc000	0x11b4	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xe000	0x9f0	0x1000	False	0.181884765625	data	2.17356537605	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0xe8c0	0x130	data
RT_ICON	0xe5d8	0x2e8	data
RT_ICON	0xe4b0	0x128	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0xe480	0x30	data
RT_VERSION	0xe150	0x330	data	English	United States

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaHresultCheck, __vbaAryMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, __vbaEnd, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaOnError, __vbaObjSet, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaVarTstLt, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaObjVar, _adj_fpatan, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaVarErrI4, __vbaI2Str, __vbaFPException, __vbaStrVarVal, __vbaDateVar, _CIlog, __vbaErrorOverflow, __vbaFileOpen, __vbaVar2Vec, __vbaNew2, __vbaInStr, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaI4Str, __vbaFreeStrList, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaVarAdd, __vbaLateMemCall, __vbaInStrB, __vbaVarDup, __vbaFpI4, __vbaLateMemCallLd, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, __vbaCastObj, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeStr, __vbaFreeObj

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0409 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Collutions
InternalName	kvalifikationen
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	Collutions
LegalTrademarks	Collutions
Comments	Collutions
ProductName	Collutions
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	Creepy Collutions
OriginalFilename	kvalifikationen.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Apr 8, 2021 20:35:58.124605894 CEST	57820	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:35:58.138807058 CEST	53	57820	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:35:59.861176014 CEST	50848	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:35:59.874805927 CEST	53	50848	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:00.442557096 CEST	61242	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:00.462649107 CEST	53	61242	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:01.041596889 CEST	58562	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:01.054368973 CEST	53	58562	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:02.216945887 CEST	56590	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:02.229949951 CEST	53	56590	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:03.330651999 CEST	60501	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:03.343095064 CEST	53	60501	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:04.365504026 CEST	53775	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:04.379268885 CEST	53	53775	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:05.174426079 CEST	51837	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:05.187256098 CEST	53	51837	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:06.344958067 CEST	55411	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:06.358233929 CEST	53	55411	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:07.345694065 CEST	63668	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:07.357342005 CEST	53	63668	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:09.270503998 CEST	54640	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:09.283051968 CEST	53	54640	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:10.129003048 CEST	58739	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:10.143260956 CEST	53	58739	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:11.852381945 CEST	60338	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:11.865338087 CEST	53	60338	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:12.845262051 CEST	58717	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:12.857690096 CEST	53	58717	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:13.845660925 CEST	59762	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:13.860131979 CEST	53	59762	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:14.864547968 CEST	54329	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:14.878345966 CEST	53	54329	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:18.225589991 CEST	58052	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:18.238105059 CEST	53	58052	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:19.297374010 CEST	54008	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:19.309941053 CEST	53	54008	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:20.350488901 CEST	59451	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:20.362494946 CEST	53	59451	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:24.112349033 CEST	52914	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:24.124360085 CEST	53	52914	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:24.996092081 CEST	64569	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:25.024862051 CEST	53	64569	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:26.457660913 CEST	52816	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:26.477552891 CEST	53	52816	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:26.722604036 CEST	50781	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:26.735862017 CEST	53	50781	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:52.940856934 CEST	54230	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:52.954406023 CEST	53	54230	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:53.004709959 CEST	54911	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:53.018409014 CEST	53	54911	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:59.098500967 CEST	49958	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:36:59.111011982 CEST	53	49958	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:37:14.608776093 CEST	50860	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:37:14.624608994 CEST	53	50860	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:37:24.458585978 CEST	50452	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:37:24.472449064 CEST	53	50452	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:37:54.713227034 CEST	59730	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:37:54.726056099 CEST	53	59730	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:19.167885065 CEST	59310	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:19.181062937 CEST	53	59310	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:19.822521925 CEST	51919	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:19.837526083 CEST	53	51919	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:20.359267950 CEST	64296	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:20.472702026 CEST	53	64296	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:21.086715937 CEST	56680	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:21.101727009 CEST	53	56680	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:21.528199911 CEST	58820	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:21.541776896 CEST	53	58820	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:21.716824055 CEST	60983	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:21.744277954 CEST	53	60983	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:22.060075045 CEST	49247	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:22.073153973 CEST	53	49247	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:22.459789038 CEST	52286	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:22.473186970 CEST	53	52286	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:23.178003073 CEST	56064	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:23.191903114 CEST	53	56064	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:24.355834961 CEST	63744	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:24.371221066 CEST	53	63744	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:24.683099031 CEST	61457	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:24.695868015 CEST	53	61457	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:30.105998993 CEST	58367	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:38:30.132018089 CEST	53	58367	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: factura.exe PID: 5932 Parent PID: 5772

General

Start time:	20:36:05
Start date:	08/04/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	57344 bytes
MD5 hash:	5950CBE94B3B5DEDBF7B75FA1B95AC84
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 4404 Parent PID: 5932

General

Start time:	20:38:18
Start date:	08/04/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe'
Imagebase:	0x130000
File size:	53248 bytes
MD5 hash:	529695608EAFBED00ACA9E61EF333A7C
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 5344 Parent PID: 5932

General

Start time:	20:38:18
Start date:	08/04/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe'
Imagebase:	0x8a0000
File size:	53248 bytes
MD5 hash:	529695608EAFBED00ACA9E61EF333A7C
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 68 Parent PID: 5344

General

Start time:	20:38:19
Start date:	08/04/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff774ee0000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Analysis Report factura.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: factura.exe PID: 5932 Parent PID: 5772

General

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 4404 Parent PID: 5932

General

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 5344 Parent PID: 5932

General

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 68 Parent PID: 5344

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis