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Windows Analysis Report dUzAkYsvl8.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:dUzAkYsvl8.exe
Analysis ID:500304
MD5:9a4a8643db95a8c0fe52af8675a5d1b1
SHA1:c6beb75cbc168f9224ace74c0dcfb29df6197e82
SHA256:b4e2d864ec03943310548bfbc963a0848bd08e088429c5ce05759face5d380d2
Tags:exeNanoCoreRAT
Infos:

Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Nanocore
Score:100
Range:0 - 100
Whitelisted:false
Confidence:100%

Signatures

Sigma detected: NanoCore
Detected Nanocore Rat
Yara detected AntiVM autoit script
Yara detected Nanocore RAT
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Sigma detected: Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments
Connects to many ports of the same IP (likely port scanning)
Machine Learning detection for sample
Allocates memory in foreign processes
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Uses dynamic DNS services
Drops PE files with a suspicious file extension
Writes to foreign memory regions
Protects its processes via BreakOnTermination flag
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Detected potential crypto function
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to simulate keystroke presses
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
OS version to string mapping found (often used in BOTs)
PE file contains strange resources
Drops PE files
Tries to load missing DLLs
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Uses 32bit PE files
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Yara signature match
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to execute programs as a different user
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)
File is packed with WinRar
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Potential key logger detected (key state polling based)
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to block mouse and keyboard input (often used to hinder debugging)

Classification

Process Tree

  • System is w10x64
  • dUzAkYsvl8.exe (PID: 6428 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\dUzAkYsvl8.exe' MD5: 9A4A8643DB95A8C0FE52AF8675A5D1B1)
    • cjlaro.pif (PID: 5028 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\77066510\cjlaro.pif' txoxpdjc.qnr MD5: 279DAE7236F5F2488A4BACDE6027F730)
      • RegSvcs.exe (PID: 6364 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
        • schtasks.exe (PID: 5252 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp1EC2.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)
          • conhost.exe (PID: 6612 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
        • schtasks.exe (PID: 1240 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp2720.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)
          • conhost.exe (PID: 6432 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
  • cjlaro.pif (PID: 2132 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\77066510\cjlaro.pif' C:\Users\user\77066510\txoxpdjc.qnr MD5: 279DAE7236F5F2488A4BACDE6027F730)
  • RegSvcs.exe (PID: 6748 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe 0 MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
    • conhost.exe (PID: 6828 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
  • dhcpmon.exe (PID: 6836 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 0 MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
    • conhost.exe (PID: 6816 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
  • cjlaro.pif (PID: 7152 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\77066510\cjlaro.pif' C:\Users\user\77066510\txoxpdjc.qnr MD5: 279DAE7236F5F2488A4BACDE6027F730)
    • RegSvcs.exe (PID: 3676 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
  • wscript.exe (PID: 3460 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe' 'C:\Users\user\77066510\Update.vbs' MD5: 9A68ADD12EB50DDE7586782C3EB9FF9C)
    • cjlaro.pif (PID: 3016 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\77066510\cjlaro.pif' C:\Users\user\77066510\txoxpdjc.qnr MD5: 279DAE7236F5F2488A4BACDE6027F730)
    • cjlaro.pif (PID: 4504 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\77066510\cjlaro.pif' C:\Users\user\77066510\txoxpdjc.qnr MD5: 279DAE7236F5F2488A4BACDE6027F730)
      • RegSvcs.exe (PID: 4968 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
  • dhcpmon.exe (PID: 4580 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
    • conhost.exe (PID: 6624 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
  • cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
00000005.00000002.560410383.0000000006110000.00000004.00020000.sdmpNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
  • 0xe75:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
  • 0xe8f:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
00000005.00000002.560410383.0000000006110000.00000004.00020000.sdmpNanocore_RAT_Feb18_1Detects Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
  • 0xe75:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
  • 0x1261:$s3: PipeExists
  • 0x1136:$s4: PipeCreated
  • 0xeb0:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
0000001B.00000003.383284019.000000000478A000.00000004.00000001.sdmpNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
  • 0xfddd:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
  • 0xfe1a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
  • 0x1394d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
0000001B.00000003.383284019.000000000478A000.00000004.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_NanocoreYara detected Nanocore RATJoe Security
    0000001B.00000003.383284019.000000000478A000.00000004.00000001.sdmpNanoCoreunknown Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
    • 0xfb45:$a: NanoCore
    • 0xfb55:$a: NanoCore
    • 0xfd89:$a: NanoCore
    • 0xfd9d:$a: NanoCore
    • 0xfddd:$a: NanoCore
    • 0xfba4:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0xfda6:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0xfde6:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0xfccb:$c: ProjectData
    • 0x106d2:$d: DESCrypto
    • 0x1809e:$e: KeepAlive
    • 0x1608c:$g: LogClientMessage
    • 0x12287:$i: get_Connected
    • 0x10a08:$j: #=q
    • 0x10a38:$j: #=q
    • 0x10a54:$j: #=q
    • 0x10a84:$j: #=q
    • 0x10aa0:$j: #=q
    • 0x10abc:$j: #=q
    • 0x10aec:$j: #=q
    • 0x10b08:$j: #=q