Play interactive tour

Edit tour

Windows Analysis Report FACTURAS.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	FACTURAS.exe
Analysis ID:	531838
MD5:	ab82f374210a08b2221d5e1807400a32
SHA1:	6a56b81549185015743deaa196996f73787c5c7d
SHA256:	ab41887e471ac822f1240bf554098fa042910f1c7ac2f9e390081829515bc2fa
Tags:	exesigned
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

GuLoader

Score:	76
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Potential malicious icon found

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected GuLoader

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Uses 32bit PE files

PE / OLE file has an invalid certificate

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

PE file contains strange resources

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Detected potential crypto function

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

FACTURAS.exe (PID: 6088 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe" MD5: AB82F374210A08B2221D5E1807400A32)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

{"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=11UpsPasq_HHoJ"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.822667479.0000000002A80000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2	Yara detected GuLoader	Joe Security

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 00000000.00000002.822667479.0000000002A80000.00000040.00000001.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: GuLoader {"Payload URL": "https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=11UpsPasq_HHoJ"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: FACTURAS.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 13%

Source: FACTURAS.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Networking:

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Show sources

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=11UpsPasq_HHoJ

Source: FACTURAS.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootCA.crt0
Source: FACTURAS.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertSHA2AssuredIDTimestampingCA.crt0
Source: FACTURAS.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://crl3.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootCA.crl0P
Source: FACTURAS.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://crl3.digicert.com/sha2-assured-ts.crl02
Source: FACTURAS.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://crl4.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootCA.crl0:
Source: FACTURAS.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://crl4.digicert.com/sha2-assured-ts.crl0
Source: FACTURAS.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.digicert.com0C
Source: FACTURAS.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.digicert.com0O
Source: FACTURAS.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.digicert.com/CPS0
Source: FACTURAS.exe	String found in binary or memory: https://www.digicert.com/CPS0

System Summary:

Potential malicious icon found

Show sources

Source: initial sample

Icon embedded in PE file: bad icon match: 20047c7c70f0e004

Source: FACTURAS.exe

Static PE information: LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED

Source: FACTURAS.exe

Static PE information: invalid certificate

Source: FACTURAS.exe, 00000000.00000000.290801203.0000000000424000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamefilterhjdens.exe vs FACTURAS.exe
Source: FACTURAS.exe, 00000000.00000002.820596620.0000000002800000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamefilterhjdens.exeFE2XK vs FACTURAS.exe
Source: FACTURAS.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenamefilterhjdens.exe vs FACTURAS.exe

Source: FACTURAS.exe

Static PE information: Resource name: RT_ICON type: GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_00403540
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A8CC26

Source: FACTURAS.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 13%

Source: FACTURAS.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe

Section loaded: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvbvm60.dll

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal76.rans.troj.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{0D43FE01-F093-11CF-8940-00A0C9054228}\InprocServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\XvFu5flZcgudIlwvVLtjOx372

Jump to behavior

Data Obfuscation:

Yara detected GuLoader

Show sources

Source: Yara match

File source: 00000000.00000002.822667479.0000000002A80000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040A86B push ebx; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040A00A push EDF1CA21h; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_00409212 push ecx; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404AC6 push ebp; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_00404AD5 push cs; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_0040A2B2 push ss; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_00406DF9 push edi; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A871D6 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A87176 push eax; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A81A64 push eax; retf

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe

Code function: 0_2_02A8D105 rdtsc

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A930FB mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A92703 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe	Code function: 0_2_02A8C5E2 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe

Code function: 0_2_02A8D105 rdtsc

Source: FACTURAS.exe, 00000000.00000002.816581992.0000000000C30000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: FACTURAS.exe, 00000000.00000002.816581992.0000000000C30000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: FACTURAS.exe, 00000000.00000002.816581992.0000000000C30000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: FACTURAS.exe, 00000000.00000002.816581992.0000000000C30000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Process Injection1	Masquerading1	OS Credential Dumping	Security Software Discovery1	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Process Injection1	LSASS Memory	Process Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Application Layer Protocol1	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Security Account Manager	System Information Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
FACTURAS.exe	13%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Downloader.GuLoader

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
0.2.FACTURAS.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1140082		Download File
0.0.FACTURAS.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1140082		Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	34.0.0 Boulder Opal
Analysis ID:	531838
Start date:	01.12.2021
Start time:	13:16:12
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 7m 9s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	FACTURAS.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	18
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal76.rans.troj.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 8.3% (good quality ratio 4.8%) Quality average: 37.4% Quality standard deviation: 34.9%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 23.211.6.115 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, client.wns.windows.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, arc.msn.com Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.1786714462714025
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.15% Win32 Executable Microsoft Visual Basic 6 (82127/2) 0.81% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	FACTURAS.exe
File size:	152720
MD5:	ab82f374210a08b2221d5e1807400a32
SHA1:	6a56b81549185015743deaa196996f73787c5c7d
SHA256:	ab41887e471ac822f1240bf554098fa042910f1c7ac2f9e390081829515bc2fa
SHA512:	8844aca394f38a59a63b1984a00b16861a0f7e0fdc04ba20aba264da79fc6e54eeb73c6814f0745ab37ba12ba306e6371561e64f23deac22ba555d75aa3b2019
SSDEEP:	1536:gZEG7DecysKvlp4erYY77BLm321zb2aKQhbHdEs5obasAJepPNp8:6EG7Dpy9nYYn2EzBKYpdOSoNp8
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......O.......................D.......=.......Rich............PE..L.....4U.....................0............... ....@................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	20047c7c70f0e004

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x401888
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	true
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, RELOCS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x5534C2F5 [Mon Apr 20 09:12:21 2015 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	b209c8634733456633136bfedc71877a

Authenticode Signature

Signature Valid:	false
Signature Issuer:	E=parteringens@Shiremen3.slu, CN=SELSKABSLOKALET, OU=Interimskvitteringerne, O=JUSTITSEN, L=Rutiners, S=honkytonks, C=ML
Signature Validation Error:	A certificate chain processed, but terminated in a root certificate which is not trusted by the trust provider
Error Number:	-2146762487
Not Before, Not After	12/1/2021 2:36:44 AM 12/1/2022 2:36:44 AM
Subject Chain	E=parteringens@Shiremen3.slu, CN=SELSKABSLOKALET, OU=Interimskvitteringerne, O=JUSTITSEN, L=Rutiners, S=honkytonks, C=ML
Version:	3
Thumbprint MD5:	CDDFD4747563B21AE94964F7C6F9EB7A
Thumbprint SHA-1:	1CFBE705D5055A36D357E2EF5F5FE20BC6959CA9
Thumbprint SHA-256:	176B1E7918EE21C3FEADE8CC2C9D049B7DFDE73ECFE288C07CF37C692D0011A0
Serial:	00

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 004019BCh
call 00007F85EC75A0A5h
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
cmp byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
xor byte ptr [edx-58h], ah
wait
dec esp
push ss
das
dec ebx
test dword ptr [esi+10DDAE1Bh], esi
inc edi
scasb
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec esp
imul ebp, dword ptr [esi+6Fh], 0065696Ch
add byte ptr [eax], al
add byte ptr [eax], al
dec esp
xor dword ptr [eax], eax
add byte ptr [esi], bl
mov dword ptr [A74FB7F8h], eax
pushfd
dec ebp
test al, DFh
pop edx
mov dword ptr [ecx-242943C3h], eax
fcomip st(0), st(2)

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x215d4	0x28	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x24000	0x970	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x24000	0x1490
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x228	0x20
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x1000	0x234	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x20cc4	0x21000	False	0.367520419034	data	5.25414504645	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x22000	0x122c	0x1000	False	0.00634765625	data	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x24000	0x970	0x1000	False	0.173828125	data	2.0476168209	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_ICON	0x24840	0x130	data
RT_ICON	0x24558	0x2e8	data
RT_ICON	0x24430	0x128	GLS_BINARY_LSB_FIRST
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x24400	0x30	data
RT_VERSION	0x24150	0x2b0	data	Chinese	Taiwan

Imports

DLL

Import

MSVBVM60.DLL

__vbaR8FixI4, _CIcos, _adj_fptan, __vbaHresultCheck, __vbaVarMove, __vbaStrI4, __vbaFreeVar, __vbaAryMove, __vbaStrVarMove, __vbaLenBstr, __vbaFreeVarList, __vbaVarIdiv, _adj_fdiv_m64, _adj_fprem1, __vbaStrCat, __vbaHresultCheckObj, __vbaLenBstrB, __vbaLenVar, _adj_fdiv_m32, __vbaAryDestruct, __vbaObjSet, __vbaOnError, _adj_fdiv_m16i, __vbaObjSetAddref, _adj_fdivr_m16i, __vbaFPFix, __vbaVarTstLt, __vbaFpR8, _CIsin, __vbaChkstk, __vbaFileClose, EVENT_SINK_AddRef, __vbaStrCmp, __vbaGet3, __vbaAryConstruct2, __vbaVarTstEq, __vbaObjVar, _adj_fpatan, __vbaRedim, EVENT_SINK_Release, _CIsqrt, EVENT_SINK_QueryInterface, __vbaExceptHandler, _adj_fprem, _adj_fdivr_m64, __vbaFPException, __vbaStrVarVal, __vbaVarCat, _CIlog, __vbaFileOpen, __vbaNew2, __vbaVar2Vec, _adj_fdiv_m32i, _adj_fdivr_m32i, __vbaStrCopy, __vbaFreeStrList, _adj_fdivr_m32, _adj_fdiv_r, __vbaVarTstNe, __vbaI4Var, __vbaInStrB, __vbaVarDup, __vbaVarTstGe, __vbaFpI4, __vbaLateMemCallLd, _CIatan, __vbaStrMove, __vbaR8IntI4, _allmul, _CItan, _CIexp, __vbaFreeStr, __vbaFreeObj

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0404 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Union
InternalName	filterhjdens
FileVersion	4.00
CompanyName	Union
LegalTrademarks	Union
ProductName	Union
ProductVersion	4.00
FileDescription	Union
OriginalFilename	filterhjdens.exe

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
Chinese	Taiwan

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: FACTURAS.exe PID: 6088 Parent PID: 3324

General

Start time:	13:17:09
Start date:	01/12/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\FACTURAS.exe"
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	152720 bytes
MD5 hash:	AB82F374210A08B2221D5E1807400A32
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	Visual Basic
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_GuLoader_2, Description: Yara detected GuLoader, Source: 00000000.00000002.822667479.0000000002A80000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report FACTURAS.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: GuLoader

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Authenticode Signature

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: FACTURAS.exe PID: 6088 Parent PID: 3324

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis