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Windows Analysis Report pug6mtV48A.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	pug6mtV48A.exe
Analysis ID:	491388
MD5:	74da6faf84783587dd82552dfa63eb00
SHA1:	276512acad7ec63916653862778438c169a3b890
SHA256:	584b5b4a74cb945f3be3ff0a4017d8ce2b073d6a98bfceb7bc59cb0f3fe7c3ee
Tags:	exe
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

FormBook

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected FormBook

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Yara detected AntiVM3

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Sample uses process hollowing technique

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)

Self deletion via cmd delete

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Queues an APC in another process (thread injection)

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Uses 32bit PE files

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Yara signature match

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Detected potential crypto function

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Enables debug privileges

Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Tries to resolve domain names, but no domain seems valid (expired dropper behavior)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

pug6mtV48A.exe (PID: 6664 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe' MD5: 74DA6FAF84783587DD82552DFA63EB00)

pug6mtV48A.exe (PID: 6980 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe MD5: 74DA6FAF84783587DD82552DFA63EB00)

explorer.exe (PID: 3440 cmdline: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE MD5: AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D)

netsh.exe (PID: 6864 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe MD5: A0AA3322BB46BBFC36AB9DC1DBBBB807)

cmd.exe (PID: 3012 cmdline: /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe' MD5: F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D)

conhost.exe (PID: 6968 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: FormBook

{"C2 list": ["www.odysseysailingsantorini.com/cmsr/"], "decoy": ["dahlia-dolls.com", "iamawife.com", "gardunomx.com", "roweelitetrucking.com", "asapvk.com", "strategieslimited.com", "healthyweathorganics.com", "wedding-gallery.net", "fastoffer.online", "biolab33.cloud", "los40delocta.com", "charliepaton.com", "jenpaddock.com", "zzmweb.com", "poetarts.com", "techwork4u.com", "tracylynpropp.com", "rkbodyfit.site", "migaleriapanama.com", "cosmostco.com", "johnsoncamping.com", "flowfinancialplanning.com", "xn--caamosdemexico-rnb.com", "plusqueindia.com", "wwwhyprr.com", "benimofis.com", "tandteutopia.com", "spaintravelvacation.com", "dear.services", "zhiwugongfang.com", "blogdavnc.com", "justicefundingexchange.com", "alphasecreweb.info", "xitechgroup.com", "kendalmountain.digital", "nieght.com", "pieter-janenmaaike.online", "myexclusiveshop.com", "love-potato.online", "mondebestglobal.com", "ranchlandconcierge.com", "southerngraphx.com", "pray4usa.info", "vilchesfinancial.com", "zelvio.store", "zenibusiness.com", "kindredhue.com", "californiatacosdinuba.com", "uncommonsolutionsllc.com", "easy-lah.com", "disciplesevents.com", "856380127.xyz", "zapzapgone.com", "paradisgrp.com", "programmerworks.info", "purchasesuite.com", "dorotajedrusik.com", "555999dy.com", "uvoyus.com", "utang.net", "elizabethhelma.com", "noseainsight.com", "simpleterior.com", "casatensina.com"]}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000001.00000002.394111409.0000000002791000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.394206876.0000000002805000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x2675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x2161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x2777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x28ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x13dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0x8317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x931a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x53f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x550c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x5428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x554d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x543b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x5563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x2675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x2161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x2777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x28ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x13dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0x8317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x931a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x53f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x550c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x5428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x554d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x543b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x5563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x63a78:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x63ce2:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x1ad388:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x1ad5f2:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x6f805:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x1b9115:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x6f2f1:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x1b8c01:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x6f907:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x1b9217:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x6fa7f:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x1b938f:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x646fa:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x1ae00a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x6e56c:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0x1b7e7c:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0x653f3:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1aed03:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x754a7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1bedb7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x764aa:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x72589:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x7269c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1bbe99:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1bbfac:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x725b8:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x726dd:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1bbec8:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1bbfed:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x725cb:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x726f3:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x1bbedb:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x1bc003:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
Process Memory Space: pug6mtV48A.exe PID: 6664	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Click to see the 25 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.unpack	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x8ae8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x8d52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x14875:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x14361:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x14977:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x14aef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x976a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x135dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xa463:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1a517:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1b51a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.unpack	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x175f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1770c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x17628:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1774d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1763b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x17763:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
1.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.28c32c0.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Click to see the 2 entries

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

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Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: FormBook {"C2 list": ["www.odysseysailingsantorini.com/cmsr/"], "decoy": ["dahlia-dolls.com", "iamawife.com", "gardunomx.com", "roweelitetrucking.com", "asapvk.com", "strategieslimited.com", "healthyweathorganics.com", "wedding-gallery.net", "fastoffer.online", "biolab33.cloud", "los40delocta.com", "charliepaton.com", "jenpaddock.com", "zzmweb.com", "poetarts.com", "techwork4u.com", "tracylynpropp.com", "rkbodyfit.site", "migaleriapanama.com", "cosmostco.com", "johnsoncamping.com", "flowfinancialplanning.com", "xn--caamosdemexico-rnb.com", "plusqueindia.com", "wwwhyprr.com", "benimofis.com", "tandteutopia.com", "spaintravelvacation.com", "dear.services", "zhiwugongfang.com", "blogdavnc.com", "justicefundingexchange.com", "alphasecreweb.info", "xitechgroup.com", "kendalmountain.digital", "nieght.com", "pieter-janenmaaike.online", "myexclusiveshop.com", "love-potato.online", "mondebestglobal.com", "ranchlandconcierge.com", "southerngraphx.com", "pray4usa.info", "vilchesfinancial.com", "zelvio.store", "zenibusiness.com", "kindredhue.com", "californiatacosdinuba.com", "uncommonsolutionsllc.com", "easy-lah.com", "disciplesevents.com", "856380127.xyz", "zapzapgone.com", "paradisgrp.com", "programmerworks.info", "purchasesuite.com", "dorotajedrusik.com", "555999dy.com", "uvoyus.com", "utang.net", "elizabethhelma.com", "noseainsight.com", "simpleterior.com", "casatensina.com"]}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: pug6mtV48A.exe

Virustotal: Detection: 25%

Perma Link

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Show sources

Source: www.odysseysailingsantorini.com/cmsr/

Virustotal: Detection: 6%

Perma Link

Source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.unpack

Avira: Label: TR/Crypt.ZPACK.Gen

Source: pug6mtV48A.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: pug6mtV48A.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: netsh.pdb source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000005.00000002.493764285.0000000001141000.00000004.00000020.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdbUGP source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000005.00000002.494671070.00000000014EF000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe, 00000010.00000002.621228978.000000000385F000.00000040.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: netsh.pdbGCTL source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000005.00000002.493764285.0000000001141000.00000004.00000020.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdb source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000005.00000002.494671070.00000000014EF000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 4x nop then pop ebx
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 4x nop then pop edi
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 4x nop then pop ebx
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 4x nop then pop edi

Networking:

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: www.wwwhyprr.com
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: www.wedding-gallery.net

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: www.odysseysailingsantorini.com/cmsr/

Source: unknown	DNS traffic detected: query: www.wwwhyprr.com replaycode: Name error (3)
Source: unknown	DNS traffic detected: query: www.wedding-gallery.net replaycode: Name error (3)

Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.415008820.000000000095C000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.autoitscript.com/autoit3/J
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.393740885.0000000000E77000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: www.wedding-gallery.net

E-Banking Fraud:

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group

Source: pug6mtV48A.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 1_2_0039502D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 1_2_00DEC124
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 1_2_00DEE570
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 1_2_00DEE563
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00401030
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_0041E993
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00402D8A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00402D90
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00409E30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_0041DFD0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00402FB0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_0094502D
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379EBB0
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03786E30
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03760D20
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03784120
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376F900
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03831D55
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377841F
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821002
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377B090
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D79E30
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D8DFD0
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D72FB0
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D72D90
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D72D8A

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00419D50 NtCreateFile,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00419E00 NtReadFile,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00419E80 NtClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00419F30 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00419D4A NtCreateFile,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00419E7C NtClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00419F2A NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9710 NtQueryInformationToken,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9FE0 NtCreateMutant,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9780 NtMapViewOfSection,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9A50 NtCreateFile,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A96E0 NtFreeVirtualMemory,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A96D0 NtCreateKey,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9540 NtReadFile,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9910 NtAdjustPrivilegesToken,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A95D0 NtClose,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A99A0 NtCreateSection,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9860 NtQuerySystemInformation,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9840 NtDelayExecution,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9770 NtSetInformationFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037AA770 NtOpenThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9760 NtOpenProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9730 NtQueryVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037AA710 NtOpenProcessToken,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9B00 NtSetValueKey,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037AA3B0 NtGetContextThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A97A0 NtUnmapViewOfSection,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9670 NtQueryInformationProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9660 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9650 NtQueryValueKey,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9A20 NtResumeThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9610 NtEnumerateValueKey,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9A10 NtQuerySection,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9A00 NtProtectVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9A80 NtOpenDirectoryObject,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9560 NtWriteFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9950 NtQueueApcThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037AAD30 NtSetContextThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9520 NtWaitForSingleObject,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A95F0 NtQueryInformationFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A99D0 NtCreateProcessEx,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037AB040 NtSuspendThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A9820 NtEnumerateKey,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A98F0 NtReadVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A98A0 NtWriteVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D89E80 NtClose,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D89E00 NtReadFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D89D50 NtCreateFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D89E7C NtClose,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D89D4A NtCreateFile,

Source: pug6mtV48A.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs pug6mtV48A.exe
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.394206876.0000000002805000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameColladaLoader.dll4 vs pug6mtV48A.exe
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000000.352213953.0000000000392000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameICriticalNotifyCompleti.exe6 vs pug6mtV48A.exe
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.399085654.0000000006F70000.00000004.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameCF_Secretaria.dll< vs pug6mtV48A.exe
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs pug6mtV48A.exe
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000005.00000002.503268988.000000000346C000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamenetsh.exej% vs pug6mtV48A.exe
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000005.00000002.492759291.0000000000942000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameICriticalNotifyCompleti.exe6 vs pug6mtV48A.exe
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000005.00000002.494671070.00000000014EF000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamentdll.dllj% vs pug6mtV48A.exe
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameICriticalNotifyCompleti.exe6 vs pug6mtV48A.exe

Source: pug6mtV48A.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: pug6mtV48A.exe

Virustotal: Detection: 25%

Source: pug6mtV48A.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe'
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe'

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{6C3EE638-B588-4D7D-B30A-E7E36759305D}\InprocServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\pug6mtV48A.exe.log

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@7/1@2/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6968:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: pug6mtV48A.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: pug6mtV48A.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: netsh.pdb source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000005.00000002.493764285.0000000001141000.00000004.00000020.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdbUGP source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000005.00000002.494671070.00000000014EF000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe, 00000010.00000002.621228978.000000000385F000.00000040.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: netsh.pdbGCTL source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000005.00000002.493764285.0000000001141000.00000004.00000020.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdb source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000005.00000002.494671070.00000000014EF000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe

Data Obfuscation:

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Show sources

Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, CalendarId/MainForm.cs

.Net Code: InitializeComponent System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_004178AB pushfd ; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_0040E27F push edx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00409BD5 push esp; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_004175F8 push edx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_00419DA2 pushad ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_0041660F push edx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_0041CEF2 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_0041CEFB push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_0041CEA5 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Code function: 5_2_0041CF5C push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037BD0D1 push ecx; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D7E27F push edx; iretd
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D79BD5 push esp; iretd
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D878AB pushfd ; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D8D90A push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D8CEFB push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D8CEF2 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D8CEA5 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D8660F push edx; iretd
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D8CF5C push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D875F8 push edx; iretd
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_02D89DA2 pushad ; retf

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.61528648699

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)

Show sources

Source: explorer.exe

User mode code has changed: module: user32.dll function: PeekMessageA new code: 0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x89 0x9E 0xEB

Self deletion via cmd delete

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process created: /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe'
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process created: /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX \| NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 1.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.28c32c0.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.394111409.0000000002791000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.394206876.0000000002805000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: pug6mtV48A.exe PID: 6664, type: MEMORYSTR

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.394111409.0000000002791000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.394111409.0000000002791000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: KERNEL32.DLL.WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000004098E4 second address: 00000000004098EA instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000004 add ecx, eax 0x00000006 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000409B4E second address: 0000000000409B54 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000004 add ecx, eax 0x00000006 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002D798E4 second address: 0000000002D798EA instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000004 add ecx, eax 0x00000006 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000002D79B4E second address: 0000000002D79B54 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000004 add ecx, eax 0x00000006 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe TID: 6668	Thread sleep time: -43898s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe TID: 6720	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe TID: 6604	Thread sleep time: -35000s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

Code function: 5_2_00409A80 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 43898
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.404035872.00000000083EB000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SATA CD00dRom0
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.426311357.0000000008430000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\Disk&Ven_VMware&Prod_Virtual_disk\5&1ec51bf7&0&000000
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.394111409.0000000002791000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPathJC:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.394401104.000000000095C000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000025700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#000000001F400000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000026700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000000100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_Msft&Prod_Virtual_DVD-ROM#2&1f4adffe&0&000001#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.399299998.00000000062E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\scsi#cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f56308-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.394111409.0000000002791000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.404035872.00000000083EB000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SATA CD00
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.399299998.00000000062E0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\scsi#cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f56308-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.395957236.00000000045BE000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: AGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000025700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#000000001F400000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000026700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000000100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_Msft&Prod_Virtual_DVD-ROM#2&1f4adffe&0&000001#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}R
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.426054952.00000000082E2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\scsi#cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f56308-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}>
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.394111409.0000000002791000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA II
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.426054952.00000000082E2000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00\5&280b647&0&000000
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.426311357.0000000008430000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\CDROM&VEN_NECVMWAR&PROD_VMWARE_SATA_CD00\5&280B647&0&000000-;
Source: pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.394111409.0000000002791000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWAREDSOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.415008820.000000000095C000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}G

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

Code function: 5_2_00409A80 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0381D380 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03793B7A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03793B7A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0382138A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376DB60 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377FF60 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03835BA5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376F358 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376DB40 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377EF40 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379E730 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03764F2E mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03764F2E mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037FFF10 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037FFF10 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0383070D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0383070D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0382131B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03838B58 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03838F6A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379B390 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E7794 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E7794 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E7794 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03771B8F mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03771B8F mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A927A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0378AE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0378AE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0378AE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0378AE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0378AE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377766D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03830EA5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03830EA5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03830EA5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03769240 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03769240 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03769240 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03769240 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03777E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03777E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03777E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03777E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03777E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03777E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0381FEC0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03838ED6 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376E620 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03783A1C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376C600 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376C600 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376C600 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037776E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037916E0 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037936CC mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A8EC7 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0381FE3F mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377AAB0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377AAB0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379FAB0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037652A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037652A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037652A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037652A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037652A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E46A7 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0381B260 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0381B260 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03838A62 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379D294 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379D294 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037FFE87 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376B171 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376B171 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0378C577 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0378C577 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03787D50 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A3D43 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0378B944 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0378B944 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E3540 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03794D3B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03794D3B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03794D3B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379513A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379513A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03773D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03773D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03773D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03773D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03773D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03773D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03773D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03773D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03773D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03773D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03773D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03773D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03773D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376AD30 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037EA537 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03784120 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03784120 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03784120 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03784120 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03784120 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03818DF1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03769100 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03769100 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03769100 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376B1E1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376B1E1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0376B1E1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03838D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037935A1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379FD9B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379FD9B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0378C182 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03762D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03762D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03762D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03762D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03762D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379A185 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0378746D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03780050 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03780050 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037FC450 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037FC450 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03838CD6 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379BC2C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377B02A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377B02A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377B02A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0377B02A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E7016 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E7016 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E7016 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E6C0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E6C0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E6C0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E6C0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_038214FB mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03821C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0383740D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0383740D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0383740D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E6CF0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E6CF0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E6CF0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03834015 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03834015 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037FB8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037FB8D0 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037FB8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037FB8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037FB8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037FB8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379F0BF mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379F0BF mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_0379F0BF mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037A90AF mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03822073 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03769080 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_03831074 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E3884 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 16_2_037E3884 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process queried: DebugPort

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

Code function: 5_2_0040ACC0 LdrLoadDll,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: www.wwwhyprr.com
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: www.wedding-gallery.net

Sample uses process hollowing technique

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

Section unmapped: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe base address: 9E0000

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: execute and read and write
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: execute and read and write
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe protection: execute and read and write
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe protection: execute and read and write
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: read write
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: execute and read and write

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

Memory written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Queues an APC in another process (thread injection)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

Thread APC queued: target process: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Thread register set: target process: 3440
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Thread register set: target process: 3440
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Thread register set: target process: 3440

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe'

Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.404035872.00000000083EB000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe, 00000010.00000002.622564714.0000000004BD0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.439280693.00000000008B8000.00000004.00000020.sdmp, netsh.exe, 00000010.00000002.622564714.0000000004BD0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.394747320.0000000000EE0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, netsh.exe, 00000010.00000002.622564714.0000000004BD0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: &Program Manager
Source: explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.394747320.0000000000EE0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, netsh.exe, 00000010.00000002.622564714.0000000004BD0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arial.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariali.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariblk.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\bahnschrift.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibril.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibriz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambria.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candara.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candaraz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comic.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comici.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constan.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constani.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbel.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbeli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cour.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\couri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrima.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrimabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framdit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAMDCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHV.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHVIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Gabriola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgia.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\impact.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Inkfree.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\javatext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelawUI.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelUIsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelaUIb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\lucon.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\l_10646.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgun.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\himalaya.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailu.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailub.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspa.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taile.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taileb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mingliub.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\monbaiti.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msgothic.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mvboli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtextb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Nirmala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaS.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaB.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\pala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palabi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoepr.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeprb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoesc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoescb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguiemj.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguihis.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisym.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsun.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsunb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Sitka.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaI.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaZ.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\sylfaen.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\symbol.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahoma.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahomabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebuc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdana.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\webdings.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeuiz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality:

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Shared Modules1	Path Interception	Process Injection612	Rootkit1	Credential API Hooking1	Security Software Discovery221	Remote Services	Credential API Hooking1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Masquerading1	LSASS Memory	Process Discovery2	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Disable or Modify Tools11	Security Account Manager	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion31	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Application Layer Protocol11	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion31	NTDS	Remote System Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Process Injection612	LSA Secrets	System Information Discovery112	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Obfuscated Files or Information3	Cached Domain Credentials	System Owner/User Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Software Packing13	DCSync	Network Sniffing	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	File Deletion1	Proc Filesystem	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
pug6mtV48A.exe	25%	Virustotal		Browse
pug6mtV48A.exe	9%	ReversingLabs

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
5.2.pug6mtV48A.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.ZPACK.Gen		Download File

Domains

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
www.wedding-gallery.net	0%	Virustotal		Browse

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
www.odysseysailingsantorini.com/cmsr/	7%	Virustotal		Browse
www.odysseysailingsantorini.com/cmsr/	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
www.wwwhyprr.com	unknown	unknown	true		unknown
www.wedding-gallery.net	unknown	unknown	true	0%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
www.odysseysailingsantorini.com/cmsr/	true	7%, Virustotal, Browse Avira URL Cloud: safe	low

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.autoitscript.com/autoit3/J	explorer.exe, 00000006.00000000.415008820.000000000095C000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	false		high
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.393740885.0000000000E77000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.tiro.com	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.coml	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fonts.com	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sakkal.com	pug6mtV48A.exe, 00000001.00000002.398459967.0000000006942000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	33.0.0 White Diamond
Analysis ID:	491388
Start date:	27.09.2021
Start time:	14:38:55
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 12m 14s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	pug6mtV48A.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	24
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@7/1@2/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 27.4% (good quality ratio 24.4%) Quality average: 72.6% Quality standard deviation: 32.6%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 23.54.113.53, 20.50.102.62, 23.0.174.185, 23.0.174.200, 20.54.110.249, 40.112.88.60, 23.10.249.43, 23.10.249.26, 95.100.54.203 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, a767.dspw65.akamai.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, arc.msn.com, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, consumer-displaycatalogrp-aks2aks-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, arc.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, fs.microsoft.com, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, wu-shim.trafficmanager.net, neu-displaycatalogrp.frontdoor.bigcatalog.commerce.microsoft.com, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, asf-ris-prod-neu.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, iris-de-prod-azsc-uks.uksouth.cloudapp.azure.com, download.windowsupdate.com.edgesuite.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
14:40:12	API Interceptor	2x Sleep call for process: pug6mtV48A.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\pug6mtV48A.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1216
Entropy (8bit):	5.355304211458859
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:MLUE4K5E4Ks2E1qE4qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4x84j:MIHK5HKXE1qHiYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHKzr
MD5:	FED34146BF2F2FA59DCF8702FCC8232E
SHA1:	B03BFEA175989D989850CF06FE5E7BBF56EAA00A
SHA-256:	123BE4E3590609A008E85501243AF5BC53FA0C26C82A92881B8879524F8C0D5C
SHA-512:	1CC89F2ED1DBD70628FA1DC41A32BA0BFA3E81EAE1A1CF3C5F6A48F2DA0BF1F21A5001B8A18B04043C5B8FE4FBE663068D86AA8C4BD8E17933F75687C3178FF6
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Xml\b219d4630d26b88041b59c21

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.6039035513802595
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.80% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.75% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	pug6mtV48A.exe
File size:	689152
MD5:	74da6faf84783587dd82552dfa63eb00
SHA1:	276512acad7ec63916653862778438c169a3b890
SHA256:	584b5b4a74cb945f3be3ff0a4017d8ce2b073d6a98bfceb7bc59cb0f3fe7c3ee
SHA512:	cdb99cd07b694c661b80c6ba53a00220784da5c7a14bc96e4bcf731886191556eed6082d8b45dcb9a7fb8a524b904012feb636148f6d23c58ba74973363ddf81
SSDEEP:	12288:41OlclRTqv/Q7z1jrRMd5mBJtxouynk/V5eb7e6OdDr:cP7bZSHmnT+k/Xemd
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...]5Qa..............0..x............... ........@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4a9786
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x6151355D [Mon Sep 27 03:07:09 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add al, byte ptr [ebx]
add al, 05h
push es
pop es
or byte ptr [eax], al
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xa9734	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xaa000	0x660	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0xac000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0xa779c	0xa7800	False	0.753477728545	data	7.61528648699	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xaa000	0x660	0x800	False	0.341796875	data	3.56505562485	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0xac000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0xaa090	0x3ce	data
RT_MANIFEST	0xaa470	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Best Products All rights reserved
Assembly Version	253.13.3.4
InternalName	ICriticalNotifyCompleti.exe
FileVersion	253.13.2.1
CompanyName	Best Products
LegalTrademarks
Comments	Calendar ID Sorter
ProductName	CalendarId
ProductVersion	253.13.2.1
FileDescription	CalendarId
OriginalFilename	ICriticalNotifyCompleti.exe

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Sep 27, 2021 14:39:50.867995977 CEST	64267	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:39:50.886336088 CEST	53	64267	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:22.055146933 CEST	49448	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:22.084383965 CEST	53	49448	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:42.795692921 CEST	60342	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:42.814198971 CEST	53	60342	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:45.078890085 CEST	61346	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:45.185601950 CEST	53	61346	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:47.045768976 CEST	51774	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:47.046406031 CEST	56023	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:47.062572002 CEST	53	51774	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:47.076649904 CEST	53	56023	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:48.172497988 CEST	58384	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:48.266284943 CEST	53	58384	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:49.382447004 CEST	60261	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:49.400058031 CEST	53	60261	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:50.329163074 CEST	56061	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:50.430471897 CEST	53	56061	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:51.794635057 CEST	58336	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:51.808240891 CEST	53	58336	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:52.449717999 CEST	53781	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:52.462551117 CEST	53	53781	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:53.853634119 CEST	54064	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:53.916657925 CEST	53	54064	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:55.180216074 CEST	52811	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:55.242477894 CEST	53	52811	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:55.791574001 CEST	55299	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:40:55.804991961 CEST	53	55299	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:41:02.467063904 CEST	63745	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:41:02.487991095 CEST	53	63745	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:41:17.310323954 CEST	50055	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:41:17.388540983 CEST	53	50055	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:41:33.899136066 CEST	61374	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:41:33.912218094 CEST	53	61374	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:41:36.299145937 CEST	50339	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:41:36.327677965 CEST	53	50339	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:41:39.849313021 CEST	63307	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:41:39.863987923 CEST	53	63307	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6
Sep 27, 2021 14:42:00.493051052 CEST	49694	53	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8
Sep 27, 2021 14:42:00.530603886 CEST	53	49694	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Sep 27, 2021 14:41:39.849313021 CEST	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0x2b55	Standard query (0)	www.wedding-gallery.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Sep 27, 2021 14:42:00.493051052 CEST	192.168.2.6	8.8.8.8	0xf059	Standard query (0)	www.wwwhyprr.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Sep 27, 2021 14:41:39.863987923 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0x2b55	Name error (3)	www.wedding-gallery.net	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Sep 27, 2021 14:42:00.530603886 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.6	0xf059	Name error (3)	www.wwwhyprr.com	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

Code Manipulations

User Modules

Hook Summary

Function Name	Hook Type	Active in Processes
PeekMessageA	INLINE	explorer.exe
PeekMessageW	INLINE	explorer.exe
GetMessageW	INLINE	explorer.exe
GetMessageA	INLINE	explorer.exe

Processes

Process: explorer.exe, Module: user32.dll

Function Name	Hook Type	New Data
PeekMessageA	INLINE	0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x89 0x9E 0xEB
PeekMessageW	INLINE	0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x81 0x1E 0xEB
GetMessageW	INLINE	0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x81 0x1E 0xEB
GetMessageA	INLINE	0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x89 0x9E 0xEB

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: pug6mtV48A.exe PID: 6664 Parent PID: 1256

General

Start time:	14:39:57
Start date:	27/09/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe'
Imagebase:	0x390000
File size:	689152 bytes
MD5 hash:	74DA6FAF84783587DD82552DFA63EB00
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000001.00000002.394111409.0000000002791000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000001.00000002.394206876.0000000002805000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000001.00000002.394935099.0000000003799000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: pug6mtV48A.exe PID: 6980 Parent PID: 6664

General

Start time:	14:40:15
Start date:	27/09/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe
Imagebase:	0x940000
File size:	689152 bytes
MD5 hash:	74DA6FAF84783587DD82552DFA63EB00
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000005.00000002.493424502.0000000001060000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000005.00000002.492622072.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000005.00000002.493490719.0000000001090000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: explorer.exe PID: 3440 Parent PID: 6980

General

Start time:	14:40:16
Start date:	27/09/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
Imagebase:	0x7ff6f22f0000
File size:	3933184 bytes
MD5 hash:	AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000006.00000000.424163979.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000006.00000000.452200423.000000000762F000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: netsh.exe PID: 6864 Parent PID: 3440

General

Start time:	14:40:59
Start date:	27/09/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe
Imagebase:	0x9e0000
File size:	82944 bytes
MD5 hash:	A0AA3322BB46BBFC36AB9DC1DBBBB807
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000010.00000002.619310420.0000000002D70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000010.00000002.618457588.0000000000A70000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000010.00000002.619152070.0000000002CB0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: cmd.exe PID: 3012 Parent PID: 6864

General

Start time:	14:41:03
Start date:	27/09/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	/c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\pug6mtV48A.exe'
Imagebase:	0x2a0000
File size:	232960 bytes
MD5 hash:	F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 6968 Parent PID: 3012

General

Start time:	14:41:04
Start date:	27/09/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff61de10000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like `CreateProcess` , `LoadLibrary` , etc. of the Win32 API.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	BIOS, MBR, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.Unlike Keylogging , this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Windows Analysis Report pug6mtV48A.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: FormBook

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

Code Manipulations

User Modules

Hook Summary