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Windows Analysis Report VZghv7yI7g

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	VZghv7yI7g (renamed file extension from none to exe)
Analysis ID:	450819
MD5:	73bb5c4b690b8d6df88d6bc18fb3a553
SHA1:	60adddd91b6038fc9d819cf6d647ce3be0b11d38
SHA256:	a3feb5265e6d02710f04ff618e966e9da9ba8fc8dc5692d6f7633fe0a3037b66
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	84
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected GuLoader

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Contains functionality to detect hardware virtualization (CPUID execution measurement)

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Detected potential crypto function

Found large amount of non-executed APIs

PE file contains strange resources

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

VZghv7yI7g.exe (PID: 2256 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe' MD5: 73BB5C4B690B8D6DF88D6BC18FB3A553)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://bamontarquitectura.com.mx/IRANSAT_kowbB4.bi}"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.756540382.0000000002250000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.756540382.0000000002250000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://bamontarquitectura.com.mx/IRANSAT_kowbB4.bi}"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 29%			Perma Link
Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 13%

Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://bamontarquitectura.com.mx/IRANSAT_kowbB4.bi}

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_004092BC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225662B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256E00
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02251664
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02251276
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02251A43
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022562A3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256AAB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225E280
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256692
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022516E3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022512E8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022536FA
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022566C7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256EC7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225C329
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256B6B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256778
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225634E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225DB55
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02251783
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256F9B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256BEB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022563F7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02255FF1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225AFD7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02257025
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02257022
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225681F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225684F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225A455
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02257CAB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256C93
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225709F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022518FB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225AFD7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225692D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256D2C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256138
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225156F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225A969
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02251175
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02253971
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256955
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256554
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022555A6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022561DC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225C5D9
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022569D8

Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe, 00000000.00000002.756145297.00000000021F0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameuser32j% vs VZghv7yI7g.exe
Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe, 00000000.00000000.226808596.0000000000435000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameIndtr8.exe vs VZghv7yI7g.exe
Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameIndtr8.exe vs VZghv7yI7g.exe

Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal84.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe

File created: C:\Users\user~1\AppData\Local\Temp\~DF815418FFB8C45D82.TMP

Jump to behavior

Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 29%
Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 13%

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.756540382.0000000002250000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040C06E push 00000000h; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406625 push ebp; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02253429 push 84000002h; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02250095 pushad ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225010B pushad ; retf

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Contains functionality to detect hardware virtualization (CPUID execution measurement)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225662B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02251664
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02251276
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022562A3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256AAB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225E280
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256692
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022516E3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022512E8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022536FA
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022566C7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256778
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225634E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02251783
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022563F7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02255FF1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225681F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225684F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225A455
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022518FB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225692D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256138
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225156F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225A969
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02251175
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02253971
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256955
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02256554
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022561DC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225C5D9
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_022569D8

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe

RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000225E352 second address: 000000000225E352 instructions:

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe

RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000225E352 second address: 000000000225E352 instructions:

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe

Code function: 0_2_02255623 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe

API coverage: 9.9 %

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe

Code function: 0_2_02255623 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_02257AB1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225A900 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225B1FE mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe	Code function: 0_2_0225C5D9 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe, 00000000.00000002.755749327.0000000000DA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: uProgram Manager
Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe, 00000000.00000002.755749327.0000000000DA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe, 00000000.00000002.755749327.0000000000DA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: VZghv7yI7g.exe, 00000000.00000002.755749327.0000000000DA0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe

Code function: 0_2_022557A4 cpuid

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery41	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Information Discovery311	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
VZghv7yI7g.exe	30%	Virustotal		Browse
VZghv7yI7g.exe	13%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Backdoor.Remcos

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
https://bamontarquitectura.com.mx/IRANSAT_kowbB4.bi}	0%	Virustotal		Browse
https://bamontarquitectura.com.mx/IRANSAT_kowbB4.bi}	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://bamontarquitectura.com.mx/IRANSAT_kowbB4.bi}	true	0%, Virustotal, Browse Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	33.0.0 White Diamond
Analysis ID:	450819
Start date:	19.07.2021
Start time:	18:34:13
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 8m 4s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	VZghv7yI7g (renamed file extension from none to exe)
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	28
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal84.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 61.1% (good quality ratio 26.9%) Quality average: 24.1% Quality standard deviation: 32.8%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	6.2221702126738
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	VZghv7yI7g.exe
File size:	241664
MD5:	73bb5c4b690b8d6df88d6bc18fb3a553
SHA1:	60adddd91b6038fc9d819cf6d647ce3be0b11d38
SHA256:	a3feb5265e6d02710f04ff618e966e9da9ba8fc8dc5692d6f7633fe0a3037b66
SHA512:	9c023dc66d9bcfb2f5bc0274001d92948ac058fc8765d2178907dfd8fb9885ede57acc3836d583ad97516dce1a97c50f081800b41a1f42ea938efb8b23e87567
SSDEEP:	3072:+3BepJlZa/xao5JKwI7V4R4iUW/qcijw2HJlZapGBR:EiUIo5JKPgU99vHP
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........#...B...B...B..L^...B...`...B...d...B..Rich.B..........PE..L...WS.N................. ...................0....@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	f8fcd4ccf4e4e8d0

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4019b0
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x4EA15357 [Fri Oct 21 11:11:19 2011 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	e9f7dd0da1a2a1266893e1ae4ef42b67

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 00408AA0h
call 00007F7270A60685h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
cmp byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
outsd
mul byte ptr [ebx+3Fh]
dec esi
outsb
and al, 41h
mov bl, 08h
popad
pop ds
test al, CEh
xchg eax, esi
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc edx
add byte ptr [esi], al
push eax
add dword ptr [ecx], 56h
jne 00007F7270A60704h
cmp dword ptr fs:[eax], eax
add al, byte ptr [eax]
add byte ptr [eax], al
add bh, bh
int3
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
xor esp, esp
push cs
xchg eax, edx
test eax, 48C3D75Ah
mov gs, bx
test al, CAh
xor esp, esp
xor al, 88h
jecxz 00007F7270A606BAh
scasb
and dword ptr [edi-40B94528h], 28h
cmp dword ptr [edx-38D0AA14h], edi
cmp cl, byte ptr [edi-53h]
xor ebx, dword ptr [ecx-48EE309Ah]
or al, 00h
stosb
add byte ptr [eax-2Dh], ah
xchg eax, ebx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
out 6Fh, eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
lea ebp, dword ptr [eax+00h]
add byte ptr [eax], al
add al, 00h
jnc 00007F7270A606FAh
add byte ptr [41000401h], cl
jc 00007F7270A606F9h
jne 00007F7270A60692h
sbb dword ptr [ecx], eax
add byte ptr [edx+00h], al
and al, byte ptr [ecx]
and ecx, dword ptr [esi+68h]
add byte ptr [eax], al
insb

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x32234	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x35000	0x6d0a	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x1a4	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x318a4	0x32000	False	0.39177734375	data	6.3764832494	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x33000	0x1290	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x35000	0x6d0a	0x7000	False	0.481689453125	data	5.46300019784	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x3ae62	0xea8	data
RT_ICON	0x3a5ba	0x8a8	data
RT_ICON	0x39ef2	0x6c8	data
RT_ICON	0x3998a	0x568	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_ICON	0x373e2	0x25a8	dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 40
RT_ICON	0x3633a	0x10a8	data
RT_ICON	0x359b2	0x988	data
RT_ICON	0x3554a	0x468	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x354d4	0x76	data
RT_VERSION	0x35240	0x294	data	English	United States

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaAryMove, __vbaLenBstr, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaStrCat, __vbaSetSystemError, __vbaHresultCheckObj, __vbaLenBstrB, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaObjSet, __vbaOnError, _adj_fdiv_m16i, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaCyStr, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaGenerateBoundsError, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaAryConstruct2, __vbaI2I4, DllFunctionCall, _adj_fpatan, __vbaLateIdCallLd, EVENT_SINK_Release, __vbaUI1I2, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaFpCmpCy, __vbaExceptHandler, __vbaStrToUnicode, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, __vbaInStrVar, __vbaDateVar, _CIlog, __vbaErrorOverflow, __vbaFileOpen, __vbaNew2, __vbaVar2Vec, __vbaInStr, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaI4Str, __vbaFreeStrList, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaI4Var, __vbaLateMemCall, __vbaVarDup, __vbaStrToAnsi, __vbaFpI4, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, __vbaCastObj, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeStr, __vbaFreeObj

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0409 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Socialbakers
InternalName	Indtr8
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	Socialbakers
LegalTrademarks	Socialbakers
ProductName	Vurd9
ProductVersion	1.00
OriginalFilename	Indtr8.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: VZghv7yI7g.exe PID: 2256 Parent PID: 5616

General

Start time:	18:35:02
Start date:	19/07/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\VZghv7yI7g.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	241664 bytes
MD5 hash:	73BB5C4B690B8D6DF88D6BC18FB3A553
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000000.00000002.756540382.0000000002250000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Windows Analysis Report VZghv7yI7g

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: VZghv7yI7g.exe PID: 2256 Parent PID: 5616

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis