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Windows Analysis Report 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe
Analysis ID:	537742
MD5:	c47bfe4e43d258b87c6cece9de90c89f
SHA1:	eb2c417a29d2f08e37d63f3b75cdc61b42855e91
SHA256:	f4d742d82698f532e0215832cb484619a4e84547d8a1ca8dc8f2e9f791a6f27d
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Score:	56
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Creates autostart registry keys to launch java

Machine Learning detection for sample

Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)

Uses 32bit PE files

AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)

PE file does not import any functions

One or more processes crash

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Checks if the current process is being debugged

PE file contains sections with non-standard names

Detected potential crypto function

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe (PID: 6984 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe" MD5: C47BFE4E43D258B87C6CECE9DE90C89F)

WerFault.exe (PID: 2060 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6984 -s 212 MD5: 9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

No yara matches

Sigma Overview

No Sigma rule has matched

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Show sources

Source: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe

Avira: detected

Machine Learning detection for sample

Show sources

Source: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source:	Binary string: wkernel32.pdb source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.299137006.0000000004BE1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.296664816.0000000002ADF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wkernelbase.pdb source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.299137006.0000000004BE1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.296789212.0000000002ACA000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: nCReportStore::Prune: MaxReportCount=%d MaxSizeInMb=%dRSDSwkernel32.pdb source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000002.309035111.0000000000522000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdb source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.299137006.0000000004BE1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: upwntdll.pdb source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.299094342.0000000002AD8000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.296865453.0000000002AD7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.297018256.0000000002AD7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.297417397.0000000002AD8000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: apphelp.pdb source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.299137006.0000000004BE1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: upwntdll.pdbk$ source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.305141001.0000000002AD8000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.306277726.0000000002AD8000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.304726906.0000000002AD8000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdbk source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.299137006.0000000004BE1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000002.309889564.0000000002ABB000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.307712711.0000000002ABB000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.globalsign.net/root-r2.crl0
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	String found in binary or memory: http://upx.sf.net

Source: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe, 00000001.00000000.292131293.000000000279A000.00000004.00000020.sdmp

Binary or memory string: <HOOK MODULE="DDRAW.DLL" FUNCTION="DirectDrawCreateEx"/>

Source: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe

Static PE information: No import functions for PE file found

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6984 -s 212

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	Code function: 1_2_022E19B0	1_2_022E19B0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	Code function: 1_2_022E8D70	1_2_022E8D70
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	Code function: 1_2_022E37F0	1_2_022E37F0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	Code function: 1_2_022E50C0	1_2_022E50C0

Source: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe

Static PE information: Section: .data ZLIB complexity 1.021484375

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe

File created: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER78B9.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal56.winEXE@2/6@0/0

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe"
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6984 -s 212

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\WERReportingForProcess6984

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source:	Binary string: wkernel32.pdb source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.299137006.0000000004BE1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.296664816.0000000002ADF000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wkernelbase.pdb source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.299137006.0000000004BE1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.296789212.0000000002ACA000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: nCReportStore::Prune: MaxReportCount=%d MaxSizeInMb=%dRSDSwkernel32.pdb source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000002.309035111.0000000000522000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdb source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.299137006.0000000004BE1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: upwntdll.pdb source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.299094342.0000000002AD8000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.296865453.0000000002AD7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.297018256.0000000002AD7000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.297417397.0000000002AD8000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: apphelp.pdb source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.299137006.0000000004BE1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: upwntdll.pdbk$ source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.305141001.0000000002AD8000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.306277726.0000000002AD8000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.304726906.0000000002AD8000.00000004.00000001.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: wntdll.pdbk source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.299137006.0000000004BE1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp

Source: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT is in: .rdata
Source: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE is in: .rsrc
Source: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC is in: .reloc
Source: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG is in: .rdata
Source: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT is in: .rdata

Source: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe

Static PE information: section name: .teslaX

Boot Survival:

Creates autostart registry keys to launch java

Show sources

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Registry value created or modified: \REGISTRY\A\{5f6f2660-b4f2-a4df-7d05-86d67e169743}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\1.2.javaw.exe.22\|d0d8f4f4 LowerCaseLongPath c:\users\user\desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Registry value created or modified: \REGISTRY\A\{5f6f2660-b4f2-a4df-7d05-86d67e169743}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\1.2.javaw.exe.22\|d0d8f4f4 LongPathHash 1.2.javaw.exe.22\|d0d8f4f4	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Registry value created or modified: \REGISTRY\A\{5f6f2660-b4f2-a4df-7d05-86d67e169743}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\1.2.javaw.exe.22\|d0d8f4f4 Name 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: FAILCRITICALERRORS \| NOGPFAULTERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: VMware
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: scsi/disk&ven_vmware&prod_virtual_disk/5&1ec51bf7&0&000000
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: @scsi/cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00/5&280b647&0&000000
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: VMware Virtual USB Mouse
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: VMware, Inc.
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: VMware Virtual disk SCSI Disk Devicehbin
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: Microsoft Hyper-V Generation Counter
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: VMware7,1
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: NECVMWar VMware SATA CD00
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: VMware Virtual disk SCSI Disk Device
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: BiosVendor:VMware, Inc.,BiosVersion:VMW71.00V.13989454.B64.1906190538,BiosReleaseDate:06/19/2019,BiosMajorRelease:0xff,BiosMinorRelease:0xff,SystemManufacturer:VMware, Inc.,SystemProduct:VMware7,1,SystemFamily:,SystemSKUNumber:,BaseboardManufacturer:,BaseboardProduct:,BaseboardVersion:,EnclosureType:0x1
Source: WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000002.309873948.0000000002AA3000.00000004.00000001.sdmp, WerFault.exe, 00000008.00000003.307778902.0000000002AA1000.00000004.00000001.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: scsi\cdromnecvmwarvmware_sata_cd001.00,scsi\cdromnecvmwarvmware_sata_cd00,scsi\cdromnecvmwar,scsi\necvmwarvmware_sata_cd001,necvmwarvmware_sata_cd001,gencdrom
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: scsi\diskvmware__virtual_disk____2.0_,scsi\diskvmware__virtual_disk____,scsi\diskvmware__,scsi\vmware__virtual_disk____2,vmware__virtual_disk____2,gendisk
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: VMware, Inc.me
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: VMware-42 35 d8 20 48 cb c7 ff-aa 5e d0 37 a0 49 53 d7
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: scsi/cdrom&ven_necvmwar&prod_vmware_sata_cd00/5&280b647&0&000000
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: :scsi/disk&ven_vmware&prod_virtual_disk/5&1ec51bf7&0&000000

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe

Code function: 1_2_022E3E40 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

1_2_022E3E40

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe

Process queried: DebugPort

Jump to behavior

Source: Amcache.hve.LOG1.8.dr, Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: c:\users\user\desktop\procexp.exe
Source: Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: c:\program files\windows defender\msmpeng.exe
Source: Amcache.hve.LOG1.8.dr, Amcache.hve.8.dr	Binary or memory string: procexp.exe

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder1	Process Injection1	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	Input Capture1	Security Software Discovery21	Remote Services	Input Capture1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Encrypted Channel1	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder1	Software Packing1	LSASS Memory	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Process Injection1	Security Account Manager	System Information Discovery1	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Binary Padding	NTDS	Remote System Discovery1	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen
1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
1.2.1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe.22e0000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
1.0.1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe.22e0000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
1.0.1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe.22e0000.1.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File
1.0.1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe.22e0000.2.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen	Download File

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://upx.sf.net	Amcache.hve.8.dr	false		high

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	34.0.0 Boulder Opal
Analysis ID:	537742
Start date:	10.12.2021
Start time:	12:15:12
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 5m 39s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Sample file name:	1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Run name:	Run with higher sleep bypass
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	26
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal56.winEXE@2/6@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 94.7% (good quality ratio 47.4%) Quality average: 36.5% Quality standard deviation: 41.2%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 5
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Sleeps bigger than 120000ms are automatically reduced to 1000ms Found application associated with file extension: .exe
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WerFault.exe, WMIADAP.exe, MusNotifyIcon.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 23.211.6.115, 52.168.117.173 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): onedsblobprdeus16.eastus.cloudapp.azure.com, settings-win.data.microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net, arc.msn.com, ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, e12564.dspb.akamaiedge.net, login.live.com, store-images.s-microsoft.com, blobcollector.events.data.trafficmanager.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, watson.telemetry.microsoft.com Execution Graph export aborted for target 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe, PID 6984 because there are no executed function Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportQueue\AppCrash_1.2.javaw.exe.22_e816a0737e58b9c4a7ce791273f8931c044f28_358f4505_09668aab\Report.wer Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	Little-endian UTF-16 Unicode text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	65536
Entropy (8bit):	0.6387115446126613
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	192:4nlgLpUmqHBUZMXW1xjE/u7svS274ItJ6H:+yQBUZMXIjE/u7svX4ItE
MD5:	259D7D09E351671F850950A54F800028
SHA1:	8163D0665B803B97847B84CF528E4E9ED55BBA1F
SHA-256:	073CFD100EC7746447AD2EB1CC08A7D9899BF378ECC7B85BE52EAE01CBB96826
SHA-512:	665EB00CC8653950101549C144E409E4BED71E19164682B37459E60CC06C9A7C8C14DDFD59CF2CFC0A230DFEED79A61EF78FCB5F58170387EAE1E71F7349259A
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	..V.e.r.s.i.o.n.=.1.....E.v.e.n.t.T.y.p.e.=.A.P.P.C.R.A.S.H.....E.v.e.n.t.T.i.m.e.=.1.3.2.8.3.6.4.0.9.7.3.0.8.4.1.3.2.5.....R.e.p.o.r.t.T.y.p.e.=.2.....C.o.n.s.e.n.t.=.1.....U.p.l.o.a.d.T.i.m.e.=.1.3.2.8.3.6.4.0.9.7.6.3.8.1.0.0.3.1.....R.e.p.o.r.t.S.t.a.t.u.s.=.5.2.4.3.8.4.....R.e.p.o.r.t.I.d.e.n.t.i.f.i.e.r.=.e.5.e.3.1.8.a.2.-.7.8.b.b.-.4.3.6.7.-.b.3.2.2.-.2.a.0.a.a.e.e.6.f.5.d.d.....I.n.t.e.g.r.a.t.o.r.R.e.p.o.r.t.I.d.e.n.t.i.f.i.e.r.=.6.d.4.f.e.9.6.3.-.c.d.c.2.-.4.c.1.e.-.8.8.d.6.-.7.3.1.d.5.a.e.e.5.b.7.a.....W.o.w.6.4.H.o.s.t.=.3.4.4.0.4.....W.o.w.6.4.G.u.e.s.t.=.3.3.2.....N.s.A.p.p.N.a.m.e.=.1...2...j.a.v.a.w...e.x.e...2.2.e.0.0.0.0...2...e.x.e.....A.p.p.S.e.s.s.i.o.n.G.u.i.d.=.0.0.0.0.1.b.4.8.-.0.0.0.1.-.0.0.1.c.-.e.e.9.0.-.4.7.c.4.0.2.e.e.d.7.0.1.....T.a.r.g.e.t.A.p.p.I.d.=.W.:.0.0.0.6.9.c.4.9.c.8.6.c.a.b.9.5.e.7.6.6.2.d.e.d.8.0.3.a.3.f.1.0.6.b.3.f.0.0.0.0.f.f.f.f.!.0.0.0.0.e.b.2.c.4.1.7.a.2.9.d.2.f.0.8.e.3.7.d.6.3.f.3.b.7.5.c.d.c.6.1.b.4.2.8.5.5.e.9.1.!.1...2...j.a.v.a.w...e.x.

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER78B9.tmp.dmp Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	Mini DuMP crash report, 14 streams, Fri Dec 10 20:16:13 2021, 0x1205a4 type
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	18362
Entropy (8bit):	2.343903676364738
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	96:5y8iT8Q/VrODryOCxYyoi7kj9zCHubLBE/1Tk2flR2WntEWInWIX4I4ChWO9OY:niXVruryOCubOKzRLYlMWtBChWOoY
MD5:	EB0B539902398955A64EF6B0E07C3BAA
SHA1:	FD3BD62651A5166D74603F07C6AA1DFA680F510E
SHA-256:	2DD148793BA664BE56E3C5B2EB1DFC64796FF3E0E9B90556FCC844883F9ED593
SHA-512:	E42FE9230E408F4035816CBDE921509C712DBA0A0FC97F27FC6950EB2DB2856A3A1EE068F81EEC75E8F173DC046CEA018840785DF73C591724EAD058F4B5CA67
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	MDMP....... ..........a............4........... ...<.......d...............T.......8...........T................>..........\...........H....................................................................U...........B..............GenuineIntelW...........T.......H......a.............................0..2...............P.a.c.i.f.i.c. .S.t.a.n.d.a.r.d. .T.i.m.e...........................................P.a.c.i.f.i.c. .D.a.y.l.i.g.h.t. .T.i.m.e...........................................1.7.1.3.4...1...x.8.6.f.r.e...r.s.4._.r.e.l.e.a.s.e...1.8.0.4.1.0.-.1.8.0.4.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER7B79.tmp.WERInternalMetadata.xml Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, Little-endian UTF-16 Unicode text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	8356
Entropy (8bit):	3.698609452578638
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	192:Rrl7r3GLNiAkD60bv6YFASUUogmfgKbS5Cpr489bR5sfhbm:RrlsNiH646YCSUUogmfhS0RSfA
MD5:	216914B0B00EC2009D396AAAA7FFB323
SHA1:	F5F1BCEA1FD05CCCDF9E88EF7FD2504F0F372DA5
SHA-256:	0B0C307B0EFCDFB64C1CBEF95D904E66410A97C58BA088543A7DFAFA4CD976BD
SHA-512:	F1D563E56EB0A92F7A5C7BEA0081F4D39243AF20F91581A0D1D450220E485426712175A1B76F81B3FCD88DE52FB5355FAC0893FE4C7BCB268B3ACE608B27337B
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	..<.?.x.m.l. .v.e.r.s.i.o.n.=.".1...0.". .e.n.c.o.d.i.n.g.=.".U.T.F.-.1.6.".?.>.....<.W.E.R.R.e.p.o.r.t.M.e.t.a.d.a.t.a.>.......<.O.S.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.I.n.f.o.r.m.a.t.i.o.n.>.........<.W.i.n.d.o.w.s.N.T.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.>.1.0...0.<./.W.i.n.d.o.w.s.N.T.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.>.........<.B.u.i.l.d.>.1.7.1.3.4.<./.B.u.i.l.d.>.........<.P.r.o.d.u.c.t.>.(.0.x.3.0.).:. .W.i.n.d.o.w.s. .1.0. .P.r.o.<./.P.r.o.d.u.c.t.>.........<.E.d.i.t.i.o.n.>.P.r.o.f.e.s.s.i.o.n.a.l.<./.E.d.i.t.i.o.n.>.........<.B.u.i.l.d.S.t.r.i.n.g.>.1.7.1.3.4...1...a.m.d.6.4.f.r.e...r.s.4._.r.e.l.e.a.s.e...1.8.0.4.1.0.-.1.8.0.4.<./.B.u.i.l.d.S.t.r.i.n.g.>.........<.R.e.v.i.s.i.o.n.>.1.<./.R.e.v.i.s.i.o.n.>.........<.F.l.a.v.o.r.>.M.u.l.t.i.p.r.o.c.e.s.s.o.r. .F.r.e.e.<./.F.l.a.v.o.r.>.........<.A.r.c.h.i.t.e.c.t.u.r.e.>.X.6.4.<./.A.r.c.h.i.t.e.c.t.u.r.e.>.........<.L.C.I.D.>.1.0.3.3.<./.L.C.I.D.>.......<./.O.S.V.e.r.s.i.o.n.I.n.f.o.r.m.a.t.i.o.n.>.......<.P.r.o.c.e.s.s.I.n.f.o.r.m.a.t.i.o.n.>.........<.P.i.d.>.6.9.8.4.<./.P.i.d.>.......

C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WER7E68.tmp.xml Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	4654
Entropy (8bit):	4.469771708373248
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	48:cvIwSD8zssJgtWI9HKzoWSC8B5y/8fm8M4Jij2mFoi+q8mWcc9osUd:uITfqFNSNGkJNiq9osUd
MD5:	C5A829051FB453E06999223896F7EAE8
SHA1:	49FDB57106FB64C6D32550E577BEC8A7A21A7FA4
SHA-256:	F52D469D5312316C025D55E6C2150CBED4C1BEA42E85D8020635372BCC0E85F9
SHA-512:	C45D9D45DE5953F1FF5DFB45A81A9B37775A37ADE198E8A20A66A8CFCE7C7C87A993510A530911B3C4D0D5009CF6D89328B8EF21266E07F0391D00461601E36E
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>..<req ver="2">.. <tlm>.. <src>.. <desc>.. <mach>.. <os>.. <arg nm="vermaj" val="10" />.. <arg nm="vermin" val="0" />.. <arg nm="verbld" val="17134" />.. <arg nm="vercsdbld" val="1" />.. <arg nm="verqfe" val="1" />.. <arg nm="csdbld" val="1" />.. <arg nm="versp" val="0" />.. <arg nm="arch" val="9" />.. <arg nm="lcid" val="1033" />.. <arg nm="geoid" val="244" />.. <arg nm="sku" val="48" />.. <arg nm="domain" val="0" />.. <arg nm="prodsuite" val="256" />.. <arg nm="ntprodtype" val="1" />.. <arg nm="platid" val="2" />.. <arg nm="tmsi" val="1292006" />.. <arg nm="osinsty" val="1" />.. <arg nm="iever" val="11.1.17134.0-11.0.47" />.. <arg nm="portos" val="0" />.. <arg nm="ram" val="4096" />..

C:\Windows\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	MS Windows registry file, NT/2000 or above
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1572864
Entropy (8bit):	4.275800585591826
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12288:vvsTovxSsEMRpXQDqJzAeuJgpN1sSxkbTHJsuRdNo4s6fThgDuxSy:HsTovxSsEMRpXQ3E
MD5:	31FA34FBB33900F29147D20EF0DA77C0
SHA1:	E70D0DADA92800498655AFD85A7BE4E3A01964CE
SHA-256:	9BD63165253885AB98F8592689B127D2766FAA9E490A3ECB50E7086D1497A60D
SHA-512:	C52B3E0D58FD8E4656AB43DAF33B0121C8EA2B150ED6B098E38A7F1388DE15638C2F025F3F321D63A62814343A9B574B3BCAF9F6DAB17935A14E674214BF50FF
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	regfZ...Z...p.\..,.................. ...........\.A.p.p.C.o.m.p.a.t.\.P.r.o.g.r.a.m.s.\.A.m.c.a.c.h.e...h.v.e...4............E.4............E.....5............E.rmtm..r...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................v.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Windows\appcompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.LOG1 Download File
Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
File Type:	MS Windows registry file, NT/2000 or above
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	24576
Entropy (8bit):	4.0023138344330675
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	384:wJYX5Rftx1OPJ4XxZFFnQ7k9PBqXeSeq5QMVyiy+/1l4Lk4iZd1DoXzn+a8deV:wYJRftx10J4XTFFQ7KBqXleq5QMVyiy1
MD5:	C21D8691ED58E0FEA9BCF34504847DA0
SHA1:	69B0F3CAE2893150E8C21FE86AACAA0867C8F9A5
SHA-256:	986ADE1932FF0E7C06D04589D3222CC247E5345EFDE167682F2188D1DA7272B7
SHA-512:	C67FB1DA7DA1B3ADC6EAD421986CC53B7C19E995254B42E3140DF04B72A9C2DCDBF5FD486E383F31F46AD37E4F18CABF2A1AEB7AF705EB95A8DA5183D6861DD0
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	regfY...Y...p.\..,.................. ...........\.A.p.p.C.o.m.p.a.t.\.P.r.o.g.r.a.m.s.\.A.m.c.a.c.h.e...h.v.e...4............E.4............E.....5............E.rmtm..r...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................v.HvLE.^......Y...........C)..F..I!.5..J.j.........0................... ..hbin................p.\..,..........nk,...u..................................... ...........................&...{ad79c032-a2ea-f756-e377-72fb9332c3ae}......nk ...u......... ........................... .......Z.......................Root........lf......Root....nk ...u......................}.............. ...............*...............DeviceCensus.......................vk..................WritePermissionsCheck...

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.916588118656297
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.96% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe
File size:	58880
MD5:	c47bfe4e43d258b87c6cece9de90c89f
SHA1:	eb2c417a29d2f08e37d63f3b75cdc61b42855e91
SHA256:	f4d742d82698f532e0215832cb484619a4e84547d8a1ca8dc8f2e9f791a6f27d
SHA512:	e5fe932fc3245c68f846450db94459d69f992009667e2d9cc6e0ac520723ba9da558698948d596d18512afdfa554ce61dddafa1d0941cc7f3ab94b066885f57b
SSDEEP:	768:kg9fMhjuf6B6vgjloxr9EIz2y9Vn/uS4POG1GY5GMxzdAjNxc:klhiCB6gjyBEs3h4WG1lUMld4Nxc
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$..........;.z.h.z.h.z.h...i.z.h...i.z.h...h.z.h.z.h.z.h=..i.z.h=..h.z.h=..i.z.hRich.z.h........................PE..L.....ga...........

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x22e4a40
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x22e0000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	GUARD_CF, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE
Time Stamp:	0x616701A9 [Wed Oct 13 15:56:25 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	5
OS Version Minor:	1
File Version Major:	5
File Version Minor:	1
Subsystem Version Major:	5
Subsystem Version Minor:	1
Import Hash:

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push 40000001h
push dword ptr [ebp-0Ch]
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp-00000210h]
push eax
call dword ptr [0040A074h]
test eax, eax
jne 00007FBB94D63111h
push esi
push eax
call dword ptr [0040A184h]
push eax
call dword ptr [0040A188h]
push 00000000h
push 00000080h
push 00000004h
push 00000000h
push 00000000h
push C0000000h
push 0040C028h
call dword ptr [0040A1A0h]
mov dword ptr [ebp-1Ch], eax
test eax, eax
je 00007FBB94D63176h
push 00000000h
lea ecx, dword ptr [ebp-000000C0h]
push ecx
push dword ptr [ebp-000000B8h]
push dword ptr [ebp-000000BCh]
push eax
call dword ptr [0040A140h]
push 0040A7C8h
push 0040A81Ch
push esi
push 0040A830h
push 0040A7C8h
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp-00000310h]
push 0040A844h
push eax
call dword ptr [0040A1D8h]
add esp, 1Ch
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp-00000310h]
push eax
call dword ptr [0040A09Ch]
push 00000000h
lea ecx, dword ptr [ebp-000000C0h]
push ecx
push eax
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp-00000310h]
push eax
push dword ptr [ebp-1Ch]
call dword ptr [0040A140h]
mov eax, dword ptr [ebp-1Ch]
push eax
call dword ptr [0040A0D0h]

Rich Headers

Programming Language:

[IMP] VS2008 SP1 build 30729

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0xac40	0xa0	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x10000	0x1e0	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x11000	0x5d0	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0xaba0	0x40	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0xa000	0x1e0	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x8f5f	0x9000	False	0.487820095486	data	6.55103014538	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rdata	0xa000	0x1740	0x1800	False	0.583821614583	data	5.73452393233	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0xc000	0x9ec	0x200	False	1.021484375	data	7.55445028361	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.teslaX	0xd000	0x2e70	0x3000	False	0.223551432292	data	2.49418691917	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_SHARED, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x10000	0x1e0	0x200	False	0.291015625	data	1.76481887066	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x11000	0x5d0	0x600	False	0.303385416667	data	3.43918740047	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

CPU Usage

Click to jump to process

Memory Usage

Click to jump to process

High Level Behavior Distribution

Click to dive into process behavior distribution

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe PID: 6984 Parent PID: 3416

General

Start time:	12:16:08
Start date:	10/12/2021
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe"
Imagebase:	0x22e0000
File size:	58880 bytes
MD5 hash:	C47BFE4E43D258B87C6CECE9DE90C89F
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: WerFault.exe PID: 2060 Parent PID: 6984

General

Start time:	12:16:10
Start date:	10/12/2021
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 6984 -s 212
Imagebase:	0x890000
File size:	434592 bytes
MD5 hash:	9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe PID: 6984 Parent PID: 3416 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exeCOMMON

Executed Functions

Non-executed Functions

Function 022E3E40, Relevance: 15.6, Strings: 12, Instructions: 635COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Strings

\, xrefs: 022E46E4
:\, xrefs: 022E4101
--, xrefs: 022E464D
IN P, xrefs: 022E462F
----, xrefs: 022E461A
\, xrefs: 022E4708
UBLI, xrefs: 022E4636
?, xrefs: 022E46FE
\, xrefs: 022E46F4
Y---, xrefs: 022E4646
C KE, xrefs: 022E463F
-BEG, xrefs: 022E4626

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.310857995.00000000022E1000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, Offset: 022E0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000001.00000002.310851147.00000000022E0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310868024.00000000022EA000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310874334.00000000022EC000.00000008.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310886066.00000000022ED000.00000040.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310892342.00000000022F0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_22e0000_1.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID: :\$--$----$-BEG$?$C KE$IN P$UBLI$Y---$\$\$\
API String ID: 0-3781867839
Opcode ID: a42d6b0571476a135d6872291771d1009d7d2f5690da01647f50bfef1f798d18
Instruction ID: dfdafc4f844c5d32fc84bfc14d4bffea3bc48878a360309ab49b4601eba6981d
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: a42d6b0571476a135d6872291771d1009d7d2f5690da01647f50bfef1f798d18
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 9E429E71910319ABEF209FA0DD49FEE7BB8BB04700F0041A5F60AF6190D7B45A94DF6A

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Function 022E19B0, Relevance: 3.0, Strings: 2, Instructions: 475COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Strings

, xrefs: 022E1F73
, xrefs: 022E1DCC

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.310857995.00000000022E1000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, Offset: 022E0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000001.00000002.310851147.00000000022E0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310868024.00000000022EA000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310874334.00000000022EC000.00000008.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310886066.00000000022ED000.00000040.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310892342.00000000022F0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_22e0000_1.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID: $
API String ID: 0-227171996
Opcode ID: 52d2e84b8b21ea5cdf70ede3f66e8a6307202e7d7e3d27daa08e02ca69b7a5e9
Instruction ID: 989b4299117e0df9bd4c7a4c01cce2cad11b153de504daf034b3978f94a595f5
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 52d2e84b8b21ea5cdf70ede3f66e8a6307202e7d7e3d27daa08e02ca69b7a5e9
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 79127D71900219AFDF10DFA0DD48BEEBBB8FB08304F504169EA0AB7290D7749A54DF69

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Function 022E37F0, Relevance: 1.5, Strings: 1, Instructions: 293
COMMONCrypto

Download Yara Rule

C-Code - Quality: 73%

			E022E37F0(intOrPtr __ecx, signed int* _a4, signed char* _a8, signed int _a12, signed int _a16) {
				signed int _v8;
				signed int _v12;
				signed int _v16;
				signed int _v20;
				signed int _v24;
				signed int _v28;
				signed int _v32;
				signed int _v36;
				signed int _v40;
				signed int _v44;
				signed int _v48;
				signed int _v52;
				signed int _v56;
				signed int _v60;
				signed int _v64;
				signed int _v68;
				signed int _v72;
				signed int _v76;
				intOrPtr _v80;
				signed int _v84;
				intOrPtr _v88;
				signed int _v92;
				signed int _v96;
				signed int _v100;
				signed int _v104;
				signed int _v108;
				signed int _v112;
				signed int _v116;
				signed int _v120;
				signed int _v124;
				signed int _v128;
				signed int _v132;
				signed int _v136;
				signed int _v140;
				signed int _v144;
				signed int _v148;
				signed int _v152;
				signed int _v156;
				signed int _v160;
				signed int _v164;
				intOrPtr _v168;
				char _v230;
				signed int _t186;
				signed int _t187;
				signed int _t201;
				signed int _t203;
				signed int _t207;
				signed int _t211;
				signed int _t215;
				signed int _t217;
				signed int _t218;
				signed int _t219;
				signed int _t220;
				void* _t221;
				signed int _t225;
				signed int _t229;
				signed int _t231;
				signed int _t236;
				signed int _t238;
				signed int _t240;
				signed int _t242;
				signed int _t243;
				signed int _t246;
				signed int _t248;
				signed int _t250;
				signed int _t252;
				signed int _t254;
				signed int _t255;
				signed int _t257;
				signed int _t258;
				signed int _t260;
				signed int _t261;
				signed int _t263;
				intOrPtr _t270;
				intOrPtr _t271;
				signed int _t273;
				signed int _t275;
				signed int _t276;
				signed int _t277;
				signed int _t278;
				signed int _t280;
				signed int _t282;
				signed int _t284;
				signed int _t286;
				unsigned int _t288;
				signed int _t290;
				signed int _t293;
				signed int _t295;
				signed int _t296;
				signed int _t298;
				signed char* _t300;
				signed int _t302;
				signed int _t304;
				signed int _t305;
				signed int _t307;
				signed int _t309;
				char* _t311;
				signed int _t312;
				void* _t315;
				void* _t320;
				signed int _t321;
				void* _t323;

				_t186 = _a12;
				_t273 = _a16;
				_v28 = _t186;
				_t187 = _t186 | _t273;
				_v80 = __ecx;
				_v60 = _t273;
				if(_t187 != 0) {
					_v168 = __ecx -  &_v230;
					do {
						asm("movups xmm0, [ecx]");
						_v24 = 0xa;
						asm("movups [ebp-0x94], xmm0");
						_t302 = _v148;
						asm("movups xmm0, [ecx+0x10]");
						_v56 = _t302;
						asm("movups [ebp-0x84], xmm0");
						asm("movups xmm0, [ecx+0x20]");
						asm("movups [ebp-0x74], xmm0");
						_t229 = _v108;
						asm("movups xmm0, [ecx+0x30]");
						_t246 = _v152;
						_v20 = _t229;
						asm("movups [ebp-0x64], xmm0");
						_t275 = _v104;
						_v8 = _v96;
						_v12 = _v100;
						_v44 = _v112;
						_v40 = _v116;
						_v36 = _v120;
						_v72 = _v124;
						_v76 = _v132;
						_v32 = _v136;
						_v48 = _v92;
						_t293 = _v128;
						_v68 = _v140;
						_v52 = _t293;
						_v64 = _v144;
						_v16 = _t246;
						do {
							asm("rol eax, 0x7");
							_t201 = _t246 + _t275 ^ _v32;
							_v32 = _t201;
							asm("rol ecx, 0x9");
							_t248 = _t246 + _t201 ^ _v36;
							_v156 = _t248;
							asm("rol eax, 0xd");
							_t203 = _t201 + _t248 ^ _t275;
							_t276 = _v76;
							_v164 = _t203;
							asm("ror eax, 0xe");
							_v16 = _t203 + _t248 ^ _v16;
							asm("rol eax, 0x7");
							_t207 = _t302 + _t276 ^ _v40;
							_v36 = _t207;
							asm("rol ecx, 0x9");
							_t250 = _t207 + _t276 ^ _v12;
							_v84 = _t250;
							asm("rol esi, 0xd");
							_t304 = _t207 + _t250 ^ _v56;
							asm("ror eax, 0xe");
							_t277 = _v44;
							_v40 = _t304 + _t250 ^ _t276;
							asm("rol eax, 0x7");
							_t211 = _t293 + _t277 ^ _v8;
							_v160 = _t211;
							asm("rol ecx, 0x9");
							_t252 = _t211 + _t277 ^ _v64;
							asm("rol edi, 0xd");
							_t295 = _t252 + _t211 ^ _v52;
							_v8 = _t295;
							asm("ror eax, 0xe");
							_t278 = _v48;
							_v44 = _t252 + _t295 ^ _t277;
							asm("rol eax, 0x7");
							_t215 = _t229 + _t278 ^ _v68;
							asm("rol edx, 0x9");
							_t280 = _t278 + _t215 ^ _v72;
							asm("rol ebx, 0xd");
							_t231 = _t280 + _t215 ^ _v20;
							_v20 = _t231;
							_t296 = _t280 + _t231;
							_v12 = _t296;
							asm("ror ebx, 0xe");
							_v12 = _t296 ^ _v48;
							asm("rol ebx, 0x7");
							_t236 = _v16 + _t215 ^ _t304;
							_t305 = _v16;
							_v56 = _t236;
							_v148 = _t236;
							asm("rol edi, 0x9");
							_t298 = _t236 + _t305 ^ _t252;
							_v64 = _t298;
							_v144 = _t298;
							asm("rol ecx, 0xd");
							_t254 = _t298 + _t236 ^ _t215;
							_v68 = _t254;
							_v140 = _t254;
							_t255 = _v32;
							asm("ror eax, 0xe");
							_t217 = _t298 + _t254 ^ _t305;
							_v16 = _t217;
							_v152 = _t217;
							_t218 = _v40;
							asm("rol ebx, 0x7");
							_t238 = _t255 + _t218 ^ _v8;
							_v52 = _t238;
							_v128 = _t238;
							_t293 = _v52;
							asm("rol esi, 0x9");
							_t307 = _t218 + _t238 ^ _t280;
							_v72 = _t307;
							_v124 = _t307;
							asm("rol edx, 0xd");
							_t282 = _t307 + _t238 ^ _t255;
							_v32 = _t282;
							_v136 = _t282;
							asm("ror ecx, 0xe");
							_t257 = _t282 + _t307 ^ _t218;
							_t219 = _v44;
							_v76 = _t257;
							_v132 = _t257;
							_t258 = _v36;
							asm("rol edx, 0x7");
							_t284 = _t258 + _t219 ^ _v20;
							_v20 = _t284;
							_v108 = _t284;
							asm("rol ebx, 0x9");
							_t240 = _t219 + _t284 ^ _v156;
							_v36 = _t240;
							asm("rol edx, 0xd");
							_t286 = _t284 + _t240 ^ _t258;
							_v120 = _t240;
							_v40 = _t286;
							_v116 = _t286;
							asm("ror ecx, 0xe");
							_t260 = _t286 + _t240 ^ _t219;
							_t220 = _v12;
							_v44 = _t260;
							_v112 = _t260;
							_t261 = _v160;
							asm("rol edx, 0x7");
							_t275 = _t220 + _t261 ^ _v164;
							asm("rol ebx, 0x9");
							_t242 = _t220 + _t275 ^ _v84;
							_v12 = _t242;
							_v100 = _t242;
							asm("rol esi, 0xd");
							_t309 = _t242 + _t275 ^ _t261;
							_v8 = _t309;
							_v96 = _t309;
							_t229 = _v20;
							_t302 = _v56;
							asm("ror ecx, 0xe");
							_t263 = _t309 + _t242 ^ _t220;
							_t139 =  &_v24;
							 *_t139 = _v24 - 1;
							_v48 = _t263;
							_v92 = _t263;
							_t246 = _v16;
						} while ( *_t139 != 0);
						_v104 = _t275;
						_t221 = 0;
						do {
							_t311 =  &_v230 + _t221;
							 *(_t315 + _t221 - 0x94) =  *(_t315 + _t221 - 0x94) +  *((intOrPtr*)(_t311 + _v168));
							_t288 =  *(_t315 + _t221 - 0x94);
							 *((char*)(_t311 - 1)) = _t288 >> 8;
							 *(_t315 + _t221 - 0xe4) = _t288;
							_t221 = _t221 + 4;
							 *_t311 = _t288 >> 0x10;
							 *((char*)(_t311 + 1)) = _t288 >> 0x18;
							_t320 = _t221 - 0x40;
						} while (_t320 < 0);
						_t270 = _v80;
						_t312 = _v60;
						_t243 = _v28;
						 *((intOrPtr*)(_t270 + 0x20)) =  *((intOrPtr*)(_t270 + 0x20)) + 1;
						 *((intOrPtr*)(_t270 + 0x24)) =  *((intOrPtr*)(_t270 + 0x24)) + (0 | _t320 == 0x00000000);
						_t321 = _t312;
						if(_t321 < 0 || _t321 <= 0 && _t243 < 0x40) {
							_v8 = _t243;
							_v24 = _t312;
							__eflags = _t312;
							if(__eflags < 0) {
								goto L18;
							}
							if(__eflags > 0) {
								goto L13;
							}
							__eflags = _t243;
							if(_t243 == 0) {
								goto L18;
							}
							goto L13;
						} else {
							_v8 = 0x40;
							_v24 = 0;
							L13:
							_t300 = _a8;
							asm("xorps xmm0, xmm0");
							asm("movlpd [ebp-0x54], xmm0");
							_t290 = _v84;
							_t271 = _v88;
							asm("o16 nop [eax+eax]");
							do {
								_a4 =  &(_a4[0]);
								_t312 = _v60;
								 *_t300 =  *(_t315 + _t271 - 0xe4) ^  *_a4;
								_t300 =  &(_t300[1]);
								_t271 = _t271 + 1;
								asm("adc edx, 0x0");
								_t243 = _t243 + 0xffffffff;
								asm("adc esi, 0xffffffff");
								_v60 = _t312;
								_t323 = _t290 - _v24;
							} while (_t323 < 0 || _t323 <= 0 && _t271 < _v8);
							_a8 = _t300;
							_v28 = _t243;
						}
						L18:
						_t225 = _t243 | _t312;
					} while (_t225 != 0);
					return _t225;
				}
				return _t187;
			}

0x022e37f9
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Strings

@, xrefs: 022E3B16

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.310857995.00000000022E1000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, Offset: 022E0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000001.00000002.310851147.00000000022E0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310868024.00000000022EA000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310874334.00000000022EC000.00000008.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310886066.00000000022ED000.00000040.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310892342.00000000022F0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_22e0000_1.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID: @
API String ID: 0-2766056989
Opcode ID: 8b7a9e1a88feac1389d61535c88320b9d5055c0f177b05ed808b92a018e8774f
Instruction ID: 7b0e90d4457caef0cd1f79a6b4973ad0cf048f8d73ebb9465e9c567418418da1
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 8b7a9e1a88feac1389d61535c88320b9d5055c0f177b05ed808b92a018e8774f
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: B4D1CEB5D103599BCF54CFA9C980AEDBBB1FF49304F2485AED81AA7205D7306A85CF90

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Function 022E8D70, Relevance: .3, Instructions: 285
COMMONCrypto

Download Yara Rule

C-Code - Quality: 36%

			E022E8D70(void* __ecx, char* _a4, unsigned int* _a8) {
				unsigned int _t176;
				unsigned int* _t280;
				unsigned int _t284;
				unsigned int _t301;
				unsigned int _t302;
				unsigned int _t303;
				unsigned int _t304;
				unsigned int _t305;
				unsigned int _t306;
				unsigned int _t307;
				unsigned int _t308;
				unsigned int _t315;
				unsigned int _t326;
				unsigned int _t327;
				unsigned int _t328;
				unsigned int _t329;
				unsigned int _t330;
				unsigned int _t331;
				unsigned int _t332;
				unsigned int _t333;
				unsigned int _t336;
				void* _t337;
				void* _t338;
				char* _t339;
				void* _t343;
				unsigned int* _t347;
				void* _t349;

				_push(__ecx);
				_t347 = _a8;
				_t2 =  &(_t347[0x14]); // 0x22e50f3
				_t280 = _t2;
				_t3 =  &(_t347[0x34]); // 0xd80bf20b
				_t336 =  *_t3;
				 *((char*)(_t280 + _t336)) = 0x80;
				_t337 = _t336 + 1;
				if(_t337 > 0x70) {
					_t315 = 0x80 - _t337;
					_t343 = _t337 + _t280;
					if(0x80 != 0) {
						memset(_t343 + (_t315 >> 2), memset(_t343, 0, 0x80 << 2), 0 << 0);
						_t349 = _t349 + 0x18;
					}
					_t337 = 0;
					E022E50C0(0x80, _t347, _t280);
					_t349 = _t349 + 8;
				}
				_t284 = 0x70 - _t337;
				_t338 = _t337 + _t280;
				if(0x70 != 0) {
					memset(_t338 + (_t284 >> 2), memset(_t338, 0, 0x70 << 2), 0 << 0);
					_t349 = _t349 + 0x18;
				}
				_t11 =  &(_t347[0x10]); // 0x89fffffe
				_t280[0x1f] =  *_t11 & 0x000000ff;
				_t13 =  &(_t347[0x10]); // 0x89fffffe
				_t14 =  &(_t347[0x11]); // 0x478ba045
				_t280[0x1f] = ( *_t14 << 0x00000020 |  *_t13) >> 8;
				_t20 =  &(_t347[0x10]); // 0x89fffffe
				_t21 =  &(_t347[0x11]); // 0x478ba045
				_t280[0x1f] = ( *_t21 << 0x00000020 |  *_t20) >> 0x10;
				_t27 =  &(_t347[0x10]); // 0x89fffffe
				_t28 =  &(_t347[0x11]); // 0x478ba045
				_t280[0x1f] = ( *_t28 << 0x00000020 |  *_t27) >> 0x18;
				_t34 =  &(_t347[0x10]); // 0x89fffffe
				_t35 =  &(_t347[0x11]); // 0x478ba045
				_t280[0x1e] = E022E9340( *_t34, 0x20,  *_t35);
				_t37 =  &(_t347[0x10]); // 0x89fffffe
				_t38 =  &(_t347[0x11]); // 0x478ba045
				_t280[0x1e] = E022E9340( *_t37, 0x28,  *_t38);
				_t40 =  &(_t347[0x11]); // 0x8910478b
				_t280[0x1e] =  *_t40 & 0x000000ff;
				_t42 =  &(_t347[0x11]); // 0x85891047
				_t280[0x1e] =  *_t42 & 0x000000ff;
				_t44 =  &(_t347[0x12]); // 0xec858910
				_t280[0x1d] =  *_t44 & 0x000000ff;
				_t280[0x1d] = 0x28;
				_t280[0x1d] = 0x28;
				_t60 =  &(_t347[0x12]); // 0xec858910
				_t61 =  &(_t347[0x13]); // 0x89fffffe
				_t280[0x1d] = ( *_t61 << 0x00000020 |  *_t60) >> 0x18;
				_t67 =  &(_t347[0x12]); // 0xec858910
				_t68 =  &(_t347[0x13]); // 0x89fffffe
				_t280[0x1c] = E022E9340( *_t67, 0x20,  *_t68);
				_t70 =  &(_t347[0x12]); // 0xec858910
				_t71 =  &(_t347[0x13]); // 0x89fffffe
				_t280[0x1c] = E022E9340( *_t70, 0x28,  *_t71);
				_t73 =  &(_t347[0x13]); // 0x9c4589ff
				_t280[0x1c] =  *_t73 & 0x000000ff;
				_t75 =  &(_t347[0x13]); // 0x8b9c4589
				_t280[0x1c] =  *_t75 & 0x000000ff;
				_t176 = E022E50C0( *_t71, _t347, _t280);
				_t339 = _a4;
				if(_t339 != 0) {
					_t78 =  &(_t347[1]); // 0x50ffffff
					_t301 =  *_t78;
					_t326 =  *_t347;
					 *_t339 = _t301 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 1)) = _t301 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 2)) = _t301 >> 8;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 3)) = 0x28;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 4)) = _t326 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 5)) = _t326 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 6)) = _t326 >> 8;
					 *(_t339 + 7) = _t326;
					_t86 =  &(_t347[3]); // 0xc4830000
					_t302 =  *_t86;
					_t87 =  &(_t347[2]); // 0x41cfe857
					_t327 =  *_t87;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 8)) = _t302 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 9)) = _t302 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0xa)) = _t302 >> 8;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0xb)) = 0x28;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0xc)) = _t327 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0xd)) = _t327 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0xe)) = _t327 >> 8;
					 *(_t339 + 0xf) = _t327;
					_t96 =  &(_t347[5]); // 0xccc35de5
					_t303 =  *_t96;
					_t97 =  &(_t347[4]); // 0x8b5e5f14
					_t328 =  *_t97;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x10)) = _t303 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x11)) = _t303 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x12)) = _t303 >> 8;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x13)) = 0x28;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x14)) = _t328 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x15)) = _t328 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x16)) = _t328 >> 8;
					 *(_t339 + 0x17) = _t328;
					_t106 =  &(_t347[7]); // 0xec8b55cc
					_t304 =  *_t106;
					_t107 =  &(_t347[6]); // 0xcccccccc
					_t329 =  *_t107;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x18)) = _t304 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x19)) = _t304 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x1a)) = _t304 >> 8;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x1b)) = 0x28;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x1c)) = _t329 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x1d)) = _t329 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x1e)) = _t329 >> 8;
					 *(_t339 + 0x1f) = _t329;
					_t116 =  &(_t347[9]); // 0x56530000
					_t305 =  *_t116;
					_t117 =  &(_t347[8]); // 0x120ec81
					_t330 =  *_t117;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x20)) = _t305 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x21)) = _t305 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x22)) = _t305 >> 8;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x23)) = 0x28;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x24)) = _t330 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x25)) = _t330 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x26)) = _t330 >> 8;
					 *(_t339 + 0x27) = _t330;
					_t126 =  &(_t347[0xb]); // 0x4f8b078b
					_t306 =  *_t126;
					_t127 =  &(_t347[0xa]); // 0x87d8b57
					_t331 =  *_t127;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x28)) = _t306 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x29)) = _t306 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x2a)) = _t306 >> 8;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x2b)) = 0x28;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x2c)) = _t331 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x2d)) = _t331 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x2e)) = _t331 >> 8;
					 *(_t339 + 0x2f) = _t331;
					_t136 =  &(_t347[0xd]); // 0x89fffffe
					_t307 =  *_t136;
					_t137 =  &(_t347[0xc]); // 0xfc858904
					_t332 =  *_t137;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x30)) = _t307 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x31)) = _t307 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x32)) = _t307 >> 8;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x33)) = 0x28;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x34)) = _t332 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x35)) = _t332 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x36)) = _t332 >> 8;
					 *(_t339 + 0x37) = _t332;
					_t146 =  &(_t347[0xf]); // 0xf4858908
					_t308 =  *_t146;
					_t147 =  &(_t347[0xe]); // 0x478bc045
					_t333 =  *_t147;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x38)) = _t308 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x39)) = _t308 >> 0x10;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x3a)) = _t308 >> 8;
					 *(_t339 + 0x3b) = _t308;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x3c)) = _t333 >> 0x18;
					 *((char*)(_t339 + 0x3d)) = _t333 >> 0x10;
					_t176 = _t333 >> 8;
					 *(_t339 + 0x3e) = _t176;
					 *(_t339 + 0x3f) = _t333;
				}
				return _t176;
			}

0x022e8d73
0x022e8d76
0x022e8d7a
0x022e8d7a
0x022e8d7d
0x022e8d7d
0x022e8d83
0x022e8d87
0x022e8d8b
0x022e8d92
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0x022e8d97
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0x022e8dd8
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0x022e8e1c
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0x022e8f11
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0x022e8f19
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0x022e8f1f
0x022e8f27
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0x022e8f37
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0x022e8f42
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0x022e8f50
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0x022e8f55
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0x022e8f5b
0x022e8f63
0x022e8f6b
0x022e8f73
0x022e8f76
0x022e8f7e
0x022e8f86
0x022e8f89
0x022e8f8c
0x022e8f8c
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0x022e9001
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0x022e901f
0x022e9027
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0x022e903a
0x022e903d
0x022e9040
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0x022e9045
0x022e9045
0x022e904b
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0x022e905b
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0x022e9066
0x022e906e
0x022e9073
0x022e9076
0x022e9079
0x022e9079
0x022e9082

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.310857995.00000000022E1000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, Offset: 022E0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000001.00000002.310851147.00000000022E0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310868024.00000000022EA000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310874334.00000000022EC000.00000008.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310886066.00000000022ED000.00000040.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310892342.00000000022F0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_22e0000_1.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 6d5f3c17d2189410a2982256a0df1cd604fda7af78697401ad1132ab0747cb84
Instruction ID: d6073d9d3b1cc9aa202becb413b8ef212256c58414437e4a1f1999a09d6d21dd
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 6d5f3c17d2189410a2982256a0df1cd604fda7af78697401ad1132ab0747cb84
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: C0B11221319BC69FC319CE7C888059ABFB17B76100388869DD8D5DBB43C614FA69C7E1

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Function 022E2070, Relevance: 62.6, Strings: 50, Instructions: 113COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Strings

i, xrefs: 022E2132
n, xrefs: 022E21E6
a, xrefs: 022E2128
z, xrefs: 022E219B
K, xrefs: 022E21A9
U, xrefs: 022E2252
a, xrefs: 022E21D2
i, xrefs: 022E2180
r, xrefs: 022E21B0
n, xrefs: 022E221A
T, xrefs: 022E21F0
b, xrefs: 022E2244
b, xrefs: 022E2114
y, xrefs: 022E21B7
i, xrefs: 022E211E
l, xrefs: 022E2162
U, xrefs: 022E223D
m, xrefs: 022E222F
r, xrefs: 022E216C
n, xrefs: 022E227A
s, xrefs: 022E220C
R, xrefs: 022E2205
j, xrefs: 022E21F7
e, xrefs: 022E210A
k, xrefs: 022E21FE
m, xrefs: 022E2143
a, xrefs: 022E2151
B, xrefs: 022E2158
K, xrefs: 022E2194
r, xrefs: 022E2228
T, xrefs: 022E2221
r, xrefs: 022E225C
o, xrefs: 022E228B
n, xrefs: 022E214A
k, xrefs: 022E21A2
i, xrefs: 022E2270
A, xrefs: 022E207E
A, xrefs: 022E213C
n, xrefs: 022E2236
k, xrefs: 022E224B
l, xrefs: 022E21C8
G, xrefs: 022E2284
i, xrefs: 022E2266
i, xrefs: 022E21DC
i, xrefs: 022E2213
g, xrefs: 022E2292
n, xrefs: 022E218A
s, xrefs: 022E2176
M, xrefs: 022E21BE
a, xrefs: 022E2299

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.310857995.00000000022E1000.00000020.00020000.sdmp, Offset: 022E0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000001.00000002.310851147.00000000022E0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310868024.00000000022EA000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310874334.00000000022EC000.00000008.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310886066.00000000022ED000.00000040.00020000.sdmp Download File
Associated: 00000001.00000002.310892342.00000000022F0000.00000002.00020000.sdmp Download File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_22e0000_1.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID: A$A$B$G$K$K$M$R$T$T$U$U$a$a$a$a$b$b$e$g$i$i$i$i$i$i$i$j$k$k$k$l$l$m$m$n$n$n$n$n$n$o$r$r$r$r$s$s$y$z
API String ID: 0-2497609231
Opcode ID: a01d41c81ad22a88638bb5f5f95c5c658f2255241a946711721c950bd740d1db
Instruction ID: e25251062b1a81bea90114d9560bbdbf1d8e138f3b7ac553a3db9914c8e486b4
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: a01d41c81ad22a88638bb5f5f95c5c658f2255241a946711721c950bd740d1db
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 5161A0B4D01368DEEF20CF91D8487DDBFB6BB05709F1041AAC549AB201D7B60AC88F65

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Description:	Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Sigma Overview

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

Networking:

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Boot Survival:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

Lowering of HIPS / PFW / Operating System Security Settings:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Rich Headers

Data Directories

Sections

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe PID: 6984 Parent PID: 3416

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: WerFault.exe PID: 2060 Parent PID: 6984

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Analysis Process: 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exe PID: 6984 Parent PID: 3416 1.2.javaw.exe.22e0000.2.exeCOMMON

Function 022E37F0, Relevance: 1.5, Strings: 1, Instructions: 293
COMMONCrypto

Function 022E8D70, Relevance: .3, Instructions: 285
COMMONCrypto