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Analysis Report faktura_fk.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	faktura_fk.exe
Analysis ID:	394244
MD5:	66fb235f133e2f690184675fe27bcc32
SHA1:	12f471ad9d4f8ef90cc548d1e0eb498c12ed0230
SHA256:	168ca422e4a4dc429c9fb4a65cdd1b3f1f32119475581b3d00c94ff6e4a82f77
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	96
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Potential malicious icon found

Yara detected GuLoader

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Yara detected VB6 Downloader Generic

Abnormal high CPU Usage

PE file contains strange resources

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

faktura_fk.exe (PID: 6352 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe' MD5: 66FB235F133E2F690184675FE27BCC32)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1O7Zrj0oTVUPxo7h5leOqWms2QfQkCgBK", "Injection Process": ["RegAsm.exe", "RegSvcs.exe", "MSBuild.exe"]}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
00000001.00000002.1276915802.0000000000510000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: faktura_fk.exe PID: 6352	JoeSecurity_VB6DownloaderGeneric	Yara detected VB6 Downloader Generic	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: faktura_fk.exe PID: 6352	JoeSecurity_GuLoader	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000001.00000002.1276915802.0000000000510000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1O7Zrj0oTVUPxo7h5leOqWms2QfQkCgBK", "Injection Process": ["RegAsm.exe", "RegSvcs.exe", "MSBuild.exe"]}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: faktura_fk.exe

Virustotal: Detection: 17%

Perma Link

Source: faktura_fk.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1O7Zrj0oTVUPxo7h5leOqWms2QfQkCgBK

System Summary:

Potential malicious icon found

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Icon embedded in PE file: bad icon match: 20047c7c70f0e004

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: faktura_fk.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1277430799.00000000020C0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameuser32j% vs faktura_fk.exe
Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000000.194842792.0000000000433000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameKnudepunkternes2.exe vs faktura_fk.exe
Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1277776072.00000000021F0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameKnudepunkternes2.exeFE2XeSafe SolutionseSafe Solutions vs faktura_fk.exe
Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1277776072.00000000021F0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameKnudepunkternes2.exeFE2XeSafe Solutions vs faktura_fk.exe
Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1277776072.00000000021F0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameKnudepunkternes2.exeFE2X vs faktura_fk.exe
Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1277776072.00000000021F0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameKnudepunkternes2.exeFE2XeSafe Solutionsi~C vs faktura_fk.exe
Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1277776072.00000000021F0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameKnudepunkternes2.exeFE2XeSafe Solutionsf`L vs faktura_fk.exe
Source: faktura_fk.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameKnudepunkternes2.exe vs faktura_fk.exe

Source: faktura_fk.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal96.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: faktura_fk.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: faktura_fk.exe

Virustotal: Detection: 17%

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.1276915802.0000000000510000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: faktura_fk.exe PID: 6352, type: MEMORY

Yara detected VB6 Downloader Generic

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: Process Memory Space: faktura_fk.exe PID: 6352, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Code function: 1_2_00407828 push ds; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Code function: 1_2_004063F3 push 85E0C3F5h; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Code function: 1_2_00407792 push es; ret

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000005129E9 second address: 00000000005129E9 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000005129AA second address: 00000000005129AA instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000051284C second address: 00000000005128CA instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a mov ecx, dword ptr [eax+1Ch] 0x0000000d test ah, ah 0x0000000f mov dword ptr [ebp+14h], ecx 0x00000012 fnop 0x00000014 mov ecx, dword ptr [eax+24h] 0x00000017 mov dword ptr [ebp+10h], ecx 0x0000001a mov esi, dword ptr [eax+20h] 0x0000001d add esi, dword ptr [ebp+04h] 0x00000020 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000022 test edx, edx 0x00000024 mov edx, dword ptr [esi] 0x00000026 test ebx, ebx 0x00000028 add edx, dword ptr [ebp+04h] 0x0000002b push ecx 0x0000002c test dh, ch 0x0000002e push esi 0x0000002f push edx 0x00000030 test bl, cl 0x00000032 call 00007FD3A88B113Bh 0x00000037 pushad 0x00000038 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000005128CA second address: 00000000005128CA instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000512886 second address: 0000000000512886 instructions:

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1276915802.0000000000510000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\QEMU-GA\QEMU-GA.EXE9
Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1276915802.0000000000510000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\QEMU-GA\QEMU-GA.EXE

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000005129E9 second address: 00000000005129E9 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000005129AA second address: 00000000005129AA instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000051284C second address: 00000000005128CA instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a mov ecx, dword ptr [eax+1Ch] 0x0000000d test ah, ah 0x0000000f mov dword ptr [ebp+14h], ecx 0x00000012 fnop 0x00000014 mov ecx, dword ptr [eax+24h] 0x00000017 mov dword ptr [ebp+10h], ecx 0x0000001a mov esi, dword ptr [eax+20h] 0x0000001d add esi, dword ptr [ebp+04h] 0x00000020 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000022 test edx, edx 0x00000024 mov edx, dword ptr [esi] 0x00000026 test ebx, ebx 0x00000028 add edx, dword ptr [ebp+04h] 0x0000002b push ecx 0x0000002c test dh, ch 0x0000002e push esi 0x0000002f push edx 0x00000030 test bl, cl 0x00000032 call 00007FD3A88B113Bh 0x00000037 pushad 0x00000038 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000005128CA second address: 00000000005128CA instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000512886 second address: 0000000000512886 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000051187C second address: 000000000051187C instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor eax, eax 0x00000004 inc eax 0x00000005 cpuid 0x00000007 popad 0x00000008 call 00007FD3A8DDBAFAh 0x0000000d lfence 0x00000010 mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000016 lfence 0x00000019 ret 0x0000001a sub edx, esi 0x0000001c ret 0x0000001d cmp edx, ecx 0x0000001f pop ecx 0x00000020 add edi, edx 0x00000022 dec ecx 0x00000023 cmp eax, eax 0x00000025 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x00000028 jne 00007FD3A8DDBADCh 0x0000002a push ecx 0x0000002b test ah, FFFFFF84h 0x0000002e call 00007FD3A8DDBB11h 0x00000033 call 00007FD3A8DDBB0Ah 0x00000038 lfence 0x0000003b mov edx, dword ptr [7FFE0014h] 0x00000041 lfence 0x00000044 ret 0x00000045 mov esi, edx 0x00000047 pushad 0x00000048 rdtsc

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1276915802.0000000000510000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe9
Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1276915802.0000000000510000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\Program Files\Qemu-ga\qemu-ga.exe

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1277213879.0000000000C60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1277213879.0000000000C60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1277213879.0000000000C60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: faktura_fk.exe, 00000001.00000002.1277213879.0000000000C60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery41	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Application Layer Protocol1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Information Discovery21	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
faktura_fk.exe	18%	Virustotal		Browse
faktura_fk.exe	7%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Worm.Wbvb

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	31.0.0 Emerald
Analysis ID:	394244
Start date:	21.04.2021
Start time:	11:00:53
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 12m 44s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	faktura_fk.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	37
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal96.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 76% (good quality ratio 50.6%) Quality average: 35.2% Quality standard deviation: 31%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information. Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, RuntimeBroker.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, HxTsr.exe, WMIADAP.exe, MusNotifyIcon.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.743984981466137
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	faktura_fk.exe
File size:	208896
MD5:	66fb235f133e2f690184675fe27bcc32
SHA1:	12f471ad9d4f8ef90cc548d1e0eb498c12ed0230
SHA256:	168ca422e4a4dc429c9fb4a65cdd1b3f1f32119475581b3d00c94ff6e4a82f77
SHA512:	1dd20f688ab25131fc8b9c8a2b68d87f468e45ae7b69594e78012353aad2cbde1c3f82f9eecb605d1787e56c9b7b26dfc6f4abc2164d1b347d08516824b8aa8c
SSDEEP:	3072:+tYMtBHA4Pid5IQrh5aAf1gaVcjQ0Rkkw7OAEvkcvdzHRe4YJv:UQjPOE1gaVBsDYEbvdLq
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........#...B...B...B..L^...B...`...B...d...B..Rich.B..........PE..L...l..`.....................0....................@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	20047c7c70f0e004

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x401d94
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x607FB66C [Wed Apr 21 05:21:48 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	e1435fa7344f6ab2e745b6e31d83ea55

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 00401FF4h
call 00007FD3A8A8A9A5h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx-7F47AE6Eh], dh
sar eax, cl
dec esp
call far B1A4h : AFF4E401h
xor al, byte ptr [eax]
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax+49030A64h], ah
dec esi
inc esp
inc esp
dec ebx
dec esi
dec ecx
dec esi
inc edi
add byte ptr [ecx+00h], al
and byte ptr [eax], cl
inc ecx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add bh, bh
int3
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
push es
pop ecx
jnbe 00007FD3A8A8A9B8h
mov dh, 2Bh
pop esp
cli
dec ebx
stosd
mov ebx, 4D7B8DF1h
retf

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x2fa64	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x33000	0x958	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x1bc	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x2f0a8	0x30000	False	0.339920043945	data	5.91772288462	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x31000	0x1228	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x33000	0x958	0x1000	False	0.1708984375	data	2.02469330583	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x33828	0x130	data
RT_ICON	0x33540	0x2e8	data
RT_ICON	0x33418	0x128	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x333e8	0x30	data
RT_VERSION	0x33150	0x298	data	Chinese	Taiwan

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, __vbaEnd, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaRecAnsiToUni, __vbaSetSystemError, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaObjSet, __vbaOnError, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaVarTstLt, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaGenerateBoundsError, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaAryConstruct2, __vbaObjVar, DllFunctionCall, _adj_fpatan, __vbaLateIdCallLd, __vbaRedim, __vbaRecUniToAnsi, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, _CIlog, __vbaFileOpen, __vbaNew2, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaFreeStrList, __vbaDerefAry1, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaI4Var, __vbaVarAdd, __vbaLateMemCall, __vbaVarDup, __vbaStrToAnsi, __vbaStrComp, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, __vbaCastObj, _allmul, __vbaLateIdSt, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeObj, __vbaFreeStr

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0404 0x04b0
InternalName	Knudepunkternes2
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	eSafe Solutions
ProductName	eSafe Solutions
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	eSafe Solutions
OriginalFilename	Knudepunkternes2.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
Chinese	Taiwan

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: faktura_fk.exe PID: 6352 Parent PID: 5716

General

Start time:	11:01:37
Start date:	21/04/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\faktura_fk.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	208896 bytes
MD5 hash:	66FB235F133E2F690184675FE27BCC32
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000001.00000002.1276915802.0000000000510000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

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Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report faktura_fk.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: faktura_fk.exe PID: 6352 Parent PID: 5716

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis