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Windows Analysis Report yw6At7QnNh

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	yw6At7QnNh (renamed file extension from none to exe)
Analysis ID:	458121
MD5:	8ba293749c97cbf48f30f02c66d3406d
SHA1:	6a7492a26d0a16320daa2cb187232fc0053f4f5f
SHA256:	e2075b32b9716dc41ef667a74c1ae2c2841a5b9fd3046db0bdcd96c581778253
Tags:	exeuncategorized
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

ZeusVM

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Antivirus detection for dropped file

Detected ZeusVM e-Banking Trojan

Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Contain functionality to detect virtual machines

Contains VNC / remote desktop functionality (version string found)

Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Machine Learning detection for sample

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers

Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls

Contains functionality to enumerate network shares

Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user

Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Contains functionality to read the clipboard data

Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes

Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system

Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

Drops PE files

Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)

Found potential string decryption / allocating functions

May initialize a security null descriptor

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

yw6At7QnNh.exe (PID: 3420 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe' MD5: 8BA293749C97CBF48F30F02C66D3406D)

yw6At7QnNh.exe (PID: 5952 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe' MD5: 8BA293749C97CBF48F30F02C66D3406D)

yw6At7QnNh.exe (PID: 1536 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe' MD5: 8BA293749C97CBF48F30F02C66D3406D)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

No yara matches

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe

Avira: detected

Antivirus detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\ athefff3h6266cd5fa708f.tmp

Avira: detection malicious, Label: TR/Agent.hjvc

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\ athefff3h6266cd5fa708f.tmp

ReversingLabs: Detection: 53%

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 81%	Perma Link
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 60%	Perma Link
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 92%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 1.2.yw6At7QnNh.exe.10000000.4.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Agent.hjvc
Source: 3.2.yw6At7QnNh.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Kazy.MK
Source: 3.1.yw6At7QnNh.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Kazy.MK
Source: 1.2.yw6At7QnNh.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Agent.hjvc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 2_2_00401282 GetModuleFileNameA,GetEnvironmentVariableA,GetEnvironmentVariableA,GetEnvironmentVariableA,FindResourceA,GetDesktopWindow,GetDesktopWindow,PeekMessageA,Sleep,IsWindow,IsDialogMessageA,TranslateMessage,DispatchMessageA,IsDlgButtonChecked,GetDesktopWindow,FindResourceA,LoadResource,SizeofResource,LockResource,FindResourceA,LoadResource,SizeofResource,??2@YAPAXI@Z,??_U@YAPAXI@Z,LockResource,PathCombineA,PathFileExistsA,CryptAcquireContextA,CryptAcquireContextA,CryptAcquireContextA,CryptCreateHash,??2@YAPAXI@Z,??_U@YAPAXI@Z,??2@YAPAXI@Z,CryptHashData,CryptDeriveKey,CryptDecrypt,MessageBoxA,??2@YAPAXI@Z,Sleep,GetCommandLineA,CreateFileA,FindCloseChangeNotification,PathCombineA,CreateFileA,CloseHandle,FindExecutableA,DeleteFileA,DeleteFileA,DeleteFileA,Sleep,PathCombineA,DeleteFileA,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_0040D467 CryptAcquireContextW,CryptCreateHash,CryptHashData,CryptGetHashParam,CryptDestroyHash,CryptReleaseContext,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_00417C71 CryptUnprotectData,LocalFree,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_0040D467 CryptAcquireContextW,CryptCreateHash,CryptHashData,CryptGetHashParam,CryptDestroyHash,CryptReleaseContext,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_00417C71 CryptUnprotectData,LocalFree,

Compliance:

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Unpacked PE file: 2.2.yw6At7QnNh.exe.400000.0.unpack
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Unpacked PE file: 3.2.yw6At7QnNh.exe.400000.0.unpack

Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_0040B8C3 GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,SHGetFolderPathW,StrCmpNIW,FreeLibrary,NetUserEnum,NetUserGetInfo,NetApiBufferFree,NetApiBufferFree,SHGetFolderPathW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_0040B8C3 GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,SHGetFolderPathW,StrCmpNIW,FreeLibrary,NetUserEnum,NetUserGetInfo,NetApiBufferFree,NetApiBufferFree,SHGetFolderPathW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_00411830 PathRemoveFileSpecW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_004118EB FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_00411830 PathRemoveFileSpecW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_004118EB FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 3_2_00414047 recv,

Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.google.com/webhp
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000002.00000002.205524903.0000000002070000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000003.00000001.203739017.0000000000400000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.google.com/webhpbcMY.txt

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 3_2_0041D43B GetFileAttributesExW,HttpSendRequestW,HttpSendRequestA,HttpSendRequestExW,HttpSendRequestExA,InternetCloseHandle,InternetReadFile,InternetReadFileExA,InternetQueryDataAvailable,HttpQueryInfoA,closesocket,send,WSASend,OpenInputDesktop,SwitchDesktop,DefWindowProcW,DefWindowProcA,DefDlgProcW,DefDlgProcA,DefFrameProcW,DefFrameProcA,DefMDIChildProcW,DefMDIChildProcA,CallWindowProcW,CallWindowProcA,RegisterClassW,RegisterClassA,RegisterClassExW,RegisterClassExA,BeginPaint,EndPaint,GetDCEx,GetDC,GetWindowDC,ReleaseDC,GetUpdateRect,GetUpdateRgn,GetMessagePos,GetCursorPos,SetCursorPos,SetCapture,ReleaseCapture,GetCapture,GetMessageW,GetMessageA,PeekMessageW,PeekMessageA,TranslateMessage,GetClipboardData,PFXImportCertStore,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 3_2_00409FCC EnterCriticalSection,GetTickCount,LeaveCriticalSection,GetKeyboardState,ToUnicode,TranslateMessage,

E-Banking Fraud:

Detected ZeusVM e-Banking Trojan

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_0041ADE1 lstrcmpiA,lstrcmpiA,lstrcmpiA,CloseHandle,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_0041ADE1 lstrcmpiA,lstrcmpiA,lstrcmpiA,TlsSetValue,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 3_2_0040A2BA OpenWindowStationW,CreateWindowStationW,GetProcessWindowStation,OpenDesktopW,CreateDesktopW,GetCurrentThreadId,GetThreadDesktop,SetThreadDesktop,CloseDesktop,CloseWindowStation,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 1_2_10001000 peagtfosapeh,GetModuleHandleA,GetModuleHandleA,GetProcAddress,GetModuleHandleA,CreateProcessA,NtUnmapViewOfSection,VirtualAllocEx,WriteProcessMemory,WriteProcessMemory,GetThreadContext,WriteProcessMemory,SetThreadContext,ResumeThread,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 2_2_00401046 DeleteFileA,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetModuleHandleA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,CreateProcessA,NtUnmapViewOfSection,VirtualAllocEx,WriteProcessMemory,WriteProcessMemory,GetThreadContext,WriteProcessMemory,SetThreadContext,ResumeThread,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 2_1_00401046 CreateProcessA,NtUnmapViewOfSection,VirtualAllocEx,WriteProcessMemory,WriteProcessMemory,GetThreadContext,WriteProcessMemory,SetThreadContext,ResumeThread,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 2_2_004018F0: GetModuleHandleA,??2@YAPAXI@Z,lstrcatA,CreateFileA,DeviceIoControl,isalnum,isalnum,lstrcpyA,lstrcpyA,lstrcpyA,CharUpperA,CharUpperA,CharUpperA,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 3_2_0040DAE4 LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,CreateProcessAsUserW,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,FreeLibrary,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_00416142 InitiateSystemShutdownExW,ExitWindowsEx,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_00413970 CreateMutexW,GetLastError,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,ExitWindowsEx,OpenEventW,SetEvent,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,Sleep,IsWellKnownSid,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,VirtualFree,CreateEventW,WaitForSingleObject,WaitForMultipleObjects,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_00416142 InitiateSystemShutdownExW,ExitWindowsEx,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_00413970 CreateMutexW,GetLastError,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,ExitWindowsEx,OpenEventW,SetEvent,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,Sleep,IsWellKnownSid,GetFileAttributesExW,ReadProcessMemory,GetFileAttributesExW,VirtualFree,CreateEventW,WaitForSingleObject,WaitForMultipleObjects,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 1_2_004036E4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_0040200B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_0040718A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_0040D373
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_0040EF15
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_0040200B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_0040718A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_0040D373
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_0040EF15

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: String function: 00408888 appears 37 times

Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000001.00000002.203455259.00000000027D0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameKernelbase.dll.muij% vs yw6At7QnNh.exe
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000001.00000002.202804109.0000000000413000.00000004.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameTStub.exe vs yw6At7QnNh.exe
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000001.00000002.202804109.0000000000413000.00000004.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameCwork.exe vs yw6At7QnNh.exe
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs yw6At7QnNh.exe
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000002.00000002.205116569.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameCwork.exe vs yw6At7QnNh.exe
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameTStub.exe vs yw6At7QnNh.exe

Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: athefff3h6266cd5fa708f.tmp.1.dr

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.bank.troj.evad.winEXE@5/2@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 1_2_0040105A GetSysColor,GetDoubleClickTime,SetDoubleClickTime,GetTickCount,GetDesktopWindow,GetDesktopWindow,PeekMessageA,PeekMessageA,Sleep,IsWindow,IsDialogMessageA,TranslateMessage,DispatchMessageA,IsDlgButtonChecked,GetDesktopWindow,FindWindowA,SetWindowTextA,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,FindResourceA,IsClipboardFormatAvailable,wsprintfA,LoadResource,SizeofResource,GetLastError,GetCurrentProcess,TerminateProcess,LockResource,GetOpenFileNameA,SetFileAttributesA,LdrInitializeThunk,lstrcmpiA,MessageBoxA,GetClassInfoW,GetSysColor,GetTempPathA,GetUserDefaultLangID,PathAddBackslashA,lstrcatA,CreateFileA,WriteFile,GetLastError,FormatMessageA,CloseHandle,IsWindowEnabled,PostMessageA,LoadLibraryA,lstrlenA,GetProcAddress,GetCurrentThreadId,peagtfosapeh,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_004099A9 CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,CharLowerW,GetSystemTime,CertCloseStore,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_00409B1E CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertDuplicateCertificateContext,CertDeleteCertificateFromStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertCloseStore,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_004099A9 CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,PFXExportCertStoreEx,CharLowerW,GetSystemTime,CertCloseStore,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_00409B1E CertOpenSystemStoreW,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertDuplicateCertificateContext,CertDeleteCertificateFromStore,CertEnumCertificatesInStore,CertCloseStore,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_0040D88E GetCurrentThread,OpenThreadToken,OpenProcessToken,LookupPrivilegeValueW,AdjustTokenPrivileges,GetLastError,CloseHandle,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_0040D88E GetCurrentThread,OpenThreadToken,OpenProcessToken,LookupPrivilegeValueW,AdjustTokenPrivileges,GetLastError,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 3_2_0040D837 CreateToolhelp32Snapshot,Thread32First,Thread32Next,CloseHandle,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 3_2_004179CD CoCreateInstance,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\ athefff3h6266cd5fa708f.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 81%
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 60%
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 92%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe'

Data Obfuscation:

Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Unpacked PE file: 3.2.yw6At7QnNh.exe.400000.0.unpack .text:ER;.rdata:R;.data:W;.rsrc:R; vs .text:ER;.data:W;.reloc:R;

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Unpacked PE file: 2.2.yw6At7QnNh.exe.400000.0.unpack
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Unpacked PE file: 3.2.yw6At7QnNh.exe.400000.0.unpack

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 1_2_00405450 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 1_2_00408888 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 2_2_00402550 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 2_1_00402550 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_00402961 push cs; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_0040292B push cs; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_0040B1F7 push ebp; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_00402295 push es; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_00402961 push cs; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_0040292B push cs; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_0040B1F7 push ebp; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_00402295 push es; iretd

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\ athefff3h6266cd5fa708f.tmp

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 3_2_0040BC07 LoadLibraryA,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,LoadLibraryA,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,LoadImageW,GetIconInfo,GetCursorPos,DrawIcon,lstrcmpiW,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,FreeLibrary,

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Contain functionality to detect virtual machines

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: VBOX VBOX QEMU HARDDISK QEMU HARDDISK VMWARE VBOX

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000001.00000002.202804109.0000000000413000.00000004.00020000.sdmp, yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000002.00000002.205116569.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: $@RTLDECOMPRESSBUFFERNTDLL.DLLGETTHREADCONTEXTWRITEPROCESSMEMORYVIRTUALALLOCEXNTDLL.DLLNTUNMAPVIEWOFSECTIONCREATEPROCESSARESUMETHREADSETTHREADCONTEXTKERNEL32.DLLOPENMSDEFAULTBROWSER.HTMLYGN3456789MICROSOFT BASE CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROVIDER V1.0APPDATATEMPVIRTUALVMWAREQEMU HARDDISKVMLOGVBOX\\.\CWMONITORSBIEDLL.DLL

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_00411830 PathRemoveFileSpecW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_004118EB FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_00411830 PathRemoveFileSpecW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,SetFileAttributesW,RemoveDirectoryW,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_004118EB FindFirstFileW,Sleep,WaitForSingleObject,PathMatchSpecW,Sleep,Sleep,FindNextFileW,FindClose,

Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000002.00000002.205116569.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: $@RtlDecompressBufferNtdll.dllGetThreadContextWriteProcessMemoryVirtualAllocExntdll.dllNtUnmapViewOfSectionCreateProcessAResumeThreadSetThreadContextkernel32.dllopenMSDefaultBrowser.htmlYGN3456789Microsoft Base Cryptographic Provider v1.0APPDATATEMPVIRTUALVMWAREQEMU HARDDISKVMLOGVBOX\\.\cwmonitorSbieDll.dll
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000001.00000002.203455259.00000000027D0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A Virtual Machine could not be started because Hyper-V is not installed.
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	Binary or memory string: QEMU HARDDISK
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	Binary or memory string: VMWARE
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000001.00000002.203455259.00000000027D0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: A communication protocol error has occurred between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Service.
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000001.00000002.203455259.00000000027D0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: The communication protocol version between the Hyper-V Host and Guest Compute Services is not supported.
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000001.00000002.203455259.00000000027D0000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: An unknown internal message was received by the Hyper-V Compute Service.

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_004129EB mov edx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_1_004129EB mov edx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 3_2_00412D30 GetModuleHandleW,GetModuleHandleW,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,HeapCreate,GetProcessHeap,InitializeCriticalSection,WSAStartup,CreateEventW,GetLengthSid,GetCurrentProcessId,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040A813 SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040A825 SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 1_2_10001000 peagtfosapeh,GetModuleHandleA,GetModuleHandleA,GetProcAddress,GetModuleHandleA,CreateProcessA,NtUnmapViewOfSection,VirtualAllocEx,WriteProcessMemory,WriteProcessMemory,GetThreadContext,WriteProcessMemory,SetThreadContext,ResumeThread,

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Memory written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Memory written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 3_2_0040F7B1 InitializeSecurityDescriptor,SetSecurityDescriptorDacl,ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW,GetSecurityDescriptorSacl,SetSecurityDescriptorSacl,LocalFree,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 1_2_00401B0C GetLocalTime,GetSystemTime,GetTimeZoneInformation,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 3_2_0040994D GetUserNameExW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 1_2_00403D2A GetTimeZoneInformation,WideCharToMultiByte,WideCharToMultiByte,WideCharToMultiByte,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Code function: 1_2_00401C01 EntryPoint,GetVersion,GetCommandLineA,GetStartupInfoA,GetModuleHandleA,KiUserExceptionDispatcher,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000002.00000002.205524903.0000000002070000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Binary or memory string: S:(ML;;NRNWNX;;;LW)SeSecurityPrivilegeS:(ML;CIOI;NRNWNX;;;LW)?O?I?Tcabcabinet.dllFCICreateFCIAddFileFCIFlushCabinetFCIDestroybcdfghklmnpqrstvwxzaeiouyGlobal\Local\

Remote Access Functionality:

Contains VNC / remote desktop functionality (version string found)

Show sources

Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000002.00000002.205524903.0000000002070000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: RFB 003.003
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000002.00000002.205524903.0000000002070000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: identityAccept-EncodingTEIf-Modified-SinceRFB 003.003
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	String found in binary or memory: RFB 003.003
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe	String found in binary or memory: RFB 003.003
Source: yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000003.00000001.203739017.0000000000400000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: identityAccept-EncodingTEIf-Modified-SinceRFB 003.003

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_0040F5E2 socket,bind,closesocket,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe	Code function: 3_2_0040F304 socket,bind,listen,closesocket,

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts1	Native API1	Application Shimming1	Application Shimming1	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	Input Capture11	System Time Discovery2	Remote Desktop Protocol1	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Ingress Tool Transfer1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	System Shutdown/Reboot1
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Create Account1	Valid Accounts1	Obfuscated Files or Information2	LSASS Memory	Account Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Input Capture11	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Encrypted Channel2	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Valid Accounts1	Access Token Manipulation11	Install Root Certificate1	Security Account Manager	File and Directory Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Clipboard Data1	Automated Exfiltration	Remote Access Software1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection211	Software Packing22	NTDS	System Information Discovery4	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Masquerading1	LSA Secrets	Network Share Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Valid Accounts1	Cached Domain Credentials	Security Software Discovery311	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	DCSync	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Access Token Manipulation11	Proc Filesystem	Process Discovery1	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue
Exploit Public-Facing Application	PowerShell	At (Linux)	At (Linux)	Process Injection211	/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow	System Owner/User Discovery1	Software Deployment Tools	Data Staged	Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Web Protocols	Rogue Cellular Base Station		Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
yw6At7QnNh.exe	81%	Virustotal		Browse
yw6At7QnNh.exe	61%	Metadefender		Browse
yw6At7QnNh.exe	92%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Zeus
yw6At7QnNh.exe	100%	Avira	TR/Dropper.Gen
yw6At7QnNh.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\ athefff3h6266cd5fa708f.tmp	100%	Avira	TR/Agent.hjvc
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\ athefff3h6266cd5fa708f.tmp	5%	Virustotal		Browse
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\ athefff3h6266cd5fa708f.tmp	53%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Zeus

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
2.2.yw6At7QnNh.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1115251	Download File
1.2.yw6At7QnNh.exe.10000000.4.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Agent.hjvc	Download File
3.2.yw6At7QnNh.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Kazy.MK	Download File
3.1.yw6At7QnNh.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Kazy.MK	Download File
1.2.yw6At7QnNh.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Agent.hjvc	Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.google.com/webhp	yw6At7QnNh.exe	false		high
http://www.google.com/webhpbcMY.txt	yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000002.00000002.205524903.0000000002070000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, yw6At7QnNh.exe, 00000003.00000001.203739017.0000000000400000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	false		high

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	33.0.0 White Diamond
Analysis ID:	458121
Start date:	02.08.2021
Start time:	21:04:10
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 3m 52s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	yw6At7QnNh (renamed file extension from none to exe)
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	4
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.bank.troj.evad.winEXE@5/2@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 78.7% (good quality ratio 73.1%) Quality average: 81.9% Quality standard deviation: 29.7%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 72% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): svchost.exe

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\ athefff3h6266cd5fa708f.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	3072
Entropy (8bit):	2.4857544881426725
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:etGSGsXpFmGEqIUfIjjObu0Nql2nLEu98DwhKQstDISMhTF0L/x8O6r:etGSB54qIUwnO/AHDw0jukx
MD5:	79460E0544E0DFFE86DD51BBA404A2D3
SHA1:	ED294E22259F0DE6BAC6DD7A701B19B3CDCDA900
SHA-256:	2AFD890122BBA0EED6193476D04266B4A5B7A4DE53CB514BD9EAF4243D9FC973
SHA-512:	E2511BCC767B9EA93D378AA5D3D81A08D39701E9920019C9125BED88CDE1DE02BFABD8A5242710E86B4D20A75A65607DE442772753AB47230DEA4A9BA36F563A
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Avira, Detection: 100% Antivirus: Virustotal, Detection: 5%, Browse Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 53%
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........N.. ... ... ...!... ...3... .I.+... .I.$... .Rich.. .........PE..L....t{N...........!......................... ...............................P....................................... ..L.... ..(............................@....................................................... ...............................text............................... ..`.rdata....... ......................@..@.data........0......................@....reloc..(....@......................@..B................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\S-1-5-21-3853321935-2125563209-4053062332-1002\414045e2d09286d5db2581e0d955d358_d06ed635-68f6-4e9a-955c-4899f5f57b9a Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	46
Entropy (8bit):	1.0424600748477153
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:/lbON:u
MD5:	89CA7E02D8B79ED50986F098D5686EC9
SHA1:	A602E0D4398F00C827BFCF711066E67718CA1377
SHA-256:	30AC626CBD4A97DB480A0379F6D2540195F594C967B7087A26566E352F24C794
SHA-512:	C5F453E32C0297E51BE43F84A7E63302E7D1E471FADF8BB789C22A4D6E03712D26E2B039D6FBDBD9EBD35C4E93EC27F03684A7BBB67C4FADCCE9F6279417B5DE
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	........................................user.

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.5870490062472085
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.96% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	yw6At7QnNh.exe
File size:	225792
MD5:	8ba293749c97cbf48f30f02c66d3406d
SHA1:	6a7492a26d0a16320daa2cb187232fc0053f4f5f
SHA256:	e2075b32b9716dc41ef667a74c1ae2c2841a5b9fd3046db0bdcd96c581778253
SHA512:	041e3f65fcb877eb19f5d63cb79d2eb6327ee4b06191a3a4202a736fb6215cd2b2b5c436c081b0165acf2b1b0341c8c551bbf166f8f46ce48fedd7d23ff74049
SSDEEP:	6144:ERAL6uxQIBpPnki+81Rnn1BgUUhgmfwgA3Bfdw+:z4MT+81RnnHLUhgrL3tdw+
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$...........Hs..Hs..Hs..Hs..Ks...o..Gs...l...s..*l..Os..Hs...s...l..[s...u..Is..RichHs..................PE..L...G.{N...................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	0000000000000000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x401c01
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x4E7B9D47 [Thu Sep 22 20:40:39 2011 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	0f16db1e18559cc080852e2e8fd0038e

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push FFFFFFFFh
push 0040C160h
push 00402C1Ch
mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000000h]
push eax
mov dword ptr fs:[00000000h], esp
sub esp, 58h
push ebx
push esi
push edi
mov dword ptr [ebp-18h], esp
call dword ptr [0040C0B0h]
xor edx, edx
mov dl, ah
mov dword ptr [0040EFBCh], edx
mov ecx, eax
and ecx, 000000FFh
mov dword ptr [0040EFB8h], ecx
shl ecx, 08h
add ecx, edx
mov dword ptr [0040EFB4h], ecx
shr eax, 10h
mov dword ptr [0040EFB0h], eax
xor esi, esi
push esi
call 00007FF708C3611Ah
pop ecx
test eax, eax
jne 00007FF708C3529Ah
push 0000001Ch
call 00007FF708C35345h
pop ecx
mov dword ptr [ebp-04h], esi
call 00007FF708C35F5Ah
call dword ptr [0040C0ACh]
mov dword ptr [00410A58h], eax
call 00007FF708C35E18h
mov dword ptr [0040EF98h], eax
call 00007FF708C35BC1h
call 00007FF708C35B03h
call 00007FF708C3545Ch
mov dword ptr [ebp-30h], esi
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp-5Ch]
push eax
call dword ptr [0040C0A8h]
call 00007FF708C35A94h
mov dword ptr [ebp-64h], eax
test byte ptr [ebp-30h], 00000001h
je 00007FF708C35298h
movzx eax, word ptr [ebp-2Ch]
jmp 00007FF708C35295h
push 0000000Ah
pop eax
push eax
push dword ptr [ebp-64h]
push esi
push esi
call dword ptr [0040C0A4h]

Rich Headers

Programming Language:

[ C ] VS98 (6.0) build 8168
[RES] VS98 (6.0) cvtres build 1720
[C++] VS98 (6.0) build 8168

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xd598	0x64	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x11000	0x29828	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0xc000	0x15c	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0xa21e	0xa400	False	0.593225990854	data	6.56845565551	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rdata	0xc000	0x1d40	0x1e00	False	0.365364583333	data	4.48192698758	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0xe000	0x2a6c	0x1000	False	0.281005859375	data	3.38536461745	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x11000	0x29828	0x29a00	False	0.905352618243	data	7.80378630892	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x11130	0x25a8	dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 40	English	United States
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x136d8	0x14	data	English	United States
RT_VERSION	0x136ec	0x348	data	English	United States
None	0x13a34	0x26df4	data

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.dll	GetCurrentThreadId, lstrlenA, CloseHandle, FormatMessageA, lstrcatA, GetUserDefaultLangID, lstrcmpiA, SetFileAttributesA, TerminateProcess, GetCurrentProcess, GetLastError, GetProcAddress, LoadLibraryA, Sleep, GetTickCount, SetStdHandle, ReadFile, IsBadCodePtr, IsBadReadPtr, SetUnhandledExceptionFilter, FlushFileBuffers, SetFilePointer, RaiseException, SetEnvironmentVariableA, CompareStringW, CompareStringA, GetStringTypeW, GetStringTypeA, LCMapStringW, LCMapStringA, MultiByteToWideChar, GetOEMCP, GetACP, GetCPInfo, IsBadWritePtr, VirtualAlloc, WriteFile, RtlUnwind, GetTimeZoneInformation, GetSystemTime, GetLocalTime, GetModuleHandleA, GetStartupInfoA, GetCommandLineA, GetVersion, ExitProcess, HeapReAlloc, HeapAlloc, HeapSize, HeapFree, UnhandledExceptionFilter, GetModuleFileNameA, FreeEnvironmentStringsA, FreeEnvironmentStringsW, WideCharToMultiByte, GetEnvironmentStrings, GetEnvironmentStringsW, SetHandleCount, GetStdHandle, GetFileType, HeapDestroy, HeapCreate, VirtualFree
USER32.dll	DispatchMessageA, GetSysColor, GetDoubleClickTime, SetDoubleClickTime, GetDesktopWindow, PeekMessageA, IsWindow, IsDialogMessageA, PostMessageA, TranslateMessage, IsDlgButtonChecked, FindWindowA, SetWindowTextA, IsClipboardFormatAvailable, wsprintfA, MessageBoxA, GetClassInfoW, IsWindowEnabled
comdlg32.dll	GetOpenFileNameA
SHLWAPI.dll	PathAddBackslashA

Version Infos

Description	Data
LegalCopyright	Copyright 2011
InternalName	TStub
FileVersion	1, 0, 5, 1
CompanyName	dpjadagef
PrivateBuild
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName	dpjadagef fddflsnjcjek
SpecialBuild
ProductVersion	1, 0, 5, 1
FileDescription	fddflsnjcjek
OriginalFilename	TStub.exe
Translation	0x0409 0x04b0

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: yw6At7QnNh.exe PID: 3420 Parent PID: 5572

General

Start time:	21:04:57
Start date:	02/08/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	225792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8BA293749C97CBF48F30F02C66D3406D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: yw6At7QnNh.exe PID: 5952 Parent PID: 3420

General

Start time:	21:04:57
Start date:	02/08/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	225792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8BA293749C97CBF48F30F02C66D3406D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: yw6At7QnNh.exe PID: 1536 Parent PID: 5952

General

Start time:	21:04:58
Start date:	02/08/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\yw6At7QnNh.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	225792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8BA293749C97CBF48F30F02C66D3406D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

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Description:	Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Tactics:	Persistence
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Azure activity logs, Office 365 account logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Digital certificate logs, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of accounts on a system or within an environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Azure activity logs, Office 365 account logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping . The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Tactics:	Lateral Movement
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	API monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report yw6At7QnNh

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Cryptography:

Compliance:

Spreading:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

E-Banking Fraud:

Protection of GUI:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Rich Headers

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: yw6At7QnNh.exe PID: 3420 Parent PID: 5572

General

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.
Tactics:	Impact
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre