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Windows Analysis Report
SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe
Analysis ID:	598602
MD5:	db995bcbc1b1ffe95cbde7f316b577bc
SHA1:	95049e53f64a1b5050d697d88ccc8bf62d58e3f6
SHA256:	bb95fa20a55260f729584b7932c7dba208dcc5b0a7597be447a72e481e0dcb09
Tags:	exe
Infos:

Detection

AveMaria UACMe

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected UACMe UAC Bypass tool

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Yara detected AveMaria stealer

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Contains functionality to hide user accounts

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Uses 32bit PE files

Yara signature match

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

PE file contains sections with non-standard names

Found potential string decryption / allocating functions

Yara detected Credential Stealer

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe (PID: 6796 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe" MD5: DB995BCBC1B1FFE95CBDE7F316B577BC)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: AveMaria

{"C2 url": "goodies.dynamic-dns.net", "port": 5200}

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000000.00000002.542027781.0000000000B7F000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Codoso_Gh0st_1	Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware	Florian Roth	0xdf0:$x3: Elevation:Administrator!new:{3ad05575-8857-4850-9277-11b85bdb8e09} 0xdf0:$c1: Elevation:Administrator!new:
00000000.00000002.542027781.0000000000B7F000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_UACMe	Yara detected UACMe UAC Bypass tool	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Codoso_Gh0st_1	Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware	Florian Roth	0x1972f:$x3: Elevation:Administrator!new:{3ad05575-8857-4850-9277-11b85bdb8e09} 0x1972f:$c1: Elevation:Administrator!new:
00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_UACMe	Yara detected UACMe UAC Bypass tool	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AveMaria	Yara detected AveMaria stealer	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.541978426.0000000000A44000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.541978426.0000000000A44000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_AveMaria	Yara detected AveMaria stealer	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe PID: 6796	JoeSecurity_UACMe	Yara detected UACMe UAC Bypass tool	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe PID: 6796	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
Click to see the 5 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.29289af.3.raw.unpack	Codoso_Gh0st_2	Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware	Florian Roth	0xd80:$s13: Elevation:Administrator!new:{3ad05575-8857-4850-9277-11b85bdb8e09}
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.29289af.3.raw.unpack	Codoso_Gh0st_1	Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware	Florian Roth	0xd80:$x3: Elevation:Administrator!new:{3ad05575-8857-4850-9277-11b85bdb8e09} 0xd80:$c1: Elevation:Administrator!new:
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.29289af.3.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_UACMe	Yara detected UACMe UAC Bypass tool	Joe Security
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack	Codoso_Gh0st_2	Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware	Florian Roth	0x191f0:$s13: Elevation:Administrator!new:{3ad05575-8857-4850-9277-11b85bdb8e09}
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack	Codoso_Gh0st_1	Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware	Florian Roth	0x191f0:$x3: Elevation:Administrator!new:{3ad05575-8857-4850-9277-11b85bdb8e09} 0x191f0:$c1: Elevation:Administrator!new:
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack	MAL_Envrial_Jan18_1	Detects Encrial credential stealer malware	Florian Roth	0x144e8:$a1: \Opera Software\Opera Stable\Login Data 0x14810:$a2: \Comodo\Dragon\User Data\Default\Login Data 0x14158:$a3: \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_UACMe	Yara detected UACMe UAC Bypass tool	Joe Security
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_AveMaria	Yara detected AveMaria stealer	Joe Security
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack	INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_RegKeyComb_IExecuteCommandCOM	Detects executables embedding command execution via IExecuteCommand COM object	ditekSHen	0x166dd:$r1: Classes\Folder\shell\open\command 0x16700:$k1: DelegateExecute
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack	MALWARE_Win_WarzoneRAT	Detects AveMaria/WarzoneRAT	ditekSHen	0x160e4:$s1: RDPClip 0x167cc:$s2: Grabber 0x162e0:$s3: Ave_Maria Stealer OpenSource 0x163e0:$s4: \MidgetPorn\workspace\MsgBox.exe 0x19310:$s6: /n:%temp%\ellocnak.xml 0x19340:$s7: Hey I'm Admin 0x13c50:$s8: warzone160
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack	AveMaria_WarZone	unknown	unknown	0x16630:$str1: cmd.exe /C ping 1.2.3.4 -n 2 -w 1000 > Nul & Del /f /q 0x1640c:$str2: MsgBox.exe 0x1669c:$str4: \System32\cmd.exe 0x162e0:$str6: Ave_Maria 0x15b78:$str7: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList 0x14e78:$str8: SMTP Password 0x14158:$str11: \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data 0x15b44:$str12: \sqlmap.dll 0x191f0:$str16: Elevation:Administrator!new 0x19310:$str17: /n:%temp%
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack	Codoso_Gh0st_2	Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware	Florian Roth	0x17ff0:$s13: Elevation:Administrator!new:{3ad05575-8857-4850-9277-11b85bdb8e09}
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack	Codoso_Gh0st_1	Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware	Florian Roth	0x17ff0:$x3: Elevation:Administrator!new:{3ad05575-8857-4850-9277-11b85bdb8e09} 0x17ff0:$c1: Elevation:Administrator!new:
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack	MAL_Envrial_Jan18_1	Detects Encrial credential stealer malware	Florian Roth	0x138e8:$a1: \Opera Software\Opera Stable\Login Data 0x13c10:$a2: \Comodo\Dragon\User Data\Default\Login Data 0x13558:$a3: \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack	JoeSecurity_UACMe	Yara detected UACMe UAC Bypass tool	Joe Security
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack	JoeSecurity_AveMaria	Yara detected AveMaria stealer	Joe Security
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack	INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_RegKeyComb_IExecuteCommandCOM	Detects executables embedding command execution via IExecuteCommand COM object	ditekSHen	0x15add:$r1: Classes\Folder\shell\open\command 0x15b00:$k1: DelegateExecute
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack	MALWARE_Win_WarzoneRAT	Detects AveMaria/WarzoneRAT	ditekSHen	0x154e4:$s1: RDPClip 0x15bcc:$s2: Grabber 0x156e0:$s3: Ave_Maria Stealer OpenSource 0x157e0:$s4: \MidgetPorn\workspace\MsgBox.exe 0x18110:$s6: /n:%temp%\ellocnak.xml 0x18140:$s7: Hey I'm Admin 0x13050:$s8: warzone160
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack	AveMaria_WarZone	unknown	unknown	0x15a30:$str1: cmd.exe /C ping 1.2.3.4 -n 2 -w 1000 > Nul & Del /f /q 0x1580c:$str2: MsgBox.exe 0x15a9c:$str4: \System32\cmd.exe 0x156e0:$str6: Ave_Maria 0x14f78:$str7: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList 0x14278:$str8: SMTP Password 0x13558:$str11: \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data 0x14f44:$str12: \sqlmap.dll 0x17ff0:$str16: Elevation:Administrator!new 0x18110:$str17: /n:%temp%
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack	Codoso_Gh0st_2	Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware	Florian Roth	0x191f0:$s13: Elevation:Administrator!new:{3ad05575-8857-4850-9277-11b85bdb8e09}
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack	Codoso_Gh0st_1	Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware	Florian Roth	0x191f0:$x3: Elevation:Administrator!new:{3ad05575-8857-4850-9277-11b85bdb8e09} 0x191f0:$c1: Elevation:Administrator!new:
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack	MAL_Envrial_Jan18_1	Detects Encrial credential stealer malware	Florian Roth	0x144e8:$a1: \Opera Software\Opera Stable\Login Data 0x14810:$a2: \Comodo\Dragon\User Data\Default\Login Data 0x14158:$a3: \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_UACMe	Yara detected UACMe UAC Bypass tool	Joe Security
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer	Yara detected Credential Stealer	Joe Security
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_AveMaria	Yara detected AveMaria stealer	Joe Security
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack	INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_RegKeyComb_IExecuteCommandCOM	Detects executables embedding command execution via IExecuteCommand COM object	ditekSHen	0x166dd:$r1: Classes\Folder\shell\open\command 0x16700:$k1: DelegateExecute
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack	MALWARE_Win_WarzoneRAT	Detects AveMaria/WarzoneRAT	ditekSHen	0x160e4:$s1: RDPClip 0x167cc:$s2: Grabber 0x162e0:$s3: Ave_Maria Stealer OpenSource 0x163e0:$s4: \MidgetPorn\workspace\MsgBox.exe 0x19310:$s6: /n:%temp%\ellocnak.xml 0x19340:$s7: Hey I'm Admin 0x13c50:$s8: warzone160
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack	AveMaria_WarZone	unknown	unknown	0x16630:$str1: cmd.exe /C ping 1.2.3.4 -n 2 -w 1000 > Nul & Del /f /q 0x1640c:$str2: MsgBox.exe 0x1669c:$str4: \System32\cmd.exe 0x162e0:$str6: Ave_Maria 0x15b78:$str7: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList 0x14e78:$str8: SMTP Password 0x14158:$str11: \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data 0x15b44:$str12: \sqlmap.dll 0x191f0:$str16: Elevation:Administrator!new 0x19310:$str17: /n:%temp%
Click to see the 25 entries

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Avira: detected

Found malware configuration

Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack

Malware Configuration Extractor: AveMaria {"C2 url": "goodies.dynamic-dns.net", "port": 5200}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 57%	Perma Link
Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 23%	Perma Link
Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 61%

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Source: goodies.dynamic-dns.net

Avira URL Cloud: Label: phishing

Yara detected AveMaria stealer

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.541978426.0000000000A44000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Patched.Ren.Gen3
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Redcap.ghjpt

Exploits

Yara detected UACMe UAC Bypass tool

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.29289af.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.542027781.0000000000B7F000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe PID: 6796, type: MEMORYSTR

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Directory created: C:\Program Files\Microsoft DN1

Jump to behavior

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Static PE information: TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source:

Binary string: C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\licensing.pdb source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Networking

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: goodies.dynamic-dns.net

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.541978426.0000000000A44000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp

String found in binary or memory: https://github.com/syohex/java-simple-mine-sweeperC:

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: GetRawInputData

E-Banking Fraud

Yara detected AveMaria stealer

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.541978426.0000000000A44000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

System Summary

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.29289af.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects Encrial credential stealer malware Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects executables embedding command execution via IExecuteCommand COM object Author: ditekSHen
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects AveMaria/WarzoneRAT Author: ditekSHen
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: AveMaria_WarZone Author: unknown
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects Encrial credential stealer malware Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects executables embedding command execution via IExecuteCommand COM object Author: ditekSHen
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects AveMaria/WarzoneRAT Author: ditekSHen
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: AveMaria_WarZone Author: unknown
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects Encrial credential stealer malware Author: Florian Roth
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects executables embedding command execution via IExecuteCommand COM object Author: ditekSHen
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Detects AveMaria/WarzoneRAT Author: ditekSHen
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: AveMaria_WarZone Author: unknown

Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: Filename: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE

Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.29289af.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Codoso_Gh0st_2 date = 2016-01-30, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware, reference = https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE, hash = 5402c785037614d09ad41e41e11093635455b53afd55aa054a09a84274725841
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.29289af.3.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Codoso_Gh0st_1 date = 2016-01-30, hash3 = d7004910a87c90ade7e5ff6169f2b866ece667d2feebed6f0ec856fb838d2297, hash2 = 7dc7cec2c3f7e56499175691f64060ebd955813002d4db780e68a8f6e7d0a8f8, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware, reference = https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE, super_rule = 5402c785037614d09ad41e41e11093635455b53afd55aa054a09a84274725841
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Codoso_Gh0st_2 date = 2016-01-30, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware, reference = https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE, hash = 5402c785037614d09ad41e41e11093635455b53afd55aa054a09a84274725841
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Codoso_Gh0st_1 date = 2016-01-30, hash3 = d7004910a87c90ade7e5ff6169f2b866ece667d2feebed6f0ec856fb838d2297, hash2 = 7dc7cec2c3f7e56499175691f64060ebd955813002d4db780e68a8f6e7d0a8f8, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware, reference = https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE, super_rule = 5402c785037614d09ad41e41e11093635455b53afd55aa054a09a84274725841
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: MAL_Envrial_Jan18_1 date = 2018-01-21, hash2 = 9edd8f0e22340ecc45c5f09e449aa85d196f3f506ff3f44275367df924b95c5d, hash1 = 9ae3aa2c61f7895ba6b1a3f85fbe36c8697287dc7477c5a03d32cf994fdbce85, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Encrial credential stealer malware, reference = https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/953313514629853184, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_RegKeyComb_IExecuteCommandCOM author = ditekSHen, description = Detects executables embedding command execution via IExecuteCommand COM object
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: MALWARE_Win_WarzoneRAT author = ditekSHen, description = Detects AveMaria/WarzoneRAT
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: AveMaria_WarZone Website = https://www.deadbits.org, Date = 2019-07-18, Repo = https://github.com/deadbits/yara-rules, Author = Adam M. Swanda
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Codoso_Gh0st_2 date = 2016-01-30, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware, reference = https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE, hash = 5402c785037614d09ad41e41e11093635455b53afd55aa054a09a84274725841
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Codoso_Gh0st_1 date = 2016-01-30, hash3 = d7004910a87c90ade7e5ff6169f2b866ece667d2feebed6f0ec856fb838d2297, hash2 = 7dc7cec2c3f7e56499175691f64060ebd955813002d4db780e68a8f6e7d0a8f8, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware, reference = https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE, super_rule = 5402c785037614d09ad41e41e11093635455b53afd55aa054a09a84274725841
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: MAL_Envrial_Jan18_1 date = 2018-01-21, hash2 = 9edd8f0e22340ecc45c5f09e449aa85d196f3f506ff3f44275367df924b95c5d, hash1 = 9ae3aa2c61f7895ba6b1a3f85fbe36c8697287dc7477c5a03d32cf994fdbce85, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Encrial credential stealer malware, reference = https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/953313514629853184, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_RegKeyComb_IExecuteCommandCOM author = ditekSHen, description = Detects executables embedding command execution via IExecuteCommand COM object
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: MALWARE_Win_WarzoneRAT author = ditekSHen, description = Detects AveMaria/WarzoneRAT
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: AveMaria_WarZone Website = https://www.deadbits.org, Date = 2019-07-18, Repo = https://github.com/deadbits/yara-rules, Author = Adam M. Swanda
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Codoso_Gh0st_2 date = 2016-01-30, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware, reference = https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE, hash = 5402c785037614d09ad41e41e11093635455b53afd55aa054a09a84274725841
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Codoso_Gh0st_1 date = 2016-01-30, hash3 = d7004910a87c90ade7e5ff6169f2b866ece667d2feebed6f0ec856fb838d2297, hash2 = 7dc7cec2c3f7e56499175691f64060ebd955813002d4db780e68a8f6e7d0a8f8, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware, reference = https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE, super_rule = 5402c785037614d09ad41e41e11093635455b53afd55aa054a09a84274725841
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: MAL_Envrial_Jan18_1 date = 2018-01-21, hash2 = 9edd8f0e22340ecc45c5f09e449aa85d196f3f506ff3f44275367df924b95c5d, hash1 = 9ae3aa2c61f7895ba6b1a3f85fbe36c8697287dc7477c5a03d32cf994fdbce85, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Encrial credential stealer malware, reference = https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/953313514629853184, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_RegKeyComb_IExecuteCommandCOM author = ditekSHen, description = Detects executables embedding command execution via IExecuteCommand COM object
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: MALWARE_Win_WarzoneRAT author = ditekSHen, description = Detects AveMaria/WarzoneRAT
Source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: AveMaria_WarZone Website = https://www.deadbits.org, Date = 2019-07-18, Repo = https://github.com/deadbits/yara-rules, Author = Adam M. Swanda
Source: 00000000.00000002.542027781.0000000000B7F000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Codoso_Gh0st_1 date = 2016-01-30, hash3 = d7004910a87c90ade7e5ff6169f2b866ece667d2feebed6f0ec856fb838d2297, hash2 = 7dc7cec2c3f7e56499175691f64060ebd955813002d4db780e68a8f6e7d0a8f8, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware, reference = https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE, super_rule = 5402c785037614d09ad41e41e11093635455b53afd55aa054a09a84274725841
Source: 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Codoso_Gh0st_1 date = 2016-01-30, hash3 = d7004910a87c90ade7e5ff6169f2b866ece667d2feebed6f0ec856fb838d2297, hash2 = 7dc7cec2c3f7e56499175691f64060ebd955813002d4db780e68a8f6e7d0a8f8, author = Florian Roth, description = Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware, reference = https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks, license = Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE, super_rule = 5402c785037614d09ad41e41e11093635455b53afd55aa054a09a84274725841

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	Code function: String function: 010D1DBB appears 36 times
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	Code function: String function: 010D1E1F appears 171 times

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 98%

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	Virustotal: Detection: 57%
Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	Metadefender: Detection: 23%
Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	ReversingLabs: Detection: 61%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{62BE5D10-60EB-11d0-BD3B-00A0C911CE86}\InprocServer32

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

File created: C:\Program Files\Microsoft DN1

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.expl.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Static file information: File size 2554880 > 1048576

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Directory created: C:\Program Files\Microsoft DN1

Jump to behavior

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Static PE information: Raw size of .data is bigger than: 0x100000 < 0x165000

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT
Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE
Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC
Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG
Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG
Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Static PE information: TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG

Source:

Binary string: C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\licensing.pdb source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Static PE information: section name: .00cfg

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Contains functionality to hide user accounts

Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList
Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: UEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEETermService%ProgramFiles%%windir%\System32%ProgramW6432%\Microsoft DN1\rfxvmt.dll\rdpwrap.ini\sqlmap.dllrudprpdpSOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserListSeDebugPrivilegeSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\TermService\ParametersServiceDllSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\TermServiceImagePathsvchost.exesvchost.exe -kCertPropSvcSessionEnvServicesActiveSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal ServerSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Licensing CoreSOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinlogonSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\AddInsSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ControlTerminal Server\AddIns\Clip RedirectorSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\AddIns\Dynamic VCfDenyTSConnectionsEnableConcurrentSessionsAllowMultipleTSSessionsRDPClipNameType
Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.541978426.0000000000A44000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList
Source: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.541978426.0000000000A44000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: UEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEETermService%ProgramFiles%%windir%\System32%ProgramW6432%\Microsoft DN1\rfxvmt.dll\rdpwrap.ini\sqlmap.dllrudprpdpSOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserListSeDebugPrivilegeSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\TermService\ParametersServiceDllSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\TermServiceImagePathsvchost.exesvchost.exe -kCertPropSvcSessionEnvServicesActiveSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal ServerSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\Licensing CoreSOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinlogonSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\AddInsSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ControlTerminal Server\AddIns\Clip RedirectorSYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\AddIns\Dynamic VCfDenyTSConnectionsEnableConcurrentSessionsAllowMultipleTSSessionsRDPClipNameType

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe TID: 7088

Thread sleep count: 60 > 30

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Anti Debugging

Found potential dummy code loops (likely to delay analysis)

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 85% for more than 60s

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected AveMaria stealer

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.541978426.0000000000A44000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.541978426.0000000000A44000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe PID: 6796, type: MEMORYSTR

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected AveMaria stealer

Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.541978426.0000000000A44000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	Path Interception	Path Interception	2 Masquerading	11 Input Capture	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	11 Input Capture	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	1 Application Layer Protocol	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	111 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	111 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Junk Data	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Software Packing	Security Account Manager	2 System Information Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	1 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 Hidden Users	LSA Secrets	Remote System Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	Cached Domain Credentials	System Owner/User Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	58%	Virustotal		Browse
SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	24%	Metadefender		Browse
SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	62%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.AveMariaRat
SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe	100%	Avira	TR/AD.MortyStealer.vctqk

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link	Download
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.291053f.4.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Patched.Ren.Gen3		Download File
0.2.SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe.a30000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Redcap.ghjpt		Download File

Domains

⊘No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
goodies.dynamic-dns.net	3%	Virustotal		Browse
goodies.dynamic-dns.net	100%	Avira URL Cloud	phishing

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

⊘No contacted domains info

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
goodies.dynamic-dns.net	true	3%, Virustotal, Browse Avira URL Cloud: phishing	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://github.com/syohex/java-simple-mine-sweeperC:	SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe, 00000000.00000002.541978426.0000000000A44000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		high

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	34.0.0 Boulder Opal
Analysis ID:	598602
Start date and time:	2022-03-28 18:28:20 +02:00
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 8m 22s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Sample file name:	SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	19
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.expl.evad.winEXE@1/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% (good quality ratio 97.6%) Quality average: 71.9% Quality standard deviation: 20.2%
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, audiodg.exe, BackgroundTransferHost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, backgroundTaskHost.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, wuapihost.exe
Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 23.35.228.56
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ris.api.iris.microsoft.com, client.wns.windows.com, fs.microsoft.com, sls.update.microsoft.com, e1723.g.akamaiedge.net, displaycatalog.mp.microsoft.com, img-prod-cms-rt-microsoft-com.akamaized.net, prod.fs.microsoft.com.akadns.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net, fs-wildcard.microsoft.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net, arc.msn.com
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

⊘No simulations

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

⊘No context

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

⊘No context

JA3 Fingerprints

⊘No context

Dropped Files

⊘No context

Created / dropped Files

⊘No created / dropped files found

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	3.945070832085131
TrID:	Win32 Executable (generic) a (10002005/4) 99.96% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.02% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.02% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe
File size:	2554880
MD5:	db995bcbc1b1ffe95cbde7f316b577bc
SHA1:	95049e53f64a1b5050d697d88ccc8bf62d58e3f6
SHA256:	bb95fa20a55260f729584b7932c7dba208dcc5b0a7597be447a72e481e0dcb09
SHA512:	c09beeab2ab7c7b65d92547f1559409012a2b1f787b4d399d8c745bf16ed2178261c64ae089582123b0111a385ba6c7d698091fe4ce72ab8af1f17a40214f120
SSDEEP:	12288:3BEnRe1ljhm1xvNkPJziiPuumDNWnr3Q5WOVI6L4qj7neunRxHfk7D4pa7+oJb:+o1ld8r2JUNJ5WOVI6L7jr/
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......M5h4.T.g.T.g.T.gf0.f.T.gf0.f.T.gf0.f.T.g.#.f.T.g.#.f.T.g.#.f:T.gf0.f.T.gf0.f.T.g.T.g.T.g.#.f.T.g.#.g.T.g.#.f.T.gRich.T.g.......

File Icon


Icon Hash:	00828e8e8686b000

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x4010af
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
DLL Characteristics:	TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x620E49BC [Thu Feb 17 13:12:28 2022 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	6
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	6
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	6
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	05bdc6a6adf04eca38d0953caca5e0fa

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
jmp 00007F12A0C903A1h
jmp 00007F12A0D0E5CCh
jmp 00007F12A0CE2B57h
jmp 00007F12A0C911D2h
jmp 00007F12A0D1813Dh
jmp 00007F12A0C96598h
jmp 00007F12A0C9C173h
jmp 00007F12A0C734BEh
jmp 00007F12A0C851F9h
jmp 00007F12A0C84644h
jmp 00007F12A0D15F2Fh
jmp 00007F12A0C9779Ah
jmp 00007F12A0CD1BE5h
jmp 00007F12A0C90320h
jmp 00007F12A0CB948Bh
jmp 00007F12A0C83D06h
jmp 00007F12A0CB4091h
jmp 00007F12A0C7342Ch
jmp 00007F12A0CBED57h
jmp 00007F12A0CE8C5Eh
jmp 00007F12A0CC7F3Dh
jmp 00007F12A0CBE8E8h
jmp 00007F12A0C941D3h
jmp 00007F12A0C972AEh
jmp 00007F12A0CC81C9h
jmp 00007F12A0CD4A04h
jmp 00007F12A0CE98BFh
jmp 00007F12A0CD349Ah
jmp 00007F12A0C93FB5h
jmp 00007F12A0CD2530h
jmp 00007F12A0C93FBBh
jmp 00007F12A0CF6AF6h
jmp 00007F12A0CB9231h
jmp 00007F12A0C9432Ch
jmp 00007F12A0C75AC7h
jmp 00007F12A0C72E72h
jmp 00007F12A0CB3A7Dh
jmp 00007F12A0C8DC88h
jmp 00007F12A0C97283h
jmp 00007F12A0D13C9Eh

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x26b43c	0xc8	.idata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x26f000	0x43c	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x270000	0x6004	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0xfdeb0	0x38	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0xfea0c	0x18	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0xfdee8	0x40	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x26b000	0x43c	.idata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0xd1f14	0xd2000	False	0.273263113839	data	5.42725734583	IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rdata	0xd3000	0x2e7dc	0x2e800	False	0.167485719086	data	3.57125252786	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x102000	0x168e58	0x165000	False	0.111753490459	data	1.96106010749	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.idata	0x26b000	0x15f0	0x1600	False	0.334339488636	data	4.55588507155	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.tls	0x26d000	0x309	0x400	False	0.021484375	data	0.0111738187212	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.00cfg	0x26e000	0x10e	0x200	False	0.03515625	data	0.110557131259	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x26f000	0x43c	0x600	False	0.182291666667	data	2.14297088193	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x270000	0x7d11	0x7e00	False	0.57902405754	data	5.74904151788	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country
RT_MANIFEST	0x26f170	0x17d	XML 1.0 document text	English	United States

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.dll	HeapFree, HeapSize, GetProcessHeap, InitializeCriticalSectionEx, DeleteCriticalSection, Sleep, VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, FindResourceExW, LoadResource, LockResource, SizeofResource, FindResourceW, MultiByteToWideChar, WideCharToMultiByte, FreeConsole, AcquireSRWLockExclusive, AssignProcessToJobObject, CloseHandle, CompareStringW, ConnectNamedPipe, CreateDirectoryW, CreateEventW, HeapReAlloc, GetProcessId, GetProcessTimes, GetQueuedCompletionStatus, GetStartupInfoW, GetStdHandle, GetStringTypeW, GetSystemDefaultLCID, GetSystemDirectoryW, IsValidLocale, IsWow64Process, K32GetPerformanceInfo, K32GetProcessMemoryInfo, K32QueryWorkingSetEx, ReadConsoleW, ReadFile, SetFilePointerEx, GetConsoleMode, GetConsoleCP, FlushFileBuffers, SetStdHandle, HeapQueryInformation, SetEnvironmentVariableW, FreeEnvironmentStringsW, HeapAlloc, HeapDestroy, SetLastError, GetLastError, RaiseException, GetProcessHeaps, DecodePointer, GetEnvironmentStringsW, GetCommandLineW, GetCommandLineA, GetCPInfo, GetOEMCP, GetACP, IsValidCodePage, FindNextFileW, FindFirstFileExW, FindClose, SetConsoleCtrlHandler, WriteConsoleW, GetFileType, EnumSystemLocalesW, GetUserDefaultLCID, GetLocaleInfoW, CreateFileW, LCMapStringW, GetTimeFormatW, GetDateFormatW, GetCurrentThread, WriteFile, HeapValidate, ExitProcess, GetModuleHandleExW, GetModuleFileNameW, IsDebuggerPresent, OutputDebugStringW, EnterCriticalSection, LeaveCriticalSection, UnhandledExceptionFilter, SetUnhandledExceptionFilter, GetCurrentProcess, TerminateProcess, IsProcessorFeaturePresent, InitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount, SetEvent, ResetEvent, WaitForSingleObjectEx, GetModuleHandleW, GetProcAddress, QueryPerformanceCounter, GetCurrentProcessId, GetCurrentThreadId, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime, InitializeSListHead, RtlUnwind, InterlockedPushEntrySList, InterlockedFlushSList, EncodePointer, TlsAlloc, TlsGetValue, TlsSetValue, TlsFree, FreeLibrary, LoadLibraryExW, GetSystemInfo, VirtualQuery
USER32.dll	GetActiveWindow, SetProcessWindowStation, TranslateMessage, UnregisterClassW, SendMessageTimeoutW, MessageBoxW, SetProcessDPIAware, UnregisterClassA
ADVAPI32.dll	GetKernelObjectSecurity, GetAce, FreeSid, EventWrite, EventUnregister, GetLengthSid
ole32.dll	CoTaskMemRealloc, CoTaskMemFree, CoInitialize, CoUninitialize, CoCreateInstance
OLEAUT32.dll	SysAllocString, VariantCopy, SysAllocStringLen, SysFreeString, SafeArrayDestroy, VariantInit, VariantClear, VariantChangeType
SHLWAPI.dll	PathMatchSpecW
USERENV.dll	DestroyEnvironmentBlock, CreateEnvironmentBlock
VERSION.dll	VerQueryValueW, GetFileVersionInfoSizeW, GetFileVersionInfoW
WINMM.dll	timeGetTime

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Network Behavior

⊘No network behavior found

Statistics

CPU Usage

Click to jump to process

Memory Usage

Click to jump to process

System Behavior

Analysis Process: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exePID: 6796, Parent PID: 5140

General

Target ID:	0
Start time:	20:29:35
Start date:	28/03/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe"
Imagebase:	0x10d0000
File size:	2554880 bytes
MD5 hash:	DB995BCBC1B1FFE95CBDE7F316B577BC
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: Codoso_Gh0st_1, Description: Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware, Source: 00000000.00000002.542027781.0000000000B7F000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_UACMe, Description: Yara detected UACMe UAC Bypass tool, Source: 00000000.00000002.542027781.0000000000B7F000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Codoso_Gh0st_1, Description: Detects Codoso APT Gh0st Malware, Source: 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Florian Roth Rule: JoeSecurity_UACMe, Description: Yara detected UACMe UAC Bypass tool, Source: 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AveMaria, Description: Yara detected AveMaria stealer, Source: 00000000.00000002.542642008.0000000002910000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer, Description: Yara detected Credential Stealer, Source: 00000000.00000002.541978426.0000000000A44000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_AveMaria, Description: Yara detected AveMaria stealer, Source: 00000000.00000002.541978426.0000000000A44000.00000002.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	low

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Reset < >

Analysis Process: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exePID: 6796, Parent PID: 5140COMMON

Execution Graph

Execution Coverage:	1.4%
Dynamic/Decrypted Code Coverage:	0%
Signature Coverage:	0%
Total number of Nodes:	11
Total number of Limit Nodes:	3

Executed Functions

Function 010DDE20 Relevance: 84.3, APIs: 6, Strings: 42, Instructions: 295
windowmemorysleepCOMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

C-Code - Quality: 61%

			E010DDE20() {
				signed int _v8;
				char _v9;
				char _v10;
				char _v11;
				char _v12;
				char _v13;
				char _v14;
				char _v15;
				char _v16;
				char _v17;
				char _v18;
				char _v19;
				char _v20;
				char _v21;
				char _v22;
				char _v23;
				char _v24;
				char _v25;
				char _v26;
				char _v27;
				char _v28;
				char _v29;
				char _v30;
				char _v31;
				char _v32;
				char _v33;
				char _v34;
				char _v35;
				char _v36;
				char _v37;
				char _v38;
				char _v39;
				char _v40;
				char _v41;
				char _v42;
				char _v43;
				char _v44;
				char _v45;
				char _v46;
				char _v47;
				char _v48;
				char _v49;
				char _v50;
				char _v51;
				char _v52;
				char _v53;
				char _v54;
				char _v55;
				char _v56;
				char _v57;
				char _v58;
				char _v59;
				char _v60;
				char _v61;
				char _v62;
				char _v63;
				char _v64;
				char _v65;
				char _v66;
				char _v67;
				char _v68;
				char _v69;
				char _v70;
				char _v71;
				char _v72;
				char _v73;
				char _v74;
				char _v75;
				char _v76;
				char _v77;
				char _v78;
				char _v79;
				char _v80;
				char _v81;
				char _v82;
				char _v83;
				char _v84;
				char _v85;
				char _v86;
				char _v87;
				char _v88;
				char _v89;
				char _v90;
				char _v91;
				char _v92;
				char _v93;
				char _v94;
				char _v95;
				char _v96;
				char _v97;
				char _v98;
				char _v99;
				char _v100;
				char _v101;
				char _v102;
				char _v103;
				char _v104;
				char _v105;
				char _v106;
				char _v107;
				char _v108;
				void* _v112;
				signed int _v120;
				struct HWND__* _v124;
				intOrPtr _v128;
				void* _v132;
				struct HWND__* _v136;
				struct HWND__* _v140;
				void* _v144;
				signed int _v148;
				signed int _v152;
				long _v156;
				intOrPtr _v160;
				intOrPtr _v164;
				signed int _v168;
				void* _t205;
				void* _t249;
				void* _t313;
				void* _t314;
				signed int _t315;

				_v8 =  *0x1335e64 ^ _t315;
				_v160 = 0x11d2000;
				_v128 = 0x3e800;
				_v108 = 0xa8;
				_v107 = 0xc1;
				_v106 = 0xd3;
				_v105 = 0x97;
				_v104 = 0x13;
				_v103 = 0xba;
				_v102 = 0x79;
				_v101 = 0x46;
				_v100 = 0x9d;
				_v99 = 0x64;
				_v98 = 0x3a;
				_v97 = 0xae;
				_v96 = 0x23;
				_v95 = 0x90;
				_v94 = 0xb5;
				_v93 = 0xfc;
				_v92 = 0x83;
				_v91 = 0x78;
				_v90 = 0x2b;
				_v89 = 0x4c;
				_v88 = 0xac;
				_v87 = 0xa2;
				_v86 = 0x16;
				_v85 = 0xa;
				_v84 = 0x76;
				_v83 = 0xa6;
				_v82 = 0x54;
				_v81 = 0xd3;
				_v80 = 0xbe;
				_v79 = 0xcc;
				_v78 = 0x92;
				_v77 = 0x26;
				_v76 = 0x94;
				_v75 = 9;
				_v74 = 0x69;
				_v73 = 0xb1;
				_v72 = 0xfb;
				_v71 = 0x13;
				_v70 = 0xdc;
				_v69 = 0xb2;
				_v68 = 0x68;
				_v67 = 0x9a;
				_v66 = 0xe4;
				_v65 = 0x21;
				_v64 = 0x20;
				_v63 = 0x4c;
				_v62 = 0x88;
				_v61 = 0x43;
				_v60 = 0x8d;
				_v59 = 0xe;
				_v58 = 0x36;
				_v57 = 0x6b;
				_v56 = 0x79;
				_v55 = 0xd9;
				_v54 = 0xd1;
				_v53 = 0x58;
				_v52 = 0x44;
				_v51 = 0x4d;
				_v50 = 0xf6;
				_v49 = 0x52;
				_v48 = 0x14;
				_v47 = 0x6e;
				_v46 = 0x8a;
				_v45 = 0xd5;
				_v44 = 0x1b;
				_v43 = 0xff;
				_v42 = 0x3c;
				_v41 = 0x1c;
				_v40 = 0xd1;
				_v39 = 0xfb;
				_v38 = 0x91;
				_v37 = 0x58;
				_v36 = 0x30;
				_v35 = 0x57;
				_v34 = 4;
				_v33 = 0x8f;
				_v32 = 0x32;
				_v31 = 0xd8;
				_v30 = 0xe9;
				_v29 = 0xcd;
				_v28 = 0x46;
				_v27 = 0x90;
				_v26 = 0xee;
				_v25 = 0x94;
				_v24 = 0x63;
				_v23 = 0xbb;
				_v22 = 0xa;
				_v21 = 0xc0;
				_v20 = 0x9a;
				_v19 = 0x50;
				_v18 = 0xf1;
				_v17 = 0xa9;
				_v16 = 0xa9;
				_v15 = 0xb0;
				_v14 = 0x69;
				_v13 = 0x1d;
				_v12 = 0x85;
				_v11 = 4;
				_v10 = 0x58;
				_v9 = 0x9d;
				_t205 = VirtualAlloc(0, 0xa00000, 0x3000, 0x40); // executed
				_v132 = _t205;
				_v156 = 0;
				_v112 = MessageBoxW;
				VirtualProtect(_v112, 0x100, 0x40,  &_v156); // executed
				 *((char*)(_t315 + 0xffffffffffffff90)) =  *_v112;
				 *((char*)(_t315 + 0xbadb3d)) =  *((intOrPtr*)(_v112 + (1 << 0)));
				 *((char*)(_t315 + 0xbadb3d)) =  *((intOrPtr*)(_v112 + (1 << 1)));
				 *((char*)(_t315 + 0xffffffffffffff93)) =  *((intOrPtr*)(_v112 + 3));
				 *_v112 = 0xc2;
				 *((char*)(_v112 + (1 << 0))) = 0x10;
				 *((char*)(_v112 + (1 << 1))) = 0;
				 *((char*)(_v112 + 3)) = 0x90;
				_v124 = 0;
				while(_v124 <= _v128 - 1) {
					_v148 =  !( *(_v160 + (_v128 - 1 - _v124) * 4));
					if(_v148 != 0) {
						 *((char*)(_v132 + _v124)) = _v148;
					}
					_v124 =  &(_v124->i);
				}
				_v140 = 0;
				while(_v140 < 0x927c00) {
					_v136 = 0;
					while(_v136 < 0x400) {
						_v164 = _v128;
						MessageBoxW(0, L"connected", L"connected", 2);
						if(_v128 >= 0x1f9) {
							_v152 = 0x64;
						} else {
							_v152 = 0;
						}
						_v136 =  &(_v136->i);
					}
					_v140 =  &(_v140->i);
				}
				_v120 = 0;
				while(_v120 < _v164) {
					MessageBoxW(0, L"connected", L"connected", 1);
					asm("cdq");
					_v168 = _v120 % _v152;
					MessageBoxW(0, L"connected", L"connected", 0);
					 *(_v132 + _v120) =  *(_v132 + _v120) ^  *(_t315 + _v168 - 0x68);
					_v120 = _v120 + 1;
				}
				_v144 = _v132;
				 *_v112 =  *((intOrPtr*)(_t315 + 0xffffffffffffff90));
				 *((char*)(_v112 + (1 << 0))) =  *((intOrPtr*)(_t315 + 0xbadb3d));
				 *((char*)(_v112 + (1 << 1))) =  *((intOrPtr*)(_t315 + 0xbadb3d));
				_t303 =  *((intOrPtr*)(_t315 + 0xffffffffffffff93));
				 *((char*)(_v112 + 3)) =  *((intOrPtr*)(_t315 + 0xffffffffffffff93));
				_v144();
				while(1 != 0) {
					Sleep(0x1388); // executed
				}
				return L010D28D8(1, _t249, _v8 ^ _t315, _t303, _t313, _t314);
			}

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APIs

VirtualAlloc.KERNEL32(00000000,00A00000,00003000,00000040), ref: 010DDFE2
VirtualProtect.KERNEL32(?,00000100,00000040,00000000), ref: 010DE00F
MessageBoxW.USER32(00000000,connected,connected,00000002), ref: 010DE15A
MessageBoxW.USER32(00000000,connected,connected,00000001), ref: 010DE1C0
MessageBoxW.USER32(00000000,connected,connected,00000000), ref: 010DE1E4
Sleep.KERNEL32(00001388), ref: 010DE299

Strings

X, xrefs: 010DDFCC
&, xrefs: 010DDEC0
y, xrefs: 010DDF14
D, xrefs: 010DDF24
v, xrefs: 010DDEA4
2, xrefs: 010DDF74
L, xrefs: 010DDE90
, xrefs: 010DDEF4
connected, xrefs: 010DE1B4
connected, xrefs: 010DE153
c, xrefs: 010DDF94
k, xrefs: 010DDF10
R, xrefs: 010DDF30
h, xrefs: 010DDEE4
F, xrefs: 010DDF84
P, xrefs: 010DDFA8
F, xrefs: 010DDE60
y, xrefs: 010DDE5C
L, xrefs: 010DDEF8
d, xrefs: 010DE175
x, xrefs: 010DDE88
+, xrefs: 010DDE8C
!, xrefs: 010DDEF0
n, xrefs: 010DDF38
connected, xrefs: 010DE14E
connected, xrefs: 010DE1B9
i, xrefs: 010DDECC
<, xrefs: 010DDF4C
M, xrefs: 010DDF28
T, xrefs: 010DDEAC
6, xrefs: 010DDF0C
W, xrefs: 010DDF68
connected, xrefs: 010DE1D8
i, xrefs: 010DDFBC
#, xrefs: 010DDE74
X, xrefs: 010DDF60
d, xrefs: 010DDE68
connected, xrefs: 010DE1DD
0, xrefs: 010DDF64
C, xrefs: 010DDF00
:, xrefs: 010DDE6C
X, xrefs: 010DDF20

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.542117982.00000000010DD000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Offset: 010D0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000000.00000002.542063537.00000000010D0000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542080292.00000000010D1000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542100110.00000000010D9000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542252459.000000000119F000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542257355.00000000011A3000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542335455.00000000011D2000.00000008.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542604835.0000000001336000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542611653.000000000133B000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542616598.000000000133F000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_10d0000_SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: Message$Virtual$AllocProtectSleep
String ID: $!$#$&$+$0$2$6$:$<$C$D$F$F$L$L$M$P$R$T$W$X$X$X$c$connected$connected$connected$connected$connected$connected$d$d$h$i$i$k$n$v$x$y$y
API String ID: 521561353-2757031617
Opcode ID: 02062b576223455ba5afd4348f9dabd323afdbf7a38f2118bb5c705209091080
Instruction ID: ff8b26dccef0fff5d27e3f0f5e876f148509832cbc258855108deaca8d062600
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 02062b576223455ba5afd4348f9dabd323afdbf7a38f2118bb5c705209091080
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: FEF11930D087C9CEEB22CABCC8487DDBFB16B16314F184299D5A46B3D6C7B50546CB66

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Function 010DD6A0 Relevance: 22.8, APIs: 3, Strings: 10, Instructions: 66
COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

C-Code - Quality: 65%

			E010DD6A0(void* __ebx, void* __edi, void* __esi, void* __fp0) {
				signed int _v8;
				int _v12;
				signed int _v16;
				int _t12;
				void* _t24;
				void* _t25;
				void* _t29;
				void* _t30;
				void* _t31;

				_t30 = __esi;
				_t29 = __edi;
				_t25 = __ebx;
				_t12 = FreeConsole();
				__imp__CoInitialize(0); // executed
				_v12 = _t12;
				_t39 = _v12;
				if(_v12 < 0) {
					_t24 = L010D1E1F(_t39, 2, L"C:\\Users\\W7H64\\Desktop\\VCSamples-master\\VC2010Samples\\ATL\\OLEDB\\Consumer\\DynamicConsumer\\DynamicConsumer.cpp", 0x525, 0, L"%ls", L"(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)");
					_t31 = _t31 + 0x18;
					_t40 = _t24 - 1;
					if(_t24 == 1) {
						asm("int3");
					}
				}
				L010D1DBB(_t40);
				L010D1DBB(_t40, "Which accessor do you want to use?\n", "Dynamic Accessor Sample\n\n");
				L010D1DBB(_t40);
				L010D1DBB(_t40, "2 - CDynamicStringAccessor\n", "1 - CDynamicAccessor\n");
				L010D1DBB(_t40);
				L010D1DBB(_t40, "4 - CDynamicParameterAccessor\n", "3 - CXMLAccessor\n");
				L010D30FD(); // executed
				_v16 = L010D1D16(_t25, _t29, _t30, "Enter 1-4 to continue: ", 4, 1);
				_v8 = _v16;
				_v8 = _v8 - 1;
				if(_v8 > 3) {
					L9:
					__imp__CoUninitialize();
					return 0;
				} else {
					switch( *((intOrPtr*)(_v8 * 4 +  &M010DD794))) {
						case 0:
							L010D5385(_t25, _t28, _t29, _t30, _t41);
							goto L9;
						case 1:
							L010D2B35(__ebx, __edi, __esi, __eflags);
							goto L9;
						case 2:
							L010D3693(__ebx, __edi, __esi);
							goto L9;
						case 3:
							L010D2ECD(__ebx, __edi, __esi, __eflags, __fp0);
							goto L9;
					}
				}
			}

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0x010dd762

APIs

FreeConsole.KERNEL32 ref: 010DD6A6
CoInitialize.OLE32(00000000), ref: 010DD6AE
CoUninitialize.OLE32 ref: 010DD783

Strings

4 - CDynamicParameterAccessor, xrefs: 010DD724
(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0), xrefs: 010DD6BD
Dynamic Accessor Sample, xrefs: 010DD6E3
C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp, xrefs: 010DD6CE
2 - CDynamicStringAccessor, xrefs: 010DD70A
%ls, xrefs: 010DD6C2
1 - CDynamicAccessor, xrefs: 010DD6FD
Enter 1-4 to continue: , xrefs: 010DD73A
Which accessor do you want to use?, xrefs: 010DD6F0
3 - CXMLAccessor, xrefs: 010DD717

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.542117982.00000000010DD000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Offset: 010D0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000000.00000002.542063537.00000000010D0000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542080292.00000000010D1000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542100110.00000000010D9000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542252459.000000000119F000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542257355.00000000011A3000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542335455.00000000011D2000.00000008.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542604835.0000000001336000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542611653.000000000133B000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542616598.000000000133F000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_10d0000_SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: ConsoleFreeInitializeUninitialize
String ID: %ls$(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)$1 - CDynamicAccessor$2 - CDynamicStringAccessor$3 - CXMLAccessor$4 - CDynamicParameterAccessor$C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp$Dynamic Accessor Sample$Enter 1-4 to continue: $Which accessor do you want to use?
API String ID: 1020786866-3690709560
Opcode ID: 4574f7411b1fd4ba3a822dc540552df4c152f87e05ff13c0961b32bb721719b9
Instruction ID: 4f1388b029adb7657361768e6cbe7dbf0e369adfda972bdc8c2d8dea1ea0bffe
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 4574f7411b1fd4ba3a822dc540552df4c152f87e05ff13c0961b32bb721719b9
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 7C11E975E44306AFD704BBE59D07BCDBA70AB24701F4040A4E486612C4FFB2130447A7

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Non-executed Functions

Function 010DF0E0 Relevance: 16.0, APIs: 1, Strings: 8, Instructions: 216
COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

C-Code - Quality: 88%

			E010DF0E0(void* __ebx, void* __edx, void* __edi, void* __esi, void* __eflags) {
				char _v8;
				char _v16;
				signed int _v20;
				char _v44;
				intOrPtr _v48;
				char _v52;
				char _v56;
				char _v60;
				intOrPtr _v64;
				intOrPtr _v68;
				char _v136;
				signed int _t86;
				intOrPtr _t92;
				void* _t105;
				void* _t113;
				void* _t125;
				void* _t126;
				signed int _t176;
				void* _t177;
				void* _t179;

				_t175 = __esi;
				_t174 = __edi;
				_t130 = __ebx;
				_push(0xffffffff);
				_push(0x11a0103);
				_push( *[fs:0x0]);
				_t86 =  *0x1335e64 ^ _t176;
				_v20 = _t86;
				_push(_t86);
				 *[fs:0x0] =  &_v16;
				L010D4B33( &_v56);
				_v8 = 0;
				L010D4A2F( &_v52);
				_v8 = 1;
				L010D2F31();
				_v8 = 2;
				L010D1E7E( &_v60);
				_v8 = 3;
				_t92 = L010D1D16(__ebx, __edi, __esi, "Enter 1-3 to continue: ", 3, 1);
				_t179 = _t177 - 0x78 + 0xc;
				_v68 = _t92;
				if(_v68 >= 0) {
					_v48 = L010D247D( &_v56, GetActiveWindow(), 1);
					__eflags = _v48;
					if(__eflags < 0) {
						_t126 = L010D1E1F(__eflags, 2, L"C:\\Users\\W7H64\\Desktop\\VCSamples-master\\VC2010Samples\\ATL\\OLEDB\\Consumer\\DynamicConsumer\\DynamicConsumer.cpp", 0x36a, 0, L"%ls", L"(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)");
						_t179 = _t179 + 0x18;
						__eflags = _t126 - 1;
						if(_t126 == 1) {
							asm("int3");
						}
					}
					_v48 = L010D2554( &_v52,  &_v56, 0, 0);
					__eflags = _v48;
					if(__eflags < 0) {
						_t125 = L010D1E1F(__eflags, 2, L"C:\\Users\\W7H64\\Desktop\\VCSamples-master\\VC2010Samples\\ATL\\OLEDB\\Consumer\\DynamicConsumer\\DynamicConsumer.cpp", 0x36e, 0, L"%ls", L"(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)");
						_t179 = _t179 + 0x18;
						__eflags = _t125 - 1;
						if(__eflags == 0) {
							asm("int3");
						}
					}
					_t173 =  &_v56;
					_v48 = L010D50E2(_t130, _t174, _t175, __eflags,  &_v56,  &_v52,  &_v60);
					__eflags = _v48;
					if(_v48 >= 0) {
						_v64 = _v68;
						__eflags = _v64 - 1;
						if(_v64 == 1) {
							L010D181B( &_v136, 0);
						} else {
							__eflags = _v64 - 2;
							if(_v64 == 2) {
								L010D181B( &_v136, 1);
							} else {
								__eflags = _v64 - 3;
								if(_v64 == 3) {
									L010D181B( &_v136, 2);
								}
							}
						}
						L010D31F2( &_v44, 0x11abf78);
						_v8 = 4;
						L010D4386( &_v44, __eflags, 0x89, 1, 1);
						L010D4386( &_v44, __eflags, 0x8b, 1, 1);
						L010D4386( &_v44, __eflags, 0x12, 1, 1);
						L010D4386( &_v44, __eflags, 0x15, 1, 1);
						_t105 = L010D2518( &_v60);
						_t173 =  &_v52;
						_v48 = L010D297D(_t130,  &_v136, _t174, _t175,  &_v52, _t105,  &_v44, 0, 0x11ac154, 1, 0);
						__eflags = _v48;
						if(__eflags >= 0) {
							L010D4FAC(_t130, _t174, _t175,  &_v136);
							_v8 = 3;
							L010D2B3A( &_v44);
							_v8 = 2;
							L010D1933( &_v60);
							_v8 = 1;
							L010D30F3( &_v136);
							_v8 = 0;
							L010D4E62( &_v52);
							_v8 = 0xffffffff;
							_t113 = L010D1398( &_v56);
						} else {
							_push("Failed to open the rowset\n");
							L010D1DBB(__eflags);
							_v8 = 3;
							L010D2B3A( &_v44);
							_v8 = 2;
							L010D1933( &_v60);
							_v8 = 1;
							L010D30F3( &_v136);
							_v8 = 0;
							L010D4E62( &_v52);
							_v8 = 0xffffffff;
							_t113 = L010D1398( &_v56);
						}
					} else {
						_v8 = 2;
						L010D1933( &_v60);
						_v8 = 1;
						L010D30F3( &_v136);
						_v8 = 0;
						L010D4E62( &_v52);
						_v8 = 0xffffffff;
						_t113 = L010D1398( &_v56);
					}
				} else {
					_v8 = 2;
					L010D1933( &_v60);
					_v8 = 1;
					L010D30F3( &_v136);
					_v8 = 0;
					L010D4E62( &_v52);
					_v8 = 0xffffffff;
					_t113 = L010D1398( &_v56);
				}
				 *[fs:0x0] = _v16;
				return L010D28D8(_t113, _t130, _v20 ^ _t176, _t173, _t174, _t175);
			}

0x010df0e0
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APIs

GetActiveWindow.USER32 ref: 010DF195

Strings

Failed to open the rowset, xrefs: 010DF32E
%ls, xrefs: 010DF1F1
Enter 1-3 to continue: , xrefs: 010DF142
(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0), xrefs: 010DF1AD
%ls, xrefs: 010DF1B2
C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp, xrefs: 010DF1FD
(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0), xrefs: 010DF1EC
C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp, xrefs: 010DF1BE

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.542117982.00000000010DD000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Offset: 010D0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000000.00000002.542063537.00000000010D0000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542080292.00000000010D1000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542100110.00000000010D9000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542252459.000000000119F000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542257355.00000000011A3000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542335455.00000000011D2000.00000008.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542604835.0000000001336000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542611653.000000000133B000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542616598.000000000133F000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_10d0000_SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: ActiveWindow
String ID: %ls$%ls$(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)$(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)$C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp$C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp$Enter 1-3 to continue: $Failed to open the rowset
API String ID: 2558294473-1565370113
Opcode ID: ad71e39c538674427d94d3440f3479915118e7449a8d87ab4dacd6bc20c1b5ec
Instruction ID: 3c55272a69f193712bd14a2211963bf85d3b43f687261993a1274dcdb2893d28
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: ad71e39c538674427d94d3440f3479915118e7449a8d87ab4dacd6bc20c1b5ec
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: C5916C30D4434AEEDB15EBA4CD56BECBB74AF20710F548198E1927A1D1EFB01B49CB52

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Function 010DF640 Relevance: 14.2, APIs: 1, Strings: 7, Instructions: 175
COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

C-Code - Quality: 84%

			E010DF640(void* __ebx, void* __edi, void* __esi) {
				char _v8;
				char _v16;
				signed int _v20;
				char _v44;
				intOrPtr _v48;
				char _v52;
				char _v56;
				char _v60;
				char _v128;
				signed int _t68;
				void* _t92;
				void* _t102;
				void* _t103;
				void* _t104;
				void* _t140;
				void* _t141;
				signed int _t142;
				void* _t143;
				void* _t144;

				_t141 = __esi;
				_t140 = __edi;
				_t104 = __ebx;
				_push(0xffffffff);
				_push(0x11a01ab);
				_push( *[fs:0x0]);
				_t144 = _t143 - 0x70;
				_t68 =  *0x1335e64 ^ _t142;
				_v20 = _t68;
				_push(_t68);
				 *[fs:0x0] =  &_v16;
				L010D4B33( &_v56);
				_v8 = 0;
				L010D4A2F( &_v52);
				_v8 = 1;
				L010D353F();
				_v8 = 2;
				L010D1E7E( &_v60);
				_v8 = 3;
				_v48 = L010D247D( &_v56, GetActiveWindow(), 1);
				_t148 = _v48;
				if(_v48 < 0) {
					_t103 = L010D1E1F(_t148, 2, L"C:\\Users\\W7H64\\Desktop\\VCSamples-master\\VC2010Samples\\ATL\\OLEDB\\Consumer\\DynamicConsumer\\DynamicConsumer.cpp", 0x3ce, 0, L"%ls", L"(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)");
					_t144 = _t144 + 0x18;
					if(_t103 == 1) {
						asm("int3");
					}
				}
				_v48 = L010D2554( &_v52,  &_v56, 0, 0);
				_t150 = _v48;
				if(_v48 < 0) {
					_t102 = L010D1E1F(_t150, 2, L"C:\\Users\\W7H64\\Desktop\\VCSamples-master\\VC2010Samples\\ATL\\OLEDB\\Consumer\\DynamicConsumer\\DynamicConsumer.cpp", 0x3d2, 0, L"%ls", L"(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)");
					_t144 = _t144 + 0x18;
					_t151 = _t102 - 1;
					if(_t102 == 1) {
						asm("int3");
					}
				}
				_t139 =  &_v56;
				_v48 = L010D50E2(_t104, _t140, _t141, _t151,  &_v56,  &_v52,  &_v60);
				if(_v48 >= 0) {
					L010D31F2( &_v44, 0x11abf78);
					_v8 = 4;
					L010D4386( &_v44, __eflags, 0x89, 1, 1);
					L010D4386( &_v44, __eflags, 0x8b, 1, 1);
					L010D4386( &_v44, __eflags, 0x12, 1, 1);
					L010D4386( &_v44, __eflags, 0x15, 1, 1);
					_v48 = L010D3C47(_t104,  &_v128, _t140, _t141,  &_v52, L010D2518( &_v60),  &_v44, 0, 0x11ac154, 1, 0);
					__eflags = _v48;
					if(__eflags >= 0) {
						_t139 =  &_v128;
						L010D240F( &_v128);
						_v8 = 3;
						L010D2B3A( &_v44);
						_v8 = 2;
						L010D1933( &_v60);
						_v8 = 1;
						L010D2F18( &_v128);
						_v8 = 0;
						L010D4E62( &_v52);
						_v8 = 0xffffffff;
						_t92 = L010D1398( &_v56);
					} else {
						_push("Failed to open the rowset\n");
						L010D1DBB(__eflags);
						_v8 = 3;
						L010D2B3A( &_v44);
						_v8 = 2;
						L010D1933( &_v60);
						_v8 = 1;
						L010D2F18( &_v128);
						_v8 = 0;
						L010D4E62( &_v52);
						_v8 = 0xffffffff;
						_t92 = L010D1398( &_v56);
					}
				} else {
					_v8 = 2;
					L010D1933( &_v60);
					_v8 = 1;
					L010D2F18( &_v128);
					_v8 = 0;
					L010D4E62( &_v52);
					_v8 = 0xffffffff;
					_t92 = L010D1398( &_v56);
				}
				 *[fs:0x0] = _v16;
				return L010D28D8(_t92, _t104, _v20 ^ _t142, _t139, _t140, _t141);
			}

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APIs

GetActiveWindow.USER32 ref: 010DF69D

Strings

(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0), xrefs: 010DF6B5
(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0), xrefs: 010DF6F4
C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp, xrefs: 010DF705
%ls, xrefs: 010DF6F9
%ls, xrefs: 010DF6BA
C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp, xrefs: 010DF6C6
Failed to open the rowset, xrefs: 010DF7EB

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.542117982.00000000010DD000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Offset: 010D0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000000.00000002.542063537.00000000010D0000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542080292.00000000010D1000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542100110.00000000010D9000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542252459.000000000119F000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542257355.00000000011A3000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542335455.00000000011D2000.00000008.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542604835.0000000001336000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542611653.000000000133B000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542616598.000000000133F000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_10d0000_SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: ActiveWindow
String ID: %ls$%ls$(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)$(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)$C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp$C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp$Failed to open the rowset
API String ID: 2558294473-3948184931
Opcode ID: cb7d6db5bbf5f1be8fece24b8d023d2ecf4207255c7eecdf0b4d34ad1528eed6
Instruction ID: 4535a22cc627e3a5b9dba68265aac986119f0532d12b768efcbf907fa0f45b32
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: cb7d6db5bbf5f1be8fece24b8d023d2ecf4207255c7eecdf0b4d34ad1528eed6
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 9561AC30D40349EAEB15EBA4DD52BECBB74AF24700F948168E1927B0C1EFB01B49CB52

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Function 010DF3F0 Relevance: 12.4, APIs: 1, Strings: 6, Instructions: 172
COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

C-Code - Quality: 88%

			E010DF3F0(void* __ebx, void* __edi, void* __esi, void* __eflags) {
				char _v8;
				char _v16;
				signed int _v20;
				char _v44;
				intOrPtr _v48;
				char _v52;
				char _v56;
				char _v60;
				char _v128;
				signed int _t68;
				void* _t92;
				void* _t101;
				void* _t102;
				void* _t103;
				void* _t139;
				void* _t140;
				signed int _t141;
				void* _t142;
				void* _t143;

				_t140 = __esi;
				_t139 = __edi;
				_t103 = __ebx;
				_push(0xffffffff);
				_push(0x11a0157);
				_push( *[fs:0x0]);
				_t143 = _t142 - 0x70;
				_t68 =  *0x1335e64 ^ _t141;
				_v20 = _t68;
				_push(_t68);
				 *[fs:0x0] =  &_v16;
				L010D4B33( &_v56);
				_v8 = 0;
				L010D4A2F( &_v52);
				_v8 = 1;
				L010D10D2(__eflags);
				_v8 = 2;
				L010D1E7E( &_v60);
				_v8 = 3;
				_v48 = L010D247D( &_v56, GetActiveWindow(), 1);
				_t147 = _v48;
				if(_v48 < 0) {
					_t102 = L010D1E1F(_t147, 2, L"C:\\Users\\W7H64\\Desktop\\VCSamples-master\\VC2010Samples\\ATL\\OLEDB\\Consumer\\DynamicConsumer\\DynamicConsumer.cpp", 0x3a4, 0, L"%ls", L"(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)");
					_t143 = _t143 + 0x18;
					if(_t102 == 1) {
						asm("int3");
					}
				}
				_v48 = L010D2554( &_v52,  &_v56, 0, 0);
				_t149 = _v48;
				if(_v48 < 0) {
					_t101 = L010D1E1F(_t149, 2, L"C:\\Users\\W7H64\\Desktop\\VCSamples-master\\VC2010Samples\\ATL\\OLEDB\\Consumer\\DynamicConsumer\\DynamicConsumer.cpp", 0x3a8, 0, L"%ls", L"(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)");
					_t143 = _t143 + 0x18;
					_t150 = _t101 - 1;
					if(_t101 == 1) {
						asm("int3");
					}
				}
				_t138 =  &_v56;
				_v48 = L010D50E2(_t103, _t139, _t140, _t150,  &_v56,  &_v52,  &_v60);
				if(_v48 >= 0) {
					L010D31F2( &_v44, 0x11abf78);
					_v8 = 4;
					L010D4386( &_v44, __eflags, 0x89, 1, 1);
					L010D4386( &_v44, __eflags, 0x8b, 1, 1);
					L010D4386( &_v44, __eflags, 0x12, 1, 1);
					L010D4386( &_v44, __eflags, 0x15, 1, 1);
					_v48 = L010D1564(_t103,  &_v128, _t139, _t140,  &_v52, L010D2518( &_v60),  &_v44, 0, 0x11ac154, 1, 0);
					__eflags = _v48;
					if(_v48 >= 0) {
						_t138 =  &_v128;
						L010D46F1( &_v128);
						_v8 = 3;
						L010D2B3A( &_v44);
						_v8 = 2;
						L010D1933( &_v60);
						_v8 = 1;
						L010D22E8( &_v128);
						_v8 = 0;
						L010D4E62( &_v52);
						_v8 = 0xffffffff;
						_t92 = L010D1398( &_v56);
					} else {
						_v8 = 3;
						L010D2B3A( &_v44);
						_v8 = 2;
						L010D1933( &_v60);
						_v8 = 1;
						L010D22E8( &_v128);
						_v8 = 0;
						L010D4E62( &_v52);
						_v8 = 0xffffffff;
						_t92 = L010D1398( &_v56);
					}
				} else {
					_v8 = 2;
					L010D1933( &_v60);
					_v8 = 1;
					L010D22E8( &_v128);
					_v8 = 0;
					L010D4E62( &_v52);
					_v8 = 0xffffffff;
					_t92 = L010D1398( &_v56);
				}
				 *[fs:0x0] = _v16;
				return L010D28D8(_t92, _t103, _v20 ^ _t141, _t138, _t139, _t140);
			}

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APIs

GetActiveWindow.USER32 ref: 010DF44D

Strings

%ls, xrefs: 010DF46A
(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0), xrefs: 010DF4A4
(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0), xrefs: 010DF465
%ls, xrefs: 010DF4A9
C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp, xrefs: 010DF4B5
C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp, xrefs: 010DF476

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.542117982.00000000010DD000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Offset: 010D0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000000.00000002.542063537.00000000010D0000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542080292.00000000010D1000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542100110.00000000010D9000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542252459.000000000119F000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542257355.00000000011A3000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542335455.00000000011D2000.00000008.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542604835.0000000001336000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542611653.000000000133B000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542616598.000000000133F000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_10d0000_SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: ActiveWindow
String ID: %ls$%ls$(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)$(((HRESULT)(hr)) >= 0)$C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp$C:\Users\W7H64\Desktop\VCSamples-master\VC2010Samples\ATL\OLEDB\Consumer\DynamicConsumer\DynamicConsumer.cpp
API String ID: 2558294473-4036015773
Opcode ID: 9cb4b83578cc51a203f0ba57780f3971a9511fc0213e14ed044f85e8806e5969
Instruction ID: da397f3f744006b686168f1a461465b74feb880214912080e9f9b6e78f6fc102
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 9cb4b83578cc51a203f0ba57780f3971a9511fc0213e14ed044f85e8806e5969
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 6C616730D41349EADB15EBA4DC56BECBB74AF24700FA48158F1A27B1D1EFB01A49CB52

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Function 010EBA30 Relevance: 12.3, APIs: 4, Strings: 3, Instructions: 88
memoryCOMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

C-Code - Quality: 68%

			E010EBA30(char* _a4, int _a8) {
				short* _v8;
				int _v12;
				short* _v16;
				int _v20;
				int _v24;
				char _v28;
				int _v32;
				short* _v36;
				int _v40;
				int _v44;
				int _v48;
				short* _t44;
				void* _t53;
				short* _t62;

				if(_a4 == 0 || _a8 == 0) {
					return 0;
				} else {
					_v40 = 0;
					_v20 = L010D439F();
					_v44 = 0;
					_v48 = 0;
					L010D2C57( &_v28);
					_v8 = 0;
					_v12 = MultiByteToWideChar(_v20, 0, _a4, _a8, 0, 0);
					_t44 = _v12;
					_v16 = _t44;
					__eflags = _a8 - 0xffffffff;
					if(_a8 == 0xffffffff) {
						_t62 = _v16 - 1;
						__eflags = _t62;
						_v16 = _t62;
					}
					__imp__#4(0, _v16);
					_v8 = _t44;
					__eflags = _v8;
					if(_v8 == 0) {
						L11:
						_v36 = _v8;
						L010D2329( &_v28);
						return _v36;
					} else {
						_v24 = MultiByteToWideChar(_v20, 0, _a4, _a8, _v8, _v12);
						__eflags = _v24 - _v12;
						if(__eflags != 0) {
							_t53 = L010D1E1F(__eflags, 2, L"C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Visual Studio\\2022\\Community\\VC\\Tools\\MSVC\\14.30.30705\\atlmfc\\include\\atlconv.h", 0x482, 0, "%ls", L"nResult == nConvertedLen");
							__eflags = _t53 - 1;
							if(_t53 == 1) {
								asm("int3");
							}
						}
						__eflags = _v24 - _v12;
						if(_v24 == _v12) {
							goto L11;
						} else {
							__imp__#6(_v8);
							_v32 = 0;
							L010D2329( &_v28);
							return _v32;
						}
					}
				}
			}

0x010eba3a
0x00000000
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APIs

MultiByteToWideChar.KERNEL32(?,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000), ref: 010EBA87
SysAllocStringLen.OLEAUT32(00000000,000000FF), ref: 010EBAAB
MultiByteToWideChar.KERNEL32(?,00000000,00000000,000000FF,00000000,00000000), ref: 010EBAD0
SysFreeString.OLEAUT32(00000000), ref: 010EBB13

Strings

nResult == nConvertedLen, xrefs: 010EBAE1
%ls, xrefs: 010EBAE6
C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\VC\Tools\MSVC\14.30.30705\atlmfc\include\atlconv.h, xrefs: 010EBAF2

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.542117982.00000000010DD000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Offset: 010D0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000000.00000002.542063537.00000000010D0000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542080292.00000000010D1000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542100110.00000000010D9000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542252459.000000000119F000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542257355.00000000011A3000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542335455.00000000011D2000.00000008.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542604835.0000000001336000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542611653.000000000133B000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542616598.000000000133F000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_10d0000_SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: ByteCharMultiStringWide$AllocFree
String ID: %ls$C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\VC\Tools\MSVC\14.30.30705\atlmfc\include\atlconv.h$nResult == nConvertedLen
API String ID: 447844807-2095365358
Opcode ID: 5ff54bd717480ada4e4300076791c1e382e54010adfb91e3c2476e07542a31ac
Instruction ID: 62e9af21c1330e69df65c825163cdfbd8c322d0f81636881f8d3ccb596308d66
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 5ff54bd717480ada4e4300076791c1e382e54010adfb91e3c2476e07542a31ac
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: E4312B74E00209EFDF24DFA9D849BEEBBF5AB48301F108149E615AB284D7B46A40CF64

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Function 010ECC00 Relevance: 7.6, APIs: 1, Strings: 4, Instructions: 71
COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

C-Code - Quality: 69%

			E010ECC00(void* __ecx, short* _a4, char* _a8, int _a12, int _a16) {
				int _v8;
				void* _t19;
				void* _t20;
				void* _t21;
				void* _t28;

				_t30 = _a8;
				if(_a8 == 0) {
					_t21 = L010D1E1F(_t30, 2, L"C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Visual Studio\\2022\\Community\\VC\\Tools\\MSVC\\14.30.30705\\atlmfc\\include\\atlconv.h", 0x234, 0, "%ls", L"lpa != 0");
					_t28 = _t28 + 0x18;
					if(_t21 == 1) {
						asm("int3");
					}
				}
				_t32 = _a4;
				if(_a4 == 0) {
					_t20 = L010D1E1F(_t32, 2, L"C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Visual Studio\\2022\\Community\\VC\\Tools\\MSVC\\14.30.30705\\atlmfc\\include\\atlconv.h", 0x235, 0, "%ls", L"lpw != 0");
					_t28 = _t28 + 0x18;
					if(_t20 == 1) {
						asm("int3");
					}
				}
				if(_a4 == 0 || _a8 == 0) {
					return 0;
				}
				 *_a4 = 0;
				_v8 = MultiByteToWideChar(_a16, 0, _a8, 0xffffffff, _a4, _a12);
				__eflags = _v8;
				if(_v8 != 0) {
					return _a4;
				}
				__eflags = 0;
				if(0 == 0) {
					_t19 = L010D1E1F(0, 2, L"C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Visual Studio\\2022\\Community\\VC\\Tools\\MSVC\\14.30.30705\\atlmfc\\include\\atlconv.h", 0x23f, 0, "%ls", 0x11a86cc);
					__eflags = _t19 - 1;
					if(_t19 == 1) {
						asm("int3");
					}
				}
				return 0;
			}

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0x00000000

APIs

MultiByteToWideChar.KERNEL32(?,00000000,00000000,000000FF,00000000,?), ref: 010ECC88

Strings

lpa != 0, xrefs: 010ECC0A
%ls, xrefs: 010ECC0F, 010ECC3B, 010ECCA0
lpw != 0, xrefs: 010ECC36
C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\VC\Tools\MSVC\14.30.30705\atlmfc\include\atlconv.h, xrefs: 010ECC1B, 010ECC47, 010ECCAC

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.542117982.00000000010DD000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Offset: 010D0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000000.00000002.542063537.00000000010D0000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542080292.00000000010D1000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542100110.00000000010D9000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542252459.000000000119F000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542257355.00000000011A3000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542335455.00000000011D2000.00000008.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542604835.0000000001336000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542611653.000000000133B000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542616598.000000000133F000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_10d0000_SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: ByteCharMultiWide
String ID: %ls$C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\VC\Tools\MSVC\14.30.30705\atlmfc\include\atlconv.h$lpa != 0$lpw != 0
API String ID: 626452242-475274735
Opcode ID: 976721aabb5cf9b0ce690e214e7e9dab2c769c60bfaac85b1511486db4b0417c
Instruction ID: 4d728a5c7b49b008f70fe7c7a9681134f523cb59d370fddaa165737722ac8f10
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 976721aabb5cf9b0ce690e214e7e9dab2c769c60bfaac85b1511486db4b0417c
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 8E113B31F4030CBFFB649E1ACE4EF6A77D49744B11F208158FA4C591C1D7B1A5A0C695

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Function 010F1B50 Relevance: 7.4, APIs: 1, Strings: 3, Instructions: 369
COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

C-Code - Quality: 91%

			E010F1B50(void* __ebx, intOrPtr __ecx, void* __edi, void* __esi, intOrPtr* _a4, signed int _a8, intOrPtr* _a12, signed int _a16, signed char _a20) {
				signed int _v8;
				intOrPtr _v12;
				char _v16;
				signed int _v20;
				char _v24;
				signed short* _v28;
				char _v32;
				signed int _v36;
				signed int _v40;
				signed int _v44;
				intOrPtr _v48;
				signed int _v52;
				signed int _v56;
				intOrPtr* _v60;
				signed int _v64;
				signed int _v68;
				signed int _v72;
				intOrPtr _v76;
				signed int _v80;
				signed int _v84;
				signed int _v88;
				signed int _v92;
				signed int _v96;
				intOrPtr _v100;
				intOrPtr _v104;
				signed int _v108;
				void* _t229;
				intOrPtr _t248;
				void* _t264;
				void* _t265;
				void* _t266;
				void* _t269;
				void* _t270;
				signed int _t275;
				void* _t279;
				void* _t281;
				void* _t283;
				signed int _t291;
				signed int _t292;
				signed int _t295;
				void* _t296;
				void* _t318;
				signed int _t347;
				signed int _t349;
				signed int _t351;
				signed int _t355;
				signed int _t357;
				signed int _t378;
				signed int _t380;
				signed int _t382;
				intOrPtr _t408;
				signed int _t425;
				void* _t442;
				void* _t443;
				void* _t444;
				void* _t448;

				_t443 = __esi;
				_t442 = __edi;
				_t318 = __ebx;
				_v12 = __ecx;
				if( *_a4 == 0) {
					L010D489F( &_v24);
					while(1) {
						__eflags = _a8;
						if(_a8 == 0) {
							_v52 = 0;
						} else {
							_v52 = 1;
						}
						_v56 = _v52;
						__eflags = _v56;
						if(__eflags == 0) {
							_t229 = L010D1E1F(__eflags, 2, L"C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Visual Studio\\2022\\Community\\VC\\Tools\\MSVC\\14.30.30705\\atlmfc\\include\\atldbcli.h", 0x1154, 0, "%ls", L"__atl_condVal");
							_t444 = _t444 + 0x18;
							__eflags = _t229 - 1;
							if(_t229 == 1) {
								asm("int3");
							}
						}
						__eflags = _v56;
						if(_v56 == 0) {
							break;
						}
						__eflags = 0;
						if(0 != 0) {
							continue;
						}
						_v20 = L010D469C(_a8, L010D5209( &_v24));
						__eflags = _v20;
						if(_v20 >= 0) {
							L010D3D8C( &_v32);
							_v20 = L010D4CD7(_a8, L010D3BF2( &_v32));
							__eflags = _v20;
							if(_v20 >= 0) {
								_v44 = 0;
								L010D254A( &_v16);
								_v60 = L010D3189( &_v32);
								_v20 =  *((intOrPtr*)( *((intOrPtr*)( *_v60 + 0xc))))(_v60,  &_v44, L010D5024( &_v16),  &_v28);
								__eflags = _v20;
								if(__eflags >= 0) {
									_v20 = L010D2284(_v12, __eflags, _v44);
									__eflags = _v20;
									if(_v20 >= 0) {
										_v40 = 0;
										_v72 = 0;
										_v68 = 0;
										_v64 = 0;
										_v48 =  *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x2c));
										_v8 = 0;
										while(1) {
											__eflags = _v8 - _v44;
											if(_v8 >= _v44) {
												break;
											}
											 *( *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x2c)) + 0x24 + _v8 * 0x34) = 0;
											_t264 = L010D3F5D( &_v16);
											_t347 = _v8 * 0x18;
											__eflags =  *(_t264 + _t347) & 0x00000001;
											if(( *(_t264 + _t347) & 0x00000001) != 0) {
												_t382 = _v8 * 0x34;
												__eflags = _t382;
												 *( *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x2c)) + _t382 + 0x24) =  *( *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x2c)) + 0x24 + _v8 * 0x34) | 0x00000001;
											}
											_t265 = L010D3F5D( &_v16);
											_t349 = _v8 * 0x18;
											__eflags =  *(_t265 + _t349) & 0x00000002;
											if(( *(_t265 + _t349) & 0x00000002) != 0) {
												_t380 = _v8 * 0x34;
												__eflags = _t380;
												 *( *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x2c)) + _t380 + 0x24) =  *( *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x2c)) + 0x24 + _v8 * 0x34) | 0x00000002;
											}
											_t266 = L010D3F5D( &_v16);
											_t351 = _v8 * 0x18;
											_t408 = _v12;
											__eflags =  *((intOrPtr*)(_t266 + _t351 + 0x10)) -  *((intOrPtr*)(_t408 + 0x24));
											if( *((intOrPtr*)(_t266 + _t351 + 0x10)) >  *((intOrPtr*)(_t408 + 0x24))) {
												_t296 = L010D3F5D( &_v16);
												_t378 = _v8 * 0x18;
												__eflags = _t378;
												 *((intOrPtr*)(_t296 + _t378 + 0x10)) =  *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x24));
											}
											_v36 =  *((intOrPtr*)(L010D3F5D( &_v16) + 0x10 + _v8 * 0x18));
											_t269 = L010D3F5D( &_v16);
											_t355 = _v8 * 0x18;
											__eflags = ( *(_t269 + _t355 + 0x14) & 0x0000ffff) - 0x81;
											if(( *(_t269 + _t355 + 0x14) & 0x0000ffff) == 0x81) {
												_t295 = _v36 + 1;
												__eflags = _t295;
												_v36 = _t295;
											}
											_t270 = L010D3F5D( &_v16);
											_t357 = _v8 * 0x18;
											__eflags = ( *(_t270 + _t357 + 0x14) & 0x0000ffff) - 0x82;
											if(( *(_t270 + _t357 + 0x14) & 0x0000ffff) == 0x82) {
												_v36 = _v36 + _v36 + 2;
											}
											_t275 = L010D2248( *(L010D3F5D( &_v16) + 0x14 + _v8 * 0x18) & 0x0000ffff, __eflags,  &_v40, _v36, L010D4B51( *(L010D3F5D( &_v16) + 0x14 + _v8 * 0x18) & 0x0000ffff,  *(L010D3F5D( &_v16) + 0x14 + _v8 * 0x18) & 0x0000ffff));
											_t448 = _t444 + 0x10;
											_v72 = _t275;
											_t360 = _a16 & 0x000000ff;
											__eflags = _a16 & 0x000000ff;
											if(__eflags != 0) {
												_t292 = L010D2248(_t360, __eflags,  &_v40, 4, 4);
												_t448 = _t448 + 0xc;
												_v68 = _t292;
											}
											__eflags = _a20 & 0x000000ff;
											if(__eflags != 0) {
												_t291 = L010D2248( &_v40, __eflags,  &_v40, 4, 4);
												_t448 = _t448 + 0xc;
												_v64 = _t291;
											}
											_t279 = L010D3F5D( &_v16);
											_t281 = L010D3F5D( &_v16);
											_t283 = L010D3F5D( &_v16);
											L010D4C28(_t318, _v48, _t442, _t443, _v48,  *((intOrPtr*)(L010D3F5D( &_v16) + 4 + _v8 * 0x18)),  *(_t283 + 0x14 + _v8 * 0x18) & 0x0000ffff, _v36,  *(_t281 + 0x16 + _v8 * 0x18) & 0x000000ff,  *(_t279 + 0x17 + _v8 * 0x18) & 0x000000ff,  *( *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x2c)) + 0x24 + _v8 * 0x34), _v72, _v68, _v64, 0);
											_t444 = _t448 + 0x2c;
											_v48 = _v48 + 0x34;
											 *((intOrPtr*)( *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x30)) + _v8 * 4)) = _v28;
											__eflags = _v28;
											if(_v28 == 0) {
												L41:
												_t425 = _v8 + 1;
												__eflags = _t425;
												_v8 = _t425;
												continue;
											} else {
												__eflags =  *_v28 & 0x0000ffff;
												if(( *_v28 & 0x0000ffff) == 0) {
													goto L41;
												} else {
													goto L39;
												}
												while(1) {
													L39:
													_v96 =  *_v28 & 0x0000ffff;
													_v28 =  &(_v28[1]);
													__eflags = _v96;
													if(_v96 == 0) {
														goto L41;
													}
												}
												goto L41;
											}
										}
										_v100 = L010D37D3(_v40, 0x11ac900);
										 *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x38)) = _v100;
										_t248 = _v12;
										__eflags =  *(_t248 + 0x38);
										if( *(_t248 + 0x38) != 0) {
											 *_a12 =  *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x38));
											 *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x34)) = _v40;
											 *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x28)) = _v44;
											L010D2BE9(_t318, _t442, _t443,  *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x2c)), _v44, _a4, _v40, L010D26E9( &_v24));
											_v108 = 0;
											L010D1EE2( &_v16);
											L010D5033( &_v32);
											L010D2AC7( &_v24);
											return _v108;
										}
										_v104 = 0x8007000e;
										L010D1EE2( &_v16);
										L010D5033( &_v32);
										L010D2AC7( &_v24);
										return _v104;
									}
									__imp__CoTaskMemFree(_v28);
									_v92 = _v20;
									L010D1EE2( &_v16);
									L010D5033( &_v32);
									L010D2AC7( &_v24);
									return _v92;
								}
								_v88 = _v20;
								L010D1EE2( &_v16);
								L010D5033( &_v32);
								L010D2AC7( &_v24);
								return _v88;
							}
							_v84 = _v20;
							L010D5033( &_v32);
							L010D2AC7( &_v24);
							return _v84;
						}
						_v80 = _v20;
						L010D2AC7( &_v24);
						return _v80;
					}
					_v76 = 0x80004005;
					L010D2AC7( &_v24);
					return _v76;
				}
				 *_a12 =  *((intOrPtr*)(_v12 + 0x38));
				return 0;
			}

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Strings

__atl_condVal, xrefs: 010F1B9D
%ls, xrefs: 010F1BA2
C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\VC\Tools\MSVC\14.30.30705\atlmfc\include\atldbcli.h, xrefs: 010F1BAE

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.542117982.00000000010DD000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Offset: 010D0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000000.00000002.542063537.00000000010D0000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542080292.00000000010D1000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542100110.00000000010D9000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542252459.000000000119F000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542257355.00000000011A3000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542335455.00000000011D2000.00000008.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542604835.0000000001336000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542611653.000000000133B000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542616598.000000000133F000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_10d0000_SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID: %ls$C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\VC\Tools\MSVC\14.30.30705\atlmfc\include\atldbcli.h$__atl_condVal
API String ID: 0-3505639908
Opcode ID: 646b1e61b6a8a58ca735b02738bd5cef7195af7ba7b4269fe75fb58eb146b70c
Instruction ID: cdc02e74be7bd6b0f23a1cdbf09103e6e55cfba5c608345be67a8db1eee826e3
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 646b1e61b6a8a58ca735b02738bd5cef7195af7ba7b4269fe75fb58eb146b70c
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 11F11CB4D01209DFCB08EF98C991EEDBBB5BF58300F60819DE5566B291DB30AA45CF91

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Function 010E9B70 Relevance: 7.0, APIs: 1, Strings: 3, Instructions: 34
memoryCOMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

C-Code - Quality: 91%

			E010E9B70(int __ecx) {
				int _v8;
				int _v12;
				int _t11;

				_v8 = __ecx;
				_t11 = _v8;
				 *_t11 = 0x11a8f3c;
				if(( *(_v8 + 8) & 0x000000ff) != 0) {
					_t11 = _v8;
					if( *((intOrPtr*)(_t11 + 4)) != 0) {
						_t11 = HeapDestroy( *(_v8 + 4));
						_v12 = _t11;
						_t21 = _v12;
						if(_v12 == 0) {
							_t11 = L010D1E1F(_t21, 2, L"C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Visual Studio\\2022\\Community\\VC\\Tools\\MSVC\\14.30.30705\\atlmfc\\include\\atlmem.h", 0x74, 0, "%ls", L"bSuccess");
							if(_t11 == 1) {
								asm("int3");
								return _t11;
							}
						}
					}
				}
				return _t11;
			}

0x010e9b76
0x010e9b79
0x010e9b7c
0x010e9b8b
0x010e9b8d
0x010e9b94
0x010e9b9d
0x010e9ba3
0x010e9ba6
0x010e9baa
0x010e9bc1
0x010e9bcc
0x010e9bce
0x00000000
0x010e9bce
0x010e9bcc
0x010e9baa
0x010e9b94
0x010e9bd2

APIs

HeapDestroy.KERNEL32(?), ref: 010E9B9D

Strings

%ls, xrefs: 010E9BB1
C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\VC\Tools\MSVC\14.30.30705\atlmfc\include\atlmem.h, xrefs: 010E9BBA
bSuccess, xrefs: 010E9BAC

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000000.00000002.542117982.00000000010DD000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmp, Offset: 010D0000, based on PE: true

Associated: 00000000.00000002.542063537.00000000010D0000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542080292.00000000010D1000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542100110.00000000010D9000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542252459.000000000119F000.00000020.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542257355.00000000011A3000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542335455.00000000011D2000.00000008.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542604835.0000000001336000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542611653.000000000133B000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File
Associated: 00000000.00000002.542616598.000000000133F000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000003.sdmpDownload File

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_0_2_10d0000_SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: DestroyHeap
String ID: %ls$C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\VC\Tools\MSVC\14.30.30705\atlmfc\include\atlmem.h$bSuccess
API String ID: 2435110975-1513969513
Opcode ID: 626b24358fecab45980419b9aab57475a0afa507577939b1909f16b2c3ce2f07
Instruction ID: 8120b2a306b10b3c25f5c6e1cf1dfe1c7d56960e38b35316c7b223dce6a8e2a4
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 626b24358fecab45980419b9aab57475a0afa507577939b1909f16b2c3ce2f07
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 73F06234E44308AFDB14DA59CA4AB5CFBF6AB40705FA480C8E54467285C7B1AA80D745

Uniqueness

Uniqueness Score: -1.00%

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create. Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Authentication logs, File monitoring
Platforms:	macOS
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking ) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture ).
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, PowerShell logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, User interface, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: AveMaria

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Exploits

Compliance

Networking

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

E-Banking Fraud

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

System Behavior

Analysis Process: SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exePID: 6796, Parent PID: 5140

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Windows Analysis Report
SHIPMENTDOCUMENTSPDF.exe

Function 010DDE20 Relevance: 84.3, APIs: 6, Strings: 42, Instructions: 295
windowmemorysleepCOMMON

Function 010DD6A0 Relevance: 22.8, APIs: 3, Strings: 10, Instructions: 66
COMMON

Function 010DF0E0 Relevance: 16.0, APIs: 1, Strings: 8, Instructions: 216
COMMON

Function 010DF640 Relevance: 14.2, APIs: 1, Strings: 7, Instructions: 175
COMMON

Function 010DF3F0 Relevance: 12.4, APIs: 1, Strings: 6, Instructions: 172
COMMON

Function 010EBA30 Relevance: 12.3, APIs: 4, Strings: 3, Instructions: 88
memoryCOMMON

Function 010ECC00 Relevance: 7.6, APIs: 1, Strings: 4, Instructions: 71
COMMON

Function 010F1B50 Relevance: 7.4, APIs: 1, Strings: 3, Instructions: 369
COMMON

Function 010E9B70 Relevance: 7.0, APIs: 1, Strings: 3, Instructions: 34
memoryCOMMON