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Windows Analysis Report fN2QHk2XYG.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	fN2QHk2XYG.exe
Analysis ID:	434546
MD5:	3d900d56e0e8284f5fea7752051fe727
SHA1:	bf0e7023d260fb580b0ad196d6135d4e5f34968c
SHA256:	686b8fac1748af72f6e0a35af456c7f473de446ba5df5430411c9ffd4c8943a0
Tags:	exeGuLoader
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	92
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Potential malicious icon found

Yara detected GuLoader

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Detected potential crypto function

PE file contains strange resources

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

fN2QHk2XYG.exe (PID: 6652 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe' MD5: 3D900D56E0E8284F5FEA7752051FE727)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "http://theater.expodium.net/wp-content/plugins/m/agent_RgbAiUJQ186.bin, https://meatflesh.com/b/agent_RgbAiUJQ186.bin"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.696727696.0000000002180000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe

Avira: detected

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.696727696.0000000002180000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "http://theater.expodium.net/wp-content/plugins/m/agent_RgbAiUJQ186.bin, https://meatflesh.com/b/agent_RgbAiUJQ186.bin"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 35%			Perma Link
Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 23%

Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: http://theater.expodium.net/wp-content/plugins/m/agent_RgbAiUJQ186.bin, https://meatflesh.com/b/agent_RgbAiUJQ186.bin

System Summary:

Potential malicious icon found

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Icon embedded in PE file: bad icon match: 20047c7c70f0e004

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Code function: 0_2_004018A4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040572D

Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe, 00000000.00000002.700011437.0000000002A40000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameBidragssatsen.exeFE2X, vs fN2QHk2XYG.exe
Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe, 00000000.00000002.700011437.0000000002A40000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameBidragssatsen.exeFE2X vs fN2QHk2XYG.exe
Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe, 00000000.00000002.700011437.0000000002A40000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameBidragssatsen.exeFE2Xt> vs fN2QHk2XYG.exe
Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe, 00000000.00000002.700011437.0000000002A40000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameBidragssatsen.exeFE2Xq< vs fN2QHk2XYG.exe
Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe, 00000000.00000002.700011437.0000000002A40000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameBidragssatsen.exeFE2Xz: vs fN2QHk2XYG.exe
Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe, 00000000.00000002.695174751.0000000000424000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameBidragssatsen.exe vs fN2QHk2XYG.exe
Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameBidragssatsen.exe vs fN2QHk2XYG.exe

Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal92.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 35%
Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 23%

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.696727696.0000000002180000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Code function: 0_2_004018A4 push es; retf 1207h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040B067 push esp; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040B011 push esp; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040C488 pushad ; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040D16E push esi; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Code function: 0_2_004099CC pushad ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040DECC push ds; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Code function: 0_2_00409EB8 push esp; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Code function: 0_2_00402F13 push dword ptr [ebp-1Ch]; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040B31C push esp; ret

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe

RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002182C1D second address: 0000000002182C1D instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, A66414CFh 0x00000007 xor eax, 581F58E6h 0x0000000c sub eax, 229E4046h 0x00000011 sub eax, DBDD0BE2h 0x00000016 cpuid 0x00000018 popad 0x00000019 jmp 00007F8734D7F3D2h 0x0000001b test ebx, DCDA3E5Bh 0x00000021 call 00007F8734D7F39Ah 0x00000026 lfence 0x00000029 mov edx, 484CC6CEh 0x0000002e add edx, 19EAE7DAh 0x00000034 xor edx, 3A01ADFCh 0x0000003a xor edx, 27C80340h 0x00000040 mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x00000042 lfence 0x00000045 ret 0x00000046 sub edx, esi 0x00000048 ret 0x00000049 cmp edx, ecx 0x0000004b pop ecx 0x0000004c cmp bh, dh 0x0000004e add edi, edx 0x00000050 dec ecx 0x00000051 cmp ecx, 00000000h 0x00000054 jne 00007F8734D7F33Fh 0x00000056 test ecx, eax 0x00000058 mov dword ptr [ebp+00000237h], edx 0x0000005e mov edx, ecx 0x00000060 push edx 0x00000061 mov edx, dword ptr [ebp+00000237h] 0x00000067 jmp 00007F8734D7F3BEh 0x00000069 cmp al, cl 0x0000006b call 00007F8734D7F3BBh 0x00000070 call 00007F8734D7F403h 0x00000075 lfence 0x00000078 mov edx, 484CC6CEh 0x0000007d add edx, 19EAE7DAh 0x00000083 xor edx, 3A01ADFCh 0x00000089 xor edx, 27C80340h 0x0000008f mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x00000091 lfence 0x00000094 ret 0x00000095 mov esi, edx 0x00000097 pushad 0x00000098 rdtsc

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe, 00000000.00000002.696430132.0000000000CA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe, 00000000.00000002.696430132.0000000000CA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe, 00000000.00000002.696430132.0000000000CA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: &Program Manager
Source: fN2QHk2XYG.exe, 00000000.00000002.696430132.0000000000CA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery2	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Information Discovery11	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
fN2QHk2XYG.exe	36%	Virustotal		Browse
fN2QHk2XYG.exe	24%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Graftor
fN2QHk2XYG.exe	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1134908

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
0.2.fN2QHk2XYG.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1134908		Download File
0.0.fN2QHk2XYG.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1134908		Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	32.0.0 Black Diamond
Analysis ID:	434546
Start date:	15.06.2021
Start time:	08:36:46
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 5s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	fN2QHk2XYG.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	18
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal92.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 34.2% (good quality ratio 15.7%) Quality average: 19.8% Quality standard deviation: 23.2%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Max analysis timeout: 220s exceeded, the analysis took too long Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information. Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.8068117659035945
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	fN2QHk2XYG.exe
File size:	147456
MD5:	3d900d56e0e8284f5fea7752051fe727
SHA1:	bf0e7023d260fb580b0ad196d6135d4e5f34968c
SHA256:	686b8fac1748af72f6e0a35af456c7f473de446ba5df5430411c9ffd4c8943a0
SHA512:	2e41dd45b4ca614fea7e4129b99365d795546931b24a11681bdf123547a7923c7baf3fc95dad4a362ab3a748651aa019f1ce934bbee908796e5300b2592c05ef
SSDEEP:	1536:odUkRSto0lSTokgoofDDTTMpK31whjEVsZCmsRfJeyftNB6zy:0GoFgX//31whqsZafJR9
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........#...B...B...B..L^...B...`...B...d...B..Rich.B..........PE..L....G.W.....................0............... ....@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	20047c7c70f0e004

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4018a4
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x57AB47F9 [Wed Aug 10 15:27:53 2016 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	2c08d8f9644132654eb702b279083d5c

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 00401CDCh
call 00007F8734B4CCD5h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], cl
cdq
jecxz 00007F8734B4CC94h
test al, FFh
stosb
inc edi
mov al, A0h
mul dword ptr [00234A8Ch+ecx*8]
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add al, al
insb
inc byte ptr [edx]
jne 00007F8734B4CD50h
outsb
je 00007F8734B4CD4Bh
je 00007F8734B4CD4Eh
outsb
jnc 00007F8734B4CD56h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec esp
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
setb byte ptr [edi+4Ah]
sbb eax, 450F6C20h
lea ecx, dword ptr [ebx-43949032h]
aad 67h
jne 00007F8734B4CD5Ch
in eax, AAh
call far 8A1Bh : BC4B29D2h
jmp far ebx
xor ebx, dword ptr [ecx+36h]
cmp cl, byte ptr [edi-53h]
xor ebx, dword ptr [ecx-48EE309Ah]
or al, 00h
stosb
add byte ptr [eax-2Dh], ah
xchg eax, ebx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
scasb
add al, byte ptr [eax]
add byte ptr [ecx+00h], dl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], dl
add byte ptr [eax+65h], dl
outsb
jnc 00007F8734B4CD4Bh
outsd
outsb
jnc 00007F8734B4CD56h
imul ebp, dword ptr [esp+ebp*2+67h], 73746567h
add byte ptr [00000001h], cl

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x21624	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x24000	0x948	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x1dc	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x20cfc	0x21000	False	0.381495620265	data	6.06044220649	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x22000	0x1278	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x24000	0x948	0x1000	False	0.172607421875	data	2.02366150258	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x24818	0x130	data
RT_ICON	0x24530	0x2e8	data
RT_ICON	0x24408	0x128	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x243d8	0x30	data
RT_VERSION	0x24150	0x288	data	English	United States

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaHresultCheck, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaLenBstr, __vbaFreeVarList, __vbaEnd, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaSetSystemError, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaBoolStr, __vbaObjSet, __vbaOnError, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaFpR8, __vbaVarTstLt, _CIsin, __vbaErase, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaGenerateBoundsError, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaAryConstruct2, __vbaVarTstEq, __vbaR4Str, __vbaObjVar, DllFunctionCall, _adj_fpatan, __vbaLateIdCallLd, __vbaRedim, EVENT_SINK_Release, __vbaUI1I2, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, __vbaInStrVar, _CIlog, __vbaNew2, __vbaInStr, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaI4Str, __vbaFreeStrList, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaI4Var, __vbaVarAdd, __vbaLateMemCall, __vbaVarDup, __vbaStrToAnsi, __vbaFpI4, __vbaVarCopy, __vbaLateMemCallLd, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, __vbaCastObj, _allmul, __vbaLateIdSt, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeObj, __vbaFreeStr

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0409 0x04b0
InternalName	Bidragssatsen
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	Workday
Comments	Workday
ProductName	Workday
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	Workday
OriginalFilename	Bidragssatsen.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: fN2QHk2XYG.exe PID: 6652 Parent PID: 5984

General

Start time:	08:37:36
Start date:	15/06/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\fN2QHk2XYG.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	147456 bytes
MD5 hash:	3D900D56E0E8284F5FEA7752051FE727
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000000.00000002.696727696.0000000002180000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

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Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

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Windows Analysis Report fN2QHk2XYG.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: fN2QHk2XYG.exe PID: 6652 Parent PID: 5984

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis