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Windows Analysis Report moni $@.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	moni $@.exe
Analysis ID:	458678
MD5:	1e46a61b2d491a15952bd579210ecb8f
SHA1:	5bb236d5c49991298040dd88b4b83c4cb21e148a
SHA256:	b07a33b6e6d8007b04f1f4a78cd8be773506bbf6b60ed0227665188d57e82a15
Tags:	exenull
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

FormBook

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Found malware configuration

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected AntiVM3

Yara detected FormBook

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Machine Learning detection for sample

Sigma detected: Suspicious Process Start Without DLL

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

Enables debug privileges

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

moni $@.exe (PID: 3516 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe' MD5: 1E46A61B2D491A15952BD579210ECB8F)

RegSvcs.exe (PID: 5996 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 59FCE79E9D81AB9E2ED4C3561205F5DF)

RegSvcs.exe (PID: 6000 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 59FCE79E9D81AB9E2ED4C3561205F5DF)

RegSvcs.exe (PID: 404 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 59FCE79E9D81AB9E2ED4C3561205F5DF)

RegSvcs.exe (PID: 6060 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 59FCE79E9D81AB9E2ED4C3561205F5DF)

RegSvcs.exe (PID: 6028 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 59FCE79E9D81AB9E2ED4C3561205F5DF)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: FormBook

{"C2 list": ["www.panyu-qqbaby.com/weni/"], "decoy": ["sdmdwang.com", "konversationswithkoshie.net", "carap.club", "eagldeream.com", "856380585.xyz", "elgallocoffee.com", "magetu.info", "lovertons.com", "theichallenge.com", "advancedautorepairsonline.com", "wingsstyling.info", "tapdaugusta.com", "wiloasbanhsgtarewdasc.solutions", "donjrisdumb.com", "experienceddoctor.com", "cloverhillconsultants.com", "underwear.show", "karensgonewild2020.com", "arodsr.com", "thefucktardmanual.com", "712kenwood.info", "telecompink.com", "ebizkendra.com", "kitkatmp3.com", "utformehagen.com", "profitsnavigator.com", "kathyharvey.com", "tongaoffshore.com", "vrpreservation.com", "hy7128.com", "nicolettejohnsonphotography.com", "rating.travel", "visualartcr.com", "nationalbarista.com", "lovecartoonforever.com", "koimkt.com", "directpractice.pro", "blockchaincloud360.com", "queverenbuenosaires.com", "coachmyragolden.com", "awree.com", "facebookipl.com", "rcheapwdbuy.com", "trinspinsgreen.com", "voxaide.com", "ecorner.online", "mattvickery.com", "regarta.com", "fknprfct.com", "theessentialstore.net", "sunilpsingh.com", "ovtnywveba.club", "optimalgafa.com", "awdjob.info", "humachem.com", "southeasternsteakcompany.com", "centerevents.net", "warrenswindowcleans.co.uk", "lebullterrier.com", "thecxchecker.com", "formerknown.com", "pupbutler.com", "tincanphones.com", "tgeuuy.cool"]}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x59470:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x5980a:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x6551d:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x65009:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x6561f:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x65797:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x5a222:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x64284:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0x5af9a:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x6a60f:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x6b6b2:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x67541:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x67654:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x67570:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x67695:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x67583:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x676ab:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000000.00000002.247523574.000000000328E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: moni $@.exe PID: 3516	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: Suspicious Process Start Without DLL

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth: Data: Command: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe, CommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe, ParentProcessId: 3516, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe, ProcessId: 5996

Sigma detected: Possible Applocker Bypass

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: juju4: Data: Command: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe, CommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe, ParentProcessId: 3516, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe, ProcessId: 5996

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: moni $@.exe

Avira: detected

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Show sources

Source: www.panyu-qqbaby.com/weni/

Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: FormBook {"C2 list": ["www.panyu-qqbaby.com/weni/"], "decoy": ["sdmdwang.com", "konversationswithkoshie.net", "carap.club", "eagldeream.com", "856380585.xyz", "elgallocoffee.com", "magetu.info", "lovertons.com", "theichallenge.com", "advancedautorepairsonline.com", "wingsstyling.info", "tapdaugusta.com", "wiloasbanhsgtarewdasc.solutions", "donjrisdumb.com", "experienceddoctor.com", "cloverhillconsultants.com", "underwear.show", "karensgonewild2020.com", "arodsr.com", "thefucktardmanual.com", "712kenwood.info", "telecompink.com", "ebizkendra.com", "kitkatmp3.com", "utformehagen.com", "profitsnavigator.com", "kathyharvey.com", "tongaoffshore.com", "vrpreservation.com", "hy7128.com", "nicolettejohnsonphotography.com", "rating.travel", "visualartcr.com", "nationalbarista.com", "lovecartoonforever.com", "koimkt.com", "directpractice.pro", "blockchaincloud360.com", "queverenbuenosaires.com", "coachmyragolden.com", "awree.com", "facebookipl.com", "rcheapwdbuy.com", "trinspinsgreen.com", "voxaide.com", "ecorner.online", "mattvickery.com", "regarta.com", "fknprfct.com", "theessentialstore.net", "sunilpsingh.com", "ovtnywveba.club", "optimalgafa.com", "awdjob.info", "humachem.com", "southeasternsteakcompany.com", "centerevents.net", "warrenswindowcleans.co.uk", "lebullterrier.com", "thecxchecker.com", "formerknown.com", "pupbutler.com", "tincanphones.com", "tgeuuy.cool"]}

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Show sources

Source: www.panyu-qqbaby.com/weni/

Virustotal: Detection: 6%

Perma Link

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: moni $@.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 39%			Perma Link
Source: moni $@.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 34%

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: moni $@.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Compliance:

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

Unpacked PE file: 0.2.moni $@.exe.ff0000.0.unpack

Source: moni $@.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED

Source: moni $@.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: www.panyu-qqbaby.com/weni/

Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247463240.0000000003211000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name

E-Banking Fraud:

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FFF2AF5629E

Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameStoreElement.dllB vs moni $@.exe
Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.250882555.000000001BD70000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs moni $@.exe
Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.246983941.000000000109A000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAppDomainHand.exe6 vs moni $@.exe
Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247121884.00000000014EC000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameclr.dllT vs moni $@.exe
Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247434414.00000000030F0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameConfigNodeType.dll> vs moni $@.exe
Source: moni $@.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAppDomainHand.exe6 vs moni $@.exe

Source: moni $@.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED

Source: 00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research

Source: moni $@.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@11/1@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\moni $@.exe.log

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\CmNWJcEtJlScVAi

Source: moni $@.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\mscorlib\ac26e2af62f23e37e645b5e44068a025\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: moni $@.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 39%
Source: moni $@.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 34%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: moni $@.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: moni $@.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Data Obfuscation:

Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

Unpacked PE file: 0.2.moni $@.exe.ff0000.0.unpack

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FFF2AF57F13 push ebx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FFF2AF5AC5D push edi; ret

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.91066136918

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.247523574.000000000328E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: moni $@.exe PID: 3516, type: MEMORYSTR

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247523574.000000000328E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME
Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247523574.000000000328E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe TID: 4852	Thread sleep time: -38692s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe TID: 6136	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 38692
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247523574.000000000328E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247523574.000000000328E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247523574.000000000328E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools
Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247523574.000000000328E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE
Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247523574.000000000328E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPath%C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247523574.000000000328E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE"SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware ToolsLHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 1\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0LHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 2\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0'SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Disk\Enum
Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247523574.000000000328E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247523574.000000000328E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmwareNSYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Class\{4D36E968-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}\0000

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality:

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection11	Masquerading1	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery11	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Disable or Modify Tools1	LSASS Memory	Process Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion21	Security Account Manager	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion21	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Software Packing12	NTDS	System Information Discovery12	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Process Injection11	LSA Secrets	Remote System Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Obfuscated Files or Information2	Cached Domain Credentials	System Owner/User Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
moni $@.exe	39%	Virustotal		Browse
moni $@.exe	35%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Swotter
moni $@.exe	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1142734
moni $@.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
0.0.moni $@.exe.ff0000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1142734		Download File
0.2.moni $@.exe.ff0000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1142734		Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
www.panyu-qqbaby.com/weni/	7%	Virustotal		Browse
www.panyu-qqbaby.com/weni/	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
www.panyu-qqbaby.com/weni/	true	7%, Virustotal, Browse Avira URL Cloud: malware	low

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	moni $@.exe, 00000000.00000002.247463240.0000000003211000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	33.0.0 White Diamond
Analysis ID:	458678
Start date:	03.08.2021
Start time:	16:36:35
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 8s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	moni $@.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	31
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@11/1@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 2% (good quality ratio 1.6%) Quality average: 51.6% Quality standard deviation: 32.9%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 86% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
16:37:30	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: moni $@.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\moni $@.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1742
Entropy (8bit):	5.381353871108486
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	48:MxHKEYHKGD8Ao6+vxpNl1qHGiD0HKeGitHTG1hAHKKPJAmHKoA9:iqEYqGgAo9ZPlwmI0qertzG1eqKPJ/qT
MD5:	978918F6120A43D1FA5899938A5A542F
SHA1:	6567A2E687B40BFD3A46246F51F4C89D93D89455
SHA-256:	F814F290A540B3FD755D05F3434317D7B26F2C33D2087F9E63233CD88AB510FC
SHA-512:	1DF2AF5A3F8212BF591AAA366FE96F167F3E6D43746E07B7CD44F1B2F06C63B1D290412891AD0B4D0A82D1DFD6EB2EB7D70981C35941F370DC97729E9205DD53
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System\10a17139182a9efd561f01fada9688a5\System.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System.Core\4e05e2e48b8a6dd267a8c9e25ef129a7\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"Microsoft.VisualBasic, Version=10.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\Microsoft.V9921e851#\f2e0589ed6d670f264a5f65dd0ad000f\Microsoft.VisualBasic.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_64\System.Drawing\49e5c0579db170be9741dccc34c1998e\System.Drawing.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_6

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.904280766447238
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.80% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.75% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	moni $@.exe
File size:	680960
MD5:	1e46a61b2d491a15952bd579210ecb8f
SHA1:	5bb236d5c49991298040dd88b4b83c4cb21e148a
SHA256:	b07a33b6e6d8007b04f1f4a78cd8be773506bbf6b60ed0227665188d57e82a15
SHA512:	022f35d056e6e1856b9c57e7d96ed63b221ad961d0d55085f26bceeb5659bb652cb2bf2e294e4a2c830a3aae67f7ecbcf57021990939b28d771d8afbbc247eb4
SSDEEP:	12288:YBg2LBBBBBBBBBBBXBBBBBBBBBBBRqLHPmm9SrzQnD+rdhpAUh7qIe6YHedKhBg/:YZmvmYSwSpFZi+dKbgwtGJl+KP3hv
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L......a.................X..........Jw... ........@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4a774a
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x61089407 [Tue Aug 3 00:55:35 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xa76f0	0x57	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xaa000	0x61c	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0xa8000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0xa5750	0xa5800	False	0.918747639728	data	7.91066136918	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0xa8000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xaa000	0x61c	0x800	False	0.33740234375	data	4.62076178534	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0xaa0a0	0x378	data
RT_MANIFEST	0xaa418	0x204	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with very long lines, with no line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright 2016
Assembly Version	1.0.0.0
InternalName	AppDomainHand.exe
FileVersion	1.0.0.0
CompanyName	flextronics
LegalTrademarks	flex
Comments	flex spare part room
ProductName	Spare Part
ProductVersion	1.0.0.0
FileDescription	Spare Part
OriginalFilename	AppDomainHand.exe

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: moni $@.exe PID: 3516 Parent PID: 5680

General

Start time:	16:37:26
Start date:	03/08/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\moni $@.exe'
Imagebase:	0xff0000
File size:	680960 bytes
MD5 hash:	1E46A61B2D491A15952BD579210ECB8F
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000000.00000002.249181885.0000000013221000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.247523574.000000000328E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: RegSvcs.exe PID: 5996 Parent PID: 3516

General

Start time:	16:37:32
Start date:	03/08/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Imagebase:	0x1ea58910000
File size:	44640 bytes
MD5 hash:	59FCE79E9D81AB9E2ED4C3561205F5DF
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: RegSvcs.exe PID: 6000 Parent PID: 3516

General

Start time:	16:37:32
Start date:	03/08/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Imagebase:	0x1fc30120000
File size:	44640 bytes
MD5 hash:	59FCE79E9D81AB9E2ED4C3561205F5DF
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: RegSvcs.exe PID: 404 Parent PID: 3516

General

Start time:	16:37:33
Start date:	03/08/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Imagebase:	0x25f29860000
File size:	44640 bytes
MD5 hash:	59FCE79E9D81AB9E2ED4C3561205F5DF
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: RegSvcs.exe PID: 6060 Parent PID: 3516

General

Start time:	16:37:33
Start date:	03/08/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Imagebase:	0x17f6b7a0000
File size:	44640 bytes
MD5 hash:	59FCE79E9D81AB9E2ED4C3561205F5DF
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: RegSvcs.exe PID: 6028 Parent PID: 3516

General

Start time:	16:37:33
Start date:	03/08/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Imagebase:	0x1f4cfd30000
File size:	44640 bytes
MD5 hash:	59FCE79E9D81AB9E2ED4C3561205F5DF
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report moni $@.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: FormBook

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: moni $@.exe PID: 3516 Parent PID: 5680

General

Analysis Process: RegSvcs.exe PID: 5996 Parent PID: 3516

General

Analysis Process: RegSvcs.exe PID: 6000 Parent PID: 3516