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Windows Analysis Report FACTURA.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	FACTURA.exe
Analysis ID:	491983
MD5:	dbe61cfd43c95752f6dfbde236558782
SHA1:	71b7f9ea7778a67ffc75fa0f7d8a74dc243aae22
SHA256:	7194eca2c497f9ea9c3bb989fb7f328d9740b6d396af39ec66ec730c0db61044
Tags:	exeGuLoader
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	76
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected GuLoader

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Uses 32bit PE files

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

PE file contains strange resources

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Detected potential crypto function

Contains functionality to call native functions

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

FACTURA.exe (PID: 3092 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe' MD5: DBE61CFD43C95752F6DFBDE236558782)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id="}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.825566947.0000000002AD0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.825566947.0000000002AD0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id="}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: FACTURA.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 24%			Perma Link
Source: FACTURA.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 26%

Source: FACTURA.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=

Source: FACTURA.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: FACTURA.exe, 00000000.00000002.824965821.0000000000415000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameexposure.exe vs FACTURA.exe
Source: FACTURA.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameexposure.exe vs FACTURA.exe

Source: FACTURA.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_004088D4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02ADBE11
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD7A42
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD62B9
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD7AB5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD04B7
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD6085
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02ADAC9F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD042D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD6438
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD5E73
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD7A40
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD77AC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD61A5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD65B1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD579C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD5FEF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD5F12
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD9F6C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02ADA97E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD6540
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD735A

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD7A42 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD7AB5 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD7A40 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD7BC1 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: FACTURA.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 24%
Source: FACTURA.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 26%

Source: FACTURA.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DFC7F0E2A53F7EEA66.TMP

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal76.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.825566947.0000000002AD0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404C45 push ds; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404CEF push es; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_00402EAF push edi; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040710A push ebp; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_00407328 push edx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD8AC9 push ebp; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD4E7A push B48F7408h; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD3B19 push 89000002h; ret

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000040ED87 second address: 000000000040ED87 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mfence 0x00000005 nop 0x00000006 popad 0x00000007 cmp ecx, 7Dh 0x0000000a mfence 0x0000000d dec edi 0x0000000e mfence 0x00000011 wait 0x00000012 cmp edi, 00000000h 0x00000015 jne 00007FC810A3F940h 0x00000017 mfence 0x0000001a cmp eax, 32h 0x0000001d pushad 0x0000001e wait 0x0000001f lfence 0x00000022 rdtsc

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Code function: 0_2_02AD72A1 rdtsc

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD70C9 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD9C78 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02ADA199 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_02AD4929 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Code function: 0_2_02AD72A1 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Code function: 0_2_02ADBE11 RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler,

Source: FACTURA.exe, 00000000.00000002.825239169.0000000000D70000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: FACTURA.exe, 00000000.00000002.825239169.0000000000D70000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: FACTURA.exe, 00000000.00000002.825239169.0000000000D70000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: FACTURA.exe, 00000000.00000002.825239169.0000000000D70000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery21	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Information Discovery11	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
FACTURA.exe	25%	Virustotal		Browse
FACTURA.exe	27%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Mucc

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	33.0.0 White Diamond
Analysis ID:	491983
Start date:	28.09.2021
Start time:	08:46:57
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 29s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	FACTURA.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	18
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal76.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 28.4% (good quality ratio 14.8%) Quality average: 29.2% Quality standard deviation: 33.4%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 23.211.6.115, 20.82.209.183, 80.67.82.235, 80.67.82.211, 8.253.207.120, 67.27.157.254, 8.248.131.254, 67.27.157.126, 8.253.204.120, 20.199.120.182, 20.199.120.151, 20.54.110.249, 40.112.88.60, 23.211.4.86, 20.199.120.85 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): fg.download.windowsupdate.com.c.footprint.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, arc.msn.com, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, wns.notify.trafficmanager.net, consumer-displaycatalogrp-aks2aks-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, arc.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, iris-de-prod-azsc-neu.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, client.wns.windows.com, fs.microsoft.com, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, wu-shim.trafficmanager.net, neu-displaycatalogrp.frontdoor.bigcatalog.commerce.microsoft.com, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, asf-ris-prod-neu.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.825848109421746
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	FACTURA.exe
File size:	90112
MD5:	dbe61cfd43c95752f6dfbde236558782
SHA1:	71b7f9ea7778a67ffc75fa0f7d8a74dc243aae22
SHA256:	7194eca2c497f9ea9c3bb989fb7f328d9740b6d396af39ec66ec730c0db61044
SHA512:	080df78e19db66f774e4924875da9301fdfb164563b32e3bbf3e32ef720de2d146e2e67f7752eea5ac1d30c64f81209a9b52a1d3a48009402e9f5b91b41226c7
SSDEEP:	768:t2FgA8P1DadQOyLO/j5RhgmDSXlqhZLkVYC5OEn7m7j1Oavx6aG7Cj7nFytQ:t2AP1msO7ZgmDSVq7VUlIj1jJ6nm7/
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........i.......................*..............Rich....................PE..L....l.Y.................0... ...............@....@........

File Icon


Icon Hash:	821ca88c8e8c8c00

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4012c8
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x59A36C05 [Mon Aug 28 01:04:05 2017 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	e73b8c032c82c64991ebe487a7ffcd43

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 004102D0h
call 00007FC810B103B3h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax-68h], cl
cmp dword ptr [ebp+44E604D0h], edx
lahf
adc al, BDh
add bh, al
adc al, DEh
mov esp, 00000000h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc edx
add byte ptr [esi], al
push eax
add dword ptr [ecx], 53h
dec ebx
inc ecx
inc esp
inc ebp
dec esp
dec ecx
inc edi
push ebx
push esp
inc ebp
add ah, al
sub dword ptr [ebx], ecx
add eax, dword ptr [eax]
add byte ptr [eax], al
add bh, bh
int3
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
cmp cl, ah
jmp far 4561h : 5915348Fh
test eax, D213FA98h
mov esp, edi
rol byte ptr [edx], FFFFFFF1h
call 00007FC8239FE986h
dec eax
call far E4BBh : 71A84919h
imul edi, dword ptr [edx], 9933AD4Fh
iretw
adc dword ptr [edi+00AA000Ch], esi
pushad
rcl dword ptr [ebx+00000000h], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
pop edi
in eax, dx
add byte ptr [eax], al
test byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [656C4600h], al
jnc 00007FC810B103F7h
add byte ptr [65000301h], cl
insb
outsd
add byte ptr [ecx], bl
add dword ptr [eax], eax
inc edx
add byte ptr [edx], ah

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x139e4	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x15000	0x548	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x230	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0xe8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x12e4c	0x13000	False	0.52587890625	data	6.31843765659	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x14000	0xcf4	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x15000	0x548	0x1000	False	0.132080078125	data	1.43485201544	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x15420	0x128	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x1540c	0x14	data
RT_VERSION	0x150f0	0x31c	data	Chinese	Taiwan

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaSetSystemError, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaObjSet, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaGenerateBoundsError, __vbaAryConstruct2, __vbaObjVar, DllFunctionCall, _adj_fpatan, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, _CIlog, __vbaNew2, __vbaInStr, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaStrToAnsi, __vbaFpI4, __vbaLateMemCallLd, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeStr, __vbaFreeObj

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0404 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	ChatSwipe
InternalName	exposure
FileVersion	4.04.0001
CompanyName	ChatSwipe
LegalTrademarks	ChatSwipe
Comments	ChatSwipe
ProductName	ChatSwipe
ProductVersion	4.04.0001
FileDescription	ChatSwipe
OriginalFilename	exposure.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
Chinese	Taiwan

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Sep 28, 2021 08:47:53.494539022 CEST	57459	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:47:53.522447109 CEST	53	57459	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:48:19.628271103 CEST	57875	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:48:19.655313969 CEST	53	57875	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:48:37.631825924 CEST	54154	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:48:37.652549982 CEST	53	54154	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:48:46.377896070 CEST	52806	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:48:46.396681070 CEST	53	52806	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:48:46.483184099 CEST	53910	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:48:46.501982927 CEST	53	53910	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:48:47.583432913 CEST	64021	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:48:47.602916956 CEST	53	64021	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:48:55.512278080 CEST	60784	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:48:55.530760050 CEST	53	60784	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:00.857177973 CEST	51143	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:00.893752098 CEST	53	51143	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:02.150414944 CEST	56009	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:02.202404022 CEST	53	56009	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:02.715295076 CEST	59026	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:02.738986969 CEST	53	59026	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:03.082223892 CEST	49572	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:03.118984938 CEST	53	49572	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:03.691489935 CEST	60823	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:03.764597893 CEST	53	60823	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:04.197411060 CEST	52130	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:04.216444969 CEST	53	52130	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:04.728686094 CEST	55102	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:04.748616934 CEST	53	55102	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:05.416394949 CEST	56236	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:05.435782909 CEST	53	56236	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:05.596211910 CEST	56527	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:05.622039080 CEST	53	56527	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:06.751741886 CEST	49559	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:06.797861099 CEST	53	49559	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:07.508202076 CEST	52650	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:07.527658939 CEST	53	52650	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:09.044059038 CEST	63297	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:09.061002016 CEST	53	63297	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:31.731404066 CEST	58361	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:31.750919104 CEST	53	58361	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:43.325959921 CEST	53615	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:43.354787111 CEST	53	53615	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:49.664633036 CEST	50728	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:49.689380884 CEST	53	50728	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:56.247452974 CEST	53777	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:49:56.266958952 CEST	53	53777	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:50:27.188128948 CEST	57106	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:50:27.207036972 CEST	53	57106	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3
Sep 28, 2021 08:51:45.373792887 CEST	60352	53	192.168.2.3	8.8.8.8
Sep 28, 2021 08:51:45.407704115 CEST	53	60352	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.3

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: FACTURA.exe PID: 3092 Parent PID: 3248

General

Start time:	08:47:58
Start date:	28/09/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	90112 bytes
MD5 hash:	DBE61CFD43C95752F6DFBDE236558782
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000000.00000002.825566947.0000000002AD0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

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Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Windows Analysis Report FACTURA.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: FACTURA.exe PID: 3092 Parent PID: 3248

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis