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Windows Analysis Report PEDIDO.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	PEDIDO.exe
Analysis ID:	502709
MD5:	8bc016e5779262b772d16903af6e142c
SHA1:	5fa020fa3a63a481eff19fca06e11c424d346e9f
SHA256:	69a8e2fa9664dce4cb9ab2d1a2e7ba67bd0516b9e4c8608e9c246d614be3241f
Tags:	exeGuloader
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	72
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Yara detected GuLoader

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Machine Learning detection for sample

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Uses 32bit PE files

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Detected potential crypto function

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

PEDIDO.exe (PID: 4724 cmdline: 'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe' MD5: 8BC016E5779262B772D16903AF6E142C)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1G3zuBgFp"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.779265380.00000000020F0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.779265380.00000000020F0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1G3zuBgFp"}

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: PEDIDO.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: PEDIDO.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1G3zuBgFp

Source: PEDIDO.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: PEDIDO.exe, 00000000.00000000.248785183.0000000000416000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameLurifaksernes.exe vs PEDIDO.exe
Source: PEDIDO.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameLurifaksernes.exe vs PEDIDO.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_00401673
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_00401626
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_00401437
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F3002
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F1210
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020FA827
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F4C35
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F226F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F208C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F029F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F1CA5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F00D5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F4F38
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F0132
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F6D4C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F2340
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F1F7A
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F0179
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F4D92
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F53BE
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F4FF3

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe

File created: C:\Users\user~1\AppData\Local\Temp\~DFF079A81BD057904A.TMP

Jump to behavior

Source: PEDIDO.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal72.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.779265380.00000000020F0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_00405AC6 push esi; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_004046A8 push es; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F0442 push FFFFFFFEh; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F2F71 pushad ; retn 0004h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F1781 push ds; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F27B0 pushfd ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F09E3 push edi; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F0BF4 push edi; retf

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 000000000040EFEE second address: 000000000040EFEE instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 nop 0x00000003 lfence 0x00000006 popad 0x00000007 lfence 0x0000000a cmp ecx, 0000009Fh 0x00000010 dec edi 0x00000011 pushfd 0x00000012 popfd 0x00000013 wait 0x00000014 cmp edi, 00000000h 0x00000017 jne 00007FA2BC937948h 0x00000019 mfence 0x0000001c cmp eax, 000000C2h 0x00000021 pushad 0x00000022 cmp eax, 000000EEh 0x00000027 mfence 0x0000002a rdtsc
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000020F6E7E second address: 00000000020F6E7E instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 5ECAEB07h 0x00000007 xor eax, E8969DE3h 0x0000000c xor eax, DEB35923h 0x00000011 add eax, 9710D03Ah 0x00000016 cpuid 0x00000018 popad 0x00000019 call 00007FA2BCDE0628h 0x0000001e lfence 0x00000021 mov edx, 03C503D6h 0x00000026 xor edx, A24BC650h 0x0000002c sub edx, AA10D02Ch 0x00000032 xor edx, 8883F54Eh 0x00000038 mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x0000003a lfence 0x0000003d ret 0x0000003e sub edx, esi 0x00000040 ret 0x00000041 cmp eax, 4C4E4F0Bh 0x00000046 pop ecx 0x00000047 add edi, edx 0x00000049 dec ecx 0x0000004a mov dword ptr [ebp+00000237h], EBF6D632h 0x00000054 xor dword ptr [ebp+00000237h], BEC846FDh 0x0000005e xor dword ptr [ebp+00000237h], 3DA10DDDh 0x00000068 add dword ptr [ebp+00000237h], 976062EEh 0x00000072 cmp ecx, dword ptr [ebp+00000237h] 0x00000078 jne 00007FA2BCDE0575h 0x0000007e mov dword ptr [ebp+00000245h], esi 0x00000084 mov esi, ecx 0x00000086 push esi 0x00000087 mov esi, dword ptr [ebp+00000245h] 0x0000008d jmp 00007FA2BCDE067Eh 0x0000008f test eax, ecx 0x00000091 call 00007FA2BCDE069Bh 0x00000096 call 00007FA2BCDE0649h 0x0000009b lfence 0x0000009e mov edx, 03C503D6h 0x000000a3 xor edx, A24BC650h 0x000000a9 sub edx, AA10D02Ch 0x000000af xor edx, 8883F54Eh 0x000000b5 mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x000000b7 lfence 0x000000ba ret 0x000000bb mov esi, edx 0x000000bd pushad 0x000000be rdtsc

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe

Code function: 0_2_020F6E76 rdtsc

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F9612 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020FA827 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F6C6E mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe	Code function: 0_2_020F9BB0 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe

Code function: 0_2_020F6E76 rdtsc

Source: PEDIDO.exe, 00000000.00000002.778371334.0000000000C60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: uProgram Manager
Source: PEDIDO.exe, 00000000.00000002.778371334.0000000000C60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: PEDIDO.exe, 00000000.00000002.778371334.0000000000C60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: PEDIDO.exe, 00000000.00000002.778371334.0000000000C60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery21	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Information Discovery11	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
PEDIDO.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	33.0.0 White Diamond
Analysis ID:	502709
Start date:	14.10.2021
Start time:	10:36:11
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 24s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	PEDIDO.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	27
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal72.troj.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 37.7% (good quality ratio 21.6%) Quality average: 35.8% Quality standard deviation: 37.2%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 95.100.216.89, 20.82.209.183, 209.197.3.8, 20.54.110.249, 40.112.88.60, 2.20.178.24, 2.20.178.33, 20.82.210.154 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): iris-de-prod-azsc-neu.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, fs.microsoft.com, displaycatalog-rp-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, wu-shim.trafficmanager.net, neu-displaycatalogrp.useroor.bigcatalog.commerce.microsoft.com, ris-prod.trafficmanager.net, asf-ris-prod-neu.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, cds.d2s7q6s2.hwcdn.net, iris-de-prod-azsc-neu-b.northeurope.cloudapp.azure.com, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, a1449.dscg2.akamai.net, arc.msn.com, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, consumer-displaycatalogrp-aks2aks-europe.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net, arc.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, displaycatalog-rp.md.mp.microsoft.com.akadns.net Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.79980248716969
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	PEDIDO.exe
File size:	98304
MD5:	8bc016e5779262b772d16903af6e142c
SHA1:	5fa020fa3a63a481eff19fca06e11c424d346e9f
SHA256:	69a8e2fa9664dce4cb9ab2d1a2e7ba67bd0516b9e4c8608e9c246d614be3241f
SHA512:	75705b51a700371ab9211b81bf0e36aeae80825418a3e260c9b9e6610cb3f31833349b309ac88f6e67bf3f16a34d349802c617a25f9a52e8bcfb989bf7289a53
SSDEEP:	1536:tqD1R2xaclNLo4V4UQhH03JYVtKP2BlxS6pE5LD:tqPkNLo4VRQh8OKettS5L
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........i.......................*..............Rich....................PE..L...i..T.................@...0...............P....@........

File Icon


Icon Hash:	69e1c892f664c884

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4012b4
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x5402F169 [Sun Aug 31 09:56:57 2014 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	3d3cd1bd8dcc611a5734bf41f4e1a6a6

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 004102ECh
call 00007FA2BCBE6943h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add ah, dl
adc ah, byte ptr [edx+4B4D12BAh]
cdq
mov ecx, 444C7E8Ah
in eax, dx
in al, dx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc ebp
outsb
insd
jc 00007FA2BCBE69BDh
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add bh, bh
int3
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
cmp bl, ah
sub al, BCh
out dx, eax
test al, D9h
inc ebp
inc ebx
mov ah, 7Bh
pop esp
sub al, 9Bh
mov byte ptr [ecx], al
test dword ptr [eax+11E72ED8h], 8B481779h
cmp bl, byte ptr [edi]
ret
nop
dec ecx
mov dword ptr [edx+33AD4F3Ah], ebx
cdq
iretw
adc dword ptr [edi+00AA000Ch], esi
pushad
rcl dword ptr [ebx+00000000h], cl
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
lodsb
in eax, dx
add byte ptr [eax], al
or ecx, dword ptr [ecx]
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [esi], al
add byte ptr [esi+65h], dl
outsb
je 00007FA2BCBE69B7h
jc 00007FA2BCBE6952h
or eax, 51000601h
jne 00007FA2BCBE69B7h
jc 00007FA2BCBE69B7h
jnc 00007FA2BCBE6952h
sbb dword ptr [ecx], eax

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x13f04	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x16000	0x1c32	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x230	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0xf0	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x132f8	0x14000	False	0.50859375	data	6.25990201424	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x15000	0xcc4	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x16000	0x1c32	0x2000	False	0.346435546875	data	3.68560912734	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
CUSTOM	0x17934	0x2fe	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 32x32, 16 colors	English	United States
CUSTOM	0x17076	0x8be	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 32x32, 8 bits/pixel	English	United States
CUSTOM	0x16d78	0x2fe	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 32x32, 16 colors, 4 bits/pixel	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x164d0	0x8a8	data
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x164bc	0x14	data
RT_VERSION	0x161a0	0x31c	data	English	United States

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaObjSet, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaVarTstLt, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaStrCmp, _adj_fpatan, __vbaLateIdCallLd, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, _CIlog, __vbaNew2, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaVarAdd, __vbaVarDup, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeObj, __vbaFreeStr

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0409 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	ExpressVPN
InternalName	Lurifaksernes
FileVersion	4.00
CompanyName	ExpressVPN
LegalTrademarks	ExpressVPN
Comments	ExpressVPN
ProductName	ExpressVPN
ProductVersion	4.00
FileDescription	ExpressVPN
OriginalFilename	Lurifaksernes.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: PEDIDO.exe PID: 4724 Parent PID: 6096

General

Start time:	10:37:12
Start date:	14/10/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	'C:\Users\user\Desktop\PEDIDO.exe'
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	98304 bytes
MD5 hash:	8BC016E5779262B772D16903AF6E142C
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000000.00000002.779265380.00000000020F0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

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Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

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Disassembly

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Windows Analysis Report PEDIDO.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: PEDIDO.exe PID: 4724 Parent PID: 6096

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis