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Analysis Report Order-078CNLTD.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Order-078CNLTD.exe
Analysis ID:	433965
MD5:	db7cc0b29cf38b5ed2a176c0043b2a58
SHA1:	8e5c1a3ca8e4b5cd7c43cd7f0acbc40a09cefbef
SHA256:	aa70c51a1df950f7b8406f4599a7e3bb89bc61fec570fc0e3a53826d42cbf13c
Tags:	exe
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	96
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Potential malicious icon found

Yara detected GuLoader

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Contains functionality to detect hardware virtualization (CPUID execution measurement)

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Detected potential crypto function

PE file contains strange resources

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

Order-078CNLTD.exe (PID: 5800 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe' MD5: DB7CC0B29CF38B5ED2A176C0043B2A58)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://andreameixueiro.com/TODAY_tRiyv97.bin"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.738009135.0000000002100000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.738009135.0000000002100000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://andreameixueiro.com/TODAY_tRiyv97.bin"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 70%	Perma Link
Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 25%	Perma Link
Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 86%

Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://andreameixueiro.com/TODAY_tRiyv97.bin

System Summary:

Potential malicious icon found

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Icon embedded in PE file: bad icon match: 20047c7c70f0e004

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: Order-078CNLTD.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02103179 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02105DA2 NtProtectVirtualMemory,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02106A9E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021018ED
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02105633
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102637
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210263B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210263F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102653
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102657
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210265B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210265F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102643
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102647
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210264B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02106E4E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210264F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102673
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102663
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102667
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210266E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021026AE
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021056D9
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021056DB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021056DF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021056F3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021056F7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021056FB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021056FF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021056E3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021056E7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021056EB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021056EF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02105713
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02105703
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02105707
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210570E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210574E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02104C4F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02104CC0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02104D1A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210155C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021015D4

Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe, 00000000.00000000.211129834.0000000000447000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameOneiro.exe vs Order-078CNLTD.exe
Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameOneiro.exe vs Order-078CNLTD.exe

Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal96.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 70%
Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 25%
Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 86%

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.738009135.0000000002100000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00401260 pushfd ; retf 0042h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041C42A push ss; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041A4EE push edi; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00419E84 push cs; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041A372 pushad ; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041C12C push ds; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0041B998 push 8DED9D04h; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_005424F3 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00541054 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00542854 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00544054 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00545854 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00547054 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00546844 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00540843 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00542043 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00543843 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00545043 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00542074 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00543874 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00545074 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00546875 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00540878 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00546065 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00543063 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00541863 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00544863 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00540068 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00546814 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00543813 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_00542013 push edx; ret

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Contains functionality to detect hardware virtualization (CPUID execution measurement)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02106A9E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021028E8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021028EB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021018ED
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021028EF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102913
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102917
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210291B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210291F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210290F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102923
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210512B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02105153
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02105157
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210515B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210515F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210514F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102637
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210263B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210263F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102653
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102657
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210265B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210265F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102643
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102647
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210264B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210264F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102673
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102663
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102667
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210266E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021026AE
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02104C4F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02104D1A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_0210155C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021015D4

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002105246 second address: 0000000002105246 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000021052BC second address: 00000000021052BC instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000021053D3 second address: 00000000021053D3 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002105066 second address: 0000000002105100 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a cmp cx, AD9Ah 0x0000000f xor edi, edi 0x00000011 mov dword ptr [ebp+000000F8h], 00A95F60h 0x0000001b call 00007F0FCD0B577Ch 0x00000020 call 00007F0FCD0B577Fh 0x00000025 lfence 0x00000028 mov edx, 7FFEFDDCh 0x0000002d add edx, FFFFB1D9h 0x00000033 sub edx, 0000CDF5h 0x00000039 add edx, 00001E54h 0x0000003f mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x00000041 lfence 0x00000044 cmp ecx, ebx 0x00000046 cmp ecx, ecx 0x00000048 pushad 0x00000049 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002105100 second address: 00000000021050B5 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a cmp cx, 9ED2h 0x0000000f ret 0x00000010 mov esi, edx 0x00000012 pushad 0x00000013 rdtsc

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002105246 second address: 0000000002105246 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000021052BC second address: 00000000021052BC instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000021053D3 second address: 00000000021053D3 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002105066 second address: 0000000002105100 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a cmp cx, AD9Ah 0x0000000f xor edi, edi 0x00000011 mov dword ptr [ebp+000000F8h], 00A95F60h 0x0000001b call 00007F0FCD0B577Ch 0x00000020 call 00007F0FCD0B577Fh 0x00000025 lfence 0x00000028 mov edx, 7FFEFDDCh 0x0000002d add edx, FFFFB1D9h 0x00000033 sub edx, 0000CDF5h 0x00000039 add edx, 00001E54h 0x0000003f mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x00000041 lfence 0x00000044 cmp ecx, ebx 0x00000046 cmp ecx, ecx 0x00000048 pushad 0x00000049 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002105100 second address: 00000000021050B5 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 00000001h 0x00000007 cpuid 0x00000009 popad 0x0000000a cmp cx, 9ED2h 0x0000000f ret 0x00000010 mov esi, edx 0x00000012 pushad 0x00000013 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe

Code function: 0_2_02101202 rdtsc

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe

Code function: 0_2_02101202 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02104A24 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102006 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_021018ED mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02104E30 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02105633 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe	Code function: 0_2_02102E68 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe, 00000000.00000002.737431739.0000000000C90000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe, 00000000.00000002.737431739.0000000000C90000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe, 00000000.00000002.737431739.0000000000C90000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: Order-078CNLTD.exe, 00000000.00000002.737431739.0000000000C90000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe

Code function: 0_2_02103A54 cpuid

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery41	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Information Discovery311	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Order-078CNLTD.exe	70%	Virustotal		Browse
Order-078CNLTD.exe	29%	Metadefender		Browse
Order-078CNLTD.exe	86%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Infostealer.Fareit

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
https://andreameixueiro.com/TODAY_tRiyv97.bin	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://andreameixueiro.com/TODAY_tRiyv97.bin	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	32.0.0 Black Diamond
Analysis ID:	433965
Start date:	14.06.2021
Start time:	08:52:46
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 47s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Order-078CNLTD.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	29
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal96.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 0.2% (good quality ratio 0.2%) Quality average: 52% Quality standard deviation: 5.7%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe, MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, RuntimeBroker.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	4.742264491721508
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	Order-078CNLTD.exe
File size:	294912
MD5:	db7cc0b29cf38b5ed2a176c0043b2a58
SHA1:	8e5c1a3ca8e4b5cd7c43cd7f0acbc40a09cefbef
SHA256:	aa70c51a1df950f7b8406f4599a7e3bb89bc61fec570fc0e3a53826d42cbf13c
SHA512:	ed42d70c69df510f2e832af1ea72d9579486b433cc478e1a10265e02a453cc031696f7f74b2530c42826852e4eb3a88ccd37359fec59843a2e5dc2f8e10549e3
SSDEEP:	3072:VO64I415+Uznrw1JmTgxViFJqryHbQbZ:Q64I4HHz0oym7
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......u...1...1...1.......0...~...0.......0...Rich1...........PE..L...B.NY.................P... ...............`....@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	20047c7c70f0e004

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x401f04
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x594ECB42 [Sat Jun 24 20:27:46 2017 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	fd5523c2b03dc52202311eff5bcab494

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 00428164h
call 00007F0FCCFA9933h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
cmp byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
jbe 00007F0FCCFA98EFh
sti

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x45974	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x47000	0x9f4	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x170	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x44f44	0x45000	False	0.212437726449	data	4.83296274478	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x46000	0xab4	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x47000	0x9f4	0x1000	False	0.1806640625	data	2.21609318156	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x478c4	0x130	data
RT_ICON	0x475dc	0x2e8	data
RT_ICON	0x474b4	0x128	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x47484	0x30	data
RT_VERSION	0x47150	0x334	data	English	United States

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaAryMove, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaRecAnsiToUni, __vbaStrCat, __vbaSetSystemError, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaBoolStr, __vbaObjSet, __vbaOnError, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaAryConstruct2, __vbaObjVar, DllFunctionCall, _adj_fpatan, __vbaLateIdCallLd, __vbaRedim, __vbaRecUniToAnsi, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, _CIlog, __vbaNew2, __vbaInStr, __vbaVar2Vec, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaI4Str, __vbaFreeStrList, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaI4Var, __vbaLateMemCall, __vbaStrToAnsi, __vbaVarDup, __vbaFpI4, __vbaLateMemCallLd, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeObj, __vbaFreeStr

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0409 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Classical, Inc.
InternalName	Oneiro
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	Classical, Inc.
LegalTrademarks	Classical, Inc.
Comments	Classical, Inc.
ProductName	Classical, Inc.
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	Classical, Inc.
OriginalFilename	Oneiro.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Order-078CNLTD.exe PID: 5800 Parent PID: 5580

General

Start time:	08:53:38
Start date:	14/06/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Order-078CNLTD.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	294912 bytes
MD5 hash:	DB7CC0B29CF38B5ED2A176C0043B2A58
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000000.00000002.738009135.0000000002100000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading ...

Warning!

Analysis Report Order-078CNLTD.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Order-078CNLTD.exe PID: 5800 Parent PID: 5580

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis