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Windows Analysis Report DOC0798.doc

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	DOC0798.doc
Analysis ID:	435310
MD5:	51a19560ad005f1dfaf49d959c2dbe7a
SHA1:	660adab2960c1e726e610223e3032595f49f7e74
SHA256:	00175c704e4d534a072f8d777bbb5413dfa32d51fd6b922e88e980c02357b0f1
Tags:	doc
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Score:	2
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	60%

Signatures

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Office Equation Editor has been started

Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)

Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)

Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)

Classification

Analysis Advice

No malicious behavior found, analyze the document also on other version of Office / Acrobat

Uses HTTPS for network communication, use the 'Proxy HTTPS (port 443) to read its encrypted data' cookbook for further analysis

Process Tree

System is w7x64

WINWORD.EXE (PID: 2596 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE' /Automation -Embedding MD5: 95C38D04597050285A18F66039EDB456)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 2628 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 912 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

No yara matches

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

There are no malicious signatures, click here to show all signatures.

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Jump to behavior

Source: global traffic

DNS query: name: femto.pw

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49165 -> 188.165.215.31:443

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49165 -> 188.165.215.31:443

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{6899A86A-6F93-4194-97B0-E6749671AC21}.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: femto.pw

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49167
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49166
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49165 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49165
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49167 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49166 -> 443

Source: classification engine

Classification label: clean2.winDOC@3/6@2/1

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$OC0798.doc

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\CVRBC7B.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE' /Automation -Embedding
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14.0\Word\Resiliency\StartupItems

Jump to behavior

Source: DOC0798.doc

Static file information: File size 1613819 > 1048576

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 2616	Thread sleep time: -120000s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 2616	Thread sleep time: -60000s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 3060	Thread sleep time: -120000s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Exploitation for Client Execution3	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Masquerading1	OS Credential Dumping	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel2	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	LSASS Memory	File and Directory Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Process Injection1	Security Account Manager	System Information Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Application Layer Protocol2	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	Remote System Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Ingress Tool Transfer1	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

No Antivirus matches

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
femto.pw	188.165.215.31	true	false		unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
188.165.215.31	femto.pw	France		16276	OVHFR	false

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	32.0.0 Black Diamond
Analysis ID:	435310
Start date:	16.06.2021
Start time:	11:57:41
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 22s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Sample file name:	DOC0798.doc
Cookbook file name:	defaultwindowsofficecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 7 x64 SP1 with Office 2010 SP2 (IE 11, FF52, Chrome 57, Adobe Reader DC 15, Flash 25.0.0.127, Java 8 Update 121, .NET 4.6.2)
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	7
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	CLEAN
Classification:	clean2.winDOC@3/6@2/1
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .doc Found Word or Excel or PowerPoint or XPS Viewer Attach to Office via COM Active ActiveX Object Scroll down Close Viewer
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryAttributesFile calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
11:58:34	API Interceptor	246x Sleep call for process: EQNEDT32.EXE modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
OVHFR	jqJ9rVHXq0LCZ6R.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	54.36.120.230
	SecuriteInfo.com.BackDoor.Rat.281.18292.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	198.245.49.191
	RFQ Products.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	167.114.158.9
	DocumentCopy_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	213.186.33.5
	Proforma Invoice & Bank Swift Copy.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	51.79.149.34
	Profoma Invoice1506021.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	158.69.138.23
	kkaH2ZEdQ1.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	213.186.33.5
	LDOsa1uqyb.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	176.31.56.216
	Quotation.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.99.208.14
	LSMD.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	37.187.95.110
	IHdviiaZ7h.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	51.195.61.169
	7#U1d05.html	Get hash	malicious	Browse	51.89.21.20
	03soKqWLfN.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	51.89.96.41
	bpkuoAqiIk.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	176.31.95.228
	Wire_receipt.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	5.135.115.129
	Shipping Doc578.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	213.186.33.5
	URGENT REQUEST FOR QUOTATION (RFQ REF R2100131410).exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	51.91.236.193
	Reference No. # 3200025006.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	213.186.33.5
	Cancellation_Letter_2137859823_06112021.xlsm	Get hash	malicious	Browse	51.254.164.254
	Cancellation_Letter_2137859823_06112021.xlsm	Get hash	malicious	Browse	51.254.164.254

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{6899A86A-6F93-4194-97B0-E6749671AC21}.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1024
Entropy (8bit):	0.05390218305374581
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ol3lYdn:4Wn
MD5:	5D4D94EE7E06BBB0AF9584119797B23A
SHA1:	DBB111419C704F116EFA8E72471DD83E86E49677
SHA-256:	4826C0D860AF884D3343CA6460B0006A7A2CE7DBCCC4D743208585D997CC5FD1
SHA-512:	95F83AE84CAFCCED5EAF504546725C34D5F9710E5CA2D11761486970F2FBECCB25F9CF50BBFC272BD75E1A66A18B7783F09E1C1454AFDA519624BC2BB2F28BA4
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{E42C9A4D-C73B-45F3-859A-E103BFD96442}.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1024
Entropy (8bit):	0.8014421130618178
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:gl2lfgREqAWlglqlg7tlNl7lY2l/Dlll8v0lglwZbvt3UlglwZel8gl7vlI8:zNgREqAWlgFJMSDlll8vlwBZFwQFrB
MD5:	D70B341E158CD3F9AF4E8246EA1FB74B
SHA1:	E07659B1ABDC722BF44A78BF03342D86C1B2DDFE
SHA-256:	CEC933B996CAF6ABE607DD8E4E4F304D81C0B8D19F95151C67C5B670B7830639
SHA-512:	A6906A6FA406C73A4A98BA680A753FB7D572559B1F611C6EAF5E673F3C2981E78F5F04A0AB1B060496BFCDBC3DE2D595DDFCC01B155916105C2EF67100005A5F
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	=......... .E.q.u.a.t.i.o.n...3.E.M.B.E.D...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................j....CJ..OJ..QJ..U..^J..aJ.. .j.etd...CJ..OJ..QJ..U..^J..aJ.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\DOC0798.LNK Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	MS Windows shortcut, Item id list present, Points to a file or directory, Has Relative path, Archive, ctime=Wed Aug 26 14:08:15 2020, mtime=Wed Aug 26 14:08:15 2020, atime=Wed Jun 16 17:58:32 2021, length=1613819, window=hide
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1994
Entropy (8bit):	4.534337781841879
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	48:83T/XT0jFiHZ3FAo4Qh23T/XT0jFiHZ3FAo4Q/:83T/XojFIZqbQh23T/XojFIZqbQ/
MD5:	CA61F9522E5DA54B48B58DBDF25FDECE
SHA1:	7C57459FA07531DEBAE847109DD9BD9EA9B8C698
SHA-256:	7A1C9267069AA243179BD1EDAE3260321D9726A7F8AE8C698CEBB9B9F11A5C43
SHA-512:	3C250489EC60FA7996892B86FD0FFD7F725677A0B30929F77D772BFEE85752B88EB1C894ED6BAA9054CAF6BFC38E4F741F8944E66BBF19760B744D7C93A380AF
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	L..................F.... .....q..{....q..{....Q..b...............................P.O. .:i.....+00.../C:\...................t.1.....QK.X..Users.`.......:..QK.X...................6.....U.s.e.r.s...@.s.h.e.l.l.3.2...d.l.l.,.-.2.1.8.1.3.....L.1......Q.y..user.8......QK.X.Q.y...&=....U...............A.l.b.u.s.....z.1......Q.y..Desktop.d......QK.X.Q.y..._=..............:.....D.e.s.k.t.o.p...@.s.h.e.l.l.3.2...d.l.l.,.-.2.1.7.6.9.....^.2......RQ. .DOC0798.doc.D.......Q.y.Q.y...8.....................D.O.C.0.7.9.8...d.o.c.......u...............-...8...[............?J......C:\Users\..#...................\\571345\Users.user\Desktop\DOC0798.doc.".....\.....\.....\.....\.....\.D.e.s.k.t.o.p.\.D.O.C.0.7.9.8...d.o.c.........:..,.LB.)...Ag...............1SPS.XF.L8C....&.m.m............-...S.-.1.-.5.-.2.1.-.9.6.6.7.7.1.3.1.5.-.3.0.1.9.4.0.5.6.3.7.-.3.6.7.3.3.6.4.7.7.-.1.0.0.6.............`.......X.......571345..........D_....3N...W...9F.C...........[D_....3N...W...9F.C...........[....L..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\index.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	59
Entropy (8bit):	4.1702223972093195
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:M18iSsd25d4sd2mX18iSsd2v:M+ocfqoI
MD5:	3C8E4AC54FF66878DC3446F616641670
SHA1:	FD8694B9B068C7CBE20128AF8398A92669E869AD
SHA-256:	1D9989644C7811E99A3B44DBB966432BFC35FDC656481E38001C0BF030F7F4BF
SHA-512:	2713B9AEFFDBC95FE7F55369AF848A67F13C0A37D547957BE15FE39D3F2E229149825C07F0BDA8159552D781D04B05B310A3BBFB708EABE2EBDC06B2E4C2928E
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	[doc]..DOC0798.LNK=0..DOC0798.LNK=0..[doc]..DOC0798.LNK=0..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	162
Entropy (8bit):	2.431160061181642
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vrJlaCkWtVysAiJNGlzgYGwg32LbO/ln:vdsCkWthASq+l
MD5:	4CDEC46BF4C5E1435E277CB4821D6306
SHA1:	506F3E77835A2AE504189833D4EF30799A0ACE45
SHA-256:	39A3F2156450758ACBBCB3D8E9461BB4CDD93F41A3EC3A4013F4EB8D2A906537
SHA-512:	7039ED1E181A8368526A65F6F0D2F70E5BCEBD37BB3BFD8E270BB305F405DB0D843B1CAF6E4E05F6CF1D203A8AA326A1316CDDDD085DD59DB15A82A26E6FA575
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	.user..................................................A.l.b.u.s.............p.......................................P.....................z...............x...

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$OC0798.doc Download File
Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	162
Entropy (8bit):	2.431160061181642
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vrJlaCkWtVysAiJNGlzgYGwg32LbO/ln:vdsCkWthASq+l
MD5:	4CDEC46BF4C5E1435E277CB4821D6306
SHA1:	506F3E77835A2AE504189833D4EF30799A0ACE45
SHA-256:	39A3F2156450758ACBBCB3D8E9461BB4CDD93F41A3EC3A4013F4EB8D2A906537
SHA-512:	7039ED1E181A8368526A65F6F0D2F70E5BCEBD37BB3BFD8E270BB305F405DB0D843B1CAF6E4E05F6CF1D203A8AA326A1316CDDDD085DD59DB15A82A26E6FA575
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	.user..................................................A.l.b.u.s.............p.......................................P.....................z...............x...

Static File Info

General
File type:	Rich Text Format data, unknown version
Entropy (8bit):	3.5119546202634186
TrID:	Rich Text Format (5005/1) 55.56% Rich Text Format (4004/1) 44.44%
File name:	DOC0798.doc
File size:	1613819
MD5:	51a19560ad005f1dfaf49d959c2dbe7a
SHA1:	660adab2960c1e726e610223e3032595f49f7e74
SHA256:	00175c704e4d534a072f8d777bbb5413dfa32d51fd6b922e88e980c02357b0f1
SHA512:	e27f5a1dfa095b4219f19866eca67fd4289ea0a72bb1b8c9532f48d204dab9d4c595efe9382a450633104204e88eb6ad43b8e2fce60ff8e323d16fda8921a576
SSDEEP:	12288:ZZ2nkYR5UxLEpyI28DpDwHVfsDpEq3EnCpug3P:akYR5UwyI9pg5Y2q38Cz/
File Content Preview:	{\rtf8561{\object\objautlink67039725\objw4045\objh7166{\*\objdata.3dbf9512020000000b0000004551556174696f6e2e33000000000000000000ab4f0c00037e01eb470a0105c02e5cec00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000500645000000000000000000000000000000000000000

File Icon


Icon Hash:	e4eea2aaa4b4b4a4

Static RTF Info

Objects

Id	Start	Format ID	Format	Classname	Datasize	Filename	Sourcepath	Temppath	Exploit
0	0000003Dh	2	embedded	EQUation.3	806827				no

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:29.961730003 CEST	49165	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.012902021 CEST	443	49165	188.165.215.31	192.168.2.22
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.013073921 CEST	49165	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.032118082 CEST	49165	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.083199024 CEST	443	49165	188.165.215.31	192.168.2.22
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.083319902 CEST	443	49165	188.165.215.31	192.168.2.22
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.083395958 CEST	443	49165	188.165.215.31	192.168.2.22
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.083420992 CEST	49165	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.083467007 CEST	49165	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.084131956 CEST	49165	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.086270094 CEST	49166	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.135154009 CEST	443	49165	188.165.215.31	192.168.2.22
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.136940956 CEST	443	49166	188.165.215.31	192.168.2.22
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.137073994 CEST	49166	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.137543917 CEST	49166	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.188447952 CEST	443	49166	188.165.215.31	192.168.2.22
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.188546896 CEST	443	49166	188.165.215.31	192.168.2.22
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.188582897 CEST	443	49166	188.165.215.31	192.168.2.22
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.188602924 CEST	49166	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.188640118 CEST	49166	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.188926935 CEST	49166	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.189764023 CEST	49167	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.240381956 CEST	443	49166	188.165.215.31	192.168.2.22
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.241820097 CEST	443	49167	188.165.215.31	192.168.2.22
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.241894960 CEST	49167	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.241991043 CEST	49167	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.293006897 CEST	443	49167	188.165.215.31	192.168.2.22
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:30.293068886 CEST	49167	443	192.168.2.22	188.165.215.31

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:29.816647053 CEST	52197	53	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:29.882754087 CEST	53	52197	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:29.883074045 CEST	52197	53	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:29.945027113 CEST	53	52197	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:29.816647053 CEST	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8	0x71dd	Standard query (0)	femto.pw	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:29.883074045 CEST	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8	0x71dd	Standard query (0)	femto.pw	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:29.882754087 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22	0x71dd	No error (0)	femto.pw		188.165.215.31	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Jun 16, 2021 11:58:29.945027113 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22	0x71dd	No error (0)	femto.pw		188.165.215.31	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

Code Manipulations

Statistics

CPU Usage

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Memory Usage

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High Level Behavior Distribution

Click to dive into process behavior distribution

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: WINWORD.EXE PID: 2596 Parent PID: 584

General

Start time:	11:58:33
Start date:	16/06/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE' /Automation -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x13f320000
File size:	1424032 bytes
MD5 hash:	95C38D04597050285A18F66039EDB456
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: EQNEDT32.EXE PID: 2628 Parent PID: 584

General

Start time:	11:58:34
Start date:	16/06/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: EQNEDT32.EXE PID: 912 Parent PID: 584

General

Start time:	11:58:53
Start date:	16/06/2021
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE' -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

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Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Anti-virus, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping or `net view` using Net . Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: `C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts` or `/etc/hosts` ) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report DOC0798.doc

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Analysis Advice

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Sigma Overview

Signature Overview

Exploits:

Compliance:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

System Summary:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

Public

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static RTF Info

Objects

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

Code Manipulations

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: WINWORD.EXE PID: 2596 Parent PID: 584

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: EQNEDT32.EXE PID: 2628 Parent PID: 584

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: EQNEDT32.EXE PID: 912 Parent PID: 584

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly