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Analysis Report 7FzERy9xWc

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	7FzERy9xWc (renamed file extension from none to exe)
Analysis ID:	385074
MD5:	8f250f634de721fec7b002a805dddc24
SHA1:	8e177de1f0ec9d45417b27e47973b8ded74242c7
SHA256:	5971fcdcf0f563f502c8ab017f34567c15e3e76c7a3c1497ae8513c305f77798
Tags:	uncategorized
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

ZeusVM

Score:	72
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Detected ZeusVM e-Banking Trojan

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Contains VNC / remote desktop functionality (version string found)

Machine Learning detection for sample

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls

Contains functionality to enumerate network shares

Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user

Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Contains functionality to read the clipboard data

Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes

Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system

Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)

Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)

Detected potential crypto function

Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)

May initialize a security null descriptor

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

7FzERy9xWc.exe (PID: 2788 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe' MD5: 8F250F634DE721FEC7B002A805DDDC24)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

No yara matches

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 87%			Perma Link
Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 92%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 0.0.7FzERy9xWc.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen
Source: 0.2.7FzERy9xWc.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00412470 CryptAcquireContextW,CryptCreateHash,CryptHashData,CryptGetHashParam,CryptDestroyHash,CryptReleaseContext,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041FB50 HeapAlloc,CryptUnprotectData,LocalFree,HeapFree,SysFreeString,SysFreeString,SysFreeString,SysFreeString,SysFreeString,SysFreeString,

Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040FEA0 GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,SHGetFolderPathW,StrCmpNIW,FreeLibrary,NetUserEnum,NetUserGetInfo,PathCombineW,VirtualFree,CloseHandle,NetApiBufferFree,NetApiBufferFree,SHGetFolderPathW,VirtualFree,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_004185D0 PathCombineW,MultiByteToWideChar,PathRemoveFileSpecW,PathCombineW,PathCombineW,SetFileAttributesW,FindFirstFileW,DeleteFileW,PathCombineW,SetFileAttributesW,DeleteFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00418700 PathCombineW,FindFirstFileW,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,PathCombineW,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_00414C40 select,recv,

Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.google.com/webhp
Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe, 00000000.00000002.200969767.0000000000401000.00000020.00020000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.google.com/webhpbcSeShutdownPrivilege

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_004239D0 GetClipboardData,WaitForSingleObject,GlobalLock,EnterCriticalSection,LeaveCriticalSection,GlobalUnlock,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_00423840 WaitForSingleObject,EnterCriticalSection,GetTickCount,LeaveCriticalSection,TranslateMessage,GetKeyboardState,ToUnicode,TranslateMessage,

Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe, 00000000.00000002.201329272.000000000077A000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Binary or memory string: <HOOK MODULE="DDRAW.DLL" FUNCTION="DirectDrawCreateEx"/>

E-Banking Fraud:

Detected ZeusVM e-Banking Trojan

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_0041A850 lstrcmpiA,lstrcmpiA,lstrcmpiA,setsockopt,WSAIoctl,HeapFree,select,WSASetLastError,HeapAlloc,SetLastError,HeapFree,HeapFree,CreateThread,shutdown,closesocket,WaitForMultipleObjects,CloseHandle,HeapFree,HeapFree,HeapFree,HeapFree,ReleaseMutex,CloseHandle,HeapFree,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_0041A370 send,OpenWindowStationW,CreateWindowStationW,GetProcessWindowStation,OpenDesktopW,CreateDesktopW,CloseDesktop,CloseWindowStation,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_00412C70 LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,CreateProcessAsUserW,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041D940 VirtualFree,CloseHandle,CreateMutexW,GetLastError,CloseHandle,ExitWindowsEx,OpenEventW,SetEvent,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,OpenMutexW,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,CloseHandle,Sleep,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,Sleep,IsWellKnownSid,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,VirtualFree,CreateEventW,WaitForSingleObject,WaitForMultipleObjects,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,ReleaseMutex,CloseHandle,HeapFree,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040E230 ExitWindowsEx,InitiateSystemShutdownExW,ExitWindowsEx,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040AC10
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_004140B0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00414990
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00416E10
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00408E30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_004022C3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00416AB0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00412360
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00412374
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040F3FD

Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal72.bank.troj.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00423460 CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertDuplicateCertificateContext,CertDuplicateCertificateContext,CertDeleteCertificateFromStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertCloseStore,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_004232A0 CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertCloseStore,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,HeapAlloc,PFXExportCertStoreEx,CharLowerW,GetSystemTime,HeapFree,CertCloseStore,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_004129B0 GetCurrentThread,OpenThreadToken,OpenProcessToken,LookupPrivilegeValueW,AdjustTokenPrivileges,GetLastError,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_00412930 CreateToolhelp32Snapshot,Thread32First,Thread32Next,Thread32Next,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_00420440 CoCreateInstance,HeapFree,

Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 87%
Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 92%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_00412C70 LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,CreateProcessAsUserW,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00409CFB push eax; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00409C70 push eax; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00402C19 push cs; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00409CB9 push eax; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040254D push es; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00402BE3 push cs; ret

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.96218490454

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_0041E910 VirtualProtect,LoadLibraryA,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,LoadImageW,GetIconInfo,GetCursorPos,DrawIcon,lstrcmpiW,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_004185D0 PathCombineW,MultiByteToWideChar,PathRemoveFileSpecW,PathCombineW,PathCombineW,SetFileAttributesW,FindFirstFileW,DeleteFileW,PathCombineW,SetFileAttributesW,DeleteFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00418700 PathCombineW,FindFirstFileW,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,PathCombineW,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,

Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe, 00000000.00000002.201329272.000000000077A000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_00412C70 LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,CreateProcessAsUserW,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00409D89 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041C4F0 mov edx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_0041CAF0 HeapCreate,GetProcessHeap,InitializeCriticalSection,WSAStartup,CreateEventW,GetCurrentProcessId,

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_00415510 InitializeSecurityDescriptor,SetSecurityDescriptorDacl,ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW,GetSecurityDescriptorSacl,SetSecurityDescriptorSacl,LocalFree,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_004234C0 PFXImportCertStore,GetSystemTime,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040C999 HeapFree,GetUserDefaultUILanguage,GetModuleFileNameW,GetUserNameExW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_00410960 GetTimeZoneInformation,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe

Code function: 0_2_0041D000 GetComputerNameW,GetVersionExW,

Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe

Binary or memory string: S:(ML;;NRNWNX;;;LW)

Remote Access Functionality:

Contains VNC / remote desktop functionality (version string found)

Show sources

Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe	String found in binary or memory: RFB 003.003
Source: 7FzERy9xWc.exe	String found in binary or memory: RFB 003.003

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00415030 socket,bind,listen,closesocket,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406D40 WaitForSingleObject,socket,bind,GetTickCount,socket,bind,listen,closesocket,CreateEventW,WSAEventSelect,CloseHandle,shutdown,closesocket,getsockname,shutdown,closesocket,CloseHandle,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00414EE0 socket,bind,listen,closesocket,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00414F40 socket,socket,bind,GetTickCount,socket,bind,listen,closesocket,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe	Code function: 0_2_00415320 socket,bind,closesocket,

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts1	Native API1	Create Account1	Valid Accounts1	Valid Accounts1	Input Capture21	Network Share Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol1	Input Capture21	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel2	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	System Shutdown/Reboot1
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Valid Accounts1	Access Token Manipulation11	Access Token Manipulation11	LSASS Memory	System Time Discovery2	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Remote Access Software1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Application Shimming1	Application Shimming1	Obfuscated Files or Information2	Security Account Manager	Security Software Discovery11	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Clipboard Data1	Automated Exfiltration	Ingress Tool Transfer1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Install Root Certificate1	NTDS	Process Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Software Packing3	LSA Secrets	Account Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Steganography	Cached Domain Credentials	System Owner/User Discovery1	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Compile After Delivery	DCSync	File and Directory Discovery1	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Indicator Removal from Tools	Proc Filesystem	System Information Discovery3	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
7FzERy9xWc.exe	88%	Virustotal		Browse
7FzERy9xWc.exe	92%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Zeus
7FzERy9xWc.exe	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen
7FzERy9xWc.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
0.0.7FzERy9xWc.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen		Download File
0.2.7FzERy9xWc.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen		Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	385074
Start date:	11.04.2021
Start time:	15:49:45
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 45s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	7FzERy9xWc (renamed file extension from none to exe)
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	5
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal72.bank.troj.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 32.2% (good quality ratio 30.7%) Quality average: 80.9% Quality standard deviation: 25.6%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, svchost.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	MS-DOS executable
Entropy (8bit):	7.912987012643321
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.94% DOS Executable Borland Pascal 7.0x (2037/25) 0.02% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% VXD Driver (31/22) 0.00%
File name:	7FzERy9xWc.exe
File size:	188928
MD5:	8f250f634de721fec7b002a805dddc24
SHA1:	8e177de1f0ec9d45417b27e47973b8ded74242c7
SHA256:	5971fcdcf0f563f502c8ab017f34567c15e3e76c7a3c1497ae8513c305f77798
SHA512:	d42a259868824429c4d6c7ed4aa5de1ddb3805d300feb39b51480a5232c0c05a74d9f27266ce60a796545f23e5de75896a8aa871ed93e5ab73ec01647175c191
SSDEEP:	3072:k8pY9M8j32Jwk95kLvkIuBEn/VnEXC1gDtfgBtW8cNhSw4L7Qpo977jurOC:k9j3SwOucIWX1fI6NATF9n6rp
File Content Preview:	MZ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................PE..L...YJ.P...................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x41dd30
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x50164A59 [Mon Jul 30 08:48:25 2012 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	5
OS Version Minor:	1
File Version Major:	5
File Version Minor:	1
Subsystem Version Major:	5
Subsystem Version Minor:	1
Import Hash:	87b3a93d03af93f2e664ed65d7224e1a

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 00409D4Bh
ret
or al, FCh
adc al, ADh
xchg eax, ecx
mov esp, C114C940h
add ecx, dword ptr [edi-62h]
push edx
xchg eax, edx
jmp 00007F50B208EC5Fh
cmc
fldcw word ptr [edx-71h]
paddsw mm5, qword ptr [ebp+79725C5Dh]
aas
cmp bl, byte ptr [ecx+edi*2]
clc

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x2a364	0x118	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x30000	0x1eb4	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x5a0	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x2b244	0x2b400	False	0.956478052746	data	7.96218490454	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x2d000	0x2054	0x400	False	0.2080078125	data	1.53050726795	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x30000	0x23f4	0x2400	False	0.709418402778	data	6.27055584577	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.dll	HeapDestroy, HeapCreate, Thread32Next, ReadFile, GetTimeZoneInformation, MultiByteToWideChar, GetTempPathW, GetFileSizeEx, OpenMutexW, VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtectEx, VirtualAllocEx, FindClose, LoadLibraryA, RemoveDirectoryW, FindNextFileW, VirtualProtect, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, GetFileTime, FileTimeToLocalFileTime, GetVolumeNameForVolumeMountPointW, DeleteFileW, GetFileInformationByHandle, GetSystemTime, WriteProcessMemory, GetNativeSystemInfo, GetThreadContext, GetProcessId, GetFileAttributesExW, GetCurrentThreadId, TlsGetValue, TlsSetValue, TerminateProcess, GetCommandLineW, SetErrorMode, GetComputerNameW, OpenEventW, DuplicateHandle, GetCurrentProcessId, GlobalLock, GlobalUnlock, GetLocalTime, MapViewOfFile, UnmapViewOfFile, CreateFileMappingW, TlsAlloc, TlsFree, CreateRemoteThread, Process32FirstW, Process32NextW, SetFileAttributesW, WTSGetActiveConsoleSessionId, ReadProcessMemory, VirtualFreeEx, WideCharToMultiByte, Thread32First, OpenProcess, VirtualQueryEx, SetFileTime, IsBadReadPtr, GetProcessHeap, lstrcmpiA, LoadLibraryW, VirtualFree, HeapFree, SetFilePointerEx, SystemTimeToFileTime, HeapAlloc, CreateProcessW, SetEndOfFile, FindFirstFileW, CreateMutexW, HeapReAlloc, GetTempFileNameW, FileTimeToDosDateTime, GetEnvironmentVariableW, LocalFree, SetThreadContext, GetVersionExW, CreateDirectoryW, FreeLibrary, ExitProcess, SetThreadPriority, GetCurrentThread, ExpandEnvironmentStringsW, GetUserDefaultUILanguage, lstrcmpiW, GetModuleFileNameW, Sleep, GetTickCount, MoveFileExW, ResetEvent, SetLastError, GetLastError, SetEvent, EnterCriticalSection, GetProcAddress, GetPrivateProfileIntW, FlushFileBuffers, CreateFileW, GetFileAttributesW, LeaveCriticalSection, InitializeCriticalSection, WriteFile, GetPrivateProfileStringW, GetModuleHandleW, CloseHandle, WaitForMultipleObjects, CreateEventW, ReleaseMutex, CreateThread, WaitForSingleObject
USER32.dll	SwitchDesktop, DefDlgProcA, DefMDIChildProcA, ReleaseCapture, RegisterClassW, CallWindowProcA, CallWindowProcW, GetMessagePos, DefFrameProcW, RegisterClassA, EndPaint, GetUpdateRgn, GetMessageW, GetWindowDC, FillRect, PostMessageW, GetWindowInfo, DefMDIChildProcW, BeginPaint, GetUpdateRect, IntersectRect, GetDCEx, PostThreadMessageW, EqualRect, PrintWindow, ToUnicode, DefWindowProcW, IsRectEmpty, CharLowerBuffA, CreateDesktopW, SetProcessWindowStation, GetWindowRect, GetParent, GetKeyboardState, GetClassLongW, GetAncestor, SetWindowPos, IsWindow, MapWindowPoints, RegisterWindowMessageW, GetMenuItemID, SetKeyboardState, GetSubMenu, MenuItemFromPoint, GetMenu, GetMenuItemRect, TrackPopupMenuEx, SystemParametersInfoW, GetClassNameW, GetMenuState, GetMenuItemCount, HiliteMenuItem, EndMenu, GetWindowThreadProcessId, CharLowerW, MapVirtualKeyW, DefWindowProcA, DrawIcon, GetShellWindow, DrawEdge, GetIconInfo, GetCursorPos, RegisterClassExA, SetCapture, GetSystemMetrics, ExitWindowsEx, DefDlgProcW, DefFrameProcA, OpenInputDesktop, GetCapture, GetThreadDesktop, CloseWindowStation, CreateWindowStationW, GetProcessWindowStation, OpenDesktopW, CloseDesktop, SetThreadDesktop, GetUserObjectInformationW, OpenWindowStationW, GetTopWindow, LoadImageW, MsgWaitForMultipleObjects, WindowFromPoint, GetDC, TranslateMessage, GetWindowLongW, CharLowerA, RegisterClassExW, SetCursorPos, GetClipboardData, PeekMessageA, SendMessageW, CharToOemW, DispatchMessageW, GetWindow, SendMessageTimeoutW, SetWindowLongW, CharUpperW, ReleaseDC, PeekMessageW, GetMessageA
ADVAPI32.dll	InitiateSystemShutdownExW, EqualSid, ConvertSidToStringSidW, CryptGetHashParam, OpenProcessToken, GetSidSubAuthority, CryptAcquireContextW, OpenThreadToken, GetSidSubAuthorityCount, GetTokenInformation, RegCreateKeyExW, CryptReleaseContext, RegQueryValueExW, CreateProcessAsUserW, InitializeSecurityDescriptor, SetSecurityDescriptorDacl, SetNamedSecurityInfoW, LookupPrivilegeValueW, CryptCreateHash, ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW, RegOpenKeyExW, GetSecurityDescriptorSacl, SetSecurityDescriptorSacl, CryptDestroyHash, AdjustTokenPrivileges, RegCloseKey, RegSetValueExW, CryptHashData, IsWellKnownSid, GetLengthSid, RegEnumKeyExW
SHLWAPI.dll	PathQuoteSpacesW, PathRenameExtensionW, StrStrIW, StrStrIA, wvnsprintfA, StrCmpNIA, PathMatchSpecW, PathRemoveBackslashW, PathUnquoteSpacesW, PathAddExtensionW, PathCombineW, SHDeleteKeyW, PathSkipRootW, SHDeleteValueW, PathAddBackslashW, PathFindFileNameW, PathIsDirectoryW, wvnsprintfW, UrlUnescapeA, StrCmpNIW, PathIsURLW, PathRemoveFileSpecW
SHELL32.dll	ShellExecuteW, SHGetFolderPathW, CommandLineToArgvW
Secur32.dll	GetUserNameExW
ole32.dll	StringFromGUID2, CLSIDFromString, CoUninitialize, CoCreateInstance, CoInitializeEx
GDI32.dll	CreateCompatibleDC, SetRectRgn, SaveDC, DeleteDC, SetViewportOrgEx, RestoreDC, CreateDIBSection, GetDeviceCaps, GetDIBits, CreateCompatibleBitmap, GdiFlush, SelectObject, DeleteObject
WS2_32.dll	recv, sendto, select, getaddrinfo, recvfrom, getpeername, listen, send, WSASend, WSAIoctl, connect, WSAAddressToStringW, WSAStartup, shutdown, setsockopt, bind, socket, WSASetLastError, freeaddrinfo, WSAEventSelect, getsockname, accept, WSAGetLastError, closesocket
CRYPT32.dll	CertDuplicateCertificateContext, CertEnumCertificatesInStore, CertCloseStore, CertOpenSystemStoreW, CertDeleteCertificateFromStore, CryptUnprotectData, PFXImportCertStore, PFXExportCertStoreEx
WININET.dll	InternetQueryOptionA, InternetOpenA, HttpOpenRequestA, InternetSetOptionA, InternetCrackUrlA, InternetQueryOptionW, InternetConnectA, InternetCloseHandle, HttpSendRequestA, HttpAddRequestHeadersA, HttpAddRequestHeadersW, InternetSetStatusCallbackW, GetUrlCacheEntryInfoW, HttpSendRequestW, InternetReadFile, InternetReadFileExA, InternetQueryDataAvailable, HttpSendRequestExW, HttpQueryInfoA, HttpSendRequestExA
OLEAUT32.dll	VariantInit, SysAllocString, VariantClear, SysFreeString
NETAPI32.dll	NetApiBufferFree, NetUserEnum, NetUserGetInfo

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: 7FzERy9xWc.exe PID: 2788 Parent PID: 5724

General

Start time:	15:50:28
Start date:	11/04/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\7FzERy9xWc.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	188928 bytes
MD5 hash:	8F250F634DE721FEC7B002A805DDDC24
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Tactics:	Persistence
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Azure activity logs, Office 365 account logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Digital certificate logs, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping . The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Tactics:	Lateral Movement
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	API monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.
Tactics:	Impact
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report 7FzERy9xWc

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Cryptography:

Compliance:

Spreading:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

E-Banking Fraud:

Protection of GUI:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Imports

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: 7FzERy9xWc.exe PID: 2788 Parent PID: 5724

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis