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Analysis Report DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe
Analysis ID:	433258
MD5:	c376cef609a18260213571d06233ba20
SHA1:	72523a0124ddd34ce6fa21901b4648311ae04b72
SHA256:	c42b7b1630553baa3aeb65e40b04244910822c175e9b6cb3f7f365264171196b
Tags:	AgentTeslaexe
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

AgentTesla

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Sigma detected: MSBuild connects to smtp port

Yara detected AgentTesla

.NET source code contains very large array initializations

Found evasive API chain (trying to detect sleep duration tampering with parallel thread)

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Machine Learning detection for sample

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Writes to foreign memory regions

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines

Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls

Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Detected potential crypto function

Drops PE files

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)

Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses SMTP (mail sending)

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara detected Credential Stealer

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe (PID: 648 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe' MD5: C376CEF609A18260213571D06233BA20)

MSBuild.exe (PID: 1404 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe' MD5: 88BBB7610152B48C2B3879473B17857E)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Agenttesla

{"Exfil Mode": "SMTP", "SMTP Info": "coco@gmicaprelam.incoco2424@gmicaprelam.in"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
00000000.00000002.233952436.00000000025E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.233952436.00000000025E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.491039762.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.491039762.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: MSBuild.exe PID: 1404	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: MSBuild.exe PID: 1404	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe PID: 648	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Click to see the 4 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author
0.2.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.25e0000.3.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.25e0000.3.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.25e0000.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.25e0000.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
1.2.MSBuild.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
1.2.MSBuild.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Click to see the 1 entries

Sigma Overview

Networking:

Sigma detected: MSBuild connects to smtp port

Show sources

Source: Network Connection

Author: Joe Security: Data: DestinationIp: 85.187.128.34, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 587, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 1404, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.7, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49741

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: Agenttesla {"Exfil Mode": "SMTP", "SMTP Info": "coco@gmicaprelam.incoco2424@gmicaprelam.in"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 30%			Perma Link
Source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 41%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 1.2.MSBuild.exe.400000.0.unpack

Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen8

Source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.9445_none_d08c58b4442ba54f\MSVCR80.dll

Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdbUGP source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe, 00000000.00000003.228549394.0000000009BC0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdb source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe, 00000000.00000003.228549394.0000000009BC0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: mscorrc.pdb source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.493237450.0000000002FC0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_00405E61 FindFirstFileA,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040548B CloseHandle,DeleteFileA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrlenA,FindFirstFileA,DeleteFileA,FindNextFileA,FindClose,RemoveDirectoryA,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040263E FindFirstFileA,

Networking:

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.7:49741 -> 85.187.128.34:587

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 85.187.128.34 85.187.128.34

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: A2HOSTINGUS A2HOSTINGUS

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.7:49741 -> 85.187.128.34:587

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

Code function: 1_2_012AA09A recv,

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: gmicaprelam.in

Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.497225400.0000000003976000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.495800569.00000000034C2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://8isgha7nUwa6.net
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://DynDns.comDynDNS
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://LUhbZz.com
Source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://nsis.sf.net/NSIS_Error
Source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://nsis.sf.net/NSIS_ErrorError
Source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.233952436.00000000025E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.491039762.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Code function: 0_2_00405042 GetDlgItem,GetDlgItem,GetDlgItem,GetDlgItem,GetClientRect,GetSystemMetrics,SendMessageA,SendMessageA,SendMessageA,SendMessageA,SendMessageA,SendMessageA,ShowWindow,ShowWindow,GetDlgItem,SendMessageA,SendMessageA,SendMessageA,GetDlgItem,CreateThread,CloseHandle,ShowWindow,ShowWindow,ShowWindow,ShowWindow,SendMessageA,CreatePopupMenu,AppendMenuA,GetWindowRect,TrackPopupMenu,SendMessageA,OpenClipboard,EmptyClipboard,GlobalAlloc,GlobalLock,SendMessageA,GlobalUnlock,SetClipboardData,CloseClipboard,

System Summary:

.NET source code contains very large array initializations

Show sources

Source: 1.2.MSBuild.exe.400000.0.unpack, u003cPrivateImplementationDetailsu003eu007b91452745u002d9CF4u002d4278u002dBA24u002dB3A15C0CF0F0u007d/u0036D67C63Bu002d2470u002d4C65u002dBBCEu002dFB9659D2985B.cs

Large array initialization: .cctor: array initializer size 11926

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 1_2_012AB0BA NtQuerySystemInformation,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 1_2_012AB089 NtQuerySystemInformation,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Code function: 0_2_0040323C EntryPoint,#17,SetErrorMode,OleInitialize,SHGetFileInfoA,GetCommandLineA,GetModuleHandleA,CharNextA,GetTempPathA,GetWindowsDirectoryA,lstrcatA,DeleteFileA,OleUninitialize,ExitProcess,lstrcatA,lstrcmpiA,CreateDirectoryA,SetCurrentDirectoryA,DeleteFileA,CopyFileA,CloseHandle,GetCurrentProcess,ExitWindowsEx,ExitProcess,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404853
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406131
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_73581A98
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 1_2_030A0760
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 1_2_030A9D60
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 1_2_030A0070
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 1_2_030A6B88
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 1_2_030AF4A2
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 1_2_030A7EA0
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 1_2_0310CBC8
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 1_2_0310B2BC
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 1_2_031080F0

Source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe, 00000000.00000003.227791679.0000000009CDF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamentdll.dllj% vs DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe
Source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.233952436.00000000025E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamesMbeWwxGyOLOjkjGpEVHbL.exe4 vs DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: 1.2.MSBuild.exe.400000.0.unpack, A/b2.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 1.2.MSBuild.exe.400000.0.unpack, A/b2.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.spre.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@3/4@1/1

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 1_2_012AAF3E AdjustTokenPrivileges,
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Code function: 1_2_012AAF07 AdjustTokenPrivileges,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Code function: 0_2_00404356 GetDlgItem,SetWindowTextA,SHBrowseForFolderA,CoTaskMemFree,lstrcmpiA,lstrcatA,SetDlgItemTextA,GetDiskFreeSpaceA,MulDiv,SetDlgItemTextA,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Code function: 0_2_00402020 CoCreateInstance,MultiByteToWideChar,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\.net clr networking

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

File created: C:\Users\user~1\AppData\Local\Temp\nsvDCD5.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\mscorlib\9603718106bd57ecfbb18fefd769cab4\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sorttbls.nlp
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sortkey.nlp

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 30%
Source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 41%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{20D04FE0-3AEA-1069-A2D8-08002B30309D}\InProcServer32

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\mscorrc.dll

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.9445_none_d08c58b4442ba54f\MSVCR80.dll

Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdbUGP source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe, 00000000.00000003.228549394.0000000009BC0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdb source: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe, 00000000.00000003.228549394.0000000009BC0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: mscorrc.pdb source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.493237450.0000000002FC0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Code function: 0_2_00405E88 GetModuleHandleA,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Code function: 0_2_73582F60 push eax; ret

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\nsvDCD7.tmp\System.dll

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

Registry key monitored for changes: HKEY_CURRENT_USER_Classes

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Found evasive API chain (trying to detect sleep duration tampering with parallel thread)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Function Chain: threadDelayed,memAlloc,memAlloc,systemQueried,systemQueried,threadCreated,threadResumed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,systemQueried,systemQueried,threadDelayed,systemQueried,processQueried,processQueried,systemQueried,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,systemQueried,threadDelayed,systemQueried,threadDelayed,systemQueried,threadDelayed
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Function Chain: threadCreated,threadResumed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,systemQueried,systemQueried,threadDelayed,systemQueried,processQueried,processQueried,systemQueried,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,systemQueried,threadDelayed,systemQueried,threadDelayed,systemQueried,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,threadDelayed,memAlloc,memAlloc

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_BaseBoard

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

File opened / queried: SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

Window / User API: threadDelayed 689

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe TID: 5368	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe TID: 5368	Thread sleep count: 689 > 30
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe TID: 5368	Thread sleep time: -20670000s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe TID: 5368	Thread sleep time: -30000s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_00405E61 FindFirstFileA,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040548B CloseHandle,DeleteFileA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrlenA,FindFirstFileA,DeleteFileA,FindNextFileA,FindClose,RemoveDirectoryA,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040263E FindFirstFileA,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 30000
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 30000

Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.492496744.00000000014C0000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dlly
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.497821019.0000000005C50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A Virtual Machine could not be started because Hyper-V is not installed.
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.492496744.00000000014C0000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.497821019.0000000005C50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A communication protocol error has occurred between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Service.
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.497821019.0000000005C50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: The communication protocol version between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Services is not supported.
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.497821019.0000000005C50000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: An unknown internal message was received by the Hyper-V Compute Service.

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

Code function: 1_2_030A8B60 LdrInitializeThunk,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Code function: 0_2_00405E88 GetModuleHandleA,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe protection: execute and read and write

Writes to foreign memory regions

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe base: FDD008

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe'

Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.493016534.0000000001A80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: uProgram Manager
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.493016534.0000000001A80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.493016534.0000000001A80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.493016534.0000000001A80000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\2.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\2.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Code function: 0_2_00405B88 GetVersion,GetSystemDirectoryA,GetWindowsDirectoryA,SHGetSpecialFolderLocation,SHGetPathFromIDListA,CoTaskMemFree,lstrcatA,StrCmpNIW,lstrlenA,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.233952436.00000000025E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.491039762.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.25e0000.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.25e0000.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.MSBuild.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.233952436.00000000025E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.491039762.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: MSBuild.exe PID: 1404, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe PID: 648, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.25e0000.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.25e0000.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.MSBuild.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Martin Prikryl\WinSCP 2\Sessions

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\profiles.ini

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\SmartFTP\Client 2.0\Favorites\Quick Connect\
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\FileZilla\recentservers.xml

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\IncrediMail\Identities
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: MSBuild.exe PID: 1404, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality:

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.233952436.00000000025E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.491039762.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.25e0000.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.25e0000.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.MSBuild.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.233952436.00000000025E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.491039762.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: MSBuild.exe PID: 1404, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe PID: 648, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.25e0000.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.25e0000.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.MSBuild.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation211	Path Interception	Access Token Manipulation1	Disable or Modify Tools11	OS Credential Dumping2	File and Directory Discovery2	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data11	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Ingress Tool Transfer1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	System Shutdown/Reboot1
Default Accounts	Native API11	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection212	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	Credentials in Registry1	System Information Discovery116	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Local System2	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Encrypted Channel1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Query Registry1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Email Collection1	Automated Exfiltration	Non-Standard Port1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Software Packing1	NTDS	Security Software Discovery121	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data1	Scheduled Transfer	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion141	LSA Secrets	Process Discovery2	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Application Layer Protocol11	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Access Token Manipulation1	Cached Domain Credentials	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion141	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Process Injection212	DCSync	Application Window Discovery1	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Indicator Removal from Tools	Proc Filesystem	Remote System Discovery1	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	30%	Virustotal		Browse
DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	41%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.AgentTesla
DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\nsvDCD7.tmp\System.dll	0%	Metadefender		Browse
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\nsvDCD7.tmp\System.dll	0%	ReversingLabs

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
1.2.MSBuild.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen8	Download File
0.0.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1137482	Download File
0.2.DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1137482	Download File

Domains

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
gmicaprelam.in	0%	Virustotal		Browse

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://8isgha7nUwa6.net	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://LUhbZz.com	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
gmicaprelam.in	85.187.128.34	true	true	0%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://8isgha7nUwa6.net	MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.497225400.0000000003976000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.495800569.00000000034C2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://LUhbZz.com	MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://nsis.sf.net/NSIS_Error	DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	false		high
http://nsis.sf.net/NSIS_ErrorError	DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe	false		high
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe, 00000000.00000002.233952436.00000000025E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, MSBuild.exe, 00000001.00000002.491039762.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe URL Reputation: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
85.187.128.34	gmicaprelam.in	United States		55293	A2HOSTINGUS	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	32.0.0 Black Diamond
Analysis ID:	433258
Start date:	11.06.2021
Start time:	14:49:19
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 43s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	23
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.spre.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@3/4@1/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 64.7% (good quality ratio 63.6%) Quality average: 88.3% Quality standard deviation: 22%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 86% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 13.88.21.125, 92.122.145.220, 52.147.198.201, 184.30.20.56, 20.50.102.62, 2.20.142.210, 2.20.142.209, 20.54.104.15, 20.54.7.98, 20.54.26.129, 92.122.213.247, 92.122.213.194, 20.82.210.154 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): au.download.windowsupdate.com.edgesuite.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, iris-de-prod-azsc-neu-b.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, consumerrp-displaycatalog-aks2eap-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, arc.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net, fs.microsoft.com, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, a767.dscg3.akamai.net, consumerrp-displaycatalog-aks2aks-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, iris-de-prod-azsc-uks.uksouth.cloudapp.azure.com, skypedataprdcoleus16.cloudapp.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, skypedataprdcolwus15.cloudapp.net, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, neu-consumerrp-displaycatalog-aks2aks-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
14:50:22	API Interceptor	998x Sleep call for process: MSBuild.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link
85.187.128.34	TNT Consigment Details_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	DHL Original Invoice_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Sanbook Equip Machines Trading Inquiry.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	TNT Consignment Detail_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Consignment Details_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	DHL delivery documents.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Consignment Details_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
gmicaprelam.in	TNT Consigment Details_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.128.34
	DHL Original Invoice_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.128.34
	Sanbook Equip Machines Trading Inquiry.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.128.34
	TNT Consignment Detail_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.128.34
	Consignment Details_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.128.34
	DHL delivery documents.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.128.34
	Consignment Details_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.128.34

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
A2HOSTINGUS	DNPr7t0GMY.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.195.117.147
	lTAPQJikGw.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.195.117.147
	audit-1349817595.xlsb	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.132.224
	TNT Consigment Details_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.128.34
	DHL Original Invoice_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.128.34
	Sanbook Equip Machines Trading Inquiry.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.128.34
	TNT Consignment Detail_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.128.34
	Consignment Details_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.128.34
	SCAN_20161017_151638921_002.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	68.66.224.18
	1zJU42cQVX.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	68.66.224.18
	DHL delivery documents.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.128.34
	GoRnrfZlAG.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.195.117.147
	SCAN_20161017_151638921_002.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	68.66.224.18
	XRFQX#P000001488.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	68.66.224.18
	templex.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	68.66.224.18
	e6f8edeb_by_Libranalysis.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	68.66.224.18
	Request Quote212021#P000001488.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	68.66.224.18
	b02c0831_by_Libranalysis.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.195.117.147
	Swift.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	68.66.224.18
	vZMIGFMR.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	85.187.149.197

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\nsvDCD7.tmp\System.dll	HALKBANK - Dekont_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Quote-TSL-1037174_4810.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SX365783909782021.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	moq fob order.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	0900000000000090000.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	444890321.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Packing-List_00930039.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	2435.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	INVOICE.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Shipment Invoice & Consignment Notification.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	KY4cmAI0jU.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	5t2CmTUhKc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	8qdfmqz1PN.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	New Order PO2193570O1.doc	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	L2.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Agency Appointment VSL Tbn-Port-Appointment Letter- 2100133.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	New Order PO2193570O1.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	2320900000000.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	CshpH9OSkc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	5SXTKXCnqS.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\nsvDCD6.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	322013
Entropy (8bit):	7.48504577375667
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6144:8S85eJ8UxDlFbNvsxgCCAo0BuWKJE5285RLk5fO20OIesyN6Y2it:785fQFbXCfwDKTImdOIINQS
MD5:	CFDD4CCF7F714F82444F81B771F81F5A
SHA1:	CBA5F09C9F6466E2E159721D95A98C45521ACA30
SHA-256:	599B93F8209DEC77381A7EBD384369BF46974C38604BFD2689E5677E6C984C0A
SHA-512:	F21F28DB62BFBF8E0212531FF13C96C3C9D872D5EDC5F0AA5EFD94E7D6E3C496F3534F5F36E3908EB2A11F9B037C24DDF8F550997FC21CF5735222595FA589C1
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	.r......,........................V.......q.......r..............................................................2...........................................................................................................................................................................J...................j...............................................................................................................................q...........f...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\nsvDCD7.tmp\System.dll Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	11776
Entropy (8bit):	5.855045165595541
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	192:xPtkiQJr7V9r3HcU17S8g1w5xzWxy6j2V7i77blbTc4v:g7VpNo8gmOyRsVc4
MD5:	FCCFF8CB7A1067E23FD2E2B63971A8E1
SHA1:	30E2A9E137C1223A78A0F7B0BF96A1C361976D91
SHA-256:	6FCEA34C8666B06368379C6C402B5321202C11B00889401C743FB96C516C679E
SHA-512:	F4335E84E6F8D70E462A22F1C93D2998673A7616C868177CAC3E8784A3BE1D7D0BB96F2583FA0ED82F4F2B6B8F5D9B33521C279A42E055D80A94B4F3F1791E0C
Malicious:	false
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Metadefender, Detection: 0%, Browse Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 0%
Joe Sandbox View:	Filename: HALKBANK - Dekont_pdf.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Quote-TSL-1037174_4810.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: SX365783909782021.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: moq fob order.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: 0900000000000090000.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: 444890321.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Packing-List_00930039.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: 2435.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: INVOICE.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Shipment Invoice & Consignment Notification.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: KY4cmAI0jU.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: 5t2CmTUhKc.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: 8qdfmqz1PN.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: New Order PO2193570O1.doc, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: L2.xlsx, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: Agency Appointment VSL Tbn-Port-Appointment Letter- 2100133.xlsx, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: New Order PO2193570O1.pdf.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: 2320900000000.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: CshpH9OSkc.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse Filename: 5SXTKXCnqS.exe, Detection: malicious, Browse
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......ir.-.D.-.D.-.D...J..D.-.E.>.D......D.y0t.).D.N1n.,.D..3@.,.D.Rich-.D.........PE..L.....$_...........!..... ..........!).......0...............................`............@..........................2.......0..P............................P.......................................................0..X............................text............ .................. ..`.rdata..c....0.......$..............@..@.data...h....@.......(..............@....reloc..\|....P.....................@..B................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\rayiid Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	60209
Entropy (8bit):	4.971325407303197
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	1536:5BgIe8ZXI1WsPrkvnDgpZdAk39T9ry6/zFkjpaD7lNTfa3D:5BgIe8ZtWkLgb+kNN/ya9N23D
MD5:	9E2895F6220DC4CA141D4C52B949C915
SHA1:	6FB2FB7F7FEDD604545A1F91B50AFFEFF6286278
SHA-256:	6E1FEDDECB4F11F73B42F8004BD8D6B3E22C67FDC58A80B3D87A24F11F876D79
SHA-512:	58BD0A7BBA74306B9F5C11136E26C9BA6E7C9E9D1DF60163FE8D7DD919ECD5C2CA735A7B667043C1F31CFC6E67780875BEADA5A95919854E7ECB8F918C5F1AFA
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	U..!........H.....I...4.J.....K.....L.....M.....N.....O.....P...X.Q.....R.....S.....T.....U.....V.....W...D.X.....Y.....Z.....[.....\.....]...F.^...@._...7.`.....a.....b.....c...;.d...!.e...,.f...`.g.....h.....i.....j.....k.....l.....m...;.n...!.o...,.p...`.q.....r.....s.....t.....u.....v.....w...;.x...!.y...,.z...`.{.....\|.....}.....~.....................;.....!.....,.....`.........................................;.....!.....,.....`.........................................;.....!.....,.....`...................................?.....;.....!.....,.....`.........................................;.....!.....,.....`.........................................;.....!.....,.....`.........................................;.....!.....,.....`.........................................;.....!.....,.....`.........................................;.....!.....,.....`

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\zjhfet5v8giw Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	220672
Entropy (8bit):	7.999008107054153
Encrypted:	true
SSDEEP:	6144:i85eJ8UxDlFbNvsxgCCAo0BuWKJE5285RLk5fO20N:i85fQFbXCfwDKTImdN
MD5:	F17CDB23A72208A0CC23C168F8D13A62
SHA1:	DB703E287110E72E71CF91E856742C3AB2B8F832
SHA-256:	2608F735EEBB0A24D76CF467C3AFB1AAFC50D44B366DFD9757CB78285338EF5A
SHA-512:	0C25ECF6DCA780A1E83D2B6B80392709EF9208818258A6D3E371ACD52E4997D32045F2CCA2103ADEC9DA9323706F4E48B920164EB8622D493720DF97D865EF94
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	...............o..`.-yt....ag.w.^'e.(.i..^.>..iR....8..c.B^..<..O.^.j....y.e.qz..."7......`.W..<....B.Z.s.t.6K...,&..k..{d.......P...t...b.<...ex~p..C.1..}l..X.3.`....yAT'2..&.\|..$..y..sJ~.....+....6+".w...[d.o.l..X.o.?..../.....z..B[{.$.......5..T.q\..R.....e.\|8...?.Q.....?..o9.4W...p+.JN.8.^c..!..d.....3.6&..A!e.3..3. ...M.Z_..X.7T..I9..Hn)..S,s....m..G.V..\..6..K...8..C.5...~%..[..xx..T$a?..Um .'.D'\|...[...^to>.&.R.SX.N......>.../....=.+...W..u?j].he\|.S..k.'.;...udBqV..k..7._\|.}....G....7.RT.......%..o...S...... .....i.....>..U...\|.\./....N...+px.D....y..C.....{..-.5BK=..k'...f..U.,....zj.K.b.."v...h.6BwHez.S.;..T,Bvt..U.....!%....(.E+.....,.x..)...........L.....t.....b..Rj.....lJ..6_K..".%d.oF.Z.......lk..B..1'+..}..{.E..D).:.,].5$>.....$.5........g.V.y!-Ya..7.........}...t...kL.._.K.\|..y.."?''......M8XN(.h...K.o..K]X....;u.L.6...d...E..2}(.4..0-u.;.$'+WN+;...['..C...w.n...d....z.\|.-nY...U....K.{..<....b...T....>$._.b...[...f..-..

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows, Nullsoft Installer self-extracting archive
Entropy (8bit):	7.94012628065006
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 92.16% NSIS - Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (846627/2) 7.80% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe
File size:	282745
MD5:	c376cef609a18260213571d06233ba20
SHA1:	72523a0124ddd34ce6fa21901b4648311ae04b72
SHA256:	c42b7b1630553baa3aeb65e40b04244910822c175e9b6cb3f7f365264171196b
SHA512:	0691af013f3012b999c69ef1331b011798a8b6802d6a91fba370a78a1d9dbb57dab2c1aaab1e3d89611fd0e64577640eaed9334d153b601418b9f5ed8ba845a2
SSDEEP:	6144:Ds9aphdmtsKdoFHOxDW+s6IVlzINDQCzvDj:yaphUtToFHSTs6IVl4QqvDj
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......1..:u..iu..iu..i...iw..iu..i...i...id..i!..i...i...it..iRichu..i........................PE..L......K.................\.........

File Icon


Icon Hash:	b2a88c96b2ca6a72

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x40323c
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:	TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x4B1AE3C6 [Sat Dec 5 22:50:46 2009 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	099c0646ea7282d232219f8807883be0

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
sub esp, 00000180h
push ebx
push ebp
push esi
xor ebx, ebx
push edi
mov dword ptr [esp+18h], ebx
mov dword ptr [esp+10h], 00409130h
xor esi, esi
mov byte ptr [esp+14h], 00000020h
call dword ptr [00407030h]
push 00008001h
call dword ptr [004070B4h]
push ebx
call dword ptr [0040727Ch]
push 00000008h
mov dword ptr [00423F58h], eax
call 00007F21D888D09Eh
mov dword ptr [00423EA4h], eax
push ebx
lea eax, dword ptr [esp+34h]
push 00000160h
push eax
push ebx
push 0041F458h
call dword ptr [00407158h]
push 004091B8h
push 004236A0h
call 00007F21D888CD51h
call dword ptr [004070B0h]
mov edi, 00429000h
push eax
push edi
call 00007F21D888CD3Fh
push ebx
call dword ptr [0040710Ch]
cmp byte ptr [00429000h], 00000022h
mov dword ptr [00423EA0h], eax
mov eax, edi
jne 00007F21D888A49Ch
mov byte ptr [esp+14h], 00000022h
mov eax, 00429001h
push dword ptr [esp+14h]
push eax
call 00007F21D888C832h
push eax
call dword ptr [0040721Ch]
mov dword ptr [esp+1Ch], eax
jmp 00007F21D888A4F5h
cmp cl, 00000020h
jne 00007F21D888A498h
inc eax
cmp byte ptr [eax], 00000020h
je 00007F21D888A48Ch
cmp byte ptr [eax], 00000022h
mov byte ptr [eax+eax+00h], 00000000h

Rich Headers

Programming Language:

[EXP] VC++ 6.0 SP5 build 8804

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x73a4	0xb4	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x2c000	0x9e0	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x7000	0x28c	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x5a5a	0x5c00	False	0.660453464674	data	6.41769823686	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rdata	0x7000	0x1190	0x1200	False	0.4453125	data	5.18162709925	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x9000	0x1af98	0x400	False	0.55859375	data	4.70902740305	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.ndata	0x24000	0x8000	0x0	False	0	empty	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x2c000	0x9e0	0xa00	False	0.45625	data	4.51012867721	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x2c190	0x2e8	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0x2c478	0x100	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0x2c578	0x11c	data	English	United States
RT_DIALOG	0x2c698	0x60	data	English	United States
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x2c6f8	0x14	data	English	United States
RT_MANIFEST	0x2c710	0x2cc	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with very long lines, with no line terminators	English	United States

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.dll	CompareFileTime, SearchPathA, GetShortPathNameA, GetFullPathNameA, MoveFileA, SetCurrentDirectoryA, GetFileAttributesA, GetLastError, CreateDirectoryA, SetFileAttributesA, Sleep, GetTickCount, CreateFileA, GetFileSize, GetModuleFileNameA, GetCurrentProcess, CopyFileA, ExitProcess, SetFileTime, GetTempPathA, GetCommandLineA, SetErrorMode, LoadLibraryA, lstrcpynA, GetDiskFreeSpaceA, GlobalUnlock, GlobalLock, CreateThread, CreateProcessA, RemoveDirectoryA, GetTempFileNameA, lstrlenA, lstrcatA, GetSystemDirectoryA, GetVersion, CloseHandle, lstrcmpiA, lstrcmpA, ExpandEnvironmentStringsA, GlobalFree, GlobalAlloc, WaitForSingleObject, GetExitCodeProcess, GetModuleHandleA, LoadLibraryExA, GetProcAddress, FreeLibrary, MultiByteToWideChar, WritePrivateProfileStringA, GetPrivateProfileStringA, WriteFile, ReadFile, MulDiv, SetFilePointer, FindClose, FindNextFileA, FindFirstFileA, DeleteFileA, GetWindowsDirectoryA
USER32.dll	EndDialog, ScreenToClient, GetWindowRect, EnableMenuItem, GetSystemMenu, SetClassLongA, IsWindowEnabled, SetWindowPos, GetSysColor, GetWindowLongA, SetCursor, LoadCursorA, CheckDlgButton, GetMessagePos, LoadBitmapA, CallWindowProcA, IsWindowVisible, CloseClipboard, SetClipboardData, EmptyClipboard, RegisterClassA, TrackPopupMenu, AppendMenuA, CreatePopupMenu, GetSystemMetrics, SetDlgItemTextA, GetDlgItemTextA, MessageBoxIndirectA, CharPrevA, DispatchMessageA, PeekMessageA, DestroyWindow, CreateDialogParamA, SetTimer, SetWindowTextA, PostQuitMessage, SetForegroundWindow, wsprintfA, SendMessageTimeoutA, FindWindowExA, SystemParametersInfoA, CreateWindowExA, GetClassInfoA, DialogBoxParamA, CharNextA, OpenClipboard, ExitWindowsEx, IsWindow, GetDlgItem, SetWindowLongA, LoadImageA, GetDC, EnableWindow, InvalidateRect, SendMessageA, DefWindowProcA, BeginPaint, GetClientRect, FillRect, DrawTextA, EndPaint, ShowWindow
GDI32.dll	SetBkColor, GetDeviceCaps, DeleteObject, CreateBrushIndirect, CreateFontIndirectA, SetBkMode, SetTextColor, SelectObject
SHELL32.dll	SHGetPathFromIDListA, SHBrowseForFolderA, SHGetFileInfoA, ShellExecuteA, SHFileOperationA, SHGetSpecialFolderLocation
ADVAPI32.dll	RegQueryValueExA, RegSetValueExA, RegEnumKeyA, RegEnumValueA, RegOpenKeyExA, RegDeleteKeyA, RegDeleteValueA, RegCloseKey, RegCreateKeyExA
COMCTL32.dll	ImageList_AddMasked, ImageList_Destroy, ImageList_Create
ole32.dll	CoTaskMemFree, OleInitialize, OleUninitialize, CoCreateInstance
VERSION.dll	GetFileVersionInfoSizeA, GetFileVersionInfoA, VerQueryValueA

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.072550058 CEST	49741	587	192.168.2.7	85.187.128.34
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.285763025 CEST	587	49741	85.187.128.34	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.285872936 CEST	49741	587	192.168.2.7	85.187.128.34
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.363347054 CEST	49741	587	192.168.2.7	85.187.128.34
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.575809956 CEST	587	49741	85.187.128.34	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.879563093 CEST	587	49741	85.187.128.34	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.879584074 CEST	587	49741	85.187.128.34	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.879659891 CEST	49741	587	192.168.2.7	85.187.128.34
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.879719019 CEST	49741	587	192.168.2.7	85.187.128.34
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.880007029 CEST	587	49741	85.187.128.34	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.880070925 CEST	49741	587	192.168.2.7	85.187.128.34

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:03.970153093 CEST	60501	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:04.022927999 CEST	53	60501	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:05.271083117 CEST	53775	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:05.331259012 CEST	53	53775	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:05.509639978 CEST	51837	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:05.562283993 CEST	53	51837	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:07.053287983 CEST	55411	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:07.106240034 CEST	53	55411	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:07.947521925 CEST	63668	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:08.000457048 CEST	53	63668	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:09.659204006 CEST	54640	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:09.718081951 CEST	53	54640	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:10.716550112 CEST	58739	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:10.768404007 CEST	53	58739	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:11.632167101 CEST	60338	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:11.682315111 CEST	53	60338	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:13.136790991 CEST	58717	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:13.188839912 CEST	53	58717	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:14.307034016 CEST	59762	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:14.358202934 CEST	53	59762	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:15.674252033 CEST	54329	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:15.724384069 CEST	53	54329	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:16.529716969 CEST	58052	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:16.581316948 CEST	53	58052	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:19.642965078 CEST	54008	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:19.696402073 CEST	53	54008	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:20.816371918 CEST	59451	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:20.868047953 CEST	53	59451	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:22.513458967 CEST	52914	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:22.563913107 CEST	53	52914	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:23.931505919 CEST	64569	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:23.981811047 CEST	53	64569	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:24.723751068 CEST	52816	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:24.778749943 CEST	53	52816	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:25.568948030 CEST	50781	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:25.619395018 CEST	53	50781	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:26.429560900 CEST	54230	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:26.479810953 CEST	53	54230	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:27.385308027 CEST	54911	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:27.435691118 CEST	53	54911	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:28.757097960 CEST	49958	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:28.810391903 CEST	53	49958	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:30.982116938 CEST	50860	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:31.054970026 CEST	53	50860	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:47.171866894 CEST	50452	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:47.244918108 CEST	53	50452	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:59.193712950 CEST	59730	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:50:59.252208948 CEST	53	59730	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:11.857003927 CEST	59310	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:11.919362068 CEST	53	59310	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:12.697503090 CEST	51919	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:12.759356022 CEST	53	51919	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:13.449784040 CEST	64296	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:13.509474039 CEST	53	64296	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:13.950711966 CEST	56680	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:14.012115002 CEST	53	56680	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:14.184889078 CEST	58820	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:14.243599892 CEST	53	58820	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:14.583158016 CEST	60983	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:14.635221004 CEST	53	60983	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:15.219150066 CEST	49247	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:15.281971931 CEST	53	49247	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:15.743913889 CEST	52286	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:15.805583954 CEST	53	52286	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:16.803013086 CEST	56064	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:16.856020927 CEST	53	56064	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:18.288245916 CEST	63744	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:18.338809967 CEST	53	63744	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:19.901808977 CEST	61457	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:19.960262060 CEST	53	61457	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:27.433022976 CEST	58367	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:27.491926908 CEST	53	58367	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:44.978660107 CEST	60599	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.042718887 CEST	53	60599	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:56.938347101 CEST	59571	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:57.011588097 CEST	53	59571	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:58.344716072 CEST	52689	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:58.416363955 CEST	53	52689	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:44.978660107 CEST	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8	0x95d8	Standard query (0)	gmicaprelam.in	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.042718887 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7	0x95d8	No error (0)	gmicaprelam.in		85.187.128.34	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

SMTP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP	Commands
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.879563093 CEST	587	49741	85.187.128.34	192.168.2.7	220-sg1-ts2.a2hosting.com ESMTP Exim 4.94.2 #2 Fri, 11 Jun 2021 20:51:45 +0800 220-We do not authorize the use of this system to transport unsolicited, 220 and/or bulk e-mail.
Jun 11, 2021 14:51:45.879584074 CEST	587	49741	85.187.128.34	192.168.2.7	421 sg1-ts2.a2hosting.com lost input connection

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe PID: 648 Parent PID: 5752

General

Start time:	14:50:12
Start date:	11/06/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	282745 bytes
MD5 hash:	C376CEF609A18260213571D06233BA20
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000000.00000002.233952436.00000000025E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000000.00000002.233952436.00000000025E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: MSBuild.exe PID: 1404 Parent PID: 648

General

Start time:	14:50:13
Start date:	11/06/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\MSBuild.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe'
Imagebase:	0xce0000
File size:	69632 bytes
MD5 hash:	88BBB7610152B48C2B3879473B17857E
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000001.00000002.491039762.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000001.00000002.491039762.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 00000001.00000002.495614720.0000000003471000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	moderate

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Email gateway, File monitoring, Mail server, Office 365 trace logs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	API monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Analysis Report DHL Original Receipt_pdf.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Agenttesla

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

Networking:

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Spreading:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Rich Headers

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.
Tactics:	Impact
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre