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Windows Analysis Report
e1f388b8a086e034b1fbd94ca7341008.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:e1f388b8a086e034b1fbd94ca7341008.exe
Analysis ID:623326
MD5:916eb825989bc96a10eab8916995c1e1
SHA1:e91e3a11ab3203c912b5d756c5f22e620760edf9
SHA256:6e5ce2c28b65e3f50c89ee799de9c047c07ec4c27b4d4b8b6f4f202b1e8d557a
Tags:exeNanoCoreRAT
Infos:

Detection

Nanocore
Score:100
Range:0 - 100
Whitelisted:false
Confidence:100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Sigma detected: NanoCore
Yara detected AntiVM3
Detected Nanocore Rat
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Yara detected Nanocore RAT
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
Connects to many ports of the same IP (likely port scanning)
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Uses dynamic DNS services
Uses 32bit PE files
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Yara signature match
Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
Detected potential crypto function
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Enables debug privileges
Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
PE file contains strange resources
Drops PE files
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Classification

  • System is w10x64
  • e1f388b8a086e034b1fbd94ca7341008.exe (PID: 6952 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\e1f388b8a086e034b1fbd94ca7341008.exe" MD5: 916EB825989BC96A10EAB8916995C1E1)
    • powershell.exe (PID: 5508 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\QgGSCvPvvCY.exe MD5: DBA3E6449E97D4E3DF64527EF7012A10)
      • conhost.exe (PID: 5144 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
    • schtasks.exe (PID: 5204 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe" /Create /TN "Updates\QgGSCvPvvCY" /XML "C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp5BA5.tmp MD5: 15FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04)
      • conhost.exe (PID: 6292 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: EA777DEEA782E8B4D7C7C33BBF8A4496)
  • cleanup
{"Version": "1.2.2.0", "Mutex": "a63bf89b-7de8-4696-9653-4f27004d", "Group": "APRILO", "Domain1": "ella666.duckdns.org", "Domain2": "mikeljack321.ddns.net", "Port": 31789, "KeyboardLogging": "Enable", "RunOnStartup": "Disable", "RequestElevation": "Disable", "BypassUAC": "Disable", "ClearZoneIdentifier": "Enable", "ClearAccessControl": "Disable", "SetCriticalProcess": "Disable", "PreventSystemSleep": "Enable", "ActivateAwayMode": "Disable", "EnableDebugMode": "Disable", "RunDelay": 0, "ConnectDelay": 4000, "RestartDelay": 5000, "TimeoutInterval": 5000, "KeepAliveTimeout": 30000, "MutexTimeout": 5000, "LanTimeout": 2500, "WanTimeout": 8000, "BufferSize": "ffff0000", "MaxPacketSize": "0000a000", "GCThreshold": "0000a000", "UseCustomDNS": "Enable", "PrimaryDNSServer": "ella666.duckdns.org"}
SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
00000008.00000002.519250618.0000000003D81000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_NanocoreYara detected Nanocore RATJoe Security
    00000008.00000002.515876792.0000000000402000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmpNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
    • 0xff8d:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
    • 0xffca:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
    • 0x13afd:$x3: #=qjgz7ljmpp0J7FvL9dmi8ctJILdgtcbw8JYUc6GC8MeJ9B11Crfg2Djxcf0p8PZGe
    00000008.00000002.515876792.0000000000402000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_NanocoreYara detected Nanocore RATJoe Security
      00000008.00000002.515876792.0000000000402000.00000040.00000400.00020000.00000000.sdmpNanoCoreunknown Kevin Breen <kevin@techanarchy.net>
      • 0xfcf5:$a: NanoCore
      • 0xfd05:$a: NanoCore
      • 0xff39:$a: NanoCore
      • 0xff4d:$a: NanoCore
      • 0xff8d:$a: NanoCore
      • 0xfd54:$b: ClientPlugin
      • 0xff56:$b: ClientPlugin
      • 0xff96:$b: ClientPlugin
      • 0xfe7b:$c: ProjectData
      • 0x10882:$d: DESCrypto
      • 0x1824e:$e: KeepAlive
      • 0x1623c:$g: LogClientMessage
      • 0x12437:$i: get_Connected
      • 0x10bb8:$j: #=q
      • 0x10be8:$j: #=q
      • 0x10c04:$j: #=q
      • 0x10c34:$j: #=q
      • 0x10c50:$j: #=q
      • 0x10c6c:$j: #=q
      • 0x10c9c:$j: #=q
      • 0x10cb8:$j: #=q
      00000000.00000002.293486073.0000000002DEB000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmpJoeSecurity_AntiVM_3Yara detected AntiVM_3Joe Security
        Click to see the 31 entries
        SourceRuleDescriptionAuthorStrings
        8.2.e1f388b8a086e034b1fbd94ca7341008.exe.5540000.5.raw.unpackNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
        • 0xe75:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
        • 0xe8f:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
        8.2.e1f388b8a086e034b1fbd94ca7341008.exe.5540000.5.raw.unpackNanocore_RAT_Feb18_1Detects Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
        • 0xe75:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
        • 0x1261:$s3: PipeExists
        • 0x1136:$s4: PipeCreated
        • 0xeb0:$s5: IClientLoggingHost
        8.2.e1f388b8a086e034b1fbd94ca7341008.exe.5540000.5.raw.unpackMALWARE_Win_NanoCoreDetects NanoCoreditekSHen
        • 0xe38:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPlugin
        • 0xe75:$x3: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
        • 0xe5a:$i1: IClientApp
        • 0xe4e:$i2: IClientData
        • 0xe29:$i3: IClientNetwork
        • 0xec3:$i4: IClientAppHost
        • 0xe65:$i5: IClientDataHost
        • 0xeb0:$i6: IClientLoggingHost
        • 0xe8f:$i7: IClientNetworkHost
        • 0xea2:$i8: IClientUIHost
        • 0xed2:$i9: IClientNameObjectCollection
        • 0xef7:$i10: IClientReadOnlyNameObjectCollection
        • 0xe41:$s1: ClientPlugin
        • 0x177c:$s1: ClientPlugin
        • 0x1789:$s1: ClientPlugin
        • 0x11f9:$s6: get_ClientSettings
        • 0x1249:$s7: get_Connected
        8.2.e1f388b8a086e034b1fbd94ca7341008.exe.3d88a58.3.unpackNanocore_RAT_Gen_2Detetcs the Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
        • 0xd9ad:$x1: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
        • 0xd9da:$x2: IClientNetworkHost
        8.2.e1f388b8a086e034b1fbd94ca7341008.exe.3d88a58.3.unpackNanocore_RAT_Feb18_1Detects Nanocore RATFlorian Roth
        • 0xd9ad:$x2: NanoCore.ClientPluginHost
        • 0xea88:$s4: PipeCreated
        • 0xd9c7:$s5: IClientLoggingHost