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Analysis Report Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Analysis ID:	403691
MD5:	b89d3e7dd6ee20a09506365497f6cc3a
SHA1:	d5a40ae65560da802d5c5135d024d5fa8e840ff4
SHA256:	c2af0dcf4558a32fde15405648d8dd6410c51d319812755fcb8e4f742723bad7
Tags:	exeNanoCoreRAT
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Nanocore

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

DLL reload attack detected

Detected Nanocore Rat

Found malware configuration

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)

Yara detected AntiVM3

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

.NET source code references suspicious native API functions

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Machine Learning detection for sample

Sigma detected: System File Execution Location Anomaly

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Writes to foreign memory regions

Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Creates processes with suspicious names

Detected potential crypto function

Drops PE files

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

PE file contains strange resources

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe (PID: 5936 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe' MD5: B89D3E7DD6EE20A09506365497F6CC3A)

MSBuild.exe (PID: 5764 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe MD5: D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1)

schtasks.exe (PID: 5792 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF57E.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 5788 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

schtasks.exe (PID: 1680 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF909.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 1492 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

MSBuild.exe (PID: 1556 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe 0 MD5: D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1)

conhost.exe (PID: 1364 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

dhcpmon.exe (PID: 980 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 0 MD5: D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1)

conhost.exe (PID: 4116 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

dhcpmon.exe (PID: 5728 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' MD5: D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1)

conhost.exe (PID: 4804 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

{"Version": "1.2.2.0", "Mutex": "692d457c-2b26-4af6-a5f8-088a1838", "Group": "Default", "Domain1": "", "Domain2": "172.93.166.26", "Port": 4090, "RunOnStartup": "Enable", "RequestElevation": "Disable", "BypassUAC": "Enable", "ClearZoneIdentifier": "Enable", "ClearAccessControl": "Disable", "SetCriticalProcess": "Disable", "PreventSystemSleep": "Enable", "ActivateAwayMode": "Disable", "EnableDebugMode": "Disable", "RunDelay": 0, "ConnectDelay": 4000, "RestartDelay": 5000, "TimeoutInterval": 5000, "KeepAliveTimeout": 30000, "MutexTimeout": 5000, "LanTimeout": 2500, "WanTimeout": 8000, "BufferSize": "ffff0000", "MaxPacketSize": "0000a000", "GCThreshold": "0000a000", "UseCustomDNS": "Enable", "PrimaryDNSServer": "8.8.8.8", "BypassUserAccountControlData": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n  <RegistrationInfo />\r\n  <Triggers />\r\n  <Principals>\r\n    <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n      <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>\r\n      <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n    </Principal>\r\n  </Principals>\r\n  <Settings>\r\n    <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n    <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n    <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n    <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n    <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n    <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n    <IdleSettings>\r\n      <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n      <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n    </IdleSettings>\r\n    <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n    <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n    <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n    <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n    <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n    <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n    <Priority>4</Priority>\r\n  </Settings>\r\n  <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n    <Exec>\r\n      <Command>\"#EXECUTABLEPATH\"</Command>\r\n      <Arguments>$(Arg0)</Arguments>\r\n    </Exec>\r\n  </Actions>\r\n</Task"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x11fe0d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x15282d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x11fe4a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x15286a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x12397d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x15639d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x11fb75:$a: NanoCore 0x11fb85:$a: NanoCore 0x11fdb9:$a: NanoCore 0x11fdcd:$a: NanoCore 0x11fe0d:$a: NanoCore 0x152595:$a: NanoCore 0x1525a5:$a: NanoCore 0x1527d9:$a: NanoCore 0x1527ed:$a: NanoCore 0x15282d:$a: NanoCore 0x11fbd4:$b: ClientPlugin 0x11fdd6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x11fe16:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1525f4:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1527f6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x152836:$b: ClientPlugin 0x11fcfb:$c: ProjectData 0x15271b:$c: ProjectData 0x272bb6:$c: ProjectData 0x2f4bd6:$c: ProjectData 0x120702:$d: DESCrypto
00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x30800:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x4f2a6:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x30861:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x4f307:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x35c66:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x43bd8:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x5470c:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x6267e:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x30305:$a: NanoCore 0x30321:$a: NanoCore 0x3047c:$a: NanoCore 0x3048b:$a: NanoCore 0x30764:$a: NanoCore 0x30790:$a: NanoCore 0x30800:$a: NanoCore 0x40242:$a: NanoCore 0x40254:$a: NanoCore 0x40290:$a: NanoCore 0x4edab:$a: NanoCore 0x4edc7:$a: NanoCore 0x4ef22:$a: NanoCore 0x4ef31:$a: NanoCore 0x4f20a:$a: NanoCore 0x4f236:$a: NanoCore 0x4f2a6:$a: NanoCore 0x5ece8:$a: NanoCore 0x5ecfa:$a: NanoCore 0x5ed36:$a: NanoCore 0x303ac:$b: ClientPlugin
Click to see the 3 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe38d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xe3ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x11efd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe105:$x1: NanoCore Client.exe 0xe38d:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xf9c6:$s1: PluginCommand 0xf9ba:$s2: FileCommand 0x1086b:$s3: PipeExists 0x16622:$s4: PipeCreated 0xe3b7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xe0f5:$a: NanoCore 0xe105:$a: NanoCore 0xe339:$a: NanoCore 0xe34d:$a: NanoCore 0xe38d:$a: NanoCore 0xe154:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe356:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe396:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe27b:$c: ProjectData 0xec82:$d: DESCrypto 0x1664e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1463c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x10837:$i: get_Connected 0xefb8:$j: #=q 0xefe8:$j: #=q 0xf004:$j: #=q 0xf034:$j: #=q 0xf050:$j: #=q 0xf06c:$j: #=q 0xf09c:$j: #=q 0xf0b8:$j: #=q
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1018d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x42bad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x101ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x42bea:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13cfd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x4671d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.raw.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfef5:$a: NanoCore 0xff05:$a: NanoCore 0x10139:$a: NanoCore 0x1014d:$a: NanoCore 0x1018d:$a: NanoCore 0x42915:$a: NanoCore 0x42925:$a: NanoCore 0x42b59:$a: NanoCore 0x42b6d:$a: NanoCore 0x42bad:$a: NanoCore 0xff54:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10156:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10196:$b: ClientPlugin 0x42974:$b: ClientPlugin 0x42b76:$b: ClientPlugin 0x42bb6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1007b:$c: ProjectData 0x42a9b:$c: ProjectData 0x162f36:$c: ProjectData 0x1e4f56:$c: ProjectData 0x10a82:$d: DESCrypto
Click to see the 2 entries

Sigma Overview

AV Detection:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

Author: Joe Security: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, ProcessId: 5764, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat

E-Banking Fraud:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

System Summary:

Sigma detected: System File Execution Location Anomaly

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth, Patrick Bareiss, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community: Data: Command: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, CommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: }}, Image: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF57E.tmp', ParentImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, ParentProcessId: 5792, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, ProcessId: 5788

Sigma detected: Possible Applocker Bypass

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: juju4: Data: Command: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, CommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, ParentProcessId: 5936, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, ProcessId: 5764

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Joe Security: Data: Command: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF57E.tmp', CommandLine: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF57E.tmp', CommandLine|base64offset|contains: j, Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, ParentImage: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, ParentProcessId: 5764, ProcessCommandLine: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF57E.tmp', ProcessId: 5792

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

Remote Access Functionality:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.raw.unpack

Malware Configuration Extractor: NanoCore {"Version": "1.2.2.0", "Mutex": "692d457c-2b26-4af6-a5f8-088a1838", "Group": "Default", "Domain1": "", "Domain2": "172.93.166.26", "Port": 4090, "RunOnStartup": "Enable", "RequestElevation": "Disable", "BypassUAC": "Enable", "ClearZoneIdentifier": "Enable", "ClearAccessControl": "Disable", "SetCriticalProcess": "Disable", "PreventSystemSleep": "Enable", "ActivateAwayMode": "Disable", "EnableDebugMode": "Disable", "RunDelay": 0, "ConnectDelay": 4000, "RestartDelay": 5000, "TimeoutInterval": 5000, "KeepAliveTimeout": 30000, "MutexTimeout": 5000, "LanTimeout": 2500, "WanTimeout": 8000, "BufferSize": "ffff0000", "MaxPacketSize": "0000a000", "GCThreshold": "0000a000", "UseCustomDNS": "Enable", "PrimaryDNSServer": "8.8.8.8", "BypassUserAccountControlData": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo />\r\n <Triggers />\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>\r\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <IdleSettings>\r\n <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n </IdleSettings>\r\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Priority>4</Priority>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>\"#EXECUTABLEPATH\"</Command>\r\n <Arguments>$(Arg0)</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n</Task"}

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: f:\binaries\Intermediate\ndp_msbuild\xmakecommandline.csproj_1613737345\objr\x86\MSBuild.pdb source: dhcpmon.exe, dhcpmon.exe.1.dr
Source:	Binary string: f:\binaries\Intermediate\ndp_msbuild\xmakecommandline.csproj_1613737345\objr\x86\MSBuild.pdbD source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000008.00000002.688516545.00000000005C2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000A.00000002.703132653.0000000000F82000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.1.dr

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h

Networking:

Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)

Show sources

Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49722 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49723 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49724 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49725 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49726 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49727 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49728 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49729 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49730 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49731 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49732 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49733 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49734 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49735 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49736 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49737 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49738 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49739 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.4:49740 -> 172.93.166.26:4090

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs:
Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: 172.93.166.26

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: GLOBALCOMPASSUS GLOBALCOMPASSUS

Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 2.20.142.209
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670534502.0000000002DD1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.654396019.0000000005FFC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.ascendercorp.com/type
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.churchsw.org/church-projector-project
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.churchsw.org/repository/Bibles/
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670478696.0000000001520000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.655221857.0000000005FFC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.656756517.0000000005FFC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.html
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-user.html
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.656074649.0000000005FFC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-user.html8
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670478696.0000000001520000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.como
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.651499309.000000000600B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.653276119.0000000006005000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cnt
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.659032488.0000000005FFB000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.658535409.0000000005FFC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr0I
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.krK
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.krr
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.660037136.0000000006025000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.monot.
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr.
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kra-d
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.krcom
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kre
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.657239356.0000000005FFC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.de
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.0/css/bootstrap.min.css

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49689
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49709 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49688
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49699
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49698
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49686
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49695
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49694
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49693
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49692
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49691
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49690
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49709

E-Banking Fraud:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: Filename: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: Filename: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_014FC2B0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_014F9990
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A4ACE8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A4C138
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A457C8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A457D8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A45520
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A45510
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A40BD8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A40B2B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A440F8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A40007
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A45068
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A47068
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A45078
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_07A40040
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952BBB0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_09528BAA
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_09520040
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952B3F8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952D590
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952C620
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952F858
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952F868
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952A800
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952FAC0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952FAB1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_095291A0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952C098
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952C0A0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_09523250
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952E240
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952E231
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952D55E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952F630
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0952F621
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 6_2_00BE5CF9
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 6_2_00BE2148
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 6_2_00BE4A20
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 6_2_00BE2133
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 6_2_00BE1A40
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 8_2_00EC5868
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 8_2_00EC4580
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 8_2_00EC2148
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 8_2_00EC1A40
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 8_2_00EC2133
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 10_2_01732370
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 10_2_01735208
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 10_2_01731A40

Source: dhcpmon.exe.1.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: dhcpmon.exe.1.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: dhcpmon.exe.1.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameDSASignature.dll@ vs Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.686876240.0000000009390000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.687212948.0000000009470000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameSimpleUI.dll( vs Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameManifestEnvelope.exeB vs Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: dhcpmon.exe.1.dr, Microsoft.Build/CommandLine/OutOfProcTaskHostNode.cs	Task registration methods: 'RegisterTaskObject', 'UnregisterPacketHandler', 'RegisterPacketHandler', 'UnregisterTaskObject', 'GetRegisteredTaskObject'
Source: dhcpmon.exe.1.dr, Microsoft.Build/Shared/TaskLoader.cs	Task registration methods: 'CreateTask'
Source: dhcpmon.exe.1.dr, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/TaskParameter.cs	Task registration methods: 'CreateNewTaskItemFrom'
Source: dhcpmon.exe.1.dr, Microsoft.Build/Shared/RegisteredTaskObjectCacheBase.cs	Task registration methods: '.cctor', 'GetLazyCollectionForLifetime', 'RegisterTaskObject', 'DisposeObjects', 'IsCollectionEmptyOrUncreated', '.ctor', 'UnregisterTaskObject', 'DisposeCacheObjects', 'GetRegisteredTaskObject', 'GetCollectionForLifetime'

Source: 8.0.dhcpmon.exe.5c0000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 8.0.dhcpmon.exe.5c0000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Boolean System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal::IsInRole(System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole)
Source: 8.2.dhcpmon.exe.5c0000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 8.2.dhcpmon.exe.5c0000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent(System.Boolean)
Source: 8.2.dhcpmon.exe.5c0000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Void System.IO.Pipes.PipeSecurity::AddAccessRule(System.IO.Pipes.PipeAccessRule)
Source: 10.0.dhcpmon.exe.f80000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 10.0.dhcpmon.exe.f80000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Boolean System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal::IsInRole(System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole)
Source: dhcpmon.exe.1.dr, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: dhcpmon.exe.1.dr, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Boolean System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal::IsInRole(System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole)
Source: 10.2.dhcpmon.exe.f80000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 10.2.dhcpmon.exe.f80000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent(System.Boolean)
Source: 10.2.dhcpmon.exe.f80000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Void System.IO.Pipes.PipeSecurity::AddAccessRule(System.IO.Pipes.PipeAccessRule)
Source: 10.0.dhcpmon.exe.f80000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 10.0.dhcpmon.exe.f80000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent(System.Boolean)
Source: 10.0.dhcpmon.exe.f80000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Void System.IO.Pipes.PipeSecurity::AddAccessRule(System.IO.Pipes.PipeAccessRule)
Source: 10.2.dhcpmon.exe.f80000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 10.2.dhcpmon.exe.f80000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Boolean System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal::IsInRole(System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole)
Source: dhcpmon.exe.1.dr, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: dhcpmon.exe.1.dr, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent(System.Boolean)
Source: dhcpmon.exe.1.dr, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Void System.IO.Pipes.PipeSecurity::AddAccessRule(System.IO.Pipes.PipeAccessRule)
Source: 8.2.dhcpmon.exe.5c0000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 8.2.dhcpmon.exe.5c0000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Boolean System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal::IsInRole(System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole)
Source: 8.0.dhcpmon.exe.5c0000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 8.0.dhcpmon.exe.5c0000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent(System.Boolean)
Source: 8.0.dhcpmon.exe.5c0000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Void System.IO.Pipes.PipeSecurity::AddAccessRule(System.IO.Pipes.PipeAccessRule)

Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000A.00000002.704185808.00000000033C1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: l)C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\*.sln
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000008.00000002.688516545.00000000005C2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000A.00000002.703132653.0000000000F82000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.1.dr	Binary or memory string: .configAMSBUILDDIRECTORYDELETERETRYCOUNTCMSBUILDDIRECTORYDELETRETRYTIMEOUT.sln
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000008.00000002.688516545.00000000005C2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000A.00000002.703132653.0000000000F82000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.1.dr	Binary or memory string: MSBuild MyApp.sln /t:Rebuild /p:Configuration=Release
Source: dhcpmon.exe, dhcpmon.exe.1.dr	Binary or memory string: f:\binaries\Intermediate\ndp_msbuild\xmakecommandline.csproj_1613737345\objr\x86\MSBuild.pdb
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000A.00000002.704185808.00000000033C1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: *.slnP#
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000008.00000002.688516545.00000000005C2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000A.00000002.703132653.0000000000F82000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.1.dr	Binary or memory string: f:\binaries\Intermediate\ndp_msbuild\xmakecommandline.csproj_1613737345\objr\x86\MSBuild.pdbD
Source: dhcpmon.exe, dhcpmon.exe.1.dr	Binary or memory string: *.sln
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000008.00000002.688516545.00000000005C2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000A.00000002.703132653.0000000000F82000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.1.dr	Binary or memory string: MSBuild MyApp.csproj /t:Clean
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000008.00000002.688516545.00000000005C2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000A.00000002.703132653.0000000000F82000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.1.dr	Binary or memory string: /ignoreprojectextensions:.sln
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000008.00000002.688516545.00000000005C2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000A.00000002.703132653.0000000000F82000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.1.dr	Binary or memory string: MSBUILD : error MSB1048: Solution files cannot be debugged directly. Run MSBuild first with an environment variable MSBUILDEMITSOLUTION=1 to create a corresponding ".sln.metaproj" file. Then debug that.

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@15/14@0/1

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

File created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.log

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:4804:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\{692d457c-2b26-4af6-a5f8-088a183828b4}
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:1492:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:4116:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:1364:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:5788:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF57E.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Select * from Clientes WHERE id=@id;;
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Select * from Aluguel Erro ao listar Banco sql-Aluguel.INSERT INTO Aluguel VALUES(@clienteID, @data);
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Select * from SecurityLogonType WHERE id=@id;
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Select * from SecurityLogonType WHERE modelo=@modelo;
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: INSERT INTO Itens_Aluguel VALUES(@aluguelID, @aviaoID, @validade);
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Insert into Clientes values (@nome, @cpf, @rg, @cidade, @endereco, @uf, @telefone);
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: INSERT INTO Aluguel VALUES(@clienteID, @data);
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: INSERT INTO SecurityLogonType VALUES(@modelo, @fabricante, @ano, @cor);
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Select * from SecurityLogonTypeErro ao listar Banco sql-SecurityLogonType,Select from SecurityLogonType WHERE id=@id;Select * from SecurityLogonType WHERE (modelo LIKE @modelo)

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF57E.tmp'
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF909.tmp'
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe 0
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 0
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe'
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF57E.tmp'
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF909.tmp'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{8856F961-340A-11D0-A96B-00C04FD705A2}\InProcServer32

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: f:\binaries\Intermediate\ndp_msbuild\xmakecommandline.csproj_1613737345\objr\x86\MSBuild.pdb source: dhcpmon.exe, dhcpmon.exe.1.dr
Source:	Binary string: f:\binaries\Intermediate\ndp_msbuild\xmakecommandline.csproj_1613737345\objr\x86\MSBuild.pdbD source: dhcpmon.exe, 00000008.00000002.688516545.00000000005C2000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000A.00000002.703132653.0000000000F82000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.1.dr

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Code function: 0_2_0952E4F6 push ss; ret

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.68387820085

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	File created: \shipping documents original bl, invoice & pa.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	File created: \shipping documents original bl, invoice & pa.exe

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

File created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe

Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival:

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF57E.tmp'

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

DLL reload attack detected

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Module Loaded: Original DLL: "C:\USERS\user\DESKTOP\SHIPPING DOCUMENTS ORIGINAL BL reload: INVOICE & PA.EXE"

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe:Zone.Identifier read attributes | delete

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936, type: MEMORY

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 4457
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 4934
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 624
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 706

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe TID: 484	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe TID: 4048	Thread sleep time: -102723s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe TID: 6016	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe TID: 1368	Thread sleep time: -11068046444225724s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe TID: 960	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe TID: 864	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe TID: 3476	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 102723
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II!Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPath%C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE"SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware ToolsLHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 1\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0LHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 2\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0'SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Disk\Enum
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmwareNSYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Class\{4D36E968-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}\0000

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

.NET source code references suspicious native API functions

Show sources

Source: dhcpmon.exe.1.dr, Microsoft.Build/Shared/NativeMethodsShared.cs	Reference to suspicious API methods: ('GetProcAddress', 'GetProcAddress@kernel32.dll'), ('OpenProcess', 'OpenProcess@KERNEL32.DLL'), ('LoadLibrary', 'LoadLibrary@kernel32.dll')
Source: 8.2.dhcpmon.exe.5c0000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Shared/NativeMethodsShared.cs	Reference to suspicious API methods: ('GetProcAddress', 'GetProcAddress@kernel32.dll'), ('OpenProcess', 'OpenProcess@KERNEL32.DLL'), ('LoadLibrary', 'LoadLibrary@kernel32.dll')
Source: 8.0.dhcpmon.exe.5c0000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Shared/NativeMethodsShared.cs	Reference to suspicious API methods: ('GetProcAddress', 'GetProcAddress@kernel32.dll'), ('OpenProcess', 'OpenProcess@KERNEL32.DLL'), ('LoadLibrary', 'LoadLibrary@kernel32.dll')
Source: 10.0.dhcpmon.exe.f80000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Shared/NativeMethodsShared.cs	Reference to suspicious API methods: ('GetProcAddress', 'GetProcAddress@kernel32.dll'), ('OpenProcess', 'OpenProcess@KERNEL32.DLL'), ('LoadLibrary', 'LoadLibrary@kernel32.dll')
Source: 10.2.dhcpmon.exe.f80000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Shared/NativeMethodsShared.cs	Reference to suspicious API methods: ('GetProcAddress', 'GetProcAddress@kernel32.dll'), ('OpenProcess', 'OpenProcess@KERNEL32.DLL'), ('LoadLibrary', 'LoadLibrary@kernel32.dll')

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Writes to foreign memory regions

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe base: 400000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe base: 402000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe base: 420000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe base: 422000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe base: D0A008

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF57E.tmp'
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF909.tmp'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Runtime.Remoting\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Runtime.Remoting.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arial.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariali.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariblk.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\bahnschrift.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibril.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibriz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambria.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candara.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candaraz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comic.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comici.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constan.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constani.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbel.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbeli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cour.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\couri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrima.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrimabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framdit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAMDCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHV.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHVIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Gabriola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgia.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\impact.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Inkfree.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\javatext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelawUI.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelUIsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelaUIb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\lucon.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\l_10646.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgun.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\himalaya.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailu.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailub.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspa.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taile.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taileb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mingliub.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\monbaiti.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msgothic.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mvboli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtextb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Nirmala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaS.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaB.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\pala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palabi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoepr.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeprb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoesc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoescb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguiemj.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguihis.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisym.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsun.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsunb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Sitka.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaI.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaZ.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\sylfaen.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\symbol.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahoma.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahomabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebuc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdana.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\webdings.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\wingding.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothR.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothM.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothL.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\holomdl2.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTURY.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LEELAWAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LEELAWDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MSUIGHUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MSUIGHUB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\WINGDNG2.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\WINGDNG3.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TEMPSITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PRISTINA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PAPYRUS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MISTRAL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LHANDW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCKRIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JUICE___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRSCRIPT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FREESCPT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRADHITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OUTLOOK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BKANT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUABI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARAIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARABD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTCORSVA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ALGER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BASKVILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BAUHS93.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BERNHC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_PSTC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRITANIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BROADW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRUSHSCI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTAUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CHILLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COLONNA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COOPBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FTLTLT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARLOWSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARNGTON.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JOKERMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\KUNSTLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITED.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LCALLIG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAGNETOB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MATURASC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MOD20.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGENG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGSOL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OLDENGL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ONYX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PARCHM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PLAYBILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\POORICH.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAVIE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\INFROMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SHOWG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SNAP____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\STENCIL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VINERITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VIVALDII.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VLADIMIR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LATINWD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCM_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCMI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCB_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCBI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCM____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCRIPTBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCCB___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAGE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTILI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTIBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PER_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PALSCRI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OCRAEXT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAIAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEBO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\IMPRISHA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HATTEN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDYSTO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIL_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLSNECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIGI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABKIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FORTE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FELIXTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASMD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASLGHT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASDEMI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ENGR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCEDSCR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CURLZ___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENSCBK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CASTELAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_R.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_I.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_B.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCBLKAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARLRDBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BSSYM7.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSPCL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTEXTRA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\marlett.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Management.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.Build.Framework\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.Build.Framework.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.Build\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.Build.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.Build.Framework\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.Build.Framework.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.Build\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.Build.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.Build.Framework\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.Build.Framework.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.Build\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.Build.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Remote Access Functionality:

Detected Nanocore Rat

Show sources

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000003.686473988.000000000673C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3ee8c80.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation1	Scheduled Task/Job11	Process Injection211	Masquerading2	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery111	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel12	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job11	DLL Side-Loading1	Scheduled Task/Job11	Disable or Modify Tools1	LSASS Memory	Process Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Remote Access Software1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	Native API1	Logon Script (Windows)	DLL Side-Loading1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion21	Security Account Manager	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion21	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Application Layer Protocol11	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection211	NTDS	Application Window Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Hidden Files and Directories1	LSA Secrets	System Information Discovery12	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Obfuscated Files or Information3	Cached Domain Credentials	System Owner/User Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Software Packing2	DCSync	Network Sniffing	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	DLL Side-Loading1	Proc Filesystem	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	6%	ReversingLabs
Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	0%	Metadefender		Browse
C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	0%	ReversingLabs

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.monot.	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr0I	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.krr	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.ascendercorp.com/type	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr.	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.churchsw.org/repository/Bibles/	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kra-d	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
172.93.166.26	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.krK	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kre	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.krcom	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.como	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.como	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.como	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnt	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnt	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnt	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.churchsw.org/church-projector-project	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.de	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.de	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.de	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
172.93.166.26	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.monot.	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.660037136.0000000006025000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670478696.0000000001520000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.goodfont.co.kr0I	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.goodfont.co.krr	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.ascendercorp.com/type	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.654396019.0000000005FFC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.sandoll.co.kr.	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.churchsw.org/repository/Bibles/	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.sandoll.co.kra-d	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.goodfont.co.krK	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.tiro.com	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sandoll.co.kre	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.0/css/bootstrap.min.css	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.carterandcone.coml	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.659032488.0000000005FFB000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.658535409.0000000005FFC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-user.html	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.html	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.656756517.0000000005FFC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.krcom	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.652728425.0000000005FFF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.como	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670478696.0000000001520000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnt	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.653276119.0000000006005000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.churchsw.org/church-projector-project	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-user.html8	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.656074649.0000000005FFC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fonts.com	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.651499309.000000000600B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.de	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.657239356.0000000005FFC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.670534502.0000000002DD1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sakkal.com	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.676141960.0000000006160000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.655221857.0000000005FFC000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
172.93.166.26	unknown	United States		22653	GLOBALCOMPASSUS	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	32.0.0 Black Diamond
Analysis ID:	403691
Start date:	04.05.2021
Start time:	10:29:25
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 10m 31s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	12
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@15/14@0/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 5.2% (good quality ratio 4.5%) Quality average: 38.1% Quality standard deviation: 20%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 96% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information. TCP Packets have been reduced to 100 Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 52.255.188.83, 104.43.139.144, 52.147.198.201, 168.61.161.212 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): skypedataprdcoleus16.cloudapp.net, skypedataprdcoleus17.cloudapp.net, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, skypedataprdcolcus17.cloudapp.net, skypedataprdcolcus16.cloudapp.net, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com Report size exceeded maximum capacity and may have missing behavior information. Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
10:30:22	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe modified
10:30:28	Task Scheduler	Run new task: DHCP Monitor path: "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe" s>$(Arg0)
10:30:28	API Interceptor	970x Sleep call for process: MSBuild.exe modified
10:30:30	Autostart	Run: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run DHCP Monitor C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
10:30:31	Task Scheduler	Run new task: DHCP Monitor Task path: "C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe" s>$(Arg0)

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
GLOBALCOMPASSUS	5zc9vbGBo3.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.16.162
	pieChart2.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	142.202.205.89
	#Ud83d#Udd04nick.ulycz- domesticandgeneral.com OKeep.htm	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.20.27
	parcel_images.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.59.215
	a4588f57322665c795bdf720abc23ffc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.52.111
	Mf1iDAE6bE.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.52.111
	Buchung.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.42.251
	Buchung.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.42.251
	Buchung.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.42.251
	P64.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.38.132
	http://v.ht/v6GD	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.26.121

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link
C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Ziraat Bankasi Swift Mesaji.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SN-346.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	insurance certificate , BL.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	E5ew8dBzdN.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	kHisp6Vo3M.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	aVzenPkPSm.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	GT42536.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	NEWPO-243769001.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Purchase Order-877.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	W29wJd8rZ5.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	INV#6534524.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	xWwkCdgUxd.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	t5R60D503x.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	GT_0397337_03987638BNG.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	CCF20032021_0003.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	1PH37n4Gva.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	E0029876556_209876689.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	BGD_03987365_0398736DSC.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	1XCQ1u2Q59.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	ROdimkVzMC9cn4X.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Created / dropped Files

C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	261728
Entropy (8bit):	6.1750840449797675
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3072:Mao0QHGUQWWimj9q/NLpj/WWqvAw2XpFU4rwOe4ubZSif02RFi/x2uv9FeP:boZTTWxxqVpqWVRXfr802biprVu
MD5:	D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1
SHA1:	ABCAE05EE61EE6292003AABD8C80583FA49EDDA2
SHA-256:	2CA7CF7146FB8209CF3C6CECB1C5AA154C61E046DC07AFA05E8158F2C0DDE2F6
SHA-512:	2D85A81D708ECC8AF9A1273143C94DA84E632F1E595E22F54B867225105A1D0A44F918F0FAE6F1EB15ECF69D75B6F4616699776A16A2AA8B5282100FD15CA74C
Malicious:	false
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Metadefender, Detection: 0%, Browse Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 0%
Joe Sandbox View:	Filename: Ziraat Bankasi Swift Mesaji.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: SN-346.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: insurance certificate , BL.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: E5ew8dBzdN.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: kHisp6Vo3M.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: aVzenPkPSm.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: GT42536.scr.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: NEWPO-243769001.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Purchase Order-877.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: W29wJd8rZ5.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: INV#6534524.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: xWwkCdgUxd.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: t5R60D503x.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: GT_0397337_03987638BNG.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: CCF20032021_0003.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: 1PH37n4Gva.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: E0029876556_209876689.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: BGD_03987365_0398736DSC.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: 1XCQ1u2Q59.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: ROdimkVzMC9cn4X.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L....Z.Z.........."...0..\|...B......n.... ........@.. ....................................`.....................................O........>..............`>.......................................................... ............... ..H............text....z... ...\|.................. ..`.rsrc....>.......@...~..............@..@.reloc..............................@..B................P.......H.......8)...................\|..........................................{.......v.(=....r...p({...-..+..}........0..%........(....-......(z.....&..}..............................0..5........(....-...-.r+..ps>...z.....i(z.....&..}......................%......>....(?...(....N..(@....oA...(....:...(B...(....:...(C...(....*....(........0..G........(....,....(....-...}......r...p(x...&.(v.....}......&..}....................7.......0..f........-.r7..ps>...z .....

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\MSBuild.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	841
Entropy (8bit):	5.356220854328477
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:ML9E4Ks2wKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoIvEE4xDqE4j:MxHKXwYHKhQnoPtHoxHwvEHxDqHj
MD5:	486580834B084C92AE1F3866166C9C34
SHA1:	C8EB7E1CEF55A6C9EB931487E9AA4A2098AACEDF
SHA-256:	65C5B1213E371D449E2A239557A5F250FEA1D3473A1B5C4C5FF7492085F663FB
SHA-512:	2C54B638A52AA87F47CAB50859EFF98F07DA02993A596686B5617BA99E73ABFCD104F0F33209E24AFB32E66B4B8A225D4DB2CC79631540C21E7E8C4573DFD457
Malicious:	false
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..2,"Microsoft.Build.Framework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..2,"Microsoft.Build, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1314
Entropy (8bit):	5.350128552078965
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:MLU84jE4K5E4Ks2E1qE4qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4sAmEw:MgvjHK5HKXE1qHiYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHR
MD5:	1DC1A2DCC9EFAA84EABF4F6D6066565B
SHA1:	B7FCF805B6DD8DE815EA9BC089BD99F1E617F4E9
SHA-256:	28D63442C17BF19558655C88A635CB3C3FF1BAD1CCD9784090B9749A7E71FCEF
SHA-512:	95DD7E2AB0884A3EFD9E26033B337D1F97DDF9A8E9E9C4C32187DCD40622D8B1AC8CCDBA12A70A6B9075DF5E7F68DF2F8FBA4AB33DB4576BE9806B8E191802B7
Malicious:	true
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"Microsoft.VisualBasic, Version=10.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\dhcpmon.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	1037
Entropy (8bit):	5.371216502395632
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:ML9E4Ks2wKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7KvEE4xDqE4j:MxHKXwYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHKzvKvEHxD0
MD5:	C7F28B87C2CAD111D929CB9A0FF822F8
SHA1:	C2CF9E7A3F6EFD9000FE76EBE54E4E9AE5754267
SHA-256:	D1B02C20EACF464229AB063FA947A525E2ED7772259A8F70C7205DC13599EAE6
SHA-512:	E0F35874E02AB672CFF0553A0DA0864DAB14C05733D06395E4D0C9CDFC6F445E940310F8D01E3E1B28895F636DFBC1F510E103D1C46818400BA4E7371D8F254D
Malicious:	false
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Xml\b219d4630d26b88041b59c21e8e2b95c\System.Xml.ni.dll",0..2,"Microsoft.Build.Framework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..2,"Microsoft.Build, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF57E.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1320
Entropy (8bit):	5.137611098420233
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+S/4oL600QlMhEMjn5pwjVLUYODOLG9RJh7h8gK0moxtn:cbk4oL600QydbQxIYODOLedq3Zoj
MD5:	3E2B26ED8B75AE83A269595180E84EF6
SHA1:	D30A0335FCCE406BCA8BA5764288235E6192F608
SHA-256:	108BE30AEB8EB31C185A39A6726F26DACBC4E4124951C61A29ADE4B7038C71EA
SHA-512:	B6981C68FCB886CC8379A068B96931B9D4F5CC5AA9BDC467E36C4168FE6C5273A2A84D8850B12C11703EC03AC6B1F1950D1E669EFCB59FC2402CE4BBA9DC03D3
Malicious:	true
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo />.. <Triggers />.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>.. <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>.. <IdleSettings>.. <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>.. <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>.. </IdleSettings>.. <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <Hidden>false</Hidden>.. <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>.. <Wak

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF909.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1310
Entropy (8bit):	5.109425792877704
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+S/4oL600QlMhEMjn5pwjVLUYODOLG9RJh7h8gK0R3xtn:cbk4oL600QydbQxIYODOLedq3S3j
MD5:	5C2F41CFC6F988C859DA7D727AC2B62A
SHA1:	68999C85FC7E37BAB9216E0099836D40D4545C1C
SHA-256:	98B6E66B6C2173B9B91FC97FE51805340EFDE978B695453742EBAB631018398B
SHA-512:	B5DA5DA378D038AFBF8A7738E47921ED39F9B726E2CAA2993D915D9291A3322F94EFE8CCA6E7AD678A670DB19926B22B20E5028460FCC89CEA7F6635E7557334
Malicious:	false
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo />.. <Triggers />.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>.. <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>.. <IdleSettings>.. <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>.. <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>.. </IdleSettings>.. <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <Hidden>false</Hidden>.. <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>.. <Wak

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\catalog.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1856
Entropy (8bit):	7.109925499344649
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	48:IkXEUg6ikXEUg6ikXEUg6ikXEUg6ikXEUg6ikXEUg6ikXEUg6ikXEUg6Z:06y6y6y6y6y6y6y6Z
MD5:	B75C7318FEA570C38EC018F2E906702F
SHA1:	05B91D7DFF32A62966BA7C58BD42C60E70C8C54B
SHA-256:	828C3ECDFC1F82F6D579A4FA1D140D1AFF98A986D5B10A5B94BD0EC19C8D3BB6
SHA-512:	75FF9ACA7EF41FE7ED8D9FAD0CB11A68F002AF79A3D7AB79314D473D6F5A30B557A7D9FD470B6F3FF75F690D70446FC5286CC5015DBF8AFCF73FBE725EEECB0C
Malicious:	false
Preview:	Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........`kZ..JR<..e.8....z...O......f..m.PQ>Y...}.....K.,Kl..G.....qA..#.w.&..7m..B.I.....in..<5J....z).H?....6..2Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........`kZ..JR<..e.8....z...O......f..m.PQ>Y...}.....K.,Kl..G.....qA..#.w.&..7m..B.I.....in..<5J....z).H?....6..2Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........`kZ..JR<..e.8....z...O......f..m.PQ>Y...}.....K.,Kl..G.....qA..#.w.&..7m..B.I.....in..<5J....z).H?....6..2Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........`kZ..JR<..e.8....z...O......f..m.PQ>Y...}.....K.,Kl..G.....qA..#.w.&..7m..B.I.....in..<5J....z).H?....6..2Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	8
Entropy (8bit):	3.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Pcn:0n
MD5:	DE7A67A3040AC701DA32B2080CBB7529
SHA1:	8F9F4EC574D3C30BBD666DF38D513CA1E9B234FC
SHA-256:	0B977E561E1A854A31E242E5E68D143D677A9EB875A5D5FB49C30C547DF2D6FD
SHA-512:	B4ACF0DBD66C30C84B85C656B6A83AF8A088A74679CE26196698BF38271AF78F2BC9F002647171B1C298B12230EF69BA6199BD2C33256C44E67E121A5E4013EA
Malicious:	true
Preview:	.v^....H

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\settings.bin Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	40
Entropy (8bit):	5.221928094887364
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:9bzY6oRDMjmPl:RzWDMCd
MD5:	AE0F5E6CE7122AF264EC533C6B15A27B
SHA1:	1265A495C42EED76CC043D50C60C23297E76CCE1
SHA-256:	73B0B92179C61C26589B47E9732CE418B07EDEE3860EE5A2A5FB06F3B8AA9B26
SHA-512:	DD44C2D24D4E3A0F0B988AD3D04683B5CB128298043134649BBE33B2512CE0C9B1A8E7D893B9F66FBBCDD901E2B0646C4533FB6C0C8C4AFCB95A0EFB95D446F8
Malicious:	false
Preview:	9iH...}Z.4..f..... 8.j....\|.&X..e.F.*.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\storage.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	315512
Entropy (8bit):	7.999402922203056
Encrypted:	true
SSDEEP:	6144:m8aeVE5MlgWfxwY/8uvJYRDMVpXUhXShjVd/WNXlMjwmZ/zVR5X7HZEKiMIqrjG:mfwiMdxwYEYyWVjVpW7mZBDCgrjG
MD5:	787AEB1604A638B138739ED060141E9D
SHA1:	A2D0680883E8C6FF3DDE0A177263B03E7644D4AA
SHA-256:	DCCB67209560E2E27A4F284CD7E412926303ABD4E77927F9A1BAF8B0B8994B45
SHA-512:	9E49E851465F07ABA6AB44AD6B7561004AD61C4794FE167C6C724994159714AF8D2AC8ECCCE128F84BC6A7607BA05CD891CFD2C9EDE9D9EFA860346F6004360E
Malicious:	false
Preview:	..f# ....)1\.....5....;.T..u.. .3.Xd... ....u(..._.V.{L..Y.8....~...S79.f0V...=.}...SJg\|.lh.J..^Ge.........3h?n..:..r....,o."a.I....\..0Z.D..........^....[..f.I....@/_..".5+...I...J`./s..p-.....c..?..... .&.....>.Ye$=.pG.....9D...'7.w.a.[3.d.-..V..]..B.b.zA?..M..3...%A....K5@.. j.U.h.B....'...0."..u.V...d..c,r"..@9.9.>..cDgP~d9..St...{..24.s.'.....9.D..P4.....I...G..G5......u.-2...z1[.....C..n.6.!..'.%@&.l4..P..rc+vq..C5B.b..j.W,..T..z......)BX4...>A.~#..A....8..B....5....w....GC..........y......7...?.T.....!.....7A.........C.3......A.....hC..5'..42..zS.*2.m7....A.'/.R..X....}e...>........}...n.A...4..?.P.l..n.0.I`...".d1.(e\|..f.....i.9.#...n..+..l....Xz.q...6".Hl...+...1^pgs...%.FR.T....(...=.rHX.d.9%...?..f?.Q.yi.D9/>....V..5......q...nP'...S.Y.....pu.!..-..\..\|/....V.......NX....../.8..V.0.5`m$.{b..lw.K.3-..C3...-.2.Qb.....o...6z....`H...(..o.ag.-7../F..RoI..O#.u\|.U.@....$;.....s.~.M...j?...q#.l..y..M.[../.....=T.......5HX.QJ...

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\task.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	57
Entropy (8bit):	4.887726803973036
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:oMty8WddSJ8:oMLW6C
MD5:	6ECAFC0490DAB08E4A288E0042B6B613
SHA1:	4A4529907588505FC65CC9933980CFE6E576B3D6
SHA-256:	DC5F76FBF44B3E6CDDC14EA9E5BB9B6BD3A955197FE13F33F7DDA7ECC08E79E0
SHA-512:	7DA2B02627A36C8199814C250A1FBD61A9C18E098F8D691C11D75044E7F51DBD52C31EC2E1EA8CDEE5077ADCCB8CD247266F191292DB661FE7EA1B613FC646F8
Malicious:	false
Preview:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

\Device\ConDrv Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	298
Entropy (8bit):	4.943030742860529
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6:zx3M1tFAbQtU1R30qyMstwYVoRRZBXVN+J0fFdCsq2UTiMdH8stCal+n:zK13I30ZMt9BFN+QdCT2UftCM+
MD5:	6A9888952541A41F033EB114C24DC902
SHA1:	41903D7C8F31013C44572E09D97B9AAFBBCE77E6
SHA-256:	41A61D0084CD7884BEA1DF02ED9213CB8C83F4034F5C8156FC5B06D6A3E133CE
SHA-512:	E6AC898E67B4052375FDDFE9894B26D504A7827917BF3E02772CFF45C3FA7CC5E0EFFDC701D208E0DB89F05E42F195B1EC890F316BEE5CB8239AB45444DAA65E
Malicious:	false
Preview:	Microsoft (R) Build Engine version 4.7.3056.0..[Microsoft .NET Framework, version 4.0.30319.42000]..Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.....MSBUILD : error MSB1003: Specify a project or solution file. The current working directory does not contain a project or solution file...

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.673145545979894
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.80% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.75% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
File size:	734208
MD5:	b89d3e7dd6ee20a09506365497f6cc3a
SHA1:	d5a40ae65560da802d5c5135d024d5fa8e840ff4
SHA256:	c2af0dcf4558a32fde15405648d8dd6410c51d319812755fcb8e4f742723bad7
SHA512:	9ffdf6633cc35a4cf2817ab9033d30d9377c83944e6b013aea5697a53c8d0772bf992305fcbbe18810bd4fa41aafcf7e31f517323f78eb0b637254a740281e09
SSDEEP:	12288:O2g1o0ezIROKMTSXHlIp8maopsxu05K6zAyLe6NPBmFBdWM/QXPZ:bg1o9mOKSA9bzhLnNgXv/QB
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L......`..............P..*...........I... ...`....@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4b49a6
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x6090F8E4 [Tue May 4 07:33:56 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xb4954	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xb6000	0x404	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0xb8000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0xb29ac	0xb2a00	False	0.817510606193	data	7.68387820085	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xb6000	0x404	0x600	False	0.285807291667	data	2.3669114928	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0xb8000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0xb6058	0x3a8	data

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright Felix Jeyareuben 2012
Assembly Version	2.0.0.0
InternalName	ManifestEnvelope.exe
FileVersion	2.0
CompanyName	www.churchsw.org
LegalTrademarks	Church Software
Comments
ProductName	Church Projector
ProductVersion	2.0
FileDescription	Church Projector
OriginalFilename	ManifestEnvelope.exe

Network Behavior

Snort IDS Alerts

Timestamp	Protocol	SID	Message	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
05/04/21-10:30:30.516363	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:30:38.726516	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49723	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:30:45.525830	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49724	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:30:51.542446	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49725	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:30:57.537521	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49726	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:31:02.522919	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49727	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:31:08.571572	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49728	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:31:15.430293	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49729	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:31:20.466887	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49730	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:31:26.477561	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49731	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:31:32.571814	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49732	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:31:37.631265	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49733	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:31:43.636714	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49734	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:31:49.661091	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49735	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:31:56.624315	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49736	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:32:03.661380	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49737	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:32:09.718870	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49738	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:32:15.719024	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49739	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-10:32:20.736724	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49740	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
May 4, 2021 10:30:25.946350098 CEST	49685	80	192.168.2.4	2.20.142.209
May 4, 2021 10:30:30.304523945 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:30.452847958 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:30.452972889 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:30.516362906 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:30.676390886 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:30.684725046 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:30.833106995 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:30.887154102 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:30.900424957 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.093060017 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.104357958 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.104378939 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.104394913 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.104412079 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.104429007 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.104444981 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.104463100 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.104480028 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.104491949 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.104513884 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.104531050 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.104576111 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.104603052 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254400015 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254445076 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254487038 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254544020 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254587889 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254587889 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254622936 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254627943 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254667044 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254688025 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254705906 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254744053 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254762888 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254791021 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254837036 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254838943 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254889965 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254931927 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254967928 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.254968882 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.255007982 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.255016088 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.255089998 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.255127907 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.255141020 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.255175114 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.255217075 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.255227089 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.255265951 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.255323887 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405056000 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405106068 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405147076 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405184031 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405209064 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405220985 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405252934 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405260086 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405308008 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405308008 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405350924 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405400991 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405420065 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405457973 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405495882 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405509949 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405534029 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405570984 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405585051 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405610085 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405648947 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405662060 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405695915 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405739069 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405744076 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405777931 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405816078 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405827045 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405854940 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405891895 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405911922 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405930996 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405977964 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.405983925 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.406014919 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.406070948 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.406109095 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.406120062 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.406153917 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.406166077 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.406210899 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.406249046 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.406286955 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.406296015 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.406323910 CEST	4090	49722	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:31.406342030 CEST	49722	4090	192.168.2.4	172.93.166.26

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
May 4, 2021 10:30:08.362804890 CEST	61516	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:08.414283037 CEST	53	61516	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:09.153835058 CEST	49182	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:09.203901052 CEST	53	49182	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:09.926547050 CEST	59920	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:09.975424051 CEST	53	59920	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:10.701407909 CEST	57458	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:10.751379967 CEST	53	57458	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:11.596306086 CEST	50579	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:11.649147987 CEST	53	50579	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:12.713280916 CEST	51703	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:12.764913082 CEST	53	51703	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:13.953927040 CEST	65248	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:14.002691984 CEST	53	65248	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:14.819376945 CEST	53723	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:14.868194103 CEST	53	53723	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:15.610141993 CEST	64646	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:15.658852100 CEST	53	64646	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:16.914283991 CEST	65298	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:16.963977098 CEST	53	65298	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:17.848736048 CEST	59123	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:17.900161028 CEST	53	59123	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:18.729810953 CEST	54531	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:18.779098988 CEST	53	54531	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:19.625092983 CEST	49714	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:19.674388885 CEST	53	49714	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:22.860003948 CEST	58028	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:22.909003019 CEST	53	58028	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:23.656889915 CEST	53097	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:23.706955910 CEST	53	53097	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
May 4, 2021 10:30:24.475920916 CEST	49257	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 10:30:24.541471004 CEST	53	49257	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5936 Parent PID: 6028

General

Start time:	10:30:14
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe'
Imagebase:	0xac0000
File size:	734208 bytes
MD5 hash:	B89D3E7DD6EE20A09506365497F6CC3A
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000000.00000002.673275544.0000000003DD9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.670633702.0000000002E4C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: MSBuild.exe PID: 5764 Parent PID: 5936

General

Start time:	10:30:24
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
Imagebase:	0xb10000
File size:	261728 bytes
MD5 hash:	D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 5792 Parent PID: 5764

General

Start time:	10:30:26
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF57E.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x1310000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 5788 Parent PID: 5792

General

Start time:	10:30:27
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff724c50000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 1680 Parent PID: 5764

General

Start time:	10:30:27
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpF909.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x1310000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 1492 Parent PID: 1680

General

Start time:	10:30:28
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff724c50000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: MSBuild.exe PID: 1556 Parent PID: 968

General

Start time:	10:30:28
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe 0
Imagebase:	0x1e0000
File size:	261728 bytes
MD5 hash:	D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 1364 Parent PID: 1556

General

Start time:	10:30:28
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff724c50000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: dhcpmon.exe PID: 980 Parent PID: 968

General

Start time:	10:30:31
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 0
Imagebase:	0x5c0000
File size:	261728 bytes
MD5 hash:	D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Antivirus matches:	Detection: 0%, Metadefender, Browse Detection: 0%, ReversingLabs
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 4116 Parent PID: 980

General

Start time:	10:30:32
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff724c50000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: dhcpmon.exe PID: 5728 Parent PID: 3424

General

Start time:	10:30:39
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe'
Imagebase:	0xf80000
File size:	261728 bytes
MD5 hash:	D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 4804 Parent PID: 5728

General

Start time:	10:30:39
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff724c50000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Tactics:	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches ( `dir /a` for Windows and `ls –a` for Linux and macOS).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Analysis Report Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

AV Detection:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports