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Windows Analysis Report CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe
Analysis ID:	530857
MD5:	94cb19d0951996cdb8b4cb914248763e
SHA1:	fa319fb54dfb0b1f715a19924087cacef22ccbcf
SHA256:	4ff14d83a926458439f039ea2e756a646b2bb63be4fd22ed8559138214efcaf8
Tags:	exeguloader
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	72
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected GuLoader

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Uses 32bit PE files

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

PE file contains strange resources

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Detected potential crypto function

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe (PID: 1556 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe" MD5: 94CB19D0951996CDB8B4CB914248763E)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://bgreenidaho.com/Crur/bin_TLiGMZYC180.bin"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.1175743788.00000000021A0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.1175743788.00000000021A0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://bgreenidaho.com/Crur/bin_TLiGMZYC180.bin"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 35%

Source: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://bgreenidaho.com/Crur/bin_TLiGMZYC180.bin

Source: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe, 00000000.00000002.1175536540.0000000000423000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameTornf2.exe vs CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe
Source: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameTornf2.exe vs CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Source: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_021AFF33
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_021B0520
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_021AA749

Source: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 35%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DF86C6EDC191096B55.TMP

Jump to behavior

Source: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal72.troj.evad.winEXE@1/1@0/0

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.1175743788.00000000021A0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_004074C8 push 713BC6CEh; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406CDB push esi; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_004095C1 push 74E4E9CEh; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_00407DA1 push E5AD70CEh; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040966A pushad ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_00405E18 push eax; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_00407A19 push ADDCA7CEh; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040968D pushad ; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_021A2807 push FFFFFFABh; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_021A282C push FFFFFFABh; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_021A4E4E push es; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_021A54AB push cs; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	Code function: 0_2_021A5396 push edi; ret

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Code function: 0_2_021B0A39 rdtsc

Anti Debugging:

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 90% for more than 60s

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Code function: 0_2_021AF77C mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Code function: 0_2_021B0A39 rdtsc

Source: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe, 00000000.00000002.1175637395.0000000000C60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe, 00000000.00000002.1175637395.0000000000C60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe, 00000000.00000002.1175637395.0000000000C60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe, 00000000.00000002.1175637395.0000000000C60000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery11	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion11	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Information Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe	36%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Shelsy

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
https://bgreenidaho.com/Crur/bin_TLiGMZYC180.bin	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://bgreenidaho.com/Crur/bin_TLiGMZYC180.bin	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	34.0.0 Boulder Opal
Analysis ID:	530857
Start date:	30.11.2021
Start time:	03:30:24
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 56s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	18
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal72.troj.evad.winEXE@1/1@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 3.7% (good quality ratio 0%) Quality average: 0% Quality standard deviation: 0%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): taskhostw.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, UpdateNotificationMgr.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, go.microsoft.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com, settings-win.data.microsoft.com, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, arc.msn.com

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DF86C6EDC191096B55.TMP Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe
File Type:	Composite Document File V2 Document, Cannot read section info
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	16384
Entropy (8bit):	0.8889429216618719
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:rl3lKFQCb77aqWPp8aFW3gJH6OXkDgIOJefKadcMqpwbmHZbGzJzzz/jP5prGI:rQYH6OCgLAMibm5bGzJzX/
MD5:	E114AD50630A185807BCDFF5F7DACEF6
SHA1:	5091C562986C0A729FF4AC836083EFFBB4257977
SHA-256:	8C0B8DE53510102223758C6543D9EB102BC7423B83BDF902975FB221AB77E945
SHA-512:	F8C4FA0ABA5BD5CE8246A9C2A0A525129B5461E90634FE406A1704F8E42240174C6D1D8CCBC42EBE14EE777F79A5C7E32618CC2ED532CA6264D614337840BF1A
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	......................>...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	6.045005360835647
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe
File size:	143360
MD5:	94cb19d0951996cdb8b4cb914248763e
SHA1:	fa319fb54dfb0b1f715a19924087cacef22ccbcf
SHA256:	4ff14d83a926458439f039ea2e756a646b2bb63be4fd22ed8559138214efcaf8
SHA512:	b06b3df9de83932c9f5013ce90720710ba9645c5bcce4b46dd377c541343b8095742a7923634805a61214ba1eda4ac3ecaaee935b73942c53c27190e792dc007
SSDEEP:	1536:5oDAE4euYT88tnh07k177v10aeb/by8W1hgW3rAITGLKy:ZEvuYT8CQm/v10aeixxCKy
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......7b..s...s...s.......r...<!..v...E%..r...Richs...........................PE..L......G.....................0....................@

File Icon


Icon Hash:	28f0da9af0f0f034

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x4016a4
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x47BEE20B [Fri Feb 22 14:54:03 2008 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	9b824bd6da8a9367fa6d96e7ab5dc79d

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 00402498h
call 00007FB2B082EE85h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
cmp byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
enter 59CEh, 8Ah

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x20124	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x23000	0xf3e	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x238	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x21c	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x1f7cc	0x20000	False	0.547492980957	data	6.30287654494	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x21000	0x19ec	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x23000	0xf3e	0x1000	False	0.27490234375	data	3.55639650835	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
CUSTOM	0x239c0	0x57e	MS Windows icon resource - 1 icon, 16x16, 8 bits/pixel	English	United States
RT_ICON	0x23458	0x568	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x23444	0x14	data
RT_VERSION	0x23140	0x304	data	English	United States

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

__vbaVarTstGt, _CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaHresultCheck, __vbaAryMove, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaLenBstr, __vbaFreeVarList, _adj_fdiv_m64, _adj_fprem1, __vbaStrCat, __vbaHresultCheckObj, __vbaLenBstrB, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryVar, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaObjSet, __vbaOnError, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaFpR8, __vbaVarTstLt, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, __vbaFileClose, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaGenerateBoundsError, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaGet3, __vbaVarTstEq, __vbaAryConstruct2, __vbaObjVar, _adj_fpatan, __vbaStrR8, EVENT_SINK_Release, __vbaUI1I2, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, __vbaStrVarVal, __vbaVarCat, _CIlog, __vbaErrorOverflow, __vbaFileOpen, __vbaVar2Vec, __vbaNew2, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaFreeStrList, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaI4Var, __vbaVarDup, __vbaFpI4, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, __vbaAryCopy, __vbaR8IntI4, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeStr, __vbaFreeObj

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0409 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	BiSide Frak
InternalName	Tornf2
FileVersion	1.00
CompanyName	BiSide Frak
LegalTrademarks	BiSide Frak
Comments	BiSide Frak
ProductName	BiSide Frak
ProductVersion	1.00
FileDescription	BiSide Frak
OriginalFilename	Tornf2.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe PID: 1556 Parent PID: 5836

General

Start time:	03:31:14
Start date:	30/11/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe"
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	143360 bytes
MD5 hash:	94CB19D0951996CDB8B4CB914248763E
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000000.00000002.1175743788.00000000021A0000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Windows Analysis Report CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: CI_PL_BL_ 4100675407_xls.exe PID: 1556 Parent PID: 5836

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis