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Windows Analysis Report Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll
Analysis ID:	553989
MD5:	e61518ae9454a563b8f842286bbdb87b
SHA1:	82d29b52e35e7938e7ee610c04ea9daaf5e08e90
SHA256:	9ef7dbd3da51332a78eff19146d21c82957821e464e8133e9594a07d716d892d
Tags:	dllWhisperGate
Infos:
Most interesting Screenshot:

Detection

Score:	60
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Sigma detected: Suspicious Call by Ordinal

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

.NET source code references suspicious native API functions

Yara signature match

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

loaddll32.exe (PID: 6088 cmdline: loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll" MD5: 7DEB5DB86C0AC789123DEC286286B938)

cmd.exe (PID: 5696 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1 MD5: F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D)

rundll32.exe (PID: 2008 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1 MD5: D7CA562B0DB4F4DD0F03A89A1FDAD63D)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

No configs have been found

Yara Overview

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll	MAL_OBFUSC_Unknown_Jan22_1	Detects samples similar to reversed stage3 found in Ukrainian wiper incident named WhisperGate	Florian Roth	0x43da8:$xc1: 37 00 63 00 38 00 63 00 62 00 35 00 35 00 39 00 38 00 65 00 37 00 32 00 34 00 64 00 33 00 34 00 33 00 38 00 34 00 63 00 63 00 65 00 37 00 34 00 30 00 32 00 62 00 31 00 31 00 66 00 30 00 65 0x3ff6e:$xc2: 4D 61 69 6E 00 43 6C 61 73 73 4C 69 62 72 61 72 79 31 00 70 63 31 65 0x44216:$s1: .dll 0x442c2:$s1: .dll 0x3e471:$s2: %&%,%s% 0x2fed8:$op1: A2 87 FA B1 44 A5 F5 12 DA A7 49 11 5C 8C 26 D4 75 0x26d5f:$op2: D7 AF 52 38 C7 47 95 C8 0E 88 F3 D5 0B 0x1f499:$op3: 6C 05 DF D6 B8 AC 11 F2 67 16 CB B7 34 4D B6 91

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Sigma detected: Suspicious Call by Ordinal

Show sources

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth: Data: Command: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1, CommandLine: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, ParentCommandLine: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1, ParentImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 5696, ProcessCommandLine: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1, ProcessId: 2008

Jbx Signature Overview

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection:

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Show sources

Source: Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll	Virustotal: Detection: 16%			Perma Link
Source: Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll	ReversingLabs: Detection: 23%

Source: Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

System Summary:

Source: Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll, type: SAMPLE

Matched rule: MAL_OBFUSC_Unknown_Jan22_1 date = 2022-01-16, hash1 = 9ef7dbd3da51332a78eff19146d21c82957821e464e8133e9594a07d716d892d, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects samples similar to reversed stage3 found in Ukrainian wiper incident named WhisperGate, reference = https://twitter.com/juanandres_gs/status/1482827018404257792

Source: Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll	Virustotal: Detection: 16%
Source: Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll	ReversingLabs: Detection: 23%

Source: Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal60.evad.winDLL@5/0@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1

Source: Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll, u0008u2007.cs

Cryptographic APIs: 'CreateDecryptor', 'TransformFinalBlock'

Source: Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll

Static PE information: NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Data Obfuscation:

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Show sources

Source: Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll, u000eu2004u2000.cs

.Net Code: \x03 System.Reflection.Assembly System.Reflection.Assembly::Load(System.Byte[])

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section name: .text entropy: 6.9383493763

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 120000

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

.NET source code references suspicious native API functions

Show sources

Source: Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll, u0006u2003u2000.cs

Reference to suspicious API methods: ('\\x02', 'VirtualAlloc@kernel32'), ('\\x02', 'LoadLibraryA@kernel32'), ('\\x02', 'VirtualProtect@kernel32'), ('\\x02', 'GetProcAddress@kernel32'), ('\\x02', 'OpenProcess@kernel32.dll')

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Native API1	Path Interception	Process Injection11	Rundll321	OS Credential Dumping	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	Remote Services	Archive Collected Data1	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion1	LSASS Memory	System Information Discovery1	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Software Packing11	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	Process Injection11	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information1	LSA Secrets	Remote System Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	Obfuscated Files or Information1	Cached Domain Credentials	System Owner/User Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll	16%	Virustotal		Browse
Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll	8%	Metadefender		Browse
Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll	23%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Network.WhisperGate

Dropped Files

No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

No Antivirus matches

Domains

No Antivirus matches

URLs

No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

No contacted domains info

Contacted IPs

No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	34.0.0 Boulder Opal
Analysis ID:	553989
Start date:	17.01.2022
Start time:	02:35:22
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 6m 18s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	26
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal60.evad.winDLL@5/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .dll Override analysis time to 240s for rundll32
Warnings:	Show All Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, SgrmBroker.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 23.211.4.86 Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, fs.microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, arc.msn.com Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
02:36:14	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: loaddll32.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

No context

Domains

No context

ASN

No context

JA3 Fingerprints

No context

Dropped Files

No context

Created / dropped Files

No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General
File type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	6.916354202479544
TrID:	Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) Net Framework (1011504/3) 50.14% Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (1002004/3) 49.67% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.10% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.10% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll
File size:	280064
MD5:	e61518ae9454a563b8f842286bbdb87b
SHA1:	82d29b52e35e7938e7ee610c04ea9daaf5e08e90
SHA256:	9ef7dbd3da51332a78eff19146d21c82957821e464e8133e9594a07d716d892d
SHA512:	7a30af55518eb2f125ad475b3e495b9beebcc7cba2adf5d9edf3aa1a9e0a351b53df430061089cdcebe3073364754ccad4d2ca22b05c84c925089a0229f04e6e
SSDEEP:	6144:i9JxgDyGljt5zFSb4rKWFV1y3QXJgGsHYjohn/wkKLwZl8UYrOqvM:irxgDyGljt5zF9xS2j8Km4kYM
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L...#E.a........... .....>...........]... ...`....@.. ....................................@................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	74f0e4ecccdce0e4

Static PE Info

General
Entrypoint:	0x445da6
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows cui
Image File Characteristics:	LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, DLL, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED
DLL Characteristics:	NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x61DC4523 [Mon Jan 10 14:39:31 2022 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:	v4.0.30319
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	dae02f32a21e03ce65412f6e56942daa

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp dword ptr [00402000h]
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x45d4c	0x57	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x46000	0x35c	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x48000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x43dac	0x43e00	False	0.631226260359	data	6.9383493763	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x46000	0x35c	0x400	False	0.345703125	data	2.69926905034	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x48000	0xc	0x200	False	0.044921875	data	0.101910425663	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_VERSION	0x46058	0x304	data

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorDllMain

Version Infos

Description	Data
Translation	0x0000 0x04b0
LegalCopyright
Assembly Version	1.0.0.0
InternalName	Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll
FileVersion	1.0.0.0
CompanyName
LegalTrademarks
Comments
ProductName
ProductVersion	1.0.0.0
FileDescription
OriginalFilename	Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll

Network Behavior

No network behavior found

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: loaddll32.exe PID: 6088 Parent PID: 4964

General

Start time:	02:36:13
Start date:	17/01/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll"
Imagebase:	0x50000
File size:	116736 bytes
MD5 hash:	7DEB5DB86C0AC789123DEC286286B938
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate

Analysis Process: cmd.exe PID: 5696 Parent PID: 6088

General

Start time:	02:36:13
Start date:	17/01/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0xd80000
File size:	232960 bytes
MD5 hash:	F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: rundll32.exe PID: 2008 Parent PID: 5696

General

Start time:	02:36:14
Start date:	17/01/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0x90000
File size:	61952 bytes
MD5 hash:	D7CA562B0DB4F4DD0F03A89A1FDAD63D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Disassembly

Code Analysis

Reset < >

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules ), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report Frkmlkdkdubkznbkmcf.dll

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Overview

Initial Sample

Sigma Overview

System Summary:

Jbx Signature Overview

AV Detection:

Compliance:

System Summary:

Data Obfuscation:

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection:

Malware Analysis System Evasion:

Anti Debugging:

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion:

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted IPs

General Information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASN

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Version Infos

Network Behavior

Code Manipulations

Statistics

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: loaddll32.exe PID: 6088 Parent PID: 4964

General

Analysis Process: cmd.exe PID: 5696 Parent PID: 6088

General

Analysis Process: rundll32.exe PID: 2008 Parent PID: 5696

General

Disassembly

Code Analysis