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Windows Analysis Report FACTURA.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	FACTURA.exe
Analysis ID:	502111
MD5:	d9b54bd175163eae11715a5b89b32aba
SHA1:	8a926c701db271e1f2edfec8890a865248e52d24
SHA256:	3e123fbdc89e8c9c59a0c5a3a1c2d8fda13f5d8551da654bef2f17f34f578075
Tags:	exe
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	68
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Yara detected GuLoader

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Uses 32bit PE files

Contains functionality to call native functions

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Detected potential crypto function

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

FACTURA.exe (PID: 6816 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe' MD5: D9B54BD175163EAE11715A5B89B32ABA)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1AoRiyDm8nMjHX"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.1202548059.00000000021D0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.1202548059.00000000021D0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1AoRiyDm8nMjHX"}

Source: FACTURA.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1AoRiyDm8nMjHX

Source: FACTURA.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D7298 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D7614 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D763B NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D727C NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D72B5 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D775D NtAllocateVirtualMemory,

Source: FACTURA.exe, 00000000.00000000.676817252.0000000000416000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameHippa6.exe vs FACTURA.exe
Source: FACTURA.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameHippa6.exe vs FACTURA.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_00401440
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040167C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040162F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404D2C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D7298
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DB9D6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D7614
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBA08
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D5207
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D763B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DAA32
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DAE44
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D727C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DA26F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D566A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBA65
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DAABB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D72B5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBAD8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D5AE0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D5F15
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D5B2B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D7B4E
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D9F4A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBB47
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D5F40
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D9F6A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DAB61
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DB386
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D57B4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D7BB3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBBAF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D8FDA
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DA013
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D8400
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DAC2D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D742B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D5C51
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBC4D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D6066
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D58A1
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D7CC5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D54EB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DA11F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DAD09
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DB138
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D5557
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D516C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D5D9D
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBDBA
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D59DD
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D09C5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D7DF4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D99F0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D61E9

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DF6F8D286EA7402917.TMP

Jump to behavior

Source: FACTURA.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal68.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.1202548059.00000000021D0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_00403F79 push ss; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404B0F push cs; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D338C pushad ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D3457 pushad ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D348A pushad ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D9900 push edi; ret

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000040F124 second address: 000000000040F124 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 lfence 0x00000005 wait 0x00000006 popad 0x00000007 pushfd 0x00000008 popfd 0x00000009 wait 0x0000000a dec edi 0x0000000b lfence 0x0000000e pushfd 0x0000000f popfd 0x00000010 cmp edi, 00000000h 0x00000013 jne 00007F2F4096AF93h 0x00000015 nop 0x00000016 pushfd 0x00000017 popfd 0x00000018 pushad 0x00000019 lfence 0x0000001c cmp eax, 4Ch 0x0000001f rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000021D6F4D second address: 00000000021D6F4D instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 4344BD4Eh 0x00000007 xor eax, 9523C638h 0x0000000c xor eax, 8C421A1Dh 0x00000011 sub eax, 5A25616Ah 0x00000016 cpuid 0x00000018 popad 0x00000019 call 00007F2F4096DCB8h 0x0000001e lfence 0x00000021 mov edx, FAD6A590h 0x00000026 xor edx, B228D1B3h 0x0000002c xor edx, 57AF33B0h 0x00000032 xor edx, 60AF4787h 0x00000038 mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x0000003a lfence 0x0000003d ret 0x0000003e sub edx, esi 0x00000040 ret 0x00000041 pop ecx 0x00000042 add edi, edx 0x00000044 dec ecx 0x00000045 mov dword ptr [ebp+00000182h], ebx 0x0000004b mov ebx, F34FAB69h 0x00000050 add ebx, D3E79685h 0x00000056 xor ebx, 85E85CE5h 0x0000005c sub ebx, 42DF1D0Bh 0x00000062 cmp ecx, ebx 0x00000064 mov ebx, dword ptr [ebp+00000182h] 0x0000006a jne 00007F2F4096DC70h 0x0000006c mov dword ptr [ebp+00000168h], edi 0x00000072 cmp dx, bx 0x00000075 mov edi, ecx 0x00000077 push edi 0x00000078 mov edi, dword ptr [ebp+00000168h] 0x0000007e call 00007F2F4096DD18h 0x00000083 call 00007F2F4096DCD9h 0x00000088 lfence 0x0000008b mov edx, FAD6A590h 0x00000090 xor edx, B228D1B3h 0x00000096 xor edx, 57AF33B0h 0x0000009c xor edx, 60AF4787h 0x000000a2 mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x000000a4 lfence 0x000000a7 ret 0x000000a8 mov esi, edx 0x000000aa pushad 0x000000ab rdtsc

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Code function: 0_2_021D726A rdtsc

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DAA32 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DAABB mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D4794 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D4383 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D97FC mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D97FE mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D98B3 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D6DDC mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021D9DE9 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe

Code function: 0_2_021D726A rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DB9D6 RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBA08 RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBE7C RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBA65 RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBAD8 RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBEF5 RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBB47 RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBBAF RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBC4D RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe	Code function: 0_2_021DBDBA RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler,

Source: FACTURA.exe, 00000000.00000002.1202275518.0000000000C70000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: FACTURA.exe, 00000000.00000002.1202275518.0000000000C70000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: FACTURA.exe, 00000000.00000002.1202275518.0000000000C70000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: FACTURA.exe, 00000000.00000002.1202275518.0000000000C70000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery21	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Information Discovery11	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

No Antivirus matches

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	33.0.0 White Diamond
Analysis ID:	502111
Start date:	13.10.2021
Start time:	16:06:26
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 45s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	FACTURA.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	15
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal68.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 39.8% (good quality ratio 29.4%) Quality average: 42.1% Quality standard deviation: 32.7%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 95.100.218.79, 20.82.210.154, 209.197.3.8, 20.54.110.249, 40.112.88.60, 2.20.178.24, 2.20.178.33 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, wu-shim.trafficmanager.net, neu-displaycatalogrp.frontdoor.bigcatalog.commerce.microsoft.com, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, asf-ris-prod-neu.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, iris-de-prod-azsc-neu-b.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, cds.d2s7q6s2.hwcdn.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, consumer-displaycatalogrp-aks2aks-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com, arc.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.770492551220603
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	FACTURA.exe
File size:	98304
MD5:	d9b54bd175163eae11715a5b89b32aba
SHA1:	8a926c701db271e1f2edfec8890a865248e52d24
SHA256:	3e123fbdc89e8c9c59a0c5a3a1c2d8fda13f5d8551da654bef2f17f34f578075
SHA512:	315c96c4109d3cdcede665b6550b9c55799581a6c193efbb50a0185bf492cc2dde75597b3a8635924f17c43b2f887b10aa88636f4ae97051fb173435a8f1e925
SSDEEP:	1536:t1DeOJvAoJDsEzYRwBVRCFu3oCZTaQFus94kbbnLK3KKPD:t1zhAoJDNzYDQZ7cWLTK6KP
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........i.......................*..............Rich....................PE..L...v.uQ.................@...0...............P....@........

File Icon


Icon Hash:	69e1c892f664c884

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4012b4
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x5175DA76 [Tue Apr 23 00:48:54 2013 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	3d3cd1bd8dcc611a5734bf41f4e1a6a6

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 0041044Ch
call 00007F2F407AB273h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx-4F77326Ch], al
in eax, FAh
inc ebp
mov ecx, 1EE07E99h
push esp
pop edi
mov ah, 00h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edx+00h], al
push es
push eax
add dword ptr [ecx], 42h
jc 00007F2F407AB2F7h
insd
insd
imul ebp, dword ptr [edi+72h], 73h
xor eax, 00AE3400h
add eax, dword ptr [eax]
add byte ptr [eax], al
add bh, bh
int3
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
cmp byte ptr [CCCB72A4h], ch
les eax, fword ptr [1B56A145h]
or bl, byte ptr [esi+esi*4-27h]
cdq
or al, 6Dh

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x14024	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x16000	0x1c1a	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x230	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0xf0	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x13418	0x14000	False	0.508483886719	data	6.22648163803	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x15000	0xcc4	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x16000	0x1c1a	0x2000	False	0.344970703125	data	3.68013439536	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
CUSTOM	0x1791c	0x2fe	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 32x32, 16 colors	English	United States
CUSTOM	0x1705e	0x8be	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 32x32, 8 bits/pixel	English	United States
CUSTOM	0x16d60	0x2fe	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 32x32, 16 colors, 4 bits/pixel	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x164b8	0x8a8	data
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x164a4	0x14	data
RT_VERSION	0x161a0	0x304	data	English	United States

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaObjSet, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaVarTstLt, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaStrCmp, _adj_fpatan, __vbaLateIdCallLd, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, _CIlog, __vbaNew2, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaVarAdd, __vbaVarDup, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeObj, __vbaFreeStr

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0409 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	ExpressVPN
InternalName	Hippa6
FileVersion	4.00
CompanyName	ExpressVPN
LegalTrademarks	ExpressVPN
Comments	ExpressVPN
ProductName	ExpressVPN
ProductVersion	4.00
FileDescription	ExpressVPN
OriginalFilename	Hippa6.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: FACTURA.exe PID: 6816 Parent PID: 5280

General

Start time:	16:07:27
Start date:	13/10/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURA.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	98304 bytes
MD5 hash:	D9B54BD175163EAE11715A5B89B32ABA
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000000.00000002.1202548059.00000000021D0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Windows Analysis Report FACTURA.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: FACTURA.exe PID: 6816 Parent PID: 5280

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis