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Windows Analysis Report Halkbank02.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Halkbank02.exe
Analysis ID:	483639
MD5:	a4cb6740c9195c5579acef4f7c8e40c7
SHA1:	54abe0f828d828d5ff840b989fb5f010395961f6
SHA256:	f1b1abf0182c865a3521d659cbc4bd86a4b00b0e4be95468a1d3b5ff46a3efc8
Tags:	exegeoGuLoaderHalkbankTUR
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	88
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Potential malicious icon found

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Yara detected GuLoader

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Uses 32bit PE files

Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)

Yara signature match

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

PE file contains strange resources

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Detected potential crypto function

Contains functionality to call native functions

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

Halkbank02.exe (PID: 6396 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe' MD5: A4CB6740C9195C5579ACEF4F7C8E40C7)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1l"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000001.00000002.775767651.0000000002BD0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.772950247.0000000000410000.00000020.00020000.sdmp	LokiBot_Dropper_Packed_R11_Feb18	Auto-generated rule - file scan copy.pdf.r11	Florian Roth	0x450:$s1: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\VB98\VB6.OLB
00000001.00000000.247791172.0000000000410000.00000020.00020000.sdmp	LokiBot_Dropper_Packed_R11_Feb18	Auto-generated rule - file scan copy.pdf.r11	Florian Roth	0x450:$s1: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\VB98\VB6.OLB

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000001.00000002.775767651.0000000002BD0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1l"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: Halkbank02.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 15%

Source: Halkbank02.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov ebx, ebx
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov ebx, ebx
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov ebx, ebx
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov ebx, ebx
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov ebx, ebx
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov ebx, ebx
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov ebx, ebx
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 4x nop then mov ebx, ebx
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 5x nop then xor eax, 4C849A4Bh

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1l

System Summary:

Potential malicious icon found

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Icon embedded in PE file: bad icon match: 20047c7c70f0e004

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 00000001.00000002.772950247.0000000000410000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Auto-generated rule - file scan copy.pdf.r11 Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000001.00000000.247791172.0000000000410000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Auto-generated rule - file scan copy.pdf.r11 Author: Florian Roth

Source: Halkbank02.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: 00000001.00000002.772950247.0000000000410000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: LokiBot_Dropper_Packed_R11_Feb18 date = 2018-02-14, hash1 = 3b248d40fd7acb839cc592def1ed7652734e0e5ef93368be3c36c042883a3029, author = Florian Roth, description = Auto-generated rule - file scan copy.pdf.r11, reference = https://app.any.run/tasks/401df4d9-098b-4fd0-86e0-7a52ce6ddbf5, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE
Source: 00000001.00000000.247791172.0000000000410000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: LokiBot_Dropper_Packed_R11_Feb18 date = 2018-02-14, hash1 = 3b248d40fd7acb839cc592def1ed7652734e0e5ef93368be3c36c042883a3029, author = Florian Roth, description = Auto-generated rule - file scan copy.pdf.r11, reference = https://app.any.run/tasks/401df4d9-098b-4fd0-86e0-7a52ce6ddbf5, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE

Source: Halkbank02.exe, 00000001.00000000.247800004.0000000000418000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemeduse.exe vs Halkbank02.exe
Source: Halkbank02.exe, 00000001.00000002.774847664.00000000021F0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemeduse.exeFE2XGeneral court% vs Halkbank02.exe
Source: Halkbank02.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemeduse.exe vs Halkbank02.exe

Source: Halkbank02.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401500
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00402872
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00402C7A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00402A0C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00402C3F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_004028F7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00402A81
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_004020A7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401550
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00402B02
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_004027DC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00402B84
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040298D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD65A4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD46B6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD18AE
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD38A1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD9AA0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD4AA3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD7294
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD3093
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD628F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD8E8E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD248A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD22F6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD90F3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD28EB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD98EA
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD8EE0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD08DF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BDA8D9
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BDACD7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD50D3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD52C8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD022B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD122A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD4E25
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD2024
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BDA00E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD060B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD0E01
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD3673
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD146E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD2850
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD8452
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD0A46
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD1C46
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD1592
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD4983
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD4DF9
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD41F0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD85E3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD69DD
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD05DF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD89D6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD4DD3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD37D2
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BDA7C9
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD9DC1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD9DC3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD99C2
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD1138
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD352D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD0D2C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD2F1D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD9B0D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD630A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD1B72
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD8D6F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD5963
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD8F56
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD614D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD9149
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD9745
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD1340
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD1143

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe

Code function: 1_2_02BD65A4 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: Halkbank02.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 15%

Source: Halkbank02.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal88.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000001.00000002.775767651.0000000002BD0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00403640 push 966DCA76h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00405A45 push esp; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00403C65 push ds; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00405E73 push ds; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00404A75 push 7B3E4015h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00407231 push esp; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_004080C5 push E868A7E5h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00406ED7 push esi; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_004082EB pushfd ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_004080ED push 7767F77Ch; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00408105 push 03C6A3FEh; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00407B29 pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_004061DD push 22BD4488h; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD7409 pushfd ; iretd

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe

Code function: 1_2_02BD8CF8 rdtsc

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_00401500 mov ebx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_004020A7 mov ebx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_004027DC mov ebx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD88B2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD608C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD41F0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD352D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD8150 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe	Code function: 1_2_02BD9745 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe

Code function: 1_2_02BD8CF8 rdtsc

Source: Halkbank02.exe, 00000001.00000002.773637952.0000000000D60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: Halkbank02.exe, 00000001.00000002.773637952.0000000000D60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: Halkbank02.exe, 00000001.00000002.773637952.0000000000D60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SProgram Managerl
Source: Halkbank02.exe, 00000001.00000002.773637952.0000000000D60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd,
Source: Halkbank02.exe, 00000001.00000002.773637952.0000000000D60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery11	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information2	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Information Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Halkbank02.exe	16%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Mucc

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	33.0.0 White Diamond
Analysis ID:	483639
Start date:	15.09.2021
Start time:	10:37:01
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 8m 19s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Halkbank02.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	30
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal88.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 5.7% (good quality ratio 3%) Quality average: 27.7% Quality standard deviation: 26.8%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.903422169790693
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	Halkbank02.exe
File size:	114688
MD5:	a4cb6740c9195c5579acef4f7c8e40c7
SHA1:	54abe0f828d828d5ff840b989fb5f010395961f6
SHA256:	f1b1abf0182c865a3521d659cbc4bd86a4b00b0e4be95468a1d3b5ff46a3efc8
SHA512:	454837e72cab7fb74b1997a9cb65f00f4f61f2c20df207af2bc68bb14b64b05bc335b7a5ee453872f39b0e4d2608d1c430355411784e810c631c2a48913e3de8
SSDEEP:	1536:eCTH2yl2XRexuS7oM7AS9GvCxrJodHrRdgGpVBPy6mgjd+:e62dAwSsO9GvCxrJ6HbrVBPy6jU
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......u...1...1...1.......0...~...0.......0...Rich1...........PE..L...{ewV.................`...P...............p....@.............B..

File Icon


Icon Hash:	20047c7c70f0e004

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x401500
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x5677657B [Mon Dec 21 02:35:39 2015 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	4907098a5ecd4cf1549046838d3d7c44

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 0041003Ch
call 00007FD154A0B3A3h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add dh, bl
adc cl, bl
inc ebp
shr byte ptr [ecx-7261B6D1h], cl
cdq
push B02314D6h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
cmp byte ptr [ecx-3Ah], bl
add ch, byte ptr [ebp+69h]
outsb
insb
insb
jnc 00007FD154A0B423h
add byte ptr [ecx+00h], al
and byte ptr [eax], cl
inc ecx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add bh, bh
int3
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
inc ebp
or word ptr [edx], cx
dec esp
xor ah, byte ptr [edi]
dec eax
xchg byte ptr [ebx-5F3E302Eh], al
jne 00007FD154A0B35Bh
lodsd
test al, D1h
inc edx
int1
out dx, eax
pop edx
inc eax
movsd
sar cl, cl
and eax, 3A648554h
dec edi
lodsd
xor ebx, dword ptr [ecx-48EE309Ah]
or al, 00h
stosb
add byte ptr [eax-2Dh], ah
xchg eax, ebx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
cmp dl, ch
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
or byte ptr [eax], al
inc edi
jne 00007FD154A0B425h
je 00007FD154A0B413h
jc 00007FD154A0B416h
push 00000000h
or eax, 6B000501h
outsd
insd
insd
jne 00007FD154A0B3B2h

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x168b4	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x18000	0x31be	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x158	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x15dc4	0x16000	False	0.537486683239	data	6.51159061582	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x17000	0xa34	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x18000	0x31be	0x4000	False	0.143920898438	data	2.81606437364	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
CUSTOM	0x1ac40	0x57e	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 16x16, 8 bits/pixel	English	United States
CUSTOM	0x1a6c2	0x57e	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 16x16, 8 bits/pixel	English	United States
CUSTOM	0x1a144	0x57e	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 16x16, 8 bits/pixel	English	United States
CUSTOM	0x19bc6	0x57e	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 16x16, 8 bits/pixel	English	United States
CUSTOM	0x19648	0x57e	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 16x16, 8 bits/pixel	English	United States
CUSTOM	0x190ca	0x57e	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 16x16, 8 bits/pixel	English	United States
CUSTOM	0x18b4c	0x57e	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 16x16, 8 bits/pixel	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x18a1c	0x130	data
RT_ICON	0x18734	0x2e8	data
RT_ICON	0x1860c	0x128	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x185dc	0x30	data
RT_VERSION	0x182c0	0x31c	data	Chinese	Taiwan

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaStrBool, __vbaObjSet, __vbaOnError, _adj_fdiv_m16i, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaI2I4, _adj_fpatan, __vbaRedim, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, __vbaStrVarVal, __vbaVarCat, _CIlog, __vbaNew2, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaI4Str, __vbaFreeStrList, __vbaDerefAry1, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaInStrB, __vbaLateMemCall, __vbaVarDup, __vbaFpI4, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, _allmul, _CItan, __vbaFPInt, _CIexp, __vbaFreeObj, __vbaFreeStr

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0404 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	General court
InternalName	meduse
FileVersion	66.00
CompanyName	General court
LegalTrademarks	General court
Comments	General court
ProductName	General court
ProductVersion	66.00
FileDescription	General court
OriginalFilename	meduse.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States
Chinese	Taiwan

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Halkbank02.exe PID: 6396 Parent PID: 3232

General

Start time:	10:38:01
Start date:	15/09/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Halkbank02.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	114688 bytes
MD5 hash:	A4CB6740C9195C5579ACEF4F7C8E40C7
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000001.00000002.775767651.0000000002BD0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: LokiBot_Dropper_Packed_R11_Feb18, Description: Auto-generated rule - file scan copy.pdf.r11, Source: 00000001.00000002.772950247.0000000000410000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: LokiBot_Dropper_Packed_R11_Feb18, Description: Auto-generated rule - file scan copy.pdf.r11, Source: 00000001.00000000.247791172.0000000000410000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report Halkbank02.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Halkbank02.exe PID: 6396 Parent PID: 3232

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis