Play interactive tour

Edit tour

Windows Analysis Report Proof of payment.jpg.scr

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Proof of payment.jpg.scr (renamed file extension from scr to exe)
Analysis ID:	501103
MD5:	f16a886b0c04454901ac6d0923297c0e
SHA1:	47ed9cbe0c0430444ffd842a231c06a258fe6a5d
SHA256:	9f4c690fdf0c329b419eb7cbf02c874dd7be5ec7bb3585a0c94a0aba266604d4
Tags:	exenanocore
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

NanoCore

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Yara detected AntiVM3

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Sigma detected: Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Writes to foreign memory regions

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Allocates memory in foreign processes

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Uses 32bit PE files

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Yara signature match

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

Detected potential crypto function

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

PE file contains strange resources

Drops PE files

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

Proof of payment.jpg.exe (PID: 2940 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe' MD5: F16A886B0C04454901AC6D0923297C0E)

schtasks.exe (PID: 5080 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\eoPqnTxJGg' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB6E9.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 4924 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

RegSvcs.exe (PID: 2600 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 71369277D09DA0830C8C59F9E22BB23A)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

{"Version": "1.2.2.0", "Mutex": "ed2d5ce0-ca4d-4264-be01-91a018d5", "Domain1": "harold.accesscam.org", "Domain2": "harold.2waky.com", "Port": 6051, "KeyboardLogging": "Enable", "RunOnStartup": "Disable", "RequestElevation": "Disable", "BypassUAC": "Disable", "ClearZoneIdentifier": "Enable", "ClearAccessControl": "Disable", "SetCriticalProcess": "Disable", "PreventSystemSleep": "Enable", "ActivateAwayMode": "Disable", "EnableDebugMode": "Disable", "RunDelay": 0, "ConnectDelay": 4000, "RestartDelay": 5000, "TimeoutInterval": 5000, "KeepAliveTimeout": 30000, "MutexTimeout": 5000, "LanTimeout": 2500, "WanTimeout": 8000, "BufferSize": "ffff0000", "MaxPacketSize": "0000a000", "GCThreshold": "0000a000", "UseCustomDNS": "Enable", "PrimaryDNSServer": "8.8.8.8", "BackupDNSServer": "8.8.4.4"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.260682862.00000000028D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.260632599.00000000028A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xf3595:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x125db5:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xf35d2:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x125df2:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0xf7105:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x129925:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xf32fd:$a: NanoCore 0xf330d:$a: NanoCore 0xf3541:$a: NanoCore 0xf3555:$a: NanoCore 0xf3595:$a: NanoCore 0x125b1d:$a: NanoCore 0x125b2d:$a: NanoCore 0x125d61:$a: NanoCore 0x125d75:$a: NanoCore 0x125db5:$a: NanoCore 0xf335c:$b: ClientPlugin 0xf355e:$b: ClientPlugin 0xf359e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x125b7c:$b: ClientPlugin 0x125d7e:$b: ClientPlugin 0x125dbe:$b: ClientPlugin 0xf3483:$c: ProjectData 0x125ca3:$c: ProjectData 0x202a9e:$c: ProjectData 0x27d2be:$c: ProjectData 0xf3e8a:$d: DESCrypto
Process Memory Space: Proof of payment.jpg.exe PID: 2940	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Click to see the 1 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe38d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xe3ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x11efd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1	Detects Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0xe105:$x1: NanoCore Client.exe 0xe38d:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0xf9c6:$s1: PluginCommand 0xf9ba:$s2: FileCommand 0x1086b:$s3: PipeExists 0x16622:$s4: PipeCreated 0xe3b7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xe0f5:$a: NanoCore 0xe105:$a: NanoCore 0xe339:$a: NanoCore 0xe34d:$a: NanoCore 0xe38d:$a: NanoCore 0xe154:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe356:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe396:$b: ClientPlugin 0xe27b:$c: ProjectData 0xec82:$d: DESCrypto 0x1664e:$e: KeepAlive 0x1463c:$g: LogClientMessage 0x10837:$i: get_Connected 0xefb8:$j: #=q 0xefe8:$j: #=q 0xf004:$j: #=q 0xf034:$j: #=q 0xf050:$j: #=q 0xf06c:$j: #=q 0xf09c:$j: #=q 0xf0b8:$j: #=q
0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.28a9640.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.raw.unpack	Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2	Detetcs the Nanocore RAT	Florian Roth	0x1018d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x429ad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost 0x101ca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x429ea:$x2: IClientNetworkHost 0x13cfd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe 0x4651d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Nanocore	Yara detected Nanocore RAT	Joe Security
0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.raw.unpack	NanoCore	unknown	Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>	0xfef5:$a: NanoCore 0xff05:$a: NanoCore 0x10139:$a: NanoCore 0x1014d:$a: NanoCore 0x1018d:$a: NanoCore 0x42715:$a: NanoCore 0x42725:$a: NanoCore 0x42959:$a: NanoCore 0x4296d:$a: NanoCore 0x429ad:$a: NanoCore 0xff54:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10156:$b: ClientPlugin 0x10196:$b: ClientPlugin 0x42774:$b: ClientPlugin 0x42976:$b: ClientPlugin 0x429b6:$b: ClientPlugin 0x1007b:$c: ProjectData 0x4289b:$c: ProjectData 0x11f696:$c: ProjectData 0x199eb6:$c: ProjectData 0x10a82:$d: DESCrypto
Click to see the 3 entries

Sigma Overview

AV Detection:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

Author: Joe Security: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe, ProcessId: 2600, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat

E-Banking Fraud:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

System Summary:

Sigma detected: Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Oleg Kolesnikov @securonix invrep_de, oscd.community, Florian Roth, Christian Burkard: Data: Command: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe, CommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe, ParentProcessId: 2940, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe, ProcessId: 2600

Sigma detected: Possible Applocker Bypass

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: juju4: Data: Command: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe, CommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe, ParentCommandLine: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe' , ParentImage: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe, ParentProcessId: 2940, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe, ProcessId: 2600

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

Remote Access Functionality:

Sigma detected: NanoCore

Show sources

Source: File created

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.raw.unpack

Malware Configuration Extractor: NanoCore {"Version": "1.2.2.0", "Mutex": "ed2d5ce0-ca4d-4264-be01-91a018d5", "Domain1": "harold.accesscam.org", "Domain2": "harold.2waky.com", "Port": 6051, "KeyboardLogging": "Enable", "RunOnStartup": "Disable", "RequestElevation": "Disable", "BypassUAC": "Disable", "ClearZoneIdentifier": "Enable", "ClearAccessControl": "Disable", "SetCriticalProcess": "Disable", "PreventSystemSleep": "Enable", "ActivateAwayMode": "Disable", "EnableDebugMode": "Disable", "RunDelay": 0, "ConnectDelay": 4000, "RestartDelay": 5000, "TimeoutInterval": 5000, "KeepAliveTimeout": 30000, "MutexTimeout": 5000, "LanTimeout": 2500, "WanTimeout": 8000, "BufferSize": "ffff0000", "MaxPacketSize": "0000a000", "GCThreshold": "0000a000", "UseCustomDNS": "Enable", "PrimaryDNSServer": "8.8.8.8", "BackupDNSServer": "8.8.4.4"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Show sources

Source: harold.2waky.com

Virustotal: Detection: 14%

Perma Link

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.9445_none_d08c58b4442ba54f\MSVCR80.dll

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: harold.accesscam.org
Source: Malware configuration extractor	URLs: harold.2waky.com

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: DATAWIRE-ASCH DATAWIRE-ASCH

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 185.19.85.137 185.19.85.137

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49749 -> 185.19.85.137:6051

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.264668051.0000000006A00000.00000004.00020000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.collada.org/2005/11/COLLADASchema9Done
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263123119.0000000004D00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.248777304.0000000004D09000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designerst
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263123119.0000000004D00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comB.TTFK
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241428385.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241428385.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.commN
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.243088979.0000000004D3D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.243543510.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.243543510.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/-tR
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.243088979.0000000004D3D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cnX
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.243112899.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cne
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.245639707.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.245639707.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/E
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.245639707.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0eb
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.245639707.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/ana
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.245639707.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.245639707.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/v
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241291311.0000000004D23000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241291311.0000000004D23000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com-d
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.242260150.0000000004D09000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.242260150.0000000004D09000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr2011
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.242260150.0000000004D09000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.krlearn
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241616923.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241635617.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.comc
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241594978.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.comj
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241635617.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.commN
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.242010011.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.comymP
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: harold.accesscam.org

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.259975282.0000000000828000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Binary or memory string: <HOOK MODULE="DDRAW.DLL" FUNCTION="DirectDrawCreateEx"/>

E-Banking Fraud:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Source: 00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT Author: Florian Roth
Source: 00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Feb18_1 date = 2018-02-19, hash1 = aa486173e9d594729dbb5626748ce10a75ee966481b68c1b4f6323c827d9658c, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Nanocore RAT, reference = Internal Research - T2T, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE
Source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore
Source: 00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2 date = 2016-04-22, hash1 = 755f49a4ffef5b1b62f4b5a5de279868c0c1766b528648febf76628f1fe39050, author = Florian Roth, description = Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE, score = https://www.sentinelone.com/blogs/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/
Source: 00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: NanoCore date = 2014/04, filetype = exe, author = Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>, maltype = Remote Access Trojan, ref = http://malwareconfig.com/stats/NanoCore

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Code function: 0_2_00144351
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Code function: 0_2_001466F9
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Code function: 0_2_0252897A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Code function: 0_2_02520110
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Code function: 0_2_02522E75
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Code function: 0_2_02522E78
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Code function: 0_2_025230C0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Code function: 0_2_02520102

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.259975282.0000000000828000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamemscorwks.dllT vs Proof of payment.jpg.exe
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.265029079.0000000006BA0000.00000004.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameUI.dll< vs Proof of payment.jpg.exe
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.259658160.00000000001EA000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameIdenti.exe4 vs Proof of payment.jpg.exe
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameIdenti.exe4 vs Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: eoPqnTxJGg.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
Source: eoPqnTxJGg.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\eoPqnTxJGg' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB6E9.tmp'
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\eoPqnTxJGg' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB6E9.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{95E15D0A-66E6-93D9-C53C-76E6219D3341}\InProcServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\eoPqnTxJGg.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB6E9.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@6/8@25/2

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\mscorlib\9603718106bd57ecfbb18fefd769cab4\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sorttbls.nlp
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sortkey.nlp
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\mscorlib\9603718106bd57ecfbb18fefd769cab4\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sorttbls.nlp
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\GAC_32\mscorlib\2.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\sortkey.nlp

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\{ed2d5ce0-ca4d-4264-be01-91a018d59d09}
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\.net clr networking
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:4924:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\mscorrc.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.9445_none_d08c58b4442ba54f\MSVCR80.dll

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Data Obfuscation:

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Show sources

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, WinMixer/frmMain.cs	.Net Code: ExceptionFromErrorCode System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: eoPqnTxJGg.exe.0.dr, WinMixer/frmMain.cs	.Net Code: ExceptionFromErrorCode System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.140000.0.unpack, WinMixer/frmMain.cs	.Net Code: ExceptionFromErrorCode System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 0.0.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.140000.0.unpack, WinMixer/frmMain.cs	.Net Code: ExceptionFromErrorCode System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Code function: 0_2_022529E3 push cs; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Code function: 0_2_02252477 push esi; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Code function: 0_2_02252C95 push es; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Code function: 0_2_02267C5B push ecx; ret

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.85777209159
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.85777209159

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\eoPqnTxJGg.exe

Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival:

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\eoPqnTxJGg' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB6E9.tmp'

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe:Zone.Identifier read attributes | delete

Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)

Show sources

Source: Possible double extension: jpg.exe

Static PE information: Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.28a9640.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.260682862.00000000028D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.260632599.00000000028A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Proof of payment.jpg.exe PID: 2940, type: MEMORYSTR

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.260682862.00000000028D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.260682862.00000000028D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: KERNEL32.DLL.WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe TID: 4036	Thread sleep time: -39648s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe TID: 5040	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 716
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 638

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 39648
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.260682862.00000000028D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA IIBAdd-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.260682862.00000000028D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPathJC:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.260682862.00000000028D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.260682862.00000000028D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWAREDSOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Writes to foreign memory regions

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe base: 400000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe base: 402000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe base: 420000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe base: 422000
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe base: FFF008

Allocates memory in foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Memory allocated: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe base: 400000 protect: page execute and read and write

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe

Memory written: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\eoPqnTxJGg' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB6E9.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe

Source: RegSvcs.exe, 00000006.00000003.366721485.000000000659E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: RegSvcs.exe, 00000006.00000003.399886156.0000000006596000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program ManagerbR

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arial.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariali.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariblk.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\bahnschrift.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibril.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibriz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambria.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candara.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candaraz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comic.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comici.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constan.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constani.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbel.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbeli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cour.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\couri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrima.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrimabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framdit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAMDCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHV.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHVIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Gabriola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgia.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\impact.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Inkfree.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\javatext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelawUI.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelUIsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelaUIb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\lucon.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\l_10646.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgun.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\himalaya.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailu.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailub.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspa.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taile.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taileb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mingliub.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\monbaiti.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msgothic.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mvboli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mmrtextb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Nirmala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaS.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NirmalaB.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\pala.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palabi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoepr.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeprb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoesc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoescb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeuii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeuiz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguibl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguibli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguiemj.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguihis.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisym.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsun.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsunb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Sitka.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaI.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SitkaZ.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\sylfaen.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\symbol.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahoma.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahomabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\timesi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\timesbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\timesbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebuc.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\trebucbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdana.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\verdanaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\webdings.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\wingding.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothR.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothM.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothL.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothB.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\holomdl2.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTURY.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LEELAWAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LEELAWDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MSUIGHUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MSUIGHUB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\WINGDNG2.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\WINGDNG3.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TEMPSITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PRISTINA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PAPYRUS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MISTRAL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LHANDW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCKRIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JUICE___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRSCRIPT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FREESCPT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRADHITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OUTLOOK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BKANT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUABI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARAIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARABD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTCORSVA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHICBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ALGER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BASKVILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BAUHS93.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELLB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSDB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BERNHC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_PSTC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRITANIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BROADW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRUSHSCI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTAUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CHILLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COLONNA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COOPBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FTLTLT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARLOWSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARNGTON.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JOKERMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\KUNSTLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITED.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LCALLIG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAGNETOB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MATURASC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MOD20.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGENG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGSOL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OLDENGL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ONYX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PARCHM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PLAYBILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\POORICH.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAVIE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\INFROMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SHOWG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SNAP____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\STENCIL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VINERITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VIVALDII.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VLADIMIR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LATINWD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCM_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCMI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCB_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCBI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCM____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCRIPTBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCCB___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAGE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTILI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTIBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PER_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PALSCRI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OCRAEXT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAIAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEBO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\IMPRISHA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HATTEN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDYSTO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIL_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLSNECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIGI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABKIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FORTE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FELIXTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASMD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASLGHT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASDEMI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ENGR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCEDSCR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CURLZ___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENSCBK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CASTELAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_R.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_I.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_B.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCBLKAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARLRDBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BSSYM7.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSPCL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTEXTRA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\marlett.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeuii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeuiz.ttf VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiVirusProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM AntiSpywareProduct
Source: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - ROOT\SecurityCenter2 : SELECT DisplayName FROM FirewallProduct

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality:

Yara detected Nanocore RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Proof of payment.jpg.exe.3984408.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation1	Scheduled Task/Job1	Process Injection312	Masquerading11	Input Capture1	Security Software Discovery111	Remote Services	Input Capture1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Disable or Modify Tools1	LSASS Memory	Process Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Non-Standard Port1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion21	Security Account Manager	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion21	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Non-Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection312	NTDS	Application Window Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Application Layer Protocol11	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Hidden Files and Directories1	LSA Secrets	Remote System Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Obfuscated Files or Information12	Cached Domain Credentials	File and Directory Discovery1	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Software Packing12	DCSync	System Information Discovery12	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

No Antivirus matches

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
harold.2waky.com	15%	Virustotal		Browse
harold.accesscam.org	5%	Virustotal		Browse

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://www.fontbureau.comB.TTFK	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.tiro.comymP	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.fonts.commN	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr2011	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnX	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/-tR	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/E	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com-d	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.collada.org/2005/11/COLLADASchema9Done	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.commN	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/v	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0eb	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/ana	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.comj	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
harold.accesscam.org	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
harold.2waky.com	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.krlearn	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.tiro.comc	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cne	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
harold.2waky.com	185.19.85.137	true	true	15%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown
harold.accesscam.org	unknown	unknown	true	5%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
harold.accesscam.org	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
harold.2waky.com	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263123119.0000000004D00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.comB.TTFK	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263123119.0000000004D00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.tiro.comymP	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.242010011.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fonts.commN	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241428385.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sandoll.co.kr2011	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.242260150.0000000004D09000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cnX	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.243088979.0000000004D3D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.tiro.com	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241616923.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/-tR	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.243543510.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/E	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.245639707.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/jp/	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.245639707.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sajatypeworks.com-d	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241291311.0000000004D23000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.collada.org/2005/11/COLLADASchema9Done	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.264668051.0000000006A00000.00000004.00020000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.coml	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.tiro.commN	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241635617.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241291311.0000000004D23000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.243543510.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.243088979.0000000004D3D000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/v	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.245639707.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/Y0eb	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.245639707.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.245639707.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/ana	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.245639707.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.tiro.comj	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241594978.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fonts.com	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241428385.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.242260150.0000000004D09000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sandoll.co.krlearn	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.242260150.0000000004D09000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.tiro.comc	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.241635617.0000000004D1B000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sakkal.com	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000002.263636679.0000000005F12000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designerst	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.248777304.0000000004D09000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cne	Proof of payment.jpg.exe, 00000000.00000003.243112899.0000000004D04000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
185.19.85.137	harold.2waky.com	Switzerland		48971	DATAWIRE-ASCH	true

Private

IP
192.168.2.1

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	33.0.0 White Diamond
Analysis ID:	501103
Start date:	12.10.2021
Start time:	15:08:19
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 49s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Proof of payment.jpg.scr (renamed file extension from scr to exe)
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	26
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@6/8@25/2
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 99% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI
Warnings:	Show All Behavior information exceeds normal sizes, reducing to normal. Report will have missing behavior information. TCP Packets have been reduced to 100 Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 23.203.141.148, 95.100.216.89, 20.82.210.154, 40.112.88.60, 20.82.209.104, 2.20.178.24, 2.20.178.33 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): fs.microsoft.com, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, asf-ris-prod-neu.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, iris-de-prod-azsc-neu-b.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, iris-de-ppe-azsc-neu.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com, arc.trafficmanager.net, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
15:09:23	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: Proof of payment.jpg.exe modified
15:09:27	API Interceptor	933x Sleep call for process: RegSvcs.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link
185.19.85.137	Proof of payment.jpg.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Proof of payment.jpg.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	PROFORMA INVOICE 20210823.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	New Proforma Invoice20210630.xlxs.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Proforma Invoice20210625.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	PcdEZG6zDS.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	sfTZCyMKuC.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
harold.2waky.com	Proof of payment.jpg.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.137
	Proof of payment.jpg.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.137
	HxXHmM0T9f.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	23.146.242.147
	Request For Quotation.jar	Get hash	malicious	Browse	23.146.242.147
	QUOTE.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	194.5.98.5
	Payment proof.jpg.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	194.5.98.5
	Proof Of Payment.jpg.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	194.5.98.5
	Proof of payment.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	194.5.98.5
	Payment.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	91.193.75.29
	Payment Confirmation.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.165.153.213

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
DATAWIRE-ASCH	MT103 10.11.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.136
	dAkJsQr7A9.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.175
	GIV PO 00254.xls.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.136
	dUzAkYsvl8.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.175
	BL & INVOICE.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.171
	Routing Details.vbs	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.170
	Nueva orden #7624.xls.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.136
	voo7b2BBq6.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.175
	xmsGPH324z.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.175
	dVWsghK4Aj.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.175
	Proof of payment.jpg.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.137
	ShippingDocs.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.171
	2E9xpfvD2O.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.175
	Proof of payment.jpg.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.137
	uF74GlbXPc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.175
	jFjTeUfek3.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.175
	Q7DYDgQhKp.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.175
	USD31000.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.171
	32000USD_Swift.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.171
	dlDGpRFSEo.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	185.19.85.175

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v2.0_32\UsageLogs\Proof of payment.jpg.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	525
Entropy (8bit):	5.2874233355119316
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:Q3LaJU20NaL10U29hJ5g1B0U2ukyrFk70Ug+9Yz9tv:MLF20NaL329hJ5g522rWz2T
MD5:	61CCF53571C9ABA6511D696CB0D32E45
SHA1:	A13A42A20EC14942F52DB20FB16A0A520F8183CE
SHA-256:	3459BDF6C0B7F9D43649ADAAF19BA8D5D133BCBE5EF80CF4B7000DC91E10903B
SHA-512:	90E180D9A681F82C010C326456AC88EBB89256CC769E900BFB4B2DF92E69CA69726863B45DFE4627FC1EE8C281F2AF86A6A1E2EF1710094CCD3F4E092872F06F
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..3,"C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\System\1ffc437de59fb69ba2b865ffdc98ffd1\System.ni.dll",0..3,"C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\System.Drawing\54d944b3ca0ea1188d700fbd8089726b\System.Drawing.ni.dll",0..3,"C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\System.Windows.Forms\bd8d59c984c9f5f2695f64341115cdf0\System.Windows.Forms.ni.dll",0..3,"C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v2.0.50727_32\Microsoft.VisualBas#\cd7c74fce2a0eab72cd25cbe4bb61614\Microsoft.VisualBasic.ni.dll",0..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB6E9.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1647
Entropy (8bit):	5.171887955431004
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+SEqC/a7hTlNMFpH/rlMhEMjnGpwjpIgUYODOLD9RJh7h8gKBetn:cbhC7ZlNQF/rydbz9I3YODOLNdq3C
MD5:	1358393D4D1CFCCE7BD6823A860F20B2
SHA1:	E513A17C19EB5C677435DC73C2533D2A7C52B59F
SHA-256:	66F6CF12179F5F9B8305C4A927D4084B553D9E90166D0D1B1056925D34A9B982
SHA-512:	DA7612128A91DA3B7EA8FB4571F99ACF2BC3BEC2ACD99A2EB73EC563DE9BD2349B8C7CF4A93A8389A6778D0C1537D8ECED2FF8DD6580AA8D506ADDDB69B7AE04
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo>.. <Date>2014-10-25T14:27:44.8929027</Date>.. <Author>computer\user</Author>.. </RegistrationInfo>.. <Triggers>.. <LogonTrigger>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. </LogonTrigger>.. <RegistrationTrigger>.. <Enabled>false</Enabled>.. </RegistrationTrigger>.. </Triggers>.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvailable>t

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\catalog.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1392
Entropy (8bit):	7.089541637477408
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:IQnybgC4jh+dQnybgC4jh+dQnybgC4jh+dQnybgC4jh+dQnybgC4jh+dQnybgC4l:IknjhUknjhUknjhUknjhUknjhUknjhL
MD5:	5E3C10DCF7AAB1A5E4671C3AD52D9BD2
SHA1:	7DE7F5ACAED711BC35E62756D1440E80262D85D1
SHA-256:	B9EB9E732F6204735FFB2C9A6EC8F077E4B4F31E57E336199D22278EAD8412F9
SHA-512:	00252F19A1D0098FEBC78231182FAD57A66390077C0C462C94950D7CA02D53A7B7D692B4D7E718DF2708C1F7919CCB29837A2309E3BEFD2D585FF0C049E5FEB3
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........~f.G0^..;....W2.=...K.~.L..&f...p............:7rH}..../H......L...?...A.K...J.=8x!....+.2e'..E?.G......[.&Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........~f.G0^..;....W2.=...K.~.L..&f...p............:7rH}..../H......L...?...A.K...J.=8x!....+.2e'..E?.G......[.&Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........~f.G0^..;....W2.=...K.~.L..&f...p............:7rH}..../H......L...?...A.K...J.=8x!....+.2e'..E?.G......[.&Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.... S....}FF.2...h.M+....L.#.X..+..........~f.G0^..;....W2.=...K.~.L..&f...p............:7rH}..../H......L...?...A.K...J.=8x!....+.2e'..E?.G......[.&Gj.h\.3.A...5.x..&...i+..c(1.P..P.cLT...A.b........4h...t.+..Z\.. .i.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\run.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	8
Entropy (8bit):	3.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:98:y
MD5:	108FC92C1878B6BB04738FB9430AD1A0
SHA1:	030EF679702BA4AC7629B9D6D3980231F35CE18C
SHA-256:	FB9CF8B94C82519C911F1EE89763BF9EDFE05EAC3FDBF7A09229E6BE9AD2DCE2
SHA-512:	1C39811250792C91A1418A424081A627D5032F33F90B3B37EC24824E4BD040EC36C197C628C13B700F6435164339DE77CFB8497476A9E16B4760AF9ECC85A823
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	low
Preview:	......H

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\settings.bin Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	40
Entropy (8bit):	5.153055907333276
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:9bzY6oRDT6P2bfVn1:RzWDT621
MD5:	4E5E92E2369688041CC82EF9650EDED2
SHA1:	15E44F2F3194EE232B44E9684163B6F66472C862
SHA-256:	F8098A6290118F2944B9E7C842BD014377D45844379F863B00D54515A8A64B48
SHA-512:	1B368018907A3BC30421FDA2C935B39DC9073B9B1248881E70AD48EDB6CAA256070C1A90B97B0F64BBE61E316DBB8D5B2EC8DBABCD0B0B2999AB50B933671ECB
Malicious:	false
Preview:	9iH...}Z.4..f.~a........~.~.......3.U.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\D06ED635-68F6-4E9A-955C-4899F5F57B9A\storage.dat Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	426832
Entropy (8bit):	7.999527918131335
Encrypted:	true
SSDEEP:	6144:zKfHbamD8WN+JQYrjM7Ei2CsFJjyh9zvgPonV5HqZcPVT4Eb+Z6no3QSzjeMsdF/:zKf137EiDsTjevgArYcPVLoTQS+0iv
MD5:	653DDDCB6C89F6EC51F3DDC0053C5914
SHA1:	4CF7E7D42495CE01C261E4C5C4B8BF6CD76CCEE5
SHA-256:	83B9CAE66800C768887FB270728F6806CBEBDEAD9946FA730F01723847F17FF9
SHA-512:	27A467F2364C21CD1C6C34EF1CA5FFB09B4C3180FC9C025E293374EB807E4382108617BB4B97F8EBBC27581CD6E5988BB5E21276B3CB829C1C0E49A6FC9463A0
Malicious:	false
Preview:	..g&jo...IPg...GM....R>i...o...I.>.&.r{....8...}...E....v.!7.u3e.. .....db...}.......".t(.xC9.cp.B....7...'.......%......w.^.._.......B.W%.<..i.0.{9.xS...5...)..w..$..C..?`F..u.5.T.X.w'Si..z.n{...Y!m...RA...xg....[7...z..9@.K.-...T..+.ACe....R....enO.....AoNMT.\^....}H&..4I...B.:..@..J...v..rI5..kP......2j....B..B.~.T..>.c..emW;Rn<9..[.r.o....R[....@=...:...L.g<.....I..%4[.G^.~.l'......v.p&.........+..S...9d/.{..H.`@.1..........f.\s...X.a.].<.h...J4...k.x....%3.......3.c..?%....>.!.}..)(.{...H...3..`'].Q.[sN..JX(.%pH....+......(...v.....H...3..8.a_..J..?4...y.N(..D.h..g.jD..I...44Q?..N......oX.A......l...n?./..........$.!..;.^9"H...........OkF....v.m_.e.v..f...."..bq{.....O.-....%R+...-..P.i..t5....2Z# ...#...,L..{..j..heT -=Z.P;...g.m)<owJ].J..../.p..8.u8.&..#.m9...j%..g&....g.x.I,....u.[....>./W...........X...bZ...ex.0..x.}.....Tb...[..H_M._.^N.d&...g._."@4N.pDs].GbT.......&p........Nw...%$=.....{..J.1....2....<E{..<!G..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\eoPqnTxJGg.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	686080
Entropy (8bit):	7.645401121666266
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12288:6MbSB2Fio+a+k09R8Yrt2JX6RaaALVlQ9UfHRkkPG0r5PSsPa23rEG0r5FbnVe:6JBcio+a+ki3VRaaALPhfHRtPG0rpSsQ
MD5:	F16A886B0C04454901AC6D0923297C0E
SHA1:	47ED9CBE0C0430444FFD842A231C06A258FE6A5D
SHA-256:	9F4C690FDF0C329B419EB7CBF02C874DD7BE5EC7BB3585A0C94A0ABA266604D4
SHA-512:	E60A04F86083603CAC82F970552C0031FD52A9CBC7293BA873427D45FBEDFEB13284126BF28EB01692B9C4DA81B26D9146DB7C9F6630A2455E9F32D15183CAEB
Malicious:	false
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L....iea..............0.................. ... ....@.. ....................................@.....................................O.... .. ............................................................................ ............... ..H............text........ ...................... ..`.rsrc... .... ......................@..@.reloc...............v..............@..B........................H........_...P......}.......U...........................................0..4..........K......r...p...r...p.......,.......+.........+...0..F..........+6...........................o.........,.r!..ps....z..X....i....-....0..d..........+N..+8.....(.......(...............o.........,.r!..ps....z..X....o........-...X....o..........-..0.............+j..+R..+:......(........(...............o.........,.r!..ps....z..X....o..........-...X....o..........-...X....o..........-.".(.....

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\eoPqnTxJGg.exe:Zone.Identifier Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	26
Entropy (8bit):	3.95006375643621
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ggPYV:rPYV
MD5:	187F488E27DB4AF347237FE461A079AD
SHA1:	6693BA299EC1881249D59262276A0D2CB21F8E64
SHA-256:	255A65D30841AB4082BD9D0EEA79D49C5EE88F56136157D8D6156AEF11C12309
SHA-512:	89879F237C0C051EBE784D0690657A6827A312A82735DA42DAD5F744D734FC545BEC9642C19D14C05B2F01FF53BC731530C92F7327BB7DC9CDE1B60FB21CD64E
Malicious:	false
Preview:	[ZoneTransfer]....ZoneId=0

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.645401121666266
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.83% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.78% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Win16/32 Executable Delphi generic (2074/23) 0.01% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	Proof of payment.jpg.exe
File size:	686080
MD5:	f16a886b0c04454901ac6d0923297c0e
SHA1:	47ed9cbe0c0430444ffd842a231c06a258fe6a5d
SHA256:	9f4c690fdf0c329b419eb7cbf02c874dd7be5ec7bb3585a0c94a0aba266604d4
SHA512:	e60a04f86083603cac82f970552c0031fd52a9cbc7293ba873427d45fbedfeb13284126bf28eb01692b9c4da81b26d9146db7c9f6630a2455e9f32d15183caeb
SSDEEP:	12288:6MbSB2Fio+a+k09R8Yrt2JX6RaaALVlQ9UfHRkkPG0r5PSsPa23rEG0r5FbnVe:6JBcio+a+ki3VRaaALPhfHRtPG0rpSsQ
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L....iea..............0.................. ... ....@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	0089c5cd91810189

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x49052e
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x616569F4 [Tue Oct 12 10:56:52 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v2.0.50727
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
fcom dword ptr [edx+00h]
add bl, ah
movsd
add byte ptr [eax], al
pop esp
stc
add byte ptr [eax], al
pop ecx
dec ebp
add dword ptr [eax], eax
push es
mov byte ptr [F7630001h], al
add dword ptr [eax], eax
mov dword ptr [ebp+02h], ecx
add byte ptr [ebp-5Ch], bl
add al, byte ptr [eax]

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x904dc	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x92000	0x18a20	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0xac000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x8e61c	0x8e800	False	0.924275287829	data	7.85777209159	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x92000	0x18a20	0x18c00	False	0.377426609848	data	5.45184475744	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0xac000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.0815394123432	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type
RT_ICON	0x921a8	0x468	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_ICON	0x92610	0x4228	dBase IV DBT of \200.DBF, blocks size 0, block length 16384, next free block index 40, next free block 0, next used block 0
RT_ICON	0x96838	0x10a8	dBase IV DBT of @.DBF, block length 4096, next free block index 40, next free block 0, next used block 0
RT_ICON	0x978e0	0x25a8	dBase IV DBT of `.DBF, block length 9216, next free block index 40, next free block 0, next used block 0
RT_ICON	0x99e88	0x10828	data
RT_GROUP_ICON	0xaa6b0	0x4c	data
RT_VERSION	0xaa6fc	0x324	data

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright 2018 - 2021
Assembly Version	4.0.2.0
InternalName	Identi.exe
FileVersion	4.0.2.0
CompanyName
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName	Win Mixer
ProductVersion	4.0.2.0
FileDescription	Win Mixer
OriginalFilename	Identi.exe

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:42.797943115 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:42.920711040 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:42.922166109 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:43.290159941 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:43.418488979 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:43.418653011 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:43.599528074 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:43.599596977 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:43.713545084 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:43.713640928 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:43.873142958 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:43.873290062 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.063312054 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.063399076 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.063857079 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.063918114 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.064035892 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.064054012 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.064171076 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.064471960 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.064531088 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.177896976 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.177962065 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.178000927 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.178040028 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.178268909 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.178556919 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.178606033 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.178626060 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.178792953 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.178864002 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.179075956 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.179183960 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.179264069 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.179332018 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.179467916 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.179519892 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.293198109 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.293242931 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.293355942 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.294009924 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.294037104 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.294059992 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.294075012 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.294131041 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.294166088 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.294502974 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.294558048 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.297152042 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.297179937 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.297210932 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.297243118 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.297348022 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.297415018 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.297553062 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.297624111 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.297636032 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.297663927 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.297725916 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.297882080 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.297940016 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.298048019 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.298083067 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.298135996 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.415673018 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.415796041 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.416903019 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.416977882 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.417202950 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.417313099 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.417380095 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.417463064 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.417704105 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.419178009 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.419285059 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.419365883 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.419431925 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.419595003 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.419629097 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.419667006 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.419688940 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.419800997 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.419960022 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.420026064 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.420130968 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.420237064 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.420258045 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.420295954 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.420325994 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.420382023 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.420391083 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.420551062 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.420610905 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.421951056 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.422116995 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.422167063 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.422184944 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.422246933 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.422281027 CEST	6051	49749	185.19.85.137	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:44.422337055 CEST	49749	6051	192.168.2.5	185.19.85.137

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:28.581779003 CEST	62060	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:28.717128992 CEST	53	62060	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:28.994478941 CEST	61805	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.4.4
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:29.173227072 CEST	53	61805	8.8.4.4	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:29.297355890 CEST	54795	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:29.320130110 CEST	53	54795	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:34.137134075 CEST	49557	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:34.156547070 CEST	53	49557	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:34.171382904 CEST	61733	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.4.4
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:34.189163923 CEST	53	61733	8.8.4.4	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:34.248856068 CEST	65447	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:34.423072100 CEST	53	65447	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:38.479859114 CEST	52441	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:38.496443987 CEST	53	52441	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:38.502695084 CEST	62176	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.4.4
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:38.521024942 CEST	53	62176	8.8.4.4	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:38.531282902 CEST	59596	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:38.549801111 CEST	53	59596	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:42.769747019 CEST	65296	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:42.789721012 CEST	53	65296	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:49.097486973 CEST	60151	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:49.134582043 CEST	53	60151	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:56.914613962 CEST	56969	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:56.933176994 CEST	53	56969	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:03.356395960 CEST	55161	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:03.377588987 CEST	53	55161	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:09.863465071 CEST	49992	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:09.883897066 CEST	53	49992	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:16.205543041 CEST	60075	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:16.224287033 CEST	53	60075	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:22.732084036 CEST	64345	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:22.750188112 CEST	53	64345	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:29.331429958 CEST	54791	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:29.350970030 CEST	53	54791	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:36.415932894 CEST	50463	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:36.436556101 CEST	53	50463	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:42.501702070 CEST	50394	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:42.520405054 CEST	53	50394	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:48.522980928 CEST	58530	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:48.544002056 CEST	53	58530	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:54.661490917 CEST	53813	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:54.678647995 CEST	53	53813	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:00.709645033 CEST	57344	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:00.730202913 CEST	53	57344	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:06.779176950 CEST	59261	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:06.799339056 CEST	53	59261	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:14.627098083 CEST	57151	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:14.647671938 CEST	53	57151	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:20.681814909 CEST	59413	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:20.989131927 CEST	53	59413	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:28.581779003 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0x63f8	Standard query (0)	harold.accesscam.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:28.994478941 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.4.4	0x5a24	Standard query (0)	harold.accesscam.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:29.297355890 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0x1570	Standard query (0)	harold.accesscam.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:34.137134075 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0x27a7	Standard query (0)	harold.accesscam.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:34.171382904 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.4.4	0xe05e	Standard query (0)	harold.accesscam.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:34.248856068 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0x9cfa	Standard query (0)	harold.accesscam.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:38.479859114 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0x5fc4	Standard query (0)	harold.accesscam.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:38.502695084 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.4.4	0x3e9	Standard query (0)	harold.accesscam.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:38.531282902 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0xe842	Standard query (0)	harold.accesscam.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:42.769747019 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0xd004	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:49.097486973 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0x733e	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:56.914613962 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0xf51f	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:03.356395960 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0xb9a8	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:09.863465071 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0xf5aa	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:16.205543041 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0x71da	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:22.732084036 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0x2831	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:29.331429958 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0x85d4	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:36.415932894 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0xa351	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:42.501702070 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0x5457	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:48.522980928 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0xefe	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:54.661490917 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0xbbcb	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:00.709645033 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0x5fe1	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:06.779176950 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0xe098	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:14.627098083 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0x9026	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:20.681814909 CEST	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0xa277	Standard query (0)	harold.2waky.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:28.717128992 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0x63f8	Name error (3)	harold.accesscam.org	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:29.173227072 CEST	8.8.4.4	192.168.2.5	0x5a24	Name error (3)	harold.accesscam.org	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:29.320130110 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0x1570	Name error (3)	harold.accesscam.org	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:34.156547070 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0x27a7	Name error (3)	harold.accesscam.org	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:34.189163923 CEST	8.8.4.4	192.168.2.5	0xe05e	Name error (3)	harold.accesscam.org	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:34.423072100 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0x9cfa	Name error (3)	harold.accesscam.org	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:38.496443987 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0x5fc4	Name error (3)	harold.accesscam.org	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:38.521024942 CEST	8.8.4.4	192.168.2.5	0x3e9	Name error (3)	harold.accesscam.org	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:38.549801111 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0xe842	Name error (3)	harold.accesscam.org	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:42.789721012 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0xd004	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:49.134582043 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0x733e	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:09:56.933176994 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0xf51f	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:03.377588987 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0xb9a8	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:09.883897066 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0xf5aa	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:16.224287033 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0x71da	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:22.750188112 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0x2831	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:29.350970030 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0x85d4	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:36.436556101 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0xa351	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:42.520405054 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0x5457	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:48.544002056 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0xefe	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:10:54.678647995 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0xbbcb	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:00.730202913 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0x5fe1	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:06.799339056 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0xe098	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:14.647671938 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0x9026	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 12, 2021 15:11:20.989131927 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0xa277	No error (0)	harold.2waky.com		185.19.85.137	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Proof of payment.jpg.exe PID: 2940 Parent PID: 5620

General

Start time:	15:09:16
Start date:	12/10/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\Proof of payment.jpg.exe'
Imagebase:	0x140000
File size:	686080 bytes
MD5 hash:	F16A886B0C04454901AC6D0923297C0E
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.260682862.00000000028D7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.260632599.00000000028A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Nanocore_RAT_Gen_2, Description: Detetcs the Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_Nanocore, Description: Yara detected Nanocore RAT, Source: 00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: NanoCore, Description: unknown, Source: 00000000.00000002.261006592.00000000038A1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 5080 Parent PID: 2940

General

Start time:	15:09:24
Start date:	12/10/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\eoPqnTxJGg' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpB6E9.tmp'
Imagebase:	0x1c0000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 4924 Parent PID: 5080

General

Start time:	15:09:25
Start date:	12/10/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7ecfc0000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: RegSvcs.exe PID: 2600 Parent PID: 2940

General

Start time:	15:09:25
Start date:	12/10/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727\RegSvcs.exe
Imagebase:	0xd60000
File size:	32768 bytes
MD5 hash:	71369277D09DA0830C8C59F9E22BB23A
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Reputation:	moderate

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Tactics:	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches ( `dir /a` for Windows and `ls –a` for Linux and macOS).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port paring that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report Proof of payment.jpg.scr

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

AV Detection:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

Private

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports