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Windows Analysis Report correction HAWB.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	correction HAWB.exe
Analysis ID:	502575
MD5:	8a29580d47943a0f2c61ca552a63bc30
SHA1:	e4cdec934b4bfc2e055216c03ac7056069100b05
SHA256:	53c0cf2d25f350a579729af76c466b68b899586b620ffae8925fcb4d831dc2c8
Tags:	exe
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	76
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Potential malicious icon found

Yara detected GuLoader

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Machine Learning detection for sample

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Uses 32bit PE files

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

PE file contains strange resources

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Detected potential crypto function

Found potential string decryption / allocating functions

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

correction HAWB.exe (PID: 4784 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe' MD5: 8A29580D47943A0F2C61CA552A63BC30)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=d"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.758213767.0000000002110000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.758213767.0000000002110000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=d"}

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: correction HAWB.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: correction HAWB.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=d

System Summary:

Potential malicious icon found

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Icon embedded in PE file: bad icon match: 20047c7c70f0e004

Source: correction HAWB.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: correction HAWB.exe, 00000000.00000002.758468268.0000000002890000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameUnelega5.exeFE2X vs correction HAWB.exe
Source: correction HAWB.exe, 00000000.00000000.230189845.000000000041C000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameUnelega5.exe vs correction HAWB.exe
Source: correction HAWB.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameUnelega5.exe vs correction HAWB.exe

Source: correction HAWB.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_004022BB
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00403444
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040322C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_004034DC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_004032B6
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040333F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_004033CA
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_004031AB

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe

Code function: String function: 0040177E appears 94 times

Source: correction HAWB.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal76.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.758213767.0000000002110000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00403C72 push eax; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040440B pushad ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00405ADE push esi; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406AE7 push ss; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040695C push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406F76 push 0000002Ch; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_004057DC push ecx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_00407BBE push eax; retf

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 6.82320580255

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_004022BB mov ebx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe	Code function: 0_2_004031AB mov ebx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: correction HAWB.exe, 00000000.00000002.757533942.0000000000C60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: correction HAWB.exe, 00000000.00000002.757533942.0000000000C60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: correction HAWB.exe, 00000000.00000002.757533942.0000000000C60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SProgram Managerl
Source: correction HAWB.exe, 00000000.00000002.757533942.0000000000C60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd,
Source: correction HAWB.exe, 00000000.00000002.757533942.0000000000C60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery1	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Software Packing1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Process Injection1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	NTDS	System Information Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Obfuscated Files or Information3	LSA Secrets	Remote System Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
correction HAWB.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	33.0.0 White Diamond
Analysis ID:	502575
Start date:	14.10.2021
Start time:	04:25:07
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 9s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	correction HAWB.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	32
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal76.rans.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 3.7% (good quality ratio 3%) Quality average: 37.6% Quality standard deviation: 20.2%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 204.79.197.200, 13.107.21.200, 20.50.102.62, 23.203.141.148, 95.100.216.89, 20.82.210.154, 40.112.88.60, 2.20.178.24, 2.20.178.33, 20.82.209.183, 20.54.110.249 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, iris-de-prod-azsc-neu-b.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, consumer-displaycatalogrp-aks2aks-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, www-bing-com.dual-a-0001.a-msedge.net, arc.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, www.bing.com, iris-de-prod-azsc-neu.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, fs.microsoft.com, dual-a-0001.a-msedge.net, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, neu-displaycatalogrp.frontdoor.bigcatalog.commerce.microsoft.com, asf-ris-prod-neu.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, iris-de-prod-azsc-uks.uksouth.cloudapp.azure.com, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, a-0001.a-afdentry.net.trafficmanager.net, store-images.s-microsoft.com, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	6.349869263832848
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	correction HAWB.exe
File size:	135168
MD5:	8a29580d47943a0f2c61ca552a63bc30
SHA1:	e4cdec934b4bfc2e055216c03ac7056069100b05
SHA256:	53c0cf2d25f350a579729af76c466b68b899586b620ffae8925fcb4d831dc2c8
SHA512:	358c751d102753fd81e1d527a438ca7aed36dec3d605e870a4bf3f3232027ae1d66db2c8c70771c6e781f3a52317ddec0e483b4dce501c5ef30cc1189f217177
SSDEEP:	1536:VTbVTmIJnm6UC/HuomaUi0gAC6/lHzDc7uWWDNvtKyUrWBeSVpynmKTGYFZnymht:V/VTVnbHJ/Tkl/eS3ybzH
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........#...B...B...B..L^...B...`...B...d...B..Rich.B..........PE..L......Y.....................`......h.............@.............B..

File Icon


Icon Hash:	20047c7c70f0e004

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x401868
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x59B6E088 [Mon Sep 11 19:14:16 2017 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	c727a98e677fb7bd25bb06d2a2d956f1

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 00410420h
call 00007F054CD2BED5h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
cmp byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
jecxz 00007F054CD2BE87h
out dx, eax
pushad

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x1a9a4	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x1c000	0x456a	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x154	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x19ee0	0x1a000	False	0.56938288762	data	6.82320580255	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x1b000	0xaf0	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x1c000	0x456a	0x5000	False	0.396240234375	data	4.60844428158	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
DATA	0x1ca7c	0x3aee	MS Windows icon resource - 3 icons, 48x48, 32 bits/pixel, 32x32, 32 bits/pixel	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x1c94c	0x130	data
RT_ICON	0x1c664	0x2e8	data
RT_ICON	0x1c53c	0x128	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x1c50c	0x30	data
RT_VERSION	0x1c1a0	0x36c	data	English	United States

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, _adj_fprem1, __vbaSetSystemError, __vbaHresultCheckObj, __vbaLenBstrB, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaOnError, __vbaObjSet, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaGenerateBoundsError, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaAryConstruct2, __vbaObjVar, DllFunctionCall, _adj_fpatan, __vbaRedim, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaI2Str, __vbaFPException, _CIlog, __vbaNew2, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaI4Str, __vbaDerefAry1, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaStrToAnsi, __vbaVarDup, __vbaFpI4, __vbaLateMemCallLd, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, _allmul, __vbaLateIdSt, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeObj, __vbaFreeStr

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0409 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	RealNetworks, Inc.
InternalName	Unelega5
FileVersion	66.00
CompanyName	RealNetworks, Inc.
LegalTrademarks	RealNetworks, Inc.
Comments	RealNetworks, Inc.
ProductName	RealNetworks, Inc.
ProductVersion	66.00
FileDescription	RealNetworks, Inc.
OriginalFilename	Unelega5.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: correction HAWB.exe PID: 4784 Parent PID: 5188

General

Start time:	04:25:59
Start date:	14/10/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\correction HAWB.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	135168 bytes
MD5 hash:	8A29580D47943A0F2C61CA552A63BC30
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000000.00000002.758213767.0000000002110000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Windows Analysis Report correction HAWB.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: correction HAWB.exe PID: 4784 Parent PID: 5188

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis