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Windows Analysis Report Sales Order List.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Sales Order List.exe
Analysis ID:	526595
MD5:	80bad0903ee7ec98805678673720cfd9
SHA1:	35aecf6fe3ac24adaf16c04b787e90ac4c845eb0
SHA256:	260e6b75d7616efd29c05151f1ce95bbab1aaf8703f86f62c4d9bc6d308a56b8
Tags:	exe
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	84
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected GuLoader

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Machine Learning detection for sample

Uses 32bit PE files

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

PE file contains strange resources

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Detected potential crypto function

Contains functionality to call native functions

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

Sales Order List.exe (PID: 2260 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe" MD5: 80BAD0903EE7EC98805678673720CFD9)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=downloads;R"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000001.00000002.821817884.00000000020F0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000001.00000002.821817884.00000000020F0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=downloads;R"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: Sales Order List.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 40%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: Sales Order List.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: Sales Order List.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=downloads;R

Source: Sales Order List.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://topqualityfreeware.com
Source: Sales Order List.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.topqualityfreeware.com/

System Summary:

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: Sales Order List.exe

Source: Sales Order List.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: Sales Order List.exe, 00000001.00000002.821587077.0000000000426000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameBandies.exe vs Sales Order List.exe
Source: Sales Order List.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameBandies.exe vs Sales Order List.exe

Source: Sales Order List.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
Source: Sales Order List.exe	Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_02106B37
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020FDBA3
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020F4279
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020FE295
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020F42A5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020F12D4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_02104F00
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_02102B30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020FDBDF
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020F3FD5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020F9FE8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020FD01F
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_02103D63
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_02104993
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020FD5FC

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020FDBA3 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020FDBDF NtAllocateVirtualMemory,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: Sales Order List.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 40%

Source: Sales Order List.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DF904D784913DB7A54.TMP

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal84.troj.evad.winEXE@1/1@0/0

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000001.00000002.821817884.00000000020F0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_00404402 pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_00403827 push es; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_004044E6 pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040A880 pushfd ; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040A101 push edx; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_00404585 pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040459A pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_004051BF push dword ptr [esi]; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040665E pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040427A pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_004062C2 pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040A6C2 push ebx; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_004072E2 pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040434A pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_00404336 pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_0040633E pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_004067DF pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020F3FD5 push ebp; retf 67B7h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020F5FF4 push esp; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020F0012 push AE35C959h; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020F6479 push esp; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020F24F2 push 812B1A06h; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020F6573 push esp; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020F7198 pushad ; retf

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe

RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000021038C0 second address: 00000000021038C0 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 5F6A47EFh 0x00000007 xor eax, 22268717h 0x0000000c xor eax, 5FCDF500h 0x00000011 sub eax, 228135F7h 0x00000016 cpuid 0x00000018 popad 0x00000019 call 00007F1730B5F5D7h 0x0000001e lfence 0x00000021 mov edx, 87FFB988h 0x00000026 xor edx, 8DA6BE96h 0x0000002c add edx, 16C465BAh 0x00000032 xor edx, 5EE36CCCh 0x00000038 mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x0000003a lfence 0x0000003d test ah, ah 0x0000003f cmp dx, 744Ch 0x00000044 cmp ch, ah 0x00000046 test edx, edx 0x00000048 ret 0x00000049 sub edx, esi 0x0000004b ret 0x0000004c cmp ecx, ebx 0x0000004e add edi, edx 0x00000050 dec dword ptr [ebp+000000F8h] 0x00000056 cmp dword ptr [ebp+000000F8h], 00000000h 0x0000005d jne 00007F1730B5F4EAh 0x0000005f call 00007F1730B5F61Ch 0x00000064 call 00007F1730B5F5F8h 0x00000069 lfence 0x0000006c mov edx, 87FFB988h 0x00000071 xor edx, 8DA6BE96h 0x00000077 add edx, 16C465BAh 0x0000007d xor edx, 5EE36CCCh 0x00000083 mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x00000085 lfence 0x00000088 test ah, ah 0x0000008a cmp dx, 744Ch 0x0000008f cmp ch, ah 0x00000091 test edx, edx 0x00000093 ret 0x00000094 mov esi, edx 0x00000096 pushad 0x00000097 rdtsc

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe

Code function: 1_2_02103AA0 rdtsc

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_02102200 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_020FD2AD mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_02104F00 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe	Code function: 1_2_02102DB4 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe

Code function: 1_2_02103AA0 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe

Code function: 1_2_02106B37 RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler,

Source: Sales Order List.exe, 00000001.00000002.821708707.0000000000C50000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: Sales Order List.exe, 00000001.00000002.821708707.0000000000C50000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: Sales Order List.exe, 00000001.00000002.821708707.0000000000C50000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: Sales Order List.exe, 00000001.00000002.821708707.0000000000C50000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery21	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Information Discovery11	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Sales Order List.exe	40%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.GuLoader
Sales Order List.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://topqualityfreeware.com	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.topqualityfreeware.com/	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://topqualityfreeware.com	Sales Order List.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.topqualityfreeware.com/	Sales Order List.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	34.0.0 Boulder Opal
Analysis ID:	526595
Start date:	22.11.2021
Start time:	19:29:31
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 30s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Sales Order List.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	19
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal84.troj.evad.winEXE@1/1@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 61% (good quality ratio 46.8%) Quality average: 49.1% Quality standard deviation: 35.6%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, arc.msn.com Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DF904D784913DB7A54.TMP Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe
File Type:	Composite Document File V2 Document, Cannot read section info
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	32768
Entropy (8bit):	4.01191323271951
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	384:wcZ0tADSVlx6JQhynrV7Vr9wrCIM/ZUYVPzBAPN:wcZeADSV/6qhynrV7VxwrrMvqPN
MD5:	6C4C01A4316CD9338DE51EC175EBF11D
SHA1:	8C5D5B07E0ED6AAC72705F516E25BEAEA891EFA0
SHA-256:	95876F7C1242672418DB201C02D70276EE9CC4345394DEAD3500619A39DA28F0
SHA-512:	9F60729E865B0414DB4792F76465EDCE1595D22E884D01C07389A312474D1CE916E4CF73275D5AA0CB411D8EBB0617EF661CD10467AD838FD1B0B388C44823D5
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	......................>...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.002958856412811
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	Sales Order List.exe
File size:	192512
MD5:	80bad0903ee7ec98805678673720cfd9
SHA1:	35aecf6fe3ac24adaf16c04b787e90ac4c845eb0
SHA256:	260e6b75d7616efd29c05151f1ce95bbab1aaf8703f86f62c4d9bc6d308a56b8
SHA512:	9a88b4ea27bbc8b83c0722c715c12b3667d6138d27d2fabb315a8a8c4ddcb020962625d1aa75c56d7e2082bbded7ffaa3512b482f1a4ba138d1877a55e848e9b
SSDEEP:	3072:trejCYyLGrRxfFNEv6QN744ndRkHDwLVly5Mrc0yvhXeJ:treiGrRNFMjN6jIVCMrcbeJ
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........i.......................*..............Rich....................PE..L......G.................0..........L........@....@........

File Icon


Icon Hash:	0ceefedec6f67c0c

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x40134c
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x47ABAEC7 [Fri Feb 8 01:22:15 2008 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f27a613fda76c14f4eab7dc0085d799e

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 00407ED4h
call 00007F17307E2FF3h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
inc eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx+1Bh], bl
inc eax
or ch, FFFFFFE7h
jc 00007F17307E3047h
mov ds, word ptr [esi-04881682h]
cmc
loop 00007F17307E3002h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax+72h], dh
outsd
outsw
jc 00007F17307E306Fh
popad
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec esp
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
add eax, B2E49462h
outsd
enter 431Fh, A9h
pop ebx
add bl, dh
jl 00007F17307E2FF1h
jno 00007F17307E2F92h
test edi, edx
and dword ptr [edi], esi
push ds
xchg eax, ebp
pop edx
dec esi
xor dword ptr [edx+esi*8-7E5EB600h], 7Eh
cmp cl, byte ptr [edi-53h]
xor ebx, dword ptr [ecx-48EE309Ah]
or al, 00h
stosb
add byte ptr [eax-2Dh], ah
xchg eax, ebx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xchg dword ptr [ecx+00h], ebp
add byte ptr [ebp+00000068h], bl
or byte ptr [eax], al
jne 00007F17307E3070h
je 00007F17307E3063h
arpl word ptr [ebx+6Ch], bp
add byte ptr [66000B01h], cl
imul ebp, dword ptr [edx+6Ch], 00006B6Fh

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x23b14	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x26000	0x90bd	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x230	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x100	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x22f6c	0x23000	False	0.367292131696	data	5.18350124338	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x24000	0x13f0	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x26000	0x90bd	0xa000	False	0.346240234375	data	4.35051738239	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
CUSTOM	0x2e7ff	0x8be	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 32x32, 8 bits/pixel	English	United States
INSTALL	0x2d385	0x8be	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 32x32	English	United States
INSTALL	0x2ce82	0x503	ISO-8859 text, with CRLF line terminators	English	United States
SETUP	0x2e501	0x2fe	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 32x32, 16 colors	English	United States
SETUP	0x2dc43	0x8be	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 32x32	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x2bfda	0xea8	data
RT_ICON	0x2b732	0x8a8	data
RT_ICON	0x2b06a	0x6c8	data
RT_ICON	0x2ab02	0x568	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_ICON	0x2855a	0x25a8	dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 40
RT_ICON	0x274b2	0x10a8	dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 40
RT_ICON	0x26b2a	0x988	dBase III DBT, version number 0, next free block index 40
RT_ICON	0x266c2	0x468	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x2664c	0x76	data
RT_VERSION	0x263a0	0x2ac	data	Turkmen	Turkmenistan

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

_CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaAryMove, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, __vbaVarIdiv, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaObjSet, __vbaOnError, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaFPFix, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaStrCmp, _adj_fpatan, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, _CIlog, __vbaNew2, __vbaVar2Vec, __vbaR8Str, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaI4Var, __vbaVarDup, __vbaFpI4, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeStr, __vbaFreeObj

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0442 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Identiv
InternalName	Bandies
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	Identiv
LegalTrademarks	Identiv
ProductName	Identiv
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	Identiv
OriginalFilename	Bandies.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States
Turkmen	Turkmenistan

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Sales Order List.exe PID: 2260 Parent PID: 5012

General

Start time:	19:30:31
Start date:	22/11/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\Sales Order List.exe"
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	192512 bytes
MD5 hash:	80BAD0903EE7EC98805678673720CFD9
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000001.00000002.821817884.00000000020F0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Windows Analysis Report Sales Order List.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Sales Order List.exe PID: 2260 Parent PID: 5012

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis