Play interactive tour

Edit tour

Analysis Report pansy.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	pansy.exe
Analysis ID:	430639
MD5:	be5a85f85d011252e63cab4566239280
SHA1:	72a8f524a3b449b3c459cdfe4a7b6c1c46b0dcdd
SHA256:	057144f38e786ee18295c76f3f06a975fc342358a5d6ba049000ca0fe44e8179
Tags:	exeGuLoader
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	80
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Potential malicious icon found

Yara detected GuLoader

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Abnormal high CPU Usage

PE file contains strange resources

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

pansy.exe (PID: 7068 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe' MD5: BE5A85F85D011252E63CAB4566239280)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1k6joaGLkNYxFw0lOjR395hYutsonOF5Q"}

Yara Overview

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
pansy.exe	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_1	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: pansy.exe

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1k6joaGLkNYxFw0lOjR395hYutsonOF5Q"}

Source: pansy.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1k6joaGLkNYxFw0lOjR395hYutsonOF5Q

System Summary:

Potential malicious icon found

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Icon embedded in PE file: bad icon match: 20047c7c70f0e004

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: pansy.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: pansy.exe, 00000000.00000002.1166613915.00000000020B0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp

Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameuser32j% vs pansy.exe

Source: pansy.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal80.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: pansy.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: pansy.exe, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.pansy.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.0.pansy.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040662F push ss; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406D73 pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe	Code function: 0_2_00407F0F push 0000005Ah; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406516 push ss; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040EBF1 push cs; ret

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002B6FACE second address: 0000000002B6FACE instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002B725A5 second address: 0000000002B725A5 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002B69737 second address: 0000000002B697D9 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a mov edi, dword ptr [ebp+0000017Fh] 0x00000010 push cx 0x00000012 mov cx, 7167h 0x00000016 pop cx 0x00000018 cmp di, 3711h 0x0000001d call 00007F78F49BFB7Dh 0x00000022 call 00007F78F49BFB84h 0x00000027 lfence 0x0000002a mov edx, 464DB255h 0x0000002f xor edx, 60CB488Eh 0x00000035 xor edx, A32252D0h 0x0000003b xor edx, FA5AA81Fh 0x00000041 mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x00000043 lfence 0x00000046 ret 0x00000047 mov esi, edx 0x00000049 pushad 0x0000004a rdtsc

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002B6FACE second address: 0000000002B6FACE instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002B725A5 second address: 0000000002B725A5 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002B69737 second address: 0000000002B697D9 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a mov edi, dword ptr [ebp+0000017Fh] 0x00000010 push cx 0x00000012 mov cx, 7167h 0x00000016 pop cx 0x00000018 cmp di, 3711h 0x0000001d call 00007F78F49BFB7Dh 0x00000022 call 00007F78F49BFB84h 0x00000027 lfence 0x0000002a mov edx, 464DB255h 0x0000002f xor edx, 60CB488Eh 0x00000035 xor edx, A32252D0h 0x0000003b xor edx, FA5AA81Fh 0x00000041 mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x00000043 lfence 0x00000046 ret 0x00000047 mov esi, edx 0x00000049 pushad 0x0000004a rdtsc

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: pansy.exe, 00000000.00000002.1166514064.0000000000CA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: pansy.exe, 00000000.00000002.1166514064.0000000000CA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: pansy.exe, 00000000.00000002.1166514064.0000000000CA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: pansy.exe, 00000000.00000002.1166514064.0000000000CA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery3	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Application Layer Protocol1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Information Discovery21	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
pansy.exe	9%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Mucc

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	32.0.0 Black Diamond
Analysis ID:	430639
Start date:	07.06.2021
Start time:	17:57:43
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 3s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	pansy.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	14
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal80.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 10.3% (good quality ratio 2.1%) Quality average: 12.6% Quality standard deviation: 25.2%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe VT rate limit hit for: /opt/package/joesandbox/database/analysis/430639/sample/pansy.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	4.667078138121212
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	pansy.exe
File size:	143360
MD5:	be5a85f85d011252e63cab4566239280
SHA1:	72a8f524a3b449b3c459cdfe4a7b6c1c46b0dcdd
SHA256:	057144f38e786ee18295c76f3f06a975fc342358a5d6ba049000ca0fe44e8179
SHA512:	732e41dc029f793c9076904909ad3fe222d127dd47bec8075b682dd2a4505be38e76a3b764271ca2930945bf31c0e39f48c42295d703595247c7ba6cac5829b9
SSDEEP:	1536:Q/Qq7xbuNxA3JhkGpwPRRHkOVPVXYstBRQeag24T1f:sYN63cWqRHkOVPVostrQeTJ
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........#...B...B...B..L^...B...`...B...d...B..Rich.B..........PE..L......`.....................0....................@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	20047c7c70f0e004

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4014b8
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x60BE1B8F [Mon Jun 7 13:13:51 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	b1d5215cf0ff1abab4dacdc311d642d4

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 0040174Ch
call 00007F78F4E3F635h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], ah
adc al, 5Fh
hlt
sub dword ptr [edx-42h], ecx
mov cl, 05h
cwde
in eax, dx
add dword ptr [eax+00000026h], eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edi+45h], al
dec esi
inc ebp
push edx
inc ecx
dec esp
inc esp
inc ebp
inc edx
inc ecx
push esp
push esp
inc ebp
dec esi
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add bh, bh
int3
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
or byte ptr [eax], bh
into
fisubr word ptr [ebp-61h]
jmp 00007F787E813B7Fh
mov al, byte ptr [C51B966Dh]
popfd
fist word ptr [edx]
dec esi
push ss
mov al, byte ptr [47B24923h]
push esp
push eax
and dword ptr [ecx], esi
movsb
sahf
cmp cl, byte ptr [edi-53h]
xor ebx, dword ptr [ecx-48EE309Ah]
or al, 00h
stosb
add byte ptr [eax-2Dh], ah
xchg eax, ebx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
mov al, byte ptr [ecx]
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec esp
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
push es
add byte ptr [ecx+ebp*2+6Eh], cl
jc 00007F78F4E3F674h
add byte ptr [46000C01h], cl
dec edi
push edx
inc edi
push edx
inc ebp
dec esi
dec ecx

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x20a84	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x23000	0x9ec	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x154	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x1fffc	0x20000	False	0.330955505371	data	4.91992394666	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x21000	0x1234	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x23000	0x9ec	0x1000	False	0.1806640625	data	2.17086442612	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x238bc	0x130	data
RT_ICON	0x235d4	0x2e8	data
RT_ICON	0x234ac	0x128	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x2347c	0x30	data
RT_VERSION	0x23150	0x32c	data	Sesotho (Sutu)	South Africa

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaHresultCheck, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, __vbaEnd, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaRecAnsiToUni, __vbaSetSystemError, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaObjSet, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaVarTstLt, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaR4Str, DllFunctionCall, _adj_fpatan, __vbaLateIdCallLd, __vbaRecUniToAnsi, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, _CIlog, __vbaFileOpen, __vbaNew2, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaI4Str, __vbaFreeStrList, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaI4Var, __vbaVarAdd, __vbaLateMemCall, __vbaVarDup, __vbaStrToAnsi, __vbaFpI4, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, __vbaCastObj, _allmul, __vbaLateIdSt, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeStr, __vbaFreeObj

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0430 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Yonyou Network
InternalName	pansy
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	Yonyou Network
LegalTrademarks	Yonyou Network
Comments	Yonyou Network
ProductName	Yonyou Network
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	Yonyou Network
OriginalFilename	pansy.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
Sesotho (Sutu)	South Africa

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: pansy.exe PID: 7068 Parent PID: 5920

General

Start time:	17:58:29
Start date:	07/06/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\pansy.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	143360 bytes
MD5 hash:	BE5A85F85D011252E63CAB4566239280
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading ...

Warning!

Analysis Report pansy.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Initial Sample

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: pansy.exe PID: 7068 Parent PID: 5920

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis