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Analysis Report factura.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	factura.exe
Analysis ID:	384277
MD5:	5950cbe94b3b5dedbf7b75fa1b95ac84
SHA1:	797bb1231483bb11279f6e63fbb5d675bda58f2a
SHA256:	73f2aa87dad06704e8bbd41fb7449a987dc089160a12ba5e13d7d7f6f4196a4f
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Potential malicious icon found

Yara detected GuLoader

Contains functionality to detect hardware virtualization (CPUID execution measurement)

Contains functionality to hide a thread from the debugger

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after reading information in the PEB, e.g. number of processors)

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Hides threads from debuggers

Tries to detect Any.run

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Detected potential crypto function

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

PE file contains strange resources

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Tries to load missing DLLs

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

factura.exe (PID: 7088 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe' MD5: 5950CBE94B3B5DEDBF7B75FA1B95AC84)

RegAsm.exe (PID: 5420 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe' MD5: 529695608EAFBED00ACA9E61EF333A7C)

RegAsm.exe (PID: 5388 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe' MD5: 529695608EAFBED00ACA9E61EF333A7C)

conhost.exe (PID: 5392 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
0000000F.00000002.1031687205.0000000000C00000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: RegAsm.exe PID: 5388	JoeSecurity_GuLoader	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: factura.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 49%	Perma Link
Source: factura.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 27%	Perma Link
Source: factura.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 45%

Source: factura.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 15_2_00C035C9 InternetReadFile,

Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031916338.00000000010B0000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.globalsign.net/root-r2.crl0
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.pki.goog/GTS1O1core.crl0
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.pki.goog/gsr2/gsr2.crl0?
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.pki.goog/gsr202
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.pki.goog/gts1o1core0
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031916338.00000000010B0000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://pki.g
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://pki.goog/gsr2/GTS1O1.crt0
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031878163.000000000105B000.00000004.00000020.sdmp, RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp, RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031906231.00000000010A0000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://csp.withgoogle.com/csp/drive-explorer/
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031906231.00000000010A0000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://csp.withgoogle.com/csp/drive-explorer/dU
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031878163.000000000105B000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031916338.00000000010B0000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/A
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031878163.000000000105B000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/Mw#
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031916338.00000000010B0000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/S
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031916338.00000000010B0000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/s
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=10SUfaVtm3h4B1EKTZwmBbjvsikSdqvbe
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=10SUfaVtm3h4B1EKTZwmBbjvsikSdqvbe4J
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=10SUfaVtm3h4B1EKTZwmBbjvsikSdqvbe8J
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031878163.000000000105B000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=10SUfaVtm3h4B1EKTZwmBbjvsikSdqvbeOj
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031878163.000000000105B000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=10SUfaVtm3h4B1EKTZwmBbjvsikSdqvbeWJ
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031687205.0000000000C00000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=10SUfaVtm3h4B1EKTZwmBbjvsikSdqvbef
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=10SUfaVtm3h4B1EKTZwmBbjvsikSdqvbehJ
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=10SUfaVtm3h4B1EKTZwmBbjvsikSdqvbepJ
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=10SUfaVtm3h4B1EKTZwmBbjvsikSdqvbewmBbjvsikSdqvbetubek
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031878163.000000000105B000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=10SUfaVtm3h4B1EKTZwmBbjvsikSdqvbeyJ
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://pki.goog/repository/0

System Summary:

Potential malicious icon found

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Icon embedded in PE file: bad icon match: 20047c7c70f0e004

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00C001DE EnumWindows,NtSetInformationThread,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00C031B1 NtProtectVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00C00219 NtSetInformationThread,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00C0352C NtProtectVirtualMemory,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040169C

Source: factura.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: factura.exe, 00000000.00000002.1021965132.0000000002230000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exeFE2XCollutionsCollutions vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe, 00000000.00000002.1021965132.0000000002230000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exeFE2XCollutions vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe, 00000000.00000002.1021965132.0000000002230000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exeFE2XCollutions( vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe, 00000000.00000002.1021965132.0000000002230000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exeFE2XCollutionsW vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe, 00000000.00000000.637238818.000000000040E000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exe vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe, 00000000.00000002.1021928094.00000000021E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameuser32j% vs factura.exe
Source: factura.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamekvalifikationen.exe vs factura.exe

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Section loaded: sfc.dll

Source: factura.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@4/0@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:5392:120:WilError_01

Source: factura.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: factura.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 49%
Source: factura.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 27%
Source: factura.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 45%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe'
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000F.00000002.1031687205.0000000000C00000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: RegAsm.exe PID: 5388, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 0_2_00403542 push ebx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040657D push FFFFFFC2h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 0_2_004065AB push FFFFFFC2h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 0_2_00403E6A pushad ; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 0_2_00401E38 push esp; retf 0040h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 0_2_00403ED0 push esp; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 0_2_00403E90 push esp; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Code function: 0_2_00403F18 push esp; retf

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Contains functionality to detect hardware virtualization (CPUID execution measurement)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 15_2_00C00AE8 LoadLibraryA,

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe

RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000411A41 second address: 0000000000411A41 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007F99E4842F68h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d pop ecx 0x0000001e add edi, edx 0x00000020 dec ecx 0x00000021 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x00000024 jne 00007F99E4842F51h 0x00000026 cmp ah, dh 0x00000028 push ecx 0x00000029 call 00007F99E4842F79h 0x0000002e call 00007F99E4842F78h 0x00000033 lfence 0x00000036 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x0000003c lfence 0x0000003f ret 0x00000040 mov esi, edx 0x00000042 pushad 0x00000043 rdtsc

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after reading information in the PEB, e.g. number of processors)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Evasive API call chain: GetPEB, DecisionNodes, Sleep

Tries to detect Any.run

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	File opened: C:\Program Files\qga\qga.exe

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: RegAsm.exe

Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\QEMU-GA\QEMU-GA.EXE

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000412C6A second address: 0000000000412C0B instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b retn 0004h 0x0000000e cmp edx, dword ptr [esp+04h] 0x00000012 jne 00007F99E4842F34h 0x00000014 cmp edx, edx 0x00000016 mov eax, dword ptr [eax] 0x00000018 pushad 0x00000019 lfence 0x0000001c rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000412B18 second address: 0000000000412A79 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b mov esi, dword ptr [ebp+14h] 0x0000000e add esi, dword ptr [ebp+04h] 0x00000011 mov esi, dword ptr [esi+eax*4] 0x00000014 add esi, dword ptr [ebp+04h] 0x00000017 mov dword ptr [ebp+08h], esi 0x0000001a retn 0004h 0x0000001d pushad 0x0000001e lfence 0x00000021 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000411A41 second address: 0000000000411A41 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007F99E4842F68h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d pop ecx 0x0000001e add edi, edx 0x00000020 dec ecx 0x00000021 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x00000024 jne 00007F99E4842F51h 0x00000026 cmp ah, dh 0x00000028 push ecx 0x00000029 call 00007F99E4842F79h 0x0000002e call 00007F99E4842F78h 0x00000033 lfence 0x00000036 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x0000003c lfence 0x0000003f ret 0x00000040 mov esi, edx 0x00000042 pushad 0x00000043 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000411B03 second address: 0000000000411B03 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a ret 0x0000000b mov esi, edx 0x0000000d pushad 0x0000000e xor eax, eax 0x00000010 inc eax 0x00000011 cpuid 0x00000013 bt ecx, 1Fh 0x00000017 jc 00007F99E4D9C4AAh 0x0000001d popad 0x0000001e call 00007F99E4D9B20Bh 0x00000023 lfence 0x00000026 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000412BA9 second address: 0000000000412BA9 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b push dword ptr [eax+ecx] 0x0000000e pop dword ptr [ebx+ecx] 0x00000011 cmp bx, ax 0x00000014 test cx, 1B46h 0x00000019 inc ecx 0x0000001a inc ecx 0x0000001b inc ecx 0x0000001c inc ecx 0x0000001d cmp dl, bl 0x0000001f cmp ecx, 18h 0x00000022 jne 00007F99E4842F38h 0x00000024 cmp edx, edx 0x00000026 pushad 0x00000027 lfence 0x0000002a rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000C02C6A second address: 0000000000C02C0B instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b retn 0004h 0x0000000e cmp edx, dword ptr [esp+04h] 0x00000012 jne 00007F99E4D9B1C4h 0x00000014 cmp edx, edx 0x00000016 mov eax, dword ptr [eax] 0x00000018 pushad 0x00000019 lfence 0x0000001c rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000C02B18 second address: 0000000000C02A79 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a popad 0x0000000b mov esi, dword ptr [ebp+14h] 0x0000000e add esi, dword ptr [ebp+04h] 0x00000011 mov esi, dword ptr [esi+eax*4] 0x00000014 add esi, dword ptr [ebp+04h] 0x00000017 mov dword ptr [ebp+08h], esi 0x0000001a retn 0004h 0x0000001d pushad 0x0000001e lfence 0x00000021 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000C01B03 second address: 0000000000C01B03 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 shl edx, 20h 0x00000008 or edx, eax 0x0000000a ret 0x0000000b mov esi, edx 0x0000000d pushad 0x0000000e xor eax, eax 0x00000010 inc eax 0x00000011 cpuid 0x00000013 bt ecx, 1Fh 0x00000017 jc 00007F99E4D9C4AAh 0x0000001d popad 0x0000001e call 00007F99E4D9B20Bh 0x00000023 lfence 0x00000026 rdtsc

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 15_2_00C02A2C rdtsc

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe TID: 5448

Thread sleep time: -40000s >= -30000s

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031878163.000000000105B000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAWX
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031916338.00000000010B0000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW
Source: RegAsm.exe	Binary or memory string: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031916338.00000000010B0000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAWMA=v

Anti Debugging:

Contains functionality to hide a thread from the debugger

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 15_2_00C001DE NtSetInformationThread 000000FE,00000011,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,?,00000000,00000000

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Hides threads from debuggers

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Thread information set: HideFromDebugger

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Process queried: DebugPort

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 15_2_00C02A2C rdtsc

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe

Code function: 15_2_00C01D57 LdrInitializeThunk,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00C00AE8 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00C00E25 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00C00FE2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00C02BEE mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00C01996 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00C029BD mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe	Code function: 15_2_00C02F5D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031956172.00000000014E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031956172.00000000014E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031956172.00000000014E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031956172.00000000014E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Native API1	DLL Side-Loading1	Process Injection2	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion321	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery821	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	DLL Side-Loading1	Process Injection2	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion321	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Ingress Tool Transfer1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	DLL Side-Loading1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	NTDS	System Information Discovery31	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Software Packing	LSA Secrets	Remote System Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
factura.exe	49%	Virustotal		Browse
factura.exe	30%	Metadefender		Browse
factura.exe	46%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.GuLoader

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://pki.goog/gsr2/GTS1O1.crt0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://pki.goog/gsr2/GTS1O1.crt0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://pki.goog/gsr2/GTS1O1.crt0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://pki.goog/gsr2/GTS1O1.crt0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://crl.pki.goog/gsr2/gsr2.crl0?	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://crl.pki.goog/gsr2/gsr2.crl0?	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://crl.pki.goog/gsr2/gsr2.crl0?	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://crl.pki.goog/gsr2/gsr2.crl0?	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://pki.goog/repository/0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://pki.goog/repository/0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://pki.goog/repository/0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://pki.goog/repository/0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://pki.g	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://crl.pki.goog/GTS1O1core.crl0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://crl.pki.goog/GTS1O1core.crl0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://crl.pki.goog/GTS1O1core.crl0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://crl.pki.goog/GTS1O1core.crl0	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://pki.goog/gsr2/GTS1O1.crt0	RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://crl.pki.goog/gsr2/gsr2.crl0?	RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://pki.goog/repository/0	RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://pki.g	RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031916338.00000000010B0000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://crl.pki.goog/GTS1O1core.crl0	RegAsm.exe, 0000000F.00000002.1031930913.00000000010CC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	384277
Start date:	08.04.2021
Start time:	20:43:47
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 5m 43s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	factura.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Run name:	Run with higher sleep bypass
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	18
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@4/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 95.3% (good quality ratio 66.7%) Quality average: 41.5% Quality standard deviation: 34.2%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 69% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Sleeps bigger than 120000ms are automatically reduced to 1000ms Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information. Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 13.88.21.125, 40.88.32.150, 20.82.209.183, 23.10.249.26, 23.10.249.43, 104.42.151.234, 104.43.193.48, 52.155.217.156, 205.185.216.10, 205.185.216.42, 20.54.26.129, 20.82.210.154, 172.217.168.14 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, consumerrp-displaycatalog-aks2eap-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, db5eap.displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, skypedataprdcoleus15.cloudapp.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, au.download.windowsupdate.com.hwcdn.net, arc.trafficmanager.net, drive.google.com, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, consumerrp-displaycatalog-aks2eap.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog-europeeap.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, displaycatalog.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, cds.d2s7q6s2.hwcdn.net, skypedataprdcolcus15.cloudapp.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, skypedataprdcolwus15.cloudapp.net, skypedataprdcolwus16.cloudapp.net, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.437166061311082
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	factura.exe
File size:	57344
MD5:	5950cbe94b3b5dedbf7b75fa1b95ac84
SHA1:	797bb1231483bb11279f6e63fbb5d675bda58f2a
SHA256:	73f2aa87dad06704e8bbd41fb7449a987dc089160a12ba5e13d7d7f6f4196a4f
SHA512:	6e1f38b5f3d257a2d7926213a4ec6947882b6f38bbac8f42e9d0b3a92762494eeec21920e9ef6cf8440e7298aa2fe1eb73c51ce1c8ec1bc4abae14b2d32b1811
SSDEEP:	768:1hk5+yYZnkRUpyncqBRccge9kk1nA36yY1SoqOiiy:1a5+yk/AnbBTbkmA33RoqOe
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........#...B...B...B..L^...B...`...B...d...B..Rich.B..........PE..L....-l`.....................0....................@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	20047c7c70f0e004

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x40169c
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x606C2D85 [Tue Apr 6 09:44:37 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	b983fc96c0bd34be8388eeea33042759

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 0040192Ch
call 00007F99E4BE87C5h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [esi], bl
mov word ptr [edi], cs
mov eax, 4C003ABAh
lahf
js 00007F99E4BE8768h
push es
stosd
or dh, byte ptr [ecx]
add dword ptr [eax], 00000000h
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx+00h], al
xchg byte ptr [eax-7Eh], dl
add dword ptr [ebx+4Bh], edx
inc ebp
dec ebp
inc ecx
inc esi
dec edi
push edx
dec ebp
inc ebp
push edx
add byte ptr [ecx+ebp+00000312h], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec esp
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
add eax, 02836AD0h
fmul qword ptr [ecx-66h]
dec edi
cdq
mov seg?, word ptr [esi]
call far B4BBh : 29F2388Ch
mov al, E7h
in al, 5Eh
dec esp
cdq
xchg eax, ebx
push ebx
push eax
fcmovu st(0), st(6)
jp 00007F99E4BE8787h
cmp cl, byte ptr [edi-53h]
xor ebx, dword ptr [ecx-48EE309Ah]
or al, 00h
stosb
add byte ptr [eax-2Dh], ah
xchg eax, ebx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [ebx+00h], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], cl
add byte ptr [ecx+ebp*2+73h], al
insd
imul ebp, dword ptr [esi+69h], 0D006E6Fh
add dword ptr [edx], ecx
add byte ptr [eax+61h], dh
imul esi, dword ptr [edx+70h], 00000069h

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xada4	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xe000	0x9f0	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x1ac	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0xa3b8	0xb000	False	0.535866477273	data	6.30476552767	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0xc000	0x11b4	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xe000	0x9f0	0x1000	False	0.181884765625	data	2.17356537605	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0xe8c0	0x130	data
RT_ICON	0xe5d8	0x2e8	data
RT_ICON	0xe4b0	0x128	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0xe480	0x30	data
RT_VERSION	0xe150	0x330	data	English	United States

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaHresultCheck, __vbaAryMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, __vbaEnd, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaOnError, __vbaObjSet, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaVarTstLt, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaObjVar, _adj_fpatan, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaVarErrI4, __vbaI2Str, __vbaFPException, __vbaStrVarVal, __vbaDateVar, _CIlog, __vbaErrorOverflow, __vbaFileOpen, __vbaVar2Vec, __vbaNew2, __vbaInStr, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaI4Str, __vbaFreeStrList, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaVarAdd, __vbaLateMemCall, __vbaInStrB, __vbaVarDup, __vbaFpI4, __vbaLateMemCallLd, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, __vbaCastObj, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeStr, __vbaFreeObj

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0409 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Collutions
InternalName	kvalifikationen
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	Collutions
LegalTrademarks	Collutions
Comments	Collutions
ProductName	Collutions
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	Creepy Collutions
OriginalFilename	kvalifikationen.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:25.018028021 CEST	58028	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:25.033273935 CEST	53	58028	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:26.235450983 CEST	53097	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:26.249053001 CEST	53	53097	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:27.647319078 CEST	49257	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:27.659986973 CEST	53	49257	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:28.400440931 CEST	62389	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:28.413872957 CEST	53	62389	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:29.390337944 CEST	49910	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:29.403570890 CEST	53	49910	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:30.673795938 CEST	55854	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:30.687885046 CEST	53	55854	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:55.153501987 CEST	64549	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:44:55.170157909 CEST	53	64549	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:01.328985929 CEST	63153	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:01.348550081 CEST	53	63153	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:03.537647963 CEST	52991	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:03.550663948 CEST	53	52991	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:06.732263088 CEST	53700	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:06.745244026 CEST	53	53700	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:07.484611988 CEST	51726	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:07.500202894 CEST	53	51726	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:08.270230055 CEST	56794	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:08.283471107 CEST	53	56794	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:09.470990896 CEST	56534	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:09.483995914 CEST	53	56534	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:10.602649927 CEST	56627	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:10.615151882 CEST	53	56627	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:11.359272003 CEST	56621	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:11.371999025 CEST	53	56621	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:14.906299114 CEST	63116	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:14.919040918 CEST	53	63116	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:17.433084011 CEST	64078	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:17.545129061 CEST	53	64078	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:18.292279005 CEST	64801	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:18.384068012 CEST	53	64801	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:18.545285940 CEST	61721	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:18.560043097 CEST	53	61721	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:18.794848919 CEST	51255	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:18.807977915 CEST	53	51255	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:19.152693987 CEST	61522	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:19.168514967 CEST	53	61522	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:19.253931046 CEST	52337	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:19.266459942 CEST	53	52337	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:19.693877935 CEST	55046	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:19.706681013 CEST	53	55046	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:20.001358032 CEST	49612	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:20.014388084 CEST	53	49612	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:20.123475075 CEST	49285	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:20.139849901 CEST	53	49285	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:20.176346064 CEST	50601	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:20.190529108 CEST	53	50601	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:20.374970913 CEST	60875	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:20.407475948 CEST	53	60875	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:20.519582033 CEST	56448	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:20.611478090 CEST	53	56448	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:20.647066116 CEST	59172	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:20.661165953 CEST	53	59172	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:21.215986967 CEST	62420	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:21.229494095 CEST	53	62420	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:22.265459061 CEST	60579	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:22.280459881 CEST	53	60579	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:22.594882011 CEST	50183	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:22.648865938 CEST	53	50183	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:34.037904024 CEST	61531	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:45:34.058129072 CEST	53	61531	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:46:05.813369036 CEST	49228	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:46:05.828219891 CEST	53	49228	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:46:09.114721060 CEST	59794	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:46:09.143913984 CEST	53	59794	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Apr 8, 2021 20:46:34.451797009 CEST	55916	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Apr 8, 2021 20:46:34.480366945 CEST	53	55916	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: factura.exe PID: 7088 Parent PID: 5892

General

Start time:	20:44:30
Start date:	08/04/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	57344 bytes
MD5 hash:	5950CBE94B3B5DEDBF7B75FA1B95AC84
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 5420 Parent PID: 7088

General

Start time:	20:46:23
Start date:	08/04/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe'
Imagebase:	0x310000
File size:	53248 bytes
MD5 hash:	529695608EAFBED00ACA9E61EF333A7C
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 5388 Parent PID: 7088

General

Start time:	20:46:24
Start date:	08/04/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegAsm.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\factura.exe'
Imagebase:	0x800000
File size:	53248 bytes
MD5 hash:	529695608EAFBED00ACA9E61EF333A7C
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 0000000F.00000002.1031687205.0000000000C00000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 5392 Parent PID: 5388

General

Start time:	20:46:24
Start date:	08/04/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff724c50000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

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Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report factura.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: factura.exe PID: 7088 Parent PID: 5892

General

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 5420 Parent PID: 7088

General

Analysis Process: RegAsm.exe PID: 5388 Parent PID: 7088

General

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 5392 Parent PID: 5388

General

Disassembly