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Windows Analysis Report KRSEL0000056286.JPG.scr

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:KRSEL0000056286.JPG.scr (renamed file extension from scr to exe)
Analysis ID:501775
MD5:d6f040b4d7d217b8525dff843feba635
SHA1:8ed8beaceddf8e8e9ba4b601d1e985e5c7c2d7d9
SHA256:940ad66c876976f4a05f12710687f5abb76443f693dd3986d1ff7a4c73fc866f
Tags:exe
Infos:

Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Nanocore
Score:100
Range:0 - 100
Whitelisted:false
Confidence:100%

Signatures

Sigma detected: NanoCore
Detected Nanocore Rat
Yara detected AntiVM autoit script
Yara detected Nanocore RAT
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Sigma detected: Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments
Connects to many ports of the same IP (likely port scanning)
Allocates memory in foreign processes
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Uses an obfuscated file name to hide its real file extension (double extension)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Uses dynamic DNS services
Drops PE files with a suspicious file extension
Writes to foreign memory regions
Protects its processes via BreakOnTermination flag
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Detected potential crypto function
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to simulate keystroke presses
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
OS version to string mapping found (often used in BOTs)
PE file contains strange resources
Drops PE files
Tries to load missing DLLs
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Uses 32bit PE files
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Yara signature match
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to execute programs as a different user
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)
File is packed with WinRar
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Potential key logger detected (key state polling based)
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Contains functionality to block mouse and keyboard input (often used to hinder debugging)

Classification

Process Tree

  • System is w10x64
  • KRSEL0000056286.JPG.exe (PID: 6976 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\KRSEL0000056286.JPG.exe' MD5: D6F040B4D7D217B8525DFF843FEBA635)
    • upstsdssm.pif (PID: 6032 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\33911166\upstsdssm.pif' sqbr.wlw MD5: 8E699954F6B5D64683412CC560938507)
      • RegSvcs.exe (PID: 6404 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
        • schtasks.exe (PID: 5036 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp2BE4.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)
          • conhost.exe (PID: 5560 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
        • schtasks.exe (PID: 5312 cmdline: 'schtasks.exe' /create /f /tn 'DHCP Monitor Task' /xml 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp2F02.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)
          • conhost.exe (PID: 5492 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
  • RegSvcs.exe (PID: 5484 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RegSvcs.exe 0 MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
    • conhost.exe (PID: 1372 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
  • dhcpmon.exe (PID: 5108 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' 0 MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
    • conhost.exe (PID: 3280 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
  • upstsdssm.pif (PID: 3296 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\33911166\UPSTSD~1.PIF' C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\33911166\sqbr.wlw MD5: 8E699954F6B5D64683412CC560938507)
    • RegSvcs.exe (PID: 7128 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RegSvcs.exe MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
  • wscript.exe (PID: 6200 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe' 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\33911166\Update.vbs' MD5: 9A68ADD12EB50DDE7586782C3EB9FF9C)
  • dhcpmon.exe (PID: 6440 cmdline: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\DHCP Monitor\dhcpmon.exe' MD5: 2867A3817C9245F7CF518524DFD18F28)
    • conhost.exe (PID: 2600 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
  • cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: NanoCore

{"Version": "1.2.2.0", "Mutex": "ba2baad0-dd3f-4844-a1e3-4d042f9a", "Group": "HOBBIT", "Domain1": "strongodss.ddns.net", "Domain2": "185.19.85.175", "Port": 48562, "KeyboardLogging": "Enable", "RunOnStartup": "Enable", "RequestElevation": "Disable", "BypassUAC": "Enable", "ClearZoneIdentifier": "Enable", "ClearAccessControl": "Enable", "SetCriticalProcess": "Enable", "PreventSystemSleep": "Enable", "ActivateAwayMode": "Enable", "EnableDebugMode": "Disable", "RunDelay": 0, "ConnectDelay": 4000, "RestartDelay": 5000, "TimeoutInterval": 5000, "KeepAliveTimeout": 30000, "MutexTimeout": 5000, "LanTimeout": 2500, "WanTimeout": 8009, "BufferSize": "02000100", "MaxPacketSize": "", "GCThreshold": "", "BypassUserAccountControlData": "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-16\"?>\r\n<Task version=\"1.2\" xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task\">\r\n  <RegistrationInfo />\r\n  <Triggers />\r\n  <Principals>\r\n    <Principal id=\"Author\">\r\n      <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>\r\n      <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>\r\n    </Principal>\r\n  </Principals>\r\n  <Settings>\r\n    <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>\r\n    <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>\r\n    <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>\r\n    <AllowHardTerminate>true</AllowHardTerminate>\r\n    <StartWhenAvailable>false</StartWhenAvailable>\r\n    <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>false</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>\r\n    <IdleSettings>\r\n      <StopOnIdleEnd>false</StopOnIdleEnd>\r\n      <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>\r\n    </IdleSettings>\r\n    <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>\r\n    <Enabled>true</Enabled>\r\n    <Hidden>false</Hidden>\r\n    <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>\r\n    <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>\r\n    <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>\r\n    <Priority>4</Priority>\r\n  </Settings>\r\n  <Actions Context=\"Author\">\r\n    <Exec>\r\n      <Command>\"#EXECUTABLEPATH\"</Command>\r\n      <Arguments>$(Arg0)</Arguments>\r\n    </Exec>\r\n  </Actions>\r\n</Task"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
0000000F.00000003.720524354.0000000004651000.00000004.00000001.sdmpNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
  • 0xf9dd:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
  • 0xfa1a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
  • 0x1354d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
0000000F.00000003.720524354.0000000004651000.00000004.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_NanocoreYara detected Nanocore RATJoe Security
    0000000F.00000003.720524354.0000000004651000.00000004.00000001.sdmpNanoCoreunknown Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
    • 0xf745:$a: NanoCore
    • 0xf755:$a: NanoCore
    • 0xf989:$a: NanoCore
    • 0xf99d:$a: NanoCore
    • 0xf9dd:$a: NanoCore
    • 0xf7a4:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0xf9a6:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0xf9e6:$b: ClientPlugin
    • 0xf8cb:$c: ProjectData
    • 0x102d2:$d: DESCrypto
    • 0x17c9e:$e: KeepAlive
    • 0x15c8c:$g: LogClientMessage
    • 0x11e87:$i: get_Connected
    • 0x10608:$j: #=q
    • 0x10638:$j: #=q
    • 0x10654:$j: #=q
    • 0x10684:$j: #=q
    • 0x106a0:$j: #=q
    • 0x106bc:$j: #=q
    • 0x106ec:$j: #=q
    • 0x10708:$j: #=q
    00000002.00000003.688014335.0000000004B63000.00000004.00000001.sdmpNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
    • 0xf9fd:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
    • 0x44205:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
    • 0xfa3a:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
    • 0x44242:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
    • 0x1356d:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
    • 0x47d75:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
    00000002.00000003.688014335.0000000004B63000.00000004.00000001.sdmpJoeSecurity_NanocoreYara detected Nanocore RATJoe Security
      Click to see the 118 entries

      Unpacked PEs

      SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
      5.2.RegSvcs.exe.3723f8c.3.unpackNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
      • 0x40a6:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
      5.2.RegSvcs.exe.3723f8c.3.unpackNanocore_RAT_Feb18_1Detects Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
      • 0x40a6:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
      • 0x4184:$s4: PipeCreated
      • 0x40c0:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
      18.2.RegSvcs.exe.2f79650.2.unpackNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
      • 0x42a6:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
      18.2.RegSvcs.exe.2f79650.2.unpackNanocore_RAT_Feb18_1Detects Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
      • 0x42a6:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
      • 0x4384:$s4: PipeCreated
      • 0x42c0:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
      18.2.RegSvcs.exe.2f79650.2.raw.unpackNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
      • 0xe75:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
      • 0x66a6:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
      • 0xe8f:$x2: IClientNetworkHost