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Analysis Report PP05492110.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	PP05492110.exe
Analysis ID:	385457
MD5:	9cb24f7919feb0b91ff6071d6fddbaf6
SHA1:	4910e701802ff270266954f34bd384fcf987d429
SHA256:	e14114a3eabaaf81a42459e2dab69cf044fe90909d7bf7ccb9db62e4d12a51ce
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	72
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Yara detected GuLoader

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Machine Learning detection for sample

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)

Detected potential crypto function

PE file contains an invalid checksum

PE file contains strange resources

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

PP05492110.exe (PID: 2888 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe' MD5: 9CB24F7919FEB0B91FF6071D6FDDBAF6)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=15OztyABrKIbvulchlM9fuv9fi1p1lVIL", "Injection Process": ["RegAsm.exe", "RegSvcs.exe", "MSBuild.exe"]}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.753553871.0000000000500000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.753553871.0000000000500000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=15OztyABrKIbvulchlM9fuv9fi1p1lVIL", "Injection Process": ["RegAsm.exe", "RegSvcs.exe", "MSBuild.exe"]}

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: PP05492110.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: PP05492110.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041A3EC __vbaChkstk,__vbaRecUniToAnsi,__vbaStrToAnsi,FindFirstFileA,__vbaSetSystemError,__vbaRecAnsiToUni,__vbaFreeStr,__vbaEnd,#593,__vbaFreeVar,__vbaStrCat,__vbaStrMove,__vbaStrCat,__vbaStrMove,__vbaFreeStr,#619,__vbaVarTstNe,__vbaFreeVar,__vbaFpI4,__vbaHresultCheckObj,#693,__vbaVarDup,#600,__vbaFreeVar,__vbaFreeStr,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Code function: 0_2_004138E4 FindFirstFileA,

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=15OztyABrKIbvulchlM9fuv9fi1p1lVIL

Source: PP05492110.exe, 00000000.00000002.753871961.000000000069A000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Binary or memory string: <HOOK MODULE="DDRAW.DLL" FUNCTION="DirectDrawCreateEx"/>

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040D647

Source: PP05492110.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: PP05492110.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: PP05492110.exe, 00000000.00000000.229065756.000000000041F000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameLaboredly5.exe vs PP05492110.exe
Source: PP05492110.exe, 00000000.00000002.754349737.0000000002130000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameLaboredly5.exeFE2XPana-sonic vs PP05492110.exe
Source: PP05492110.exe, 00000000.00000002.753767529.0000000000640000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameuser32j% vs PP05492110.exe
Source: PP05492110.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameLaboredly5.exe vs PP05492110.exe

Source: PP05492110.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal72.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DF9B833C04D7FE5A04.TMP

Jump to behavior

Source: PP05492110.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.753553871.0000000000500000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: PP05492110.exe

Static PE information: real checksum: 0x33b86 should be: 0x2f77b

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404C82 push E441211Ah; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406505 push ebx; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406510 push ebx; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040D647 pushfd ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040BA7D push 7600FFCEh; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Code function: 0_2_00401B43 push edi; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040AF47 push ebp; ret

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000004092A7 second address: 00000000004092A7 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 cmp eax, 000000C7h 0x00000007 fucom st(1), st(0) 0x00000009 fsincos 0x0000000b pxor mm2, mm4 0x0000000e fsubp st(2), st(0) 0x00000010 fdecstp 0x00000012 fldpi 0x00000014 jmp 00007FDE6CAD8ECAh 0x00000016 cmp ebx, 4Ah 0x00000019 cmp eax, 000000EAh 0x0000001e cmp eax, 000000B8h 0x00000023 cmp ebx, 000000A9h 0x00000029 cmp eax, 000000A3h 0x0000002e cmp edi, 02EAFF40h 0x00000034 movd mm1, ebx 0x00000037 movd mm1, ebx 0x0000003a psraw xmm3, xmm3 0x0000003e paddusw xmm6, xmm4 0x00000042 fcos 0x00000044 fyl2xp1 0x00000046 fldlg2 0x00000048 fabs 0x0000004a fcomp st(0), st(6) 0x0000004c jmp 00007FDE6CAD8EC7h 0x0000004e movd mm1, ebx 0x00000051 movd mm1, ebx 0x00000054 jne 00007FDE6CAD8CE6h 0x0000005a inc edi 0x0000005b fdecstp 0x0000005d fmul st(0), st(6) 0x0000005f pand xmm6, xmm3 0x00000063 fsubrp st(2), st(0) 0x00000065 psrlw xmm5, 32h 0x0000006a emms 0x0000006c wait 0x0000006d fnclex 0x0000006f fsubp st(7), st(0) 0x00000071 paddsw xmm3, xmm3 0x00000075 jmp 00007FDE6CAD8EC7h 0x00000077 cmp ebx, 05h 0x0000007a cmp ebx, 000000C1h 0x00000080 cmp eax, 000000A4h 0x00000085 cmp eax, 17h 0x00000088 cmp ebx, 3Eh 0x0000008b cmp eax, 1Dh 0x0000008e rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000005033F0 second address: 00000000005033F0 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007FDE6CEFE954h 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d pop ecx 0x0000001e add edi, edx 0x00000020 jmp 00007FDE6CEFE94Ah 0x00000022 test al, cl 0x00000024 dec ecx 0x00000025 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x00000028 jne 00007FDE6CEFE902h 0x0000002a clc 0x0000002b push ecx 0x0000002c cmp ax, 00008F45h 0x00000030 call 00007FDE6CEFE96Eh 0x00000035 call 00007FDE6CEFE964h 0x0000003a lfence 0x0000003d mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000043 lfence 0x00000046 ret 0x00000047 mov esi, edx 0x00000049 pushad 0x0000004a rdtsc

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041A3EC __vbaChkstk,__vbaRecUniToAnsi,__vbaStrToAnsi,FindFirstFileA,__vbaSetSystemError,__vbaRecAnsiToUni,__vbaFreeStr,__vbaEnd,#593,__vbaFreeVar,__vbaStrCat,__vbaStrMove,__vbaStrCat,__vbaStrMove,__vbaFreeStr,#619,__vbaVarTstNe,__vbaFreeVar,__vbaFpI4,__vbaHresultCheckObj,#693,__vbaVarDup,#600,__vbaFreeVar,__vbaFreeStr,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe	Code function: 0_2_004138E4 FindFirstFileA,

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: PP05492110.exe, 00000000.00000002.754099835.0000000000D20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: PP05492110.exe, 00000000.00000002.754099835.0000000000D20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: PP05492110.exe, 00000000.00000002.754099835.0000000000D20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SProgram Managerl
Source: PP05492110.exe, 00000000.00000002.754099835.0000000000D20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd,
Source: PP05492110.exe, 00000000.00000002.754099835.0000000000D20000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Input Capture1	Security Software Discovery2	Remote Services	Input Capture1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	File and Directory Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Software Packing	LSA Secrets	System Information Discovery11	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
PP05492110.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	385457
Start date:	12.04.2021
Start time:	14:44:39
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 56s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	PP05492110.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	14
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal72.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 89.1% (good quality ratio 34.9%) Quality average: 22.9% Quality standard deviation: 31.2%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, WMIADAP.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, svchost.exe VT rate limit hit for: /opt/package/joesandbox/database/analysis/385457/sample/PP05492110.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.733443572399981
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	PP05492110.exe
File size:	147456
MD5:	9cb24f7919feb0b91ff6071d6fddbaf6
SHA1:	4910e701802ff270266954f34bd384fcf987d429
SHA256:	e14114a3eabaaf81a42459e2dab69cf044fe90909d7bf7ccb9db62e4d12a51ce
SHA512:	51a86f12d4dba21d538d8ad2255b17fc3bdb86c9f7feac2adf4fb6f5ce19c61e2a9644171ea445103ff301d2f9ab7b1c711aac36cbe23c6ad96a6fd773a63374
SSDEEP:	3072:LHefjwxF+0v8Vm2XULJ0is0Y4W71TVmy:6wHxv8s2CjY4Wxsy
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........#...B...B...B..L^...B...`...B...d...B..Rich.B..........PE..L....Q.V............................l.............@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	c0c6f2e0e4fefe3f

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x40166c
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x56EA51D8 [Thu Mar 17 06:42:32 2016 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	879f5bbda1e2f48716a0325e5b7fa215

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 004110B0h
call 00007FDE6C325363h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add bl, bh
out 99h, al
xor edi, ebx
std
imul eax, dword ptr [esi-64h], 8Fh
inc edx
lahf
jnc 00007FDE6C325392h
retf
bound eax, dword ptr [eax]
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx+45h], dl
dec ebp
push ebp
inc ecx
inc edx
dec esp
inc ebp
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec esp
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
or al, 27h
aaa
dec edi
mov eax, 44C3B89Fh
sahf
dec ebp
push 00000014h
jc 00007FDE6C3253BAh
mov edi, AFA9FF41h
add dword ptr [edi+75h], 84A0456Bh
sbb al, C4h
xor eax, 3AF35FC2h
dec edi
lodsd
xor ebx, dword ptr [ecx-48EE309Ah]
or al, 00h
stosb
add byte ptr [eax-2Dh], ah
xchg eax, ebx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
wait
stc
add byte ptr [eax], al
mov bh, dh
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx], cl
add byte ptr [ebx+41h], dl
inc ecx
dec ebx
dec edi
push edx
dec esi
inc ebp
dec esi
inc ebp
add byte ptr [56000A01h], cl
popad
insb
push 00000000h

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x1be44	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x1f000	0x5c42	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x1c0	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x1b4e0	0x1c000	False	0.400408063616	data	6.02633035795	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x1d000	0x12f0	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x1f000	0x5c42	0x6000	False	0.359944661458	data	5.27700643593	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x23d9a	0xea8	data
RT_ICON	0x234f2	0x8a8	data
RT_ICON	0x22f8a	0x568	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_ICON	0x209e2	0x25a8	dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 40
RT_ICON	0x1f93a	0x10a8	data
RT_ICON	0x1f4d2	0x468	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x1f478	0x5a	data
RT_VERSION	0x1f1e0	0x298	data	Guarani	Paraguay

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaHresultCheck, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaAryMove, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaEnd, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaRecAnsiToUni, __vbaStrCat, __vbaSetSystemError, __vbaHresultCheckObj, __vbaLenBstrB, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaObjSet, __vbaOnError, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaFpR8, __vbaVarTstLt, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaGenerateBoundsError, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaAryConstruct2, __vbaVarTstEq, __vbaObjVar, DllFunctionCall, _adj_fpatan, __vbaRecUniToAnsi, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaVarErrI4, __vbaFPException, __vbaStrVarVal, _CIlog, __vbaInStr, __vbaNew2, __vbaVar2Vec, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaFreeStrList, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaLateMemCall, __vbaVarAdd, __vbaStrToAnsi, __vbaVarDup, __vbaFpI4, __vbaLateMemCallLd, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, __vbaCastObj, _allmul, __vbaLateIdSt, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeStr, __vbaFreeObj

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0474 0x04b0
InternalName	Laboredly5
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	Pana-sonic
Comments	Pana-sonic
ProductName	Pana-sonic
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	Pana-sonic
OriginalFilename	Laboredly5.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
Guarani	Paraguay

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: PP05492110.exe PID: 2888 Parent PID: 5640

General

Start time:	14:45:29
Start date:	12/04/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PP05492110.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	147456 bytes
MD5 hash:	9CB24F7919FEB0B91FF6071D6FDDBAF6
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000000.00000002.753553871.0000000000500000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

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Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report PP05492110.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Spreading:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: PP05492110.exe PID: 2888 Parent PID: 5640

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis