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Analysis Report Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Analysis ID:	403743
MD5:	597332734fde92068c7b354d33920040
SHA1:	01454e8c59644ab0dd54d2326a93965a1f52b91c
SHA256:	d9510122ef15d475c69ca539c949d4b8c8002b8f617411854098091106c37119
Tags:	exeNanoCoreRAT
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Nanocore

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

DLL reload attack detected

Detected Nanocore Rat

Found malware configuration

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)

Yara detected AntiVM3

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

.NET source code references suspicious native API functions

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Machine Learning detection for sample

Sigma detected: System File Execution Location Anomaly

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Writes to foreign memory regions

Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Creates processes with suspicious names

Detected potential crypto function

Drops PE files

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)

PE file contains strange resources

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Startup

System is w10x64

Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe (PID: 5476 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe' MD5: 597332734FDE92068C7B354D33920040)

MSBuild.exe (PID: 6100 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe MD5: D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1)

schtasks.exe (PID: 5836 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7B35.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 5936 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

schtasks.exe (PID: 2900 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp823B.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 1012 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

MSBuild.exe (PID: 4472 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe 0 MD5: D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1)

conhost.exe (PID: 5936 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

dhcpmon.exe (PID: 5608 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 0 MD5: D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1)

conhost.exe (PID: 3880 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

dhcpmon.exe (PID: 6108 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' MD5: D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1)

conhost.exe (PID: 768 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

{"Version": "1.2.2.0", "Mutex": "692d457c-2b26-4af6-a5f8-088a1838", "Group": "Default", "Domain1": "", "Domain2": "172.93.166.26", "Port": 4090, "RunOnStartup": "Enable", "RequestElevation": "Disable", "BypassUAC": "Enable", "ClearZoneIdentifier": "Enable", "ClearAccessControl": "Disable", "SetCriticalProcess": "Disable", "PreventSystemSleep": "Enable", "ActivateAwayMode": "Disable", "EnableDebugMode": "Disable", "RunDelay": 0, "ConnectDelay": 4000, "RestartDelay": 5000, "TimeoutInterval": 5000, "KeepAliveTimeout": 30000, "MutexTimeout": 5000, "LanTimeout": 2500, "WanTimeout": 8000, "BufferSize": "ffff0000", "MaxPacketSize": "0000a000", "GCThreshold": "0000a000", "UseCustomDNS": "Enable", "PrimaryDNSServer": "8.8.8.8", "BypassUserAccountControlData": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n  <RegistrationInfo />\r\n  <Triggers />\r\n  <Principals>\r\n    <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n      <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>\r\n      <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n    </Principal>\r\n  </Principals>\r\n  <Settings>\r\n    <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n    <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n    <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n    <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n    <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n    <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n    <IdleSettings>\r\n      <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n      <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n    </IdleSettings>\r\n    <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n    <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n    <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n    <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n    <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n    <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n    <Priority>4</Priority>\r\n  </Settings>\r\n  <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n    <Exec>\r\n      <Command>\"#EXECUTABLEPATH\"</Command>\r\n      <Arguments>$(Arg0)</Arguments>\r\n    </Exec>\r\n  </Actions>\r\n</Task"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x120225:$a: NanoCore 0x120235:$a: NanoCore 0x120469:$a: NanoCore 0x12047d:$a: NanoCore 0x1204bd:$a: NanoCore 0x152c45:$a: NanoCore 0x152c55:$a: NanoCore 0x152e89:$a: NanoCore 0x152e9d:$a: NanoCore 0x152edd:$a: NanoCore 0x120284:$b: ClientPlugin 0x120486:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1204c6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x152ca4:$b: ClientPlugin 0x152ea6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x152ee6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1203ab:$c: ProjectData 0x152dcb:$c: ProjectData 0x27320e:$c: ProjectData 0x2f4e2e:$c: ProjectData 0x120db2:$d: DESCrypto
00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1204bd:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x152edd:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x1204fa:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x152f1a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x12402d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x156a4d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore	detect Nanocore in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x120225:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x120235:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x152c45:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x152c55:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x121af6:$v2: PluginCommand 0x154516:$v2: PluginCommand 0x121ade:$v3: CommandType 0x1544fe:$v3: CommandType
00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0x32ac59:$a: NanoCore 0x32ac75:$a: NanoCore 0x32add0:$a: NanoCore 0x32addf:$a: NanoCore 0x32b0b8:$a: NanoCore 0x32b0e4:$a: NanoCore 0x32b154:$a: NanoCore 0x33ab96:$a: NanoCore 0x33aba8:$a: NanoCore 0x33abe4:$a: NanoCore 0x3496ff:$a: NanoCore 0x34971b:$a: NanoCore 0x349876:$a: NanoCore 0x349885:$a: NanoCore 0x349b5e:$a: NanoCore 0x349b8a:$a: NanoCore 0x349bfa:$a: NanoCore 0x35963c:$a: NanoCore 0x35964e:$a: NanoCore 0x35968a:$a: NanoCore 0x32ad00:$b: ClientPlugin
Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x32b154:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x349bfa:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x32b1b5:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x349c5b:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x3305ba:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x33e52c:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x34f060:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x35cfd2:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476	Nanocore	detect Nanocore in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x32ac59:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x32ac75:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x32add0:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x32addf:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x3496ff:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x34971b:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x349876:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x349885:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x32d39f:$v2: PluginCommand 0x33c108:$v2: PluginCommand 0x34be45:$v2: PluginCommand 0x35abae:$v2: PluginCommand 0x32d36f:$v3: CommandType 0x33c0f2:$v3: CommandType 0x34be15:$v3: CommandType 0x35ab98:$v3: CommandType
Click to see the 5 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xe0f5:$a: NanoCore 0xe105:$a: NanoCore 0xe339:$a: NanoCore 0xe34d:$a: NanoCore 0xe38d:$a: NanoCore 0xe154:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe356:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe396:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe27b:$c: ProjectData 0xec82:$d: DESCrypto 0x1664e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1463c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x10837:$i: get_Connected 0xefb8:$j: #=q 0xefe8:$j: #=q 0xf004:$j: #=q 0xf034:$j: #=q 0xf050:$j: #=q 0xf06c:$j: #=q 0xf09c:$j: #=q 0xf0b8:$j: #=q
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe38d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xe3ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x11efd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack	Nanocore	detect Nanocore in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0xe0f5:$v1: NanoCore Client 0xe105:$v1: NanoCore Client 0xf9c6:$v2: PluginCommand 0xf9ae:$v3: CommandType
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfef5:$a: NanoCore 0xff05:$a: NanoCore 0x10139:$a: NanoCore 0x1014d:$a: NanoCore 0x1018d:$a: NanoCore 0x42915:$a: NanoCore 0x42925:$a: NanoCore 0x42b59:$a: NanoCore 0x42b6d:$a: NanoCore 0x42bad:$a: NanoCore 0xff54:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10156:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10196:$b: ClientPlugin 0x42974:$b: ClientPlugin 0x42b76:$b: ClientPlugin 0x42bb6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1007b:$c: ProjectData 0x42a9b:$c: ProjectData 0x162ede:$c: ProjectData 0x1e4afe:$c: ProjectData 0x10a82:$d: DESCrypto
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1018d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x42bad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x101ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x42bea:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13cfd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x4671d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack	Nanocore	detect Nanocore in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0xfef5:$v1: NanoCore Client 0xff05:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x42915:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x42925:$v1: NanoCore Client 0x117c6:$v2: PluginCommand 0x441e6:$v2: PluginCommand 0x117ae:$v3: CommandType 0x441ce:$v3: CommandType
Click to see the 3 entries

Sigma Overview

AV Detection:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

Author: Joe Security: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, ProcessId: 6100, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat

E-Banking Fraud:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

System Summary:

Sigma detected: System File Execution Location Anomaly

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth, Patrick Bareiss, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community: Data: Command: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, CommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: }}, Image: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7B35.tmp', ParentImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, ParentProcessId: 5836, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, ProcessId: 5936

Sigma detected: Possible Applocker Bypass

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: juju4: Data: Command: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, CommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, ParentProcessId: 5476, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, ProcessId: 6100

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Sigma detected: Scheduled temp file as task from temp location

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Joe Security: Data: Command: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7B35.tmp', CommandLine: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7B35.tmp', CommandLine|base64offset|contains: j, Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, ParentImage: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe, ParentProcessId: 6100, ProcessCommandLine: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7B35.tmp', ProcessId: 5836

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

Remote Access Functionality:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack

Malware Configuration Extractor: NanoCore {"Version": "1.2.2.0", "Mutex": "692d457c-2b26-4af6-a5f8-088a1838", "Group": "Default", "Domain1": "", "Domain2": "172.93.166.26", "Port": 4090, "RunOnStartup": "Enable", "RequestElevation": "Disable", "BypassUAC": "Enable", "ClearZoneIdentifier": "Enable", "ClearAccessControl": "Disable", "SetCriticalProcess": "Disable", "PreventSystemSleep": "Enable", "ActivateAwayMode": "Disable", "EnableDebugMode": "Disable", "RunDelay": 0, "ConnectDelay": 4000, "RestartDelay": 5000, "TimeoutInterval": 5000, "KeepAliveTimeout": 30000, "MutexTimeout": 5000, "LanTimeout": 2500, "WanTimeout": 8000, "BufferSize": "ffff0000", "MaxPacketSize": "0000a000", "GCThreshold": "0000a000", "UseCustomDNS": "Enable", "PrimaryDNSServer": "8.8.8.8", "BypassUserAccountControlData": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n <RegistrationInfo />\r\n <Triggers />\r\n <Principals>\r\n <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>\r\n <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n </Principal>\r\n </Principals>\r\n <Settings>\r\n <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n <IdleSettings>\r\n <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n </IdleSettings>\r\n <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n <Priority>4</Priority>\r\n </Settings>\r\n <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n <Exec>\r\n <Command>\"#EXECUTABLEPATH\"</Command>\r\n <Arguments>$(Arg0)</Arguments>\r\n </Exec>\r\n </Actions>\r\n</Task"}

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: f:\binaries\Intermediate\ndp_msbuild\xmakecommandline.csproj_1613737345\objr\x86\MSBuild.pdb source: dhcpmon.exe, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr
Source:	Binary string: f:\binaries\Intermediate\ndp_msbuild\xmakecommandline.csproj_1613737345\objr\x86\MSBuild.pdbD source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000D.00000002.267852932.0000000000292000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000F.00000000.270641668.0000000000632000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], 00000000h

Networking:

Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)

Show sources

Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49715 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49718 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49721 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49722 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49724 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49725 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49727 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49728 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49731 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49732 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49738 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49739 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49740 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49742 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49744 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49746 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49747 -> 172.93.166.26:4090
Source: Traffic	Snort IDS: 2025019 ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B 192.168.2.5:49748 -> 172.93.166.26:4090

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs:
Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: 172.93.166.26

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: GLOBALCOMPASSUS GLOBALCOMPASSUS

Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 104.43.193.48
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 104.43.193.48
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 20.190.160.134
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 172.93.166.26

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.247806528.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.227001843.000000000599D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.227389833.000000000599C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.churchsw.org/church-projector-project
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.churchsw.org/repository/Bibles/
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.228607607.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.229567693.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.htmlHF
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.230334241.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers1
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.230871223.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers4H
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.230417808.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers:
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.229630102.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersO
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.229108295.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersQ
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.229184999.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designerse
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.228660088.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersp
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260477736.0000000005965000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.como
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260477736.0000000005965000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comt
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260477736.0000000005965000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comueta
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.225381513.000000000596C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.225329902.000000000598E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.225381513.000000000596C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cnhu
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.231986581.0000000005991000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.231765863.0000000005991000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp//uV
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Ku
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0/lu
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0r
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/du
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/Yu
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226080749.0000000005964000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/lu
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/ru
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.225374998.000000000598E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com1
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.0/css/bootstrap.min.css

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49689
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49675 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49687
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49686
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49675
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49685
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49680
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49686 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49685 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49689 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49687 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49681 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49680 -> 443

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.246862196.00000000009EB000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Binary or memory string: <HOOK MODULE="DDRAW.DLL" FUNCTION="DirectDrawCreateEx"/>

E-Banking Fraud:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Nanocore in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Nanocore in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Nanocore in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Nanocore in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: Filename: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: Filename: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0270B264
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0270C2B0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_02709990
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0270DF73
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BA800
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BBB48
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088B0040
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BB3A8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BD3D0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088B8440
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BC508
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BF990
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BF9A0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BBB38
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BEE80
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BEE72
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088B91A0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BB2E4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088B3250
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BD3A6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BB302
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BF4A8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BF4B8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BC4F8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BF6C8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BF6D8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_088BA7F0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0B250040
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0B25C0E0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0B25AC98
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0B250B28
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0B250A91
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0B2569DF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0B250006
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0B254FE1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0B254FF0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0B25546F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Code function: 0_2_0B255480
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 10_2_01742148
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 10_2_01744000
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 10_2_01745CF9
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 10_2_017418C0
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 10_2_01744A20
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 10_2_01742133
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 15_2_00DA51F9
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 15_2_00DA2370
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Code function: 15_2_00DA1A2F

Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260326707.0000000005870000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameIEFRAME.DLLD vs Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.247908876.0000000002837000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameSimpleUI.dll( vs Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameDSASignature.dll@ vs Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.264266162.0000000008780000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.246862196.00000000009EB000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameclr.dllT vs Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameIAPPIDAUTHORITYAREREFERENCESEQUALFLAGS.exeB vs Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Nanocore in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Nanocore in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Nanocore in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Nanocore in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr, Microsoft.Build/CommandLine/OutOfProcTaskHostNode.cs	Task registration methods: 'RegisterTaskObject', 'UnregisterPacketHandler', 'RegisterPacketHandler', 'UnregisterTaskObject', 'GetRegisteredTaskObject'
Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr, Microsoft.Build/Shared/TaskLoader.cs	Task registration methods: 'CreateTask'
Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/TaskParameter.cs	Task registration methods: 'CreateNewTaskItemFrom'
Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr, Microsoft.Build/Shared/RegisteredTaskObjectCacheBase.cs	Task registration methods: '.cctor', 'GetLazyCollectionForLifetime', 'RegisterTaskObject', 'DisposeObjects', 'IsCollectionEmptyOrUncreated', '.ctor', 'UnregisterTaskObject', 'DisposeCacheObjects', 'GetRegisteredTaskObject', 'GetCollectionForLifetime'

Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Boolean System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal::IsInRole(System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole)
Source: 13.2.dhcpmon.exe.290000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 13.2.dhcpmon.exe.290000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Boolean System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal::IsInRole(System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole)
Source: 15.2.dhcpmon.exe.630000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 15.2.dhcpmon.exe.630000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent(System.Boolean)
Source: 15.2.dhcpmon.exe.630000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Void System.IO.Pipes.PipeSecurity::AddAccessRule(System.IO.Pipes.PipeAccessRule)
Source: 15.2.dhcpmon.exe.630000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 15.2.dhcpmon.exe.630000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Boolean System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal::IsInRole(System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole)
Source: 13.0.dhcpmon.exe.290000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 13.0.dhcpmon.exe.290000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Internal/CommunicationsUtilities.cs	Security API names: System.Boolean System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal::IsInRole(System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole)
Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent(System.Boolean)
Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Void System.IO.Pipes.PipeSecurity::AddAccessRule(System.IO.Pipes.PipeAccessRule)
Source: 13.0.dhcpmon.exe.290000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 13.0.dhcpmon.exe.290000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent(System.Boolean)
Source: 13.0.dhcpmon.exe.290000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Void System.IO.Pipes.PipeSecurity::AddAccessRule(System.IO.Pipes.PipeAccessRule)
Source: 13.2.dhcpmon.exe.290000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent()
Source: 13.2.dhcpmon.exe.290000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity::GetCurrent(System.Boolean)
Source: 13.2.dhcpmon.exe.290000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/BackEnd/NodeEndpointOutOfProcBase.cs	Security API names: System.Void System.IO.Pipes.PipeSecurity::AddAccessRule(System.IO.Pipes.PipeAccessRule)

Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000F.00000002.274281341.00000000029F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: l)C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\*.sln
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000D.00000002.267852932.0000000000292000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000F.00000000.270641668.0000000000632000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr	Binary or memory string: .configAMSBUILDDIRECTORYDELETERETRYCOUNTCMSBUILDDIRECTORYDELETRETRYTIMEOUT.sln
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000D.00000002.267852932.0000000000292000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000F.00000000.270641668.0000000000632000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr	Binary or memory string: MSBuild MyApp.sln /t:Rebuild /p:Configuration=Release
Source: dhcpmon.exe, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr	Binary or memory string: f:\binaries\Intermediate\ndp_msbuild\xmakecommandline.csproj_1613737345\objr\x86\MSBuild.pdb
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000F.00000002.274281341.00000000029F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: *.slnP#
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000D.00000002.267852932.0000000000292000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000F.00000000.270641668.0000000000632000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr	Binary or memory string: f:\binaries\Intermediate\ndp_msbuild\xmakecommandline.csproj_1613737345\objr\x86\MSBuild.pdbD
Source: dhcpmon.exe, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr	Binary or memory string: *.sln
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000D.00000002.267852932.0000000000292000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000F.00000000.270641668.0000000000632000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr	Binary or memory string: MSBuild MyApp.csproj /t:Clean
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000D.00000002.267852932.0000000000292000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000F.00000000.270641668.0000000000632000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr	Binary or memory string: /ignoreprojectextensions:.sln
Source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000D.00000002.267852932.0000000000292000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000F.00000000.270641668.0000000000632000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr	Binary or memory string: MSBUILD : error MSB1048: Solution files cannot be debugged directly. Run MSBuild first with an environment variable MSBUILDEMITSOLUTION=1 to create a corresponding ".sln.metaproj" file. Then debug that.

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@14/14@0/1

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

File created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.log

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\{692d457c-2b26-4af6-a5f8-088a183828b4}
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:5936:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:3880:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:1012:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:768:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7B35.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Select * from Clientes WHERE id=@id;;
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Select * from Aluguel Erro ao listar Banco sql-Aluguel.INSERT INTO Aluguel VALUES(@clienteID, @data);
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Select * from SecurityLogonType WHERE id=@id;
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Select * from SecurityLogonType WHERE modelo=@modelo;
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: INSERT INTO Itens_Aluguel VALUES(@aluguelID, @aviaoID, @validade);
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Insert into Clientes values (@nome, @cpf, @rg, @cidade, @endereco, @uf, @telefone);
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: INSERT INTO Aluguel VALUES(@clienteID, @data);
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: INSERT INTO SecurityLogonType VALUES(@modelo, @fabricante, @ano, @cor);
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Select * from SecurityLogonTypeErro ao listar Banco sql-SecurityLogonType,Select from SecurityLogonType WHERE id=@id;Select * from SecurityLogonType WHERE (modelo LIKE @modelo)

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7B35.tmp'
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp823B.tmp'
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe 0
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 0
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe'
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7B35.tmp'
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp823B.tmp'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{8856F961-340A-11D0-A96B-00C04FD705A2}\InProcServer32

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: f:\binaries\Intermediate\ndp_msbuild\xmakecommandline.csproj_1613737345\objr\x86\MSBuild.pdb source: dhcpmon.exe, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr
Source:	Binary string: f:\binaries\Intermediate\ndp_msbuild\xmakecommandline.csproj_1613737345\objr\x86\MSBuild.pdbD source: dhcpmon.exe, 0000000D.00000002.267852932.0000000000292000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe, 0000000F.00000000.270641668.0000000000632000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, dhcpmon.exe.4.dr

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Code function: 0_2_0B251B09 push ds; ret

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.68335682362

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	File created: \shipping documents original bl, invoice & pa.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	File created: \shipping documents original bl, invoice & pa.exe

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

File created: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe

Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival:

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7B35.tmp'

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

DLL reload attack detected

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Module Loaded: Original DLL: "C:\USERS\user\DESKTOP\SHIPPING DOCUMENTS ORIGINAL BL reload: INVOICE & PA.EXE"

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe:Zone.Identifier read attributes | delete

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Registry key monitored for changes: HKEY_CURRENT_USER_Classes

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476, type: MEMORY

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 6235
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 3069
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 755
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 645

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe TID: 5576	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe TID: 5928	Thread sleep time: -104343s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe TID: 5332	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe TID: 5836	Thread sleep time: -14757395258967632s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe TID: 6052	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe TID: 3532	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe TID: 5884	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 104343
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II!Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPath%C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.246959203.0000000000A1E000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll?
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE"SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware ToolsLHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 1\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0LHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 2\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0'SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Disk\Enum
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmwareNSYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Class\{4D36E968-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}\0000

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

.NET source code references suspicious native API functions

Show sources

Source: dhcpmon.exe.4.dr, Microsoft.Build/Shared/NativeMethodsShared.cs	Reference to suspicious API methods: ('GetProcAddress', 'GetProcAddress@kernel32.dll'), ('OpenProcess', 'OpenProcess@KERNEL32.DLL'), ('LoadLibrary', 'LoadLibrary@kernel32.dll')
Source: 13.0.dhcpmon.exe.290000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Shared/NativeMethodsShared.cs	Reference to suspicious API methods: ('GetProcAddress', 'GetProcAddress@kernel32.dll'), ('OpenProcess', 'OpenProcess@KERNEL32.DLL'), ('LoadLibrary', 'LoadLibrary@kernel32.dll')
Source: 13.2.dhcpmon.exe.290000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Shared/NativeMethodsShared.cs	Reference to suspicious API methods: ('GetProcAddress', 'GetProcAddress@kernel32.dll'), ('OpenProcess', 'OpenProcess@KERNEL32.DLL'), ('LoadLibrary', 'LoadLibrary@kernel32.dll')
Source: 15.2.dhcpmon.exe.630000.0.unpack, Microsoft.Build/Shared/NativeMethodsShared.cs	Reference to suspicious API methods: ('GetProcAddress', 'GetProcAddress@kernel32.dll'), ('OpenProcess', 'OpenProcess@KERNEL32.DLL'), ('LoadLibrary', 'LoadLibrary@kernel32.dll')

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Writes to foreign memory regions

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe base: 400000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe base: 402000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe base: 420000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe base: 422000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe base: BD7008

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7B35.tmp'
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp823B.tmp'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Runtime.Remoting\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Runtime.Remoting.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arial.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariali.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariblk.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\bahnschrift.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibril.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibriz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambria.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candara.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candaraz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comic.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comici.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constan.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constani.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbel.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbeli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cour.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\couri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrima.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrimabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framdit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAMDCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHV.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHVIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Gabriola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgia.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\impact.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Inkfree.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\javatext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelawUI.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelUIsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelaUIb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\lucon.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\l_10646.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgun.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\himalaya.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailu.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailub.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspa.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taile.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taileb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mingliub.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\monbaiti.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msgothic.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mvboli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtextb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Nirmala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaS.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaB.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\pala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palabi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoepr.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeprb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoesc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoescb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeuii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeuiz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguibl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguibli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguiemj.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguihis.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisym.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsun.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsunb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Sitka.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaI.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaZ.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\sylfaen.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\symbol.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahoma.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahomabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\timesi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\timesbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\timesbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebuc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdana.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\webdings.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\wingding.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothR.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothM.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothL.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\holomdl2.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTURY.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LEELAWAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LEELAWDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MSUIGHUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MSUIGHUB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\WINGDNG2.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\WINGDNG3.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TEMPSITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PRISTINA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PAPYRUS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MISTRAL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LHANDW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCKRIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JUICE___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRSCRIPT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FREESCPT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRADHITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OUTLOOK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BKANT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUABI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARAIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARABD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTCORSVA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ALGER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BASKVILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BAUHS93.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BERNHC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_PSTC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRITANIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BROADW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRUSHSCI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTAUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CHILLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COLONNA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COOPBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FTLTLT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARLOWSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARNGTON.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JOKERMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\KUNSTLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITED.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LCALLIG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAGNETOB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MATURASC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MOD20.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGENG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGSOL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OLDENGL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ONYX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PARCHM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PLAYBILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\POORICH.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAVIE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\INFROMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SHOWG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SNAP____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\STENCIL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VINERITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VIVALDII.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VLADIMIR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LATINWD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCM_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCMI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCB_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCBI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCM____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCRIPTBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCCB___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAGE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTILI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTIBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PER_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PALSCRI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OCRAEXT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAIAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEBO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\IMPRISHA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HATTEN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDYSTO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIL_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLSNECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIGI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABKIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FORTE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FELIXTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASMD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASLGHT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASDEMI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ENGR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCEDSCR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CURLZ___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENSCBK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CASTELAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_R.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_I.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_B.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCBLKAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARLRDBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BSSYM7.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSPCL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTEXTRA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\marlett.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Management.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.Build.Framework\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.Build.Framework.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.Build\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.Build.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.Build.Framework\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.Build.Framework.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.Build\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.Build.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.Build.Framework\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.Build.Framework.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.Build\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.Build.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Remote Access Functionality:

Detected Nanocore Rat

Show sources

Source: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000004.00000003.267100051.00000000064A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.3909330.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation1	Scheduled Task/Job11	Process Injection211	Masquerading2	Input Capture1	Query Registry1	Remote Services	Input Capture1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel12	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job11	DLL Side-Loading1	Scheduled Task/Job11	Disable or Modify Tools1	LSASS Memory	Security Software Discovery111	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Remote Access Software1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	Native API1	Logon Script (Windows)	DLL Side-Loading1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion21	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Application Layer Protocol11	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection211	NTDS	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion21	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Hidden Files and Directories1	LSA Secrets	Application Window Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Obfuscated Files or Information3	Cached Domain Credentials	System Information Discovery12	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Software Packing2	DCSync	Network Sniffing	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	DLL Side-Loading1	Proc Filesystem	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	9%	ReversingLabs	ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.NanoBot
Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	0%	Metadefender		Browse
C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	0%	ReversingLabs

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
api.globalsign.cloud	0%	Virustotal		Browse

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp//uV	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/lu	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Ku	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/du	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.tiro.com1	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
172.93.166.26	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0r	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnhu	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.churchsw.org/church-projector-project	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0/lu	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comueta	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.churchsw.org/repository/Bibles/	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/Yu	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comt	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comt	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comt	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.como	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.como	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.como	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/ru	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
api.globalsign.cloud	104.18.25.243	true	false	0%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
172.93.166.26	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp//uV	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/lu	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226080749.0000000005964000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Ku	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/du	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.tiro.com1	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.225374998.000000000598E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.tiro.com	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0r	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersQ	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.229108295.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersO	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.229630102.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.0/css/bootstrap.min.css	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnhu	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.225381513.000000000596C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.231986581.0000000005991000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.231765863.0000000005991000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designerse	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.229184999.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.227001843.000000000599D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.227389833.000000000599C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.churchsw.org/church-projector-project	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fonts.com	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.247806528.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersp	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.228660088.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sakkal.com	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.htmlHF	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.229567693.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0/lu	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comueta	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260477736.0000000005965000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.churchsw.org/repository/Bibles/	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/Yu	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.coml	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.225329902.000000000598E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.225381513.000000000596C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.comt	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260477736.0000000005965000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.como	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260477736.0000000005965000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000002.260525380.0000000005A50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers:	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.230417808.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers1	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.230334241.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers4H	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.230871223.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.228607607.000000000599E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/ru	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, 00000000.00000003.226622852.0000000005969000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
172.93.166.26	unknown	United States		22653	GLOBALCOMPASSUS	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	32.0.0 Black Diamond
Analysis ID:	403743
Start date:	04.05.2021
Start time:	11:26:10
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 10m 53s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	37
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@14/14@0/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 9.6% (good quality ratio 8.3%) Quality average: 38.1% Quality standard deviation: 20%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 97% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information. TCP Packets have been reduced to 100 Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 93.184.220.29, 13.64.90.137, 131.253.33.200, 13.107.22.200, 20.50.102.62, 104.18.25.243, 168.61.161.212, 92.122.145.220, 184.30.20.56, 92.122.213.194, 92.122.213.247, 2.20.142.209, 2.20.142.210, 20.54.26.129 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): au.download.windowsupdate.com.edgesuite.net, cs9.wac.phicdn.net, arc.msn.com.nsatc.net, ocsp.msocsp.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, ocsp.digicert.com, www-bing-com.dual-a-0001.a-msedge.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, arc.trafficmanager.net, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net, www.bing.com, skypedataprdcolwus17.cloudapp.net, fs.microsoft.com, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, skypedataprdcolcus17.cloudapp.net, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, a767.dscg3.akamai.net, dual-a-0001.dc-msedge.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, hostedocsp.globalsign.com, a-0001.a-afdentry.net.trafficmanager.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net Report size exceeded maximum capacity and may have missing behavior information. Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
11:27:05	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe modified
11:27:11	Autostart	Run: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run DHCP Monitor C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
11:27:14	Task Scheduler	Run new task: DHCP Monitor path: "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe" s>$(Arg0)
11:27:15	API Interceptor	900x Sleep call for process: MSBuild.exe modified
11:27:17	Task Scheduler	Run new task: DHCP Monitor Task path: "C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe" s>$(Arg0)

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
172.93.166.26	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
api.globalsign.cloud	dfa3680f_by_Libranalysis.dll	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.25.243
	f5dcaf15_by_Libranalysis.dll	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.24.243
	jH70i5mxJO.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.24.243
	Swift copy REF329001996045.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.25.243
	Invoice 32108322.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.24.243
	8adb0cc0_by_Libranalysis.dll	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.25.243
	0d7140d8_by_Libranalysis.dll	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.25.243
	be8cb104_by_Libranalysis.dll	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.25.243
	Zwi#U0119ksz-2873037.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.25.243
	SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.PackedNET.624.32220.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.25.243
	DHL_document11022020680908911.doc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.25.243
	purchace order.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.24.243
	wSBbLKrAti.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.25.243
	a7379783_by_Libranalysis.dll	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.24.243
	f6a32690_by_Libranalysis.dll	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.24.243
	PO.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.24.243
	SecuriteInfo.com.Heur.11238.xls	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.25.243
	HID Purchase LedgerAdvice - 2001330.jar	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.25.243
	b087a332_by_Libranalysis.dll	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.25.243
	wNgiGmsOwT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	104.18.25.243

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
GLOBALCOMPASSUS	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	172.93.166.26
	5zc9vbGBo3.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.16.162
	pieChart2.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	142.202.205.89
	#Ud83d#Udd04nick.ulycz- domesticandgeneral.com OKeep.htm	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.20.27
	parcel_images.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.59.215
	a4588f57322665c795bdf720abc23ffc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.52.111
	Mf1iDAE6bE.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.52.111
	Buchung.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.42.251
	Buchung.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.42.251
	Buchung.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.42.251
	P64.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.38.132
	http://v.ht/v6GD	Get hash	malicious	Browse	69.61.26.121

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link
C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Ziraat Bankasi Swift Mesaji.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SN-346.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	insurance certificate , BL.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	E5ew8dBzdN.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	kHisp6Vo3M.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	aVzenPkPSm.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	GT42536.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	NEWPO-243769001.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Purchase Order-877.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	W29wJd8rZ5.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	INV#6534524.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	xWwkCdgUxd.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	t5R60D503x.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	GT_0397337_03987638BNG.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	CCF20032021_0003.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	1PH37n4Gva.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	E0029876556_209876689.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	BGD_03987365_0398736DSC.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	1XCQ1u2Q59.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Created / dropped Files

C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	261728
Entropy (8bit):	6.1750840449797675
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3072:Mao0QHGUQWWimj9q/NLpj/WWqvAw2XpFU4rwOe4ubZSif02RFi/x2uv9FeP:boZTTWxxqVpqWVRXfr802biprVu
MD5:	D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1
SHA1:	ABCAE05EE61EE6292003AABD8C80583FA49EDDA2
SHA-256:	2CA7CF7146FB8209CF3C6CECB1C5AA154C61E046DC07AFA05E8158F2C0DDE2F6
SHA-512:	2D85A81D708ECC8AF9A1273143C94DA84E632F1E595E22F54B867225105A1D0A44F918F0FAE6F1EB15ECF69D75B6F4616699776A16A2AA8B5282100FD15CA74C
Malicious:	false
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Metadefender, Detection: 0%, Browse Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 0%
Joe Sandbox View:	Filename: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Ziraat Bankasi Swift Mesaji.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: SN-346.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: insurance certificate , BL.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: E5ew8dBzdN.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: kHisp6Vo3M.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: aVzenPkPSm.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: GT42536.scr.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: NEWPO-243769001.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Purchase Order-877.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: W29wJd8rZ5.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: INV#6534524.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: xWwkCdgUxd.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: t5R60D503x.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: GT_0397337_03987638BNG.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: CCF20032021_0003.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: 1PH37n4Gva.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: E0029876556_209876689.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: BGD_03987365_0398736DSC.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: 1XCQ1u2Q59.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L....Z.Z.........."...0..\|...B......n.... ........@.. ....................................`.....................................O........>..............`>.......................................................... ............... ..H............text....z... ...\|.................. ..`.rsrc....>.......@...~..............@..@.reloc..............................@..B................P.......H.......8)...................\|..........................................{.......v.(=....r...p({...-..+..}........0..%........(....-......(z.....&..}..............................0..5........(....-...-.r+..ps>...z.....i(z.....&..}......................%......>....(?...(....N..(@....oA...(....:...(B...(....:...(C...(....*....(........0..G........(....,....(....-...}......r...p(x...&.(v.....}......&..}....................7.......0..f........-.r7..ps>...z .....

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\MSBuild.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	841
Entropy (8bit):	5.356220854328477
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:ML9E4Ks2wKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoIvEE4xDqE4j:MxHKXwYHKhQnoPtHoxHwvEHxDqHj
MD5:	486580834B084C92AE1F3866166C9C34
SHA1:	C8EB7E1CEF55A6C9EB931487E9AA4A2098AACEDF
SHA-256:	65C5B1213E371D449E2A239557A5F250FEA1D3473A1B5C4C5FF7492085F663FB
SHA-512:	2C54B638A52AA87F47CAB50859EFF98F07DA02993A596686B5617BA99E73ABFCD104F0F33209E24AFB32E66B4B8A225D4DB2CC79631540C21E7E8C4573DFD457
Malicious:	false
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..2,"Microsoft.Build.Framework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..2,"Microsoft.Build, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1314
Entropy (8bit):	5.350128552078965
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:MLU84jE4K5E4Ks2E1qE4qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4sAmEw:MgvjHK5HKXE1qHiYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHR
MD5:	1DC1A2DCC9EFAA84EABF4F6D6066565B
SHA1:	B7FCF805B6DD8DE815EA9BC089BD99F1E617F4E9
SHA-256:	28D63442C17BF19558655C88A635CB3C3FF1BAD1CCD9784090B9749A7E71FCEF
SHA-512:	95DD7E2AB0884A3EFD9E26033B337D1F97DDF9A8E9E9C4C32187DCD40622D8B1AC8CCDBA12A70A6B9075DF5E7F68DF2F8FBA4AB33DB4576BE9806B8E191802B7
Malicious:	true
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"Microsoft.VisualBasic, Version=10.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\dhcpmon.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	1037
Entropy (8bit):	5.371216502395632
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:ML9E4Ks2wKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7KvEE4xDqE4j:MxHKXwYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHKzvKvEHxD0
MD5:	C7F28B87C2CAD111D929CB9A0FF822F8
SHA1:	C2CF9E7A3F6EFD9000FE76EBE54E4E9AE5754267
SHA-256:	D1B02C20EACF464229AB063FA947A525E2ED7772259A8F70C7205DC13599EAE6
SHA-512:	E0F35874E02AB672CFF0553A0DA0864DAB14C05733D06395E4D0C9CDFC6F445E940310F8D01E3E1B28895F636DFBC1F510E103D1C46818400BA4E7371D8F254D
Malicious:	false
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Xml\b219d4630d26b88041b59c21e8e2b95c\System.Xml.ni.dll",0..2,"Microsoft.Build.Framework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..2,"Microsoft.Build, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7B35.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1320
Entropy (8bit):	5.137611098420233
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+S/4oL600QlMhEMjn5pwjVLUYODOLG9RJh7h8gK0moxtn:cbk4oL600QydbQxIYODOLedq3Zoj
MD5:	3E2B26ED8B75AE83A269595180E84EF6
SHA1:	D30A0335FCCE406BCA8BA5764288235E6192F608
SHA-256:	108BE30AEB8EB31C185A39A6726F26DACBC4E4124951C61A29ADE4B7038C71EA
SHA-512:	B6981C68FCB886CC8379A068B96931B9D4F5CC5AA9BDC467E36C4168FE6C5273A2A84D8850B12C11703EC03AC6B1F1950D1E669EFCB59FC2402CE4BBA9DC03D3
Malicious:	true
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo />.. <Triggers />.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>.. <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>.. <IdleSettings>.. <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>.. <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>.. </IdleSettings>.. <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <Hidden>false</Hidden>.. <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>.. <Wak

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp823B.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1310
Entropy (8bit):	5.109425792877704
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+S/4oL600QlMhEMjn5pwjVLUYODOLG9RJh7h8gK0R3xtn:cbk4oL600QydbQxIYODOLedq3S3j
MD5:	5C2F41CFC6F988C859DA7D727AC2B62A
SHA1:	68999C85FC7E37BAB9216E0099836D40D4545C1C
SHA-256:	98B6E66B6C2173B9B91FC97FE51805340EFDE978B695453742EBAB631018398B
SHA-512:	B5DA5DA378D038AFBF8A7738E47921ED39F9B726E2CAA2993D915D9291A3322F94EFE8CCA6E7AD678A670DB19926B22B20E5028460FCC89CEA7F6635E7557334
Malicious:	false
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo />.. <Triggers />.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>.. <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>.. <IdleSettings>.. <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>.. <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>.. </IdleSettings>.. <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <Hidden>false</Hidden>.. <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>.. <Wak

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\catalog.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	2088
Entropy (8bit):	7.109925499344649
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	48:IkXEUg6ikXEUg6ikXEUg6ikXEUg6ikXEUg6ikXEUg6ikXEUg6ikXEUg6ikXEUg6Z:06y6y6y6y6y6y6y6y6Z
MD5:	B6EC404880A5BE35BDE0742DF27D7DDF
SHA1:	29A9CAA4B4CD1526C23D6956A8BDCC6A205E64BE
SHA-256:	EF47DD79D655D7AF9FBC895D9D9775DAC5F7BA0589D26DABA2D3537F7C9172DC
SHA-512:	A4C6D3C341D7BAFC5D39580FC84CA0BBB1272E3921A467081FC873DBEFBAC5D84F374F11A054FAB85A4A57F3E946C09C4EE68AA8083E0744C148A9053F3C5193
Malicious:	false
Preview:	Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........`kZ..JR<..e.8....z...O......f..m.PQ>Y...}.....K.,Kl..G.....qA..#.w.&..7m..B.I.....in..<5J....z).H?....6..2Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........`kZ..JR<..e.8....z...O......f..m.PQ>Y...}.....K.,Kl..G.....qA..#.w.&..7m..B.I.....in..<5J....z).H?....6..2Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........`kZ..JR<..e.8....z...O......f..m.PQ>Y...}.....K.,Kl..G.....qA..#.w.&..7m..B.I.....in..<5J....z).H?....6..2Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........`kZ..JR<..e.8....z...O......f..m.PQ>Y...}.....K.,Kl..G.....qA..#.w.&..7m..B.I.....in..<5J....z).H?....6..2Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	8
Entropy (8bit):	3.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Q:Q
MD5:	6825F9D9255E881EBFC7B1909FDD8F1B
SHA1:	7C5E76AA7C364B8C374C26B27163B9C3BDD25B8C
SHA-256:	3E8E091E90E39D9989917E641EC43DD84AF743CCE823C0AC4F2C73D259638436
SHA-512:	5F7398644A3573363F9B443A08A1842ACAC5CCA3928CCE7B7C3A3957EE4FFE8382FD063235D91DB26F81FA7CBC59CDEFF9C97D10BB4FDC784FC7ABB60E6F1571
Malicious:	true
Preview:	z.-;*..H

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\settings.bin Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	40
Entropy (8bit):	5.221928094887364
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:9bzY6oRDMjmPl:RzWDMCd
MD5:	AE0F5E6CE7122AF264EC533C6B15A27B
SHA1:	1265A495C42EED76CC043D50C60C23297E76CCE1
SHA-256:	73B0B92179C61C26589B47E9732CE418B07EDEE3860EE5A2A5FB06F3B8AA9B26
SHA-512:	DD44C2D24D4E3A0F0B988AD3D04683B5CB128298043134649BBE33B2512CE0C9B1A8E7D893B9F66FBBCDD901E2B0646C4533FB6C0C8C4AFCB95A0EFB95D446F8
Malicious:	false
Preview:	9iH...}Z.4..f..... 8.j....\|.&X..e.F.*.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\storage.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	315512
Entropy (8bit):	7.999402922203056
Encrypted:	true
SSDEEP:	6144:m8aeVE5MlgWfxwY/8uvJYRDMVpXUhXShjVd/WNXlMjwmZ/zVR5X7HZEKiMIqrjG:mfwiMdxwYEYyWVjVpW7mZBDCgrjG
MD5:	787AEB1604A638B138739ED060141E9D
SHA1:	A2D0680883E8C6FF3DDE0A177263B03E7644D4AA
SHA-256:	DCCB67209560E2E27A4F284CD7E412926303ABD4E77927F9A1BAF8B0B8994B45
SHA-512:	9E49E851465F07ABA6AB44AD6B7561004AD61C4794FE167C6C724994159714AF8D2AC8ECCCE128F84BC6A7607BA05CD891CFD2C9EDE9D9EFA860346F6004360E
Malicious:	false
Preview:	..f# ....)1\.....5....;.T..u.. .3.Xd... ....u(..._.V.{L..Y.8....~...S79.f0V...=.}...SJg\|.lh.J..^Ge.........3h?n..:..r....,o."a.I....\..0Z.D..........^....[..f.I....@/_..".5+...I...J`./s..p-.....c..?..... .&.....>.Ye$=.pG.....9D...'7.w.a.[3.d.-..V..]..B.b.zA?..M..3...%A....K5@.. j.U.h.B....'...0."..u.V...d..c,r"..@9.9.>..cDgP~d9..St...{..24.s.'.....9.D..P4.....I...G..G5......u.-2...z1[.....C..n.6.!..'.%@&.l4..P..rc+vq..C5B.b..j.W,..T..z......)BX4...>A.~#..A....8..B....5....w....GC..........y......7...?.T.....!.....7A.........C.3......A.....hC..5'..42..zS.*2.m7....A.'/.R..X....}e...>........}...n.A...4..?.P.l..n.0.I`...".d1.(e\|..f.....i.9.#...n..+..l....Xz.q...6".Hl...+...1^pgs...%.FR.T....(...=.rHX.d.9%...?..f?.Q.yi.D9/>....V..5......q...nP'...S.Y.....pu.!..-..\..\|/....V.......NX....../.8..V.0.5`m$.{b..lw.K.3-..C3...-.2.Qb.....o...6z....`H...(..o.ag.-7../F..RoI..O#.u\|.U.@....$;.....s.~.M...j?...q#.l..y..M.[../.....=T.......5HX.QJ...

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\task.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	57
Entropy (8bit):	4.887726803973036
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:oMty8WddSJ8:oMLW6C
MD5:	6ECAFC0490DAB08E4A288E0042B6B613
SHA1:	4A4529907588505FC65CC9933980CFE6E576B3D6
SHA-256:	DC5F76FBF44B3E6CDDC14EA9E5BB9B6BD3A955197FE13F33F7DDA7ECC08E79E0
SHA-512:	7DA2B02627A36C8199814C250A1FBD61A9C18E098F8D691C11D75044E7F51DBD52C31EC2E1EA8CDEE5077ADCCB8CD247266F191292DB661FE7EA1B613FC646F8
Malicious:	false
Preview:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe

\Device\ConDrv Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	298
Entropy (8bit):	4.943030742860529
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6:zx3M1tFAbQtU1R30qyMstwYVoRRZBXVN+J0fFdCsq2UTiMdH8stCal+n:zK13I30ZMt9BFN+QdCT2UftCM+
MD5:	6A9888952541A41F033EB114C24DC902
SHA1:	41903D7C8F31013C44572E09D97B9AAFBBCE77E6
SHA-256:	41A61D0084CD7884BEA1DF02ED9213CB8C83F4034F5C8156FC5B06D6A3E133CE
SHA-512:	E6AC898E67B4052375FDDFE9894B26D504A7827917BF3E02772CFF45C3FA7CC5E0EFFDC701D208E0DB89F05E42F195B1EC890F316BEE5CB8239AB45444DAA65E
Malicious:	false
Preview:	Microsoft (R) Build Engine version 4.7.3056.0..[Microsoft .NET Framework, version 4.0.30319.42000]..Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.....MSBUILD : error MSB1003: Specify a project or solution file. The current working directory does not contain a project or solution file...

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.672963694548947
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.80% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.75% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
File size:	736256
MD5:	597332734fde92068c7b354d33920040
SHA1:	01454e8c59644ab0dd54d2326a93965a1f52b91c
SHA256:	d9510122ef15d475c69ca539c949d4b8c8002b8f617411854098091106c37119
SHA512:	dc3c242b62bcbbb023530054dc71d1c273d94f11d4138df68854cca2b2347c3882c21d35f0303825975a994f6cb2674d342e0014f5ff7a6fee4961bb560b97c4
SSDEEP:	12288:FygEfhLfIEOKMN4bAapo4O6vTZ/rGm1ohM7/7lv92L97rK:UgExffOK9Uau4TTpGmd7/N8B
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L......`..............P..2..........ZP... ...`....@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4b505a
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x609109B2 [Tue May 4 08:45:38 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xb5008	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xb6000	0x45c	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0xb8000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0xb3060	0xb3200	False	0.817592027216	data	7.68335682362	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xb6000	0x45c	0x600	False	0.302734375	data	2.60683411003	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0xb8000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0xb6058	0x400	data

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright Felix Jeyareuben 2012
Assembly Version	2.0.0.0
InternalName	IAPPIDAUTHORITYAREREFERENCESEQUALFLAGS.exe
FileVersion	2.0
CompanyName	www.churchsw.org
LegalTrademarks	Church Software
Comments
ProductName	Church Projector
ProductVersion	2.0
FileDescription	Church Projector
OriginalFilename	IAPPIDAUTHORITYAREREFERENCESEQUALFLAGS.exe

Network Behavior

Snort IDS Alerts

Timestamp	Protocol	SID	Message	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
05/04/21-11:27:17.276693	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49715	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:27:23.932008	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49718	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:27:28.719047	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49721	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:27:33.797262	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49722	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:27:38.765533	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49724	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:27:45.152920	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49725	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:27:52.235711	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49727	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:27:59.089634	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49728	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:28:06.113876	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49731	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:28:13.278332	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49732	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:28:18.184485	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49738	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:28:24.187060	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49739	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:28:30.239627	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49740	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:28:36.280037	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49742	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:28:42.427171	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49744	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:28:50.532891	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49746	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:28:56.567380	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49747	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
05/04/21-11:29:02.629050	TCP	2025019	ET TROJAN Possible NanoCore C2 60B	49748	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.209290981 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.209316015 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.209327936 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.209342957 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.209357023 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.209372044 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.209405899 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.209428072 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.209450006 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.209459066 CEST	49685	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.209527969 CEST	49685	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.239491940 CEST	49686	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.239547014 CEST	49686	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.239923954 CEST	49685	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.239959955 CEST	49685	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.248092890 CEST	49689	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.287586927 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.287611008 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.294224024 CEST	443	49686	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.297158003 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.297307968 CEST	49689	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.304307938 CEST	49689	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.309508085 CEST	443	49687	104.43.193.48	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.314212084 CEST	443	49687	104.43.193.48	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.315084934 CEST	49687	443	192.168.2.5	104.43.193.48
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.331975937 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.356105089 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.356132030 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.356144905 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.356157064 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.356168032 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.356254101 CEST	49689	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.356307030 CEST	49689	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.362040997 CEST	49689	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.412318945 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.413212061 CEST	49689	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.413245916 CEST	49689	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.447264910 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.447288036 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.447299004 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.447312117 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.447326899 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.447340012 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.447359085 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.447375059 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.447388887 CEST	443	49685	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.447400093 CEST	49685	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.447458029 CEST	49685	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.450263977 CEST	443	49686	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.450290918 CEST	443	49686	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.450309992 CEST	443	49686	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.450328112 CEST	443	49686	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.450345993 CEST	443	49686	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.450361967 CEST	443	49686	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.450378895 CEST	443	49686	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.450393915 CEST	49686	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.450395107 CEST	443	49686	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.450406075 CEST	443	49686	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.450448990 CEST	49686	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.450493097 CEST	49686	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.461076975 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.461196899 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.468808889 CEST	443	49687	104.43.193.48	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.468964100 CEST	49687	443	192.168.2.5	104.43.193.48
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.492974997 CEST	49685	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.619919062 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.619975090 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.620023012 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.620079994 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.620090961 CEST	49689	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.620136976 CEST	49689	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.620137930 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.620182037 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.620219946 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.620223045 CEST	49689	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.620256901 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.620291948 CEST	443	49689	20.190.160.134	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.620295048 CEST	49689	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.669290066 CEST	49689	443	192.168.2.5	20.190.160.134
May 4, 2021 11:27:17.031640053 CEST	49715	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 11:27:17.178985119 CEST	4090	49715	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:17.179250002 CEST	49715	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 11:27:17.276693106 CEST	49715	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 11:27:17.437107086 CEST	4090	49715	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:17.437334061 CEST	49715	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 11:27:17.625561953 CEST	4090	49715	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:17.625709057 CEST	49715	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 11:27:17.771305084 CEST	4090	49715	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:17.821208954 CEST	49715	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 11:27:18.020124912 CEST	4090	49715	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:18.020421982 CEST	4090	49715	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:18.020493984 CEST	4090	49715	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:18.020558119 CEST	4090	49715	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:18.020622015 CEST	4090	49715	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:18.020634890 CEST	49715	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 11:27:18.020659924 CEST	4090	49715	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:18.020669937 CEST	49715	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26
May 4, 2021 11:27:18.020699978 CEST	4090	49715	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:18.020739079 CEST	4090	49715	172.93.166.26	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:18.020741940 CEST	49715	4090	192.168.2.5	172.93.166.26

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.311935902 CEST	53784	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.363045931 CEST	53	53784	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.402412891 CEST	65307	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.451015949 CEST	53	65307	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.722703934 CEST	64344	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.785067081 CEST	53	64344	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.791004896 CEST	62060	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.841712952 CEST	53	62060	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.920352936 CEST	61805	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.982664108 CEST	53	61805	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:50.735373974 CEST	54795	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:26:50.786870956 CEST	53	54795	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:52.527868032 CEST	49557	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:26:52.576544046 CEST	53	49557	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:52.602447033 CEST	61733	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:26:52.663760900 CEST	53	61733	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:53.879122019 CEST	65447	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:26:53.930641890 CEST	53	65447	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:55.074352980 CEST	52441	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:26:55.126118898 CEST	53	52441	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:56.334469080 CEST	62176	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:26:56.386065960 CEST	53	62176	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:57.602063894 CEST	59596	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:26:57.650607109 CEST	53	59596	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:26:58.740451097 CEST	65296	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:26:58.792013884 CEST	53	65296	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:00.521791935 CEST	63183	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:27:00.570535898 CEST	53	63183	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:01.450519085 CEST	60151	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:27:01.499279022 CEST	53	60151	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:02.468585014 CEST	56969	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:27:02.520325899 CEST	53	56969	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:19.157804966 CEST	55161	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:27:19.222526073 CEST	53	55161	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:24.745168924 CEST	54757	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:27:24.798453093 CEST	53	54757	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:34.289083958 CEST	49992	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:27:34.347805023 CEST	53	49992	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:27:44.954031944 CEST	60075	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:27:45.017167091 CEST	53	60075	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:28:04.342784882 CEST	55016	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:28:04.393522024 CEST	53	55016	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:28:14.100302935 CEST	64345	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:28:14.159441948 CEST	53	64345	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:28:29.972887993 CEST	57128	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:28:30.039331913 CEST	53	57128	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:28:39.747466087 CEST	54791	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:28:39.797235966 CEST	53	54791	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
May 4, 2021 11:28:44.984268904 CEST	50463	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
May 4, 2021 11:28:45.050970078 CEST	53	50463	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.982664108 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0xa02c	No error (0)	api.globalsign.cloud		104.18.25.243	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
May 4, 2021 11:26:49.982664108 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0xa02c	No error (0)	api.globalsign.cloud		104.18.24.243	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe PID: 5476 Parent PID: 5700

General

Start time:	11:26:56
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe'
Imagebase:	0x350000
File size:	736256 bytes
MD5 hash:	597332734FDE92068C7B354D33920040
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net> Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: Nanocore, Description: detect Nanocore in memory, Source: 00000000.00000002.255085940.00000000037F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.248107132.000000000286C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: MSBuild.exe PID: 6100 Parent PID: 5476

General

Start time:	11:27:07
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
Imagebase:	0x8c0000
File size:	261728 bytes
MD5 hash:	D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 5836 Parent PID: 6100

General

Start time:	11:27:11
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7B35.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x1150000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 5936 Parent PID: 5836

General

Start time:	11:27:11
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7ecfc0000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 2900 Parent PID: 6100

General

Start time:	11:27:12
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp823B.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x7ff797770000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 1012 Parent PID: 2900

General

Start time:	11:27:14
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7ecfc0000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: MSBuild.exe PID: 4472 Parent PID: 904

General

Start time:	11:27:14
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe 0
Imagebase:	0xfd0000
File size:	261728 bytes
MD5 hash:	D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 5936 Parent PID: 4472

General

Start time:	11:27:15
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7ecfc0000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: dhcpmon.exe PID: 5608 Parent PID: 904

General

Start time:	11:27:17
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 0
Imagebase:	0x290000
File size:	261728 bytes
MD5 hash:	D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Antivirus matches:	Detection: 0%, Metadefender, Browse Detection: 0%, ReversingLabs
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 3880 Parent PID: 5608

General

Start time:	11:27:17
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7ecfc0000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: dhcpmon.exe PID: 6108 Parent PID: 3472

General

Start time:	11:27:20
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe'
Imagebase:	0x630000
File size:	261728 bytes
MD5 hash:	D621FD77BD585874F9686D3A76462EF1
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 768 Parent PID: 6108

General

Start time:	11:27:20
Start date:	04/05/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7ecfc0000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Tactics:	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches ( `dir /a` for Windows and `ls –a` for Linux and macOS).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Analysis Report Shipping Documents Original BL, Invoice & Pa.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Startup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

AV Detection:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources