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Windows Analysis Report kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	kGSHiWbgq9.exe
Analysis ID:	457930
MD5:	27bf14807bc9d5cd2d823293f43c3a3a
SHA1:	08eeed11867aa351be0d6c48da283721ee6c0769
SHA256:	55fd5769df0df23d4140a34d07dc2c833b43ac1060f4d0992bdd27316041c69a
Tags:	exe
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	88
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected GuLoader

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Contains functionality to detect hardware virtualization (CPUID execution measurement)

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Machine Learning detection for sample

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Detected potential crypto function

PE file contains strange resources

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

kGSHiWbgq9.exe (PID: 5364 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe' MD5: 27BF14807BC9D5CD2D823293F43C3A3A)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "http://101.99.94.119/WEALTH_PRUu"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.770527143.0000000002460000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.770527143.0000000002460000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "http://101.99.94.119/WEALTH_PRUu"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Virustotal: Detection: 21%

Perma Link

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: http://101.99.94.119/WEALTH_PRUu

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02465968 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02465A62 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02465968
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02460211
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02464339
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_024640B7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_024686DB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_024686F4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02465781
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_0246443A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_024694D8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_0246853B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_024695C6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_024685E7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_024605A1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02465A62
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02462A77
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02467A7A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02460B59
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02460BDC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02463BFF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02462873
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02468802
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02461900
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_0246891F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02467E5C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02460ED2
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02461E99
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02462FD3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02468C2C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02463CEF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02463CF2
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02460CFA
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02465D78
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02462D3B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02460DD5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02461DA0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02464DB6

Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe, 00000000.00000002.769800514.00000000021E0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameuser32j% vs kGSHiWbgq9.exe
Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe, 00000000.00000002.767741983.0000000000417000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamePAAKLDENDE.exe vs kGSHiWbgq9.exe
Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamePAAKLDENDE.exe vs kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal88.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe

File created: C:\Users\user~1\AppData\Local\Temp\~DF0A4DA332BC76A601.TMP

Jump to behavior

Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Virustotal: Detection: 21%

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.770527143.0000000002460000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_00408873 push esp; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_004088C0 push esp; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_004014E9 push es; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_00408CB2 push esi; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040891C push esi; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_00407D36 pushad ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_00408672 push esi; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_00407E22 push ds; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_00408624 push esp; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_00408ADE push esi; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_00408695 push esi; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02466625 push ebp; iretd

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.07266809617

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Contains functionality to detect hardware virtualization (CPUID execution measurement)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02460B59
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02460BDC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02462FD3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02460CFA
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02462D3B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02460DD5

Detected RDTSC dummy instruction sequence (likely for instruction hammering)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002460298 second address: 0000000002460298 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002467EAD second address: 0000000002467EAD instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002469858 second address: 0000000002469858 instructions:

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002460298 second address: 0000000002460298 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002467EAD second address: 0000000002467EAD instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002469858 second address: 0000000002469858 instructions:
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002467CB5 second address: 0000000002467CB5 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 8D6257E7h 0x00000007 xor eax, D6E50CE5h 0x0000000c xor eax, CD304DCCh 0x00000011 add eax, 6948E933h 0x00000016 cpuid 0x00000018 popad 0x00000019 call 00007F7834E0F173h 0x0000001e lfence 0x00000021 mov edx, 617AD252h 0x00000026 xor edx, 84973C64h 0x0000002c xor edx, 903C3D1Eh 0x00000032 xor edx, 0A2FD33Ch 0x00000038 mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x0000003a lfence 0x0000003d cmp edx, 53D52FB7h 0x00000043 cmp ah, ch 0x00000045 test cl, bl 0x00000047 ret 0x00000048 jmp 00007F7834E0F169h 0x0000004d cmp ch, dh 0x0000004f sub edx, esi 0x00000051 ret 0x00000052 add edi, edx 0x00000054 dec dword ptr [ebp+000000F8h] 0x0000005a cmp dword ptr [ebp+000000F8h], 00000000h 0x00000061 jne 00007F7834E0F06Ch 0x00000063 call 00007F7834E0F0C7h 0x00000068 call 00007F7834E0F194h 0x0000006d lfence 0x00000070 mov edx, 617AD252h 0x00000075 xor edx, 84973C64h 0x0000007b xor edx, 903C3D1Eh 0x00000081 xor edx, 0A2FD33Ch 0x00000087 mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x00000089 lfence 0x0000008c cmp edx, 53D52FB7h 0x00000092 cmp ah, ch 0x00000094 test cl, bl 0x00000096 ret 0x00000097 mov esi, edx 0x00000099 pushad 0x0000009a rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Code function: 0_2_02460211 rdtsc

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Code function: 0_2_02460211 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_024673B4 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02463441 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_0246853B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02465589 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02467898 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe	Code function: 0_2_02462D3B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe, 00000000.00000002.769113256.0000000000D60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: uProgram Manager
Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe, 00000000.00000002.769113256.0000000000D60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe, 00000000.00000002.769113256.0000000000D60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: kGSHiWbgq9.exe, 00000000.00000002.769113256.0000000000D60000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery41	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Software Packing1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Process Injection1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Obfuscated Files or Information2	NTDS	System Information Discovery31	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
kGSHiWbgq9.exe	22%	Virustotal		Browse
kGSHiWbgq9.exe	9%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Vebzenpak
kGSHiWbgq9.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://101.99.94.119/WEALTH_PRUu	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://101.99.94.119/WEALTH_PRUu	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	33.0.0 White Diamond
Analysis ID:	457930
Start date:	02.08.2021
Start time:	15:06:08
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 50s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	kGSHiWbgq9.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	26
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal88.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 7.4% (good quality ratio 3%) Quality average: 20.2% Quality standard deviation: 28.7%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, RuntimeBroker.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	6.650522833717378
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.96% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	kGSHiWbgq9.exe
File size:	114688
MD5:	27bf14807bc9d5cd2d823293f43c3a3a
SHA1:	08eeed11867aa351be0d6c48da283721ee6c0769
SHA256:	55fd5769df0df23d4140a34d07dc2c833b43ac1060f4d0992bdd27316041c69a
SHA512:	c2bcd733a0bfd1b9e56b630e4fae6a45951a843946a389f8987c48a3b047ca9b9f74a5a01afc7d7589f156691220e474553229f485b6de4f902db566a6a0d245
SSDEEP:	1536:EAPGkc1ug6GUMu+Yg2WGI5XZ4QmiPYefCGk4H:X2bUMEWfXZiea
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........#...B...B...B..L^...B...`...B...d...B..Rich.B..........PE..L......K.................@..........D........P....@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	a5b595a595a5a5b5

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x401144
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x4B801CC3 [Sat Feb 20 17:32:51 2010 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	5565993a5a9f2bfb76f28ab304be6bc1

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 00406B54h
call 00007F7834A6B655h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx-2D91E317h], bh
sub eax, dword ptr [edx+312E8C4Dh]
cmp dword ptr [ecx+00414DE0h], edi
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ebx+4Fh], al
inc ebx
dec ebx
dec esi
inc ebp
pop ecx
inc ebp
push edx
dec esi
inc ebp
push ebx
add byte ptr [ebp+73h], ch
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec esp
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
pop es
mov ebp, 63A526FFh
pushfd
inc edi
test byte ptr [eax], ah
arpl word ptr [edi-5FF889ACh], si
adc eax, B00EF4E9h
sbb edi, ecx
inc ebx
movsd
cmp byte ptr [esi], bl
insd
pop ecx
test byte ptr [eax-52B0C5E4h], 00000033h
cdq
iretw
adc dword ptr [edi+00AA000Ch], esi
pushad
rcl dword ptr [ebx+00000000h], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
pop ecx
add byte ptr [eax], al
cmp byte ptr [eax+00h], bl
add byte ptr [eax], al
or eax, dword ptr [eax]
push edx
inc ebp
push esp
dec ecx
dec esi
dec ecx
push ebx
push eax
dec edi
push edx
inc ecx
add byte ptr [53000F01h], cl
push esp
inc ebp

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x14b74	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x17000	0x5b96	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x7c	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x13df4	0x14000	False	0.649157714844	data	7.07266809617	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x15000	0x115c	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x17000	0x5b96	0x6000	False	0.545694986979	data	6.03179178254	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x1bcee	0xea8	data
RT_ICON	0x1b446	0x8a8	dBase IV DBT of @.DBF, block length 1024, next free block index 40, next free block 1334943657, next used block 1336905122
RT_ICON	0x1aede	0x568	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_ICON	0x18936	0x25a8	data
RT_ICON	0x1788e	0x10a8	data
RT_ICON	0x17426	0x468	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x173cc	0x5a	data
RT_VERSION	0x171e0	0x1ec	data	Chinese	Taiwan

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, _adj_fdiv_m64, _adj_fprem1, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, _adj_fdiv_m16i, _adj_fdivr_m16i, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, _adj_fpatan, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, _CIlog, __vbaErrorOverflow, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, _CIatan, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0404 0x04b0
ProductVersion	1.00
InternalName	PAAKLDENDE
FileVersion	1.00
OriginalFilename	PAAKLDENDE.exe
ProductName	CAMPHOUR

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
Chinese	Taiwan

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: kGSHiWbgq9.exe PID: 5364 Parent PID: 5600

General

Start time:	15:07:02
Start date:	02/08/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\kGSHiWbgq9.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	114688 bytes
MD5 hash:	27BF14807BC9D5CD2D823293F43C3A3A
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000000.00000002.770527143.0000000002460000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Windows Analysis Report kGSHiWbgq9.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: kGSHiWbgq9.exe PID: 5364 Parent PID: 5600

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis