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Windows Analysis Report FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	FAKTURA 9502461485.exe
Analysis ID:	530352
MD5:	34ae2e779e3b63f6450aacbaa6b5ab1d
SHA1:	0f7dc13bf5871f3ba281e064776371520b65bdd9
SHA256:	5bf5fa8d817fb2902dc28de115286e963b6dd4f5940d00e017b9944172972b25
Tags:	exe
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	72
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected GuLoader

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)

Uses 32bit PE files

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

PE file contains strange resources

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Detected potential crypto function

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

FAKTURA 9502461485.exe (PID: 6644 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe" MD5: 34AE2E779E3B63F6450AACBAA6B5AB1D)

conhost.exe (PID: 6744 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1xfUz"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.1191692194.00000000022B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.1191692194.00000000022B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1xfUz"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 26%

Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1xfUz

Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe, 00000000.00000002.1191484117.000000000070A000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Binary or memory string: <HOOK MODULE="DDRAW.DLL" FUNCTION="DirectDrawCreateEx"/>

Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe, 00000000.00000000.664593381.0000000000424000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAfterpains9.exe vs FAKTURA 9502461485.exe
Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe, 00000000.00000002.1191798592.0000000002380000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAfterpains9.exeFE2X vs FAKTURA 9502461485.exe
Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameAfterpains9.exe vs FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Code function: 0_2_022C6B79
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Code function: 0_2_022BDC30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Code function: 0_2_022C3719
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Code function: 0_2_022C4BA5
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Code function: 0_2_022C4413

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

Code function: 0_2_022BDC30 NtAllocateVirtualMemory,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 26%

Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6744:120:WilError_01

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DFA25EEA5CBC5E729F.TMP

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal72.troj.evad.winEXE@2/1@0/0

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.1191692194.00000000022B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406D41 push ss; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Code function: 0_2_00409164 push 8069A23Bh; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406B87 push ebp; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Code function: 0_2_022B235C push ebx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Code function: 0_2_022B17DD pushfd ; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Code function: 0_2_022B594E push ecx; iretd

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 00000000022BCC99 second address: 00000000022BCC99 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 mov eax, 5DB00295h 0x00000007 xor eax, DFA6B599h 0x0000000c xor eax, 58BD59D9h 0x00000011 sub eax, DAABEED4h 0x00000016 cpuid 0x00000018 popad 0x00000019 call 00007F1FC084C9C8h 0x0000001e lfence 0x00000021 mov edx, F98EF895h 0x00000026 xor edx, 7569717Eh 0x0000002c add edx, 1104375Ah 0x00000032 xor edx, E215C151h 0x00000038 mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x0000003a lfence 0x0000003d ret 0x0000003e sub edx, esi 0x00000040 ret 0x00000041 pop ecx 0x00000042 add edi, edx 0x00000044 dec ecx 0x00000045 mov dword ptr [ebp+000001F1h], DD8CFFEBh 0x0000004f xor dword ptr [ebp+000001F1h], 1BBB3DA6h 0x00000059 xor dword ptr [ebp+000001F1h], A8C93992h 0x00000063 jmp 00007F1FC084CA99h 0x00000068 cmp cx, bx 0x0000006b sub dword ptr [ebp+000001F1h], 6EFEFBDFh 0x00000075 cmp ecx, dword ptr [ebp+000001F1h] 0x0000007b jne 00007F1FC084C891h 0x00000081 cmp esi, 739A0701h 0x00000087 mov dword ptr [ebp+00000205h], edx 0x0000008d test cx, ax 0x00000090 mov edx, ecx 0x00000092 push edx 0x00000093 mov edx, dword ptr [ebp+00000205h] 0x00000099 cmp ax, 00002609h 0x0000009d call 00007F1FC084CB1Bh 0x000000a2 call 00007F1FC084C9E9h 0x000000a7 lfence 0x000000aa mov edx, F98EF895h 0x000000af xor edx, 7569717Eh 0x000000b5 add edx, 1104375Ah 0x000000bb xor edx, E215C151h 0x000000c1 mov edx, dword ptr [edx] 0x000000c3 lfence 0x000000c6 ret 0x000000c7 mov esi, edx 0x000000c9 pushad 0x000000ca rdtsc

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Code function: 0_2_022C334E mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	Code function: 0_2_022C2989 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

Code function: 0_2_022C6B79 RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler,

Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe, 00000000.00000002.1191549522.0000000000D90000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe, 00000000.00000002.1191549522.0000000000D90000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe, 00000000.00000002.1191549522.0000000000D90000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe, 00000000.00000002.1191549522.0000000000D90000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection2	Process Injection2	Input Capture1	Security Software Discovery1	Remote Services	Input Capture1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Obfuscated Files or Information1	LSASS Memory	Process Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information	Security Account Manager	System Information Discovery11	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
FAKTURA 9502461485.exe	27%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Worm.GenericML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	34.0.0 Boulder Opal
Analysis ID:	530352
Start date:	29.11.2021
Start time:	14:11:07
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 21s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	FAKTURA 9502461485.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	18
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal72.troj.evad.winEXE@2/1@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 49.7% (good quality ratio 27.3%) Quality average: 35.3% Quality standard deviation: 37.5%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): BackgroundTransferHost.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 51.104.136.2, 40.127.240.158, 20.49.150.241 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): www.bing.com, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, settings-win.data.microsoft.com, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, arc.msn.com, settingsfd-geo.trafficmanager.net Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DFA25EEA5CBC5E729F.TMP Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe
File Type:	Composite Document File V2 Document, Cannot read section info
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	16384
Entropy (8bit):	1.9866006611106688
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	96:jWpahLKAycVxc4LlvnffSIPW0wLzzj1ylDHn3Rs:KMhLKCxV5vnffI0wIdHBs
MD5:	A256BBA112F7FA34FE9E19ED07D0DF83
SHA1:	3E86ADD7C0890C55E8F22334A3E26134D7AB1EE8
SHA-256:	AB9F6744C55428A62F4696BC1779409A30420D0983EDD5536A0D280DF5EE7FE0
SHA-512:	9E762DFE82611778602E8BF19439E48AF7278D3D9399FF44666EB8A196206F4B1B50B9B623710B138BD7A7E9C1E0A05BE85CE6FB7B0F208C9664669297C416EA
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	......................>...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.029637622456598
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	FAKTURA 9502461485.exe
File size:	155648
MD5:	34ae2e779e3b63f6450aacbaa6b5ab1d
SHA1:	0f7dc13bf5871f3ba281e064776371520b65bdd9
SHA256:	5bf5fa8d817fb2902dc28de115286e963b6dd4f5940d00e017b9944172972b25
SHA512:	e3e4091f41e56ab35f0be0fda28f7bd569b4ec3a9f513cfba7423eff71ac206563801103ec0ef15f8e3279578d45e2038d66861196f6c1d731929873a8ecfa48
SSDEEP:	1536:6sfJffaX1bYawjWTQGfLZDLmC30X5TnzlN26x64XhVfJffpfJff:bfJffqYiQuDLmCunzlFhVfJffpfJff
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......O.......................D.......=.......Rich............PE..L......V.....................P............... ....@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	70ecccaececc71e2

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4015a8
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x56A09498 [Thu Jan 21 08:19:36 2016 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	458ac857eb15a6ebaad7748f2f663dae

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 00402DDCh
call 00007F1FC0B1F075h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [edi+40A213C6h], al
fldenv [ebx+360FB946h]
add dword ptr [ebx+0019CD89h], esp
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [ecx+6Fh], ch
outsb
and byte ptr [726F6620h], bh
insb
popad
jnc 00007F1FC0B1F0F5h
popad
imul esi, dword ptr [edx+esi*2+65h], 72h
add byte ptr [eax], ah
and byte ptr [ebx+6Ch], al
imul esp, dword ptr [ebp+6Eh], 00000000h
dec esp
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
add eax, 75BE3F12h
mov ch, D7h
mov bl, 48h
lodsd
daa
wait
arpl word ptr [ebx+edx*4+22548EA1h], bp
mov bh, CCh
add eax, B2401A9Ah
mov seg?, word ptr [ecx+edi-5Dh]
jo 00007F1FC0B1F02Ch
pop edx
cmp cl, byte ptr [edi-53h]
xor ebx, dword ptr [ecx-48EE309Ah]
or al, 00h
stosb
add byte ptr [eax-2Dh], ah
xchg eax, ebx
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
jp 00007F1FC0B1F098h
add byte ptr [eax], al
xchg eax, edx
adc eax, 0B000000h
add byte ptr [edx+6Eh], ah
jnc 00007F1FC0B1F0EFh
imul ebp, dword ptr [esi+67h], 00736E65h

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x21784	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x24000	0x2f34	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x194	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x20d58	0x21000	False	0.360011245265	data	5.1903509422	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x22000	0x1250	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x24000	0x2f34	0x3000	False	0.232340494792	data	4.20527594126	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
CUSTOM	0x2599a	0x1542	data	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x248f2	0x10a8	data
RT_ICON	0x2448a	0x468	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_STRING	0x26edc	0x58	data	English	United States
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x24468	0x22	data
RT_VERSION	0x241c0	0x2a8	data	English	United States

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

__vbaVarTstGt, _CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaVarMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaAryMove, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaFreeVarList, __vbaVarIdiv, _adj_fdiv_m64, __vbaFreeObjList, _adj_fprem1, __vbaStrCat, __vbaSetSystemError, __vbaHresultCheckObj, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryVar, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaObjSet, __vbaOnError, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaVarTstEq, __vbaAryConstruct2, __vbaPrintObj, DllFunctionCall, _adj_fpatan, __vbaLateIdCallLd, __vbaRedim, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, __vbaUbound, _CIlog, __vbaNew2, __vbaVar2Vec, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaFreeStrList, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaI4Var, __vbaStrToAnsi, __vbaVarDup, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, __vbaAryCopy, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeObj, __vbaFreeStr

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0409 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Corps
InternalName	Afterpains9
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	Corps
LegalTrademarks	Corps
ProductName	Corps
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	Corps
OriginalFilename	Afterpains9.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe PID: 6644 Parent PID: 5452

General

Start time:	14:12:03
Start date:	29/11/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\FAKTURA 9502461485.exe"
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	155648 bytes
MD5 hash:	34AE2E779E3B63F6450AACBAA6B5AB1D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000000.00000002.1191692194.00000000022B0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 6744 Parent PID: 6644

General

Start time:	14:12:03
Start date:	29/11/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff724c50000
File size:	625664 bytes
MD5 hash:	EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

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Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Windows Analysis Report FAKTURA 9502461485.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: FAKTURA 9502461485.exe PID: 6644 Parent PID: 5452

General

Analysis Process: conhost.exe PID: 6744 Parent PID: 6644

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis