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Windows Analysis Report
400000.dll

Overview

General Information

Sample Name:	400000.dll
Analysis ID:	632394
MD5:	3b242348cab0068aa4ed98a0c4c8cf95
SHA1:	ed28762dcfbd9e1892e56d261a3facf7248817c4
SHA256:	c0f637c3bc32ba773e2a3ef78b086eb680521482bc5e46cb99f231237c9b9265
Tags:	dll
Infos:

Detection

Ursnif

Score:	76
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Found malware configuration

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected Ursnif

Machine Learning detection for sample

Registers a DLL

Uses 32bit PE files

Tries to load missing DLLs

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

loaddll32.exe (PID: 1260 cmdline: loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll" MD5: 7DEB5DB86C0AC789123DEC286286B938)

cmd.exe (PID: 6444 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll",#1 MD5: F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D)

rundll32.exe (PID: 6424 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll",#1 MD5: D7CA562B0DB4F4DD0F03A89A1FDAD63D)

regsvr32.exe (PID: 6440 cmdline: regsvr32.exe /s C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll MD5: 426E7499F6A7346F0410DEAD0805586B)

rundll32.exe (PID: 4116 cmdline: rundll32.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll,DllRegisterServer MD5: D7CA562B0DB4F4DD0F03A89A1FDAD63D)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Ursnif

{"RSA Public Key": "aVn5cc4yxmeeaLO1GhSDa9E9i9AhiobBqld00ioGlWOx7yX95FcGN3HicG7Ma8K4OSypooZMeS/Q9RHBbebiZB0htVqQfpLIdb7MhjDHDEBHCtTQeeoA8LfDaJAEQ2IdhSWjXZZqcMncDfNRXuwiAWQdEo+PTa9HSuW2G4AqVIhs9hBL2BAZZa8Egh74wCmZjW5gvEmkB+aIKoafUXWf9rJ70sGHrX3U1JPn9tSGnbML+e9g5HE/xe2QT/jXivxkLmTVQv5cQZbQWCQmVvKyQzH4ZmE8FDdAahhD8LLQyis0qatiz93QdIa9WeAg8/W3ijW7qgygdKBu/PDPFWkBFjL9Ourt+q4fqApYM+hMcvc=", "c2_domain": ["agenziaent.top", "agenziaentr.top", "statusline.ru", "statuslines.ru"], "botnet": "7631", "server": "50", "serpent_key": "xlmWrvhFyvbUdepr", "sleep_time": "1", "CONF_TIMEOUT": "20", "SetWaitableTimer_value": "0"}

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
400000.dll	JoeSecurity_Ursnif_1	Yara detected Ursnif	Joe Security

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: 400000.dll

Avira: detected

Found malware configuration

Source: 400000.dll

Malware Configuration Extractor: Ursnif {"RSA Public Key": "aVn5cc4yxmeeaLO1GhSDa9E9i9AhiobBqld00ioGlWOx7yX95FcGN3HicG7Ma8K4OSypooZMeS/Q9RHBbebiZB0htVqQfpLIdb7MhjDHDEBHCtTQeeoA8LfDaJAEQ2IdhSWjXZZqcMncDfNRXuwiAWQdEo+PTa9HSuW2G4AqVIhs9hBL2BAZZa8Egh74wCmZjW5gvEmkB+aIKoafUXWf9rJ70sGHrX3U1JPn9tSGnbML+e9g5HE/xe2QT/jXivxkLmTVQv5cQZbQWCQmVvKyQzH4ZmE8FDdAahhD8LLQyis0qatiz93QdIa9WeAg8/W3ijW7qgygdKBu/PDPFWkBFjL9Ourt+q4fqApYM+hMcvc=", "c2_domain": ["agenziaent.top", "agenziaentr.top", "statusline.ru", "statuslines.ru"], "botnet": "7631", "server": "50", "serpent_key": "xlmWrvhFyvbUdepr", "sleep_time": "1", "CONF_TIMEOUT": "20", "SetWaitableTimer_value": "0"}

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: 400000.dll

ReversingLabs: Detection: 63%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Source: 400000.dll

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: 400000.dll

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, DLL

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: queries for: fp-afd.azureedge.us

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

Yara detected Ursnif

Source: Yara match

File source: 400000.dll, type: SAMPLE

E-Banking Fraud

Yara detected Ursnif

Source: Yara match

File source: 400000.dll, type: SAMPLE

Source: 400000.dll

Static PE information: 32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, DLL

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe

Section loaded: sfc.dll

Jump to behavior

Source: 400000.dll

ReversingLabs: Detection: 63%

Source: 400000.dll

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_LNK_REMOVE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_SYSHEAP, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PRELOAD, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_16BIT, IMAGE_SCN_LNK_INFO, IMAGE_SCN_LNK_OVER, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PURGEABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal76.troj.winDLL@9/0@1/0

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll",#1

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe regsvr32.exe /s C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll,DllRegisterServer
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll",#1	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe regsvr32.exe /s C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll,DllRegisterServer	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll",#1	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe regsvr32.exe /s C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Yara detected Ursnif

Source: Yara match

File source: 400000.dll, type: SAMPLE

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 120000

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll",#1

Jump to behavior

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected Ursnif

Source: Yara match

File source: 400000.dll, type: SAMPLE

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected Ursnif

Source: Yara match

File source: 400000.dll, type: SAMPLE

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control	Network Effects	Remote Service Effects	Impact
Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	1 Regsvr32	OS Credential Dumping	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication	Remotely Track Device Without Authorization	Modify System Partition
Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Rundll32	LSASS Memory	1 System Information Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	1 Application Layer Protocol	Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS	Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization	Device Lockout
Domain Accounts	At (Linux)	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Automated Exfiltration	Steganography	Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location	Obtain Device Cloud Backups	Delete Device Data
Local Accounts	At (Windows)	Logon Script (Mac)	Logon Script (Mac)	11 Process Injection	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Protocol Impersonation	SIM Card Swap		Carrier Billing Fraud
Cloud Accounts	Cron	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 DLL Side-Loading	LSA Secrets	Remote System Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Data Transfer Size Limits	Fallback Channels	Manipulate Device Communication		Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
400000.dll	63%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Ursnif
400000.dll	100%	Avira	TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen
400000.dll	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Source	Detection	Scanner	Link
eafd-ffgov-phx01.elasticafd.msedge.azure.us	0%	Virustotal	Browse
b-9999.b-msedge.net	0%	Virustotal	Browse
fp-afd.azureedge.us	0%	Virustotal	Browse

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
eafd-ffgov-phx01.elasticafd.msedge.azure.us	20.141.10.208	true	false	0%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown
b-9999.b-msedge.net	13.107.6.254	true	false	0%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown
fp-afd.azureedge.us	unknown	unknown	false	0%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox Version:	34.0.0 Boulder Opal
Analysis ID:	632394
Start date and time: 23/05/202216:36:26	2022-05-23 16:36:26 +02:00
Joe Sandbox Product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 3m 9s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Sample file name:	400000.dll
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 64 bit v1803 with Office Professional Plus 2016, Chrome 85, IE 11, Adobe Reader DC 19, Java 8 Update 211
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	6
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled HDC enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal76.troj.winDLL@9/0@1/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HDC Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .dll Adjust boot time Enable AMSI Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): backgroundTaskHost.exe
Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 152.199.19.161
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): store-images.s-microsoft.com, fp-vp.azureedge.net, fp-vp.ec.azureedge.net, b-ring.msedge.net, cs9.wpc.v0cdn.net
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
16:37:47	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: loaddll32.exe modified

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Link	Context
b-9999.b-msedge.net	SecuriteInfo.com.W32.AIDetectNet.01.23711.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	PAYMENT COPY_PDF__________________________.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	obrazac-207-22-xml.vbs	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	rrmix.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	Order Documents .pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	MWzqNJFzvh.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	SecuriteInfo.com.Variant.Ser.Lazy.948.25861.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	e-dekont.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	G0nnaC0pe.bat	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	f5.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	8.dll	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	SecuriteInfo.com.W32.AIDetectNet.01.26448.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	terms .exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	r0z.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	A4JE7z7NPM.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	qq3.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	Sucm35Ps2i.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	lista de pedidos y productos solicitados.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	BfcbXMZk2i.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
	jeiIDatGCU.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	13.107.6.254
eafd-ffgov-phx01.elasticafd.msedge.azure.us	PAYMENT COPY_PDF__________________________.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	20.141.10.208
	obrazac-207-22-xml.vbs	Get hash	malicious	Browse	20.141.10.208
	rrmix.exe	Get hash	malicious	Browse	20.141.10.208

File type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.530069081172236
TrID:	Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (1002004/3) 99.60% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.20% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.20% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	400000.dll
File size:	39424
MD5:	3b242348cab0068aa4ed98a0c4c8cf95
SHA1:	ed28762dcfbd9e1892e56d261a3facf7248817c4
SHA256:	c0f637c3bc32ba773e2a3ef78b086eb680521482bc5e46cb99f231237c9b9265
SHA512:	3708907f1a4dc46babef37015226943d4a78ebe865f090b92a1a759c3232b41cdf97ee7215794f5e85992ada22b4441873e921bf85c507c32e94371992abb56c
SSDEEP:	768:hoxUa+kzeq5v1yCJ9FdR+rqw5Lk6Pf44FqgQYNBarm+dL+84PgT:h/kze8fVkzfzF1QVT4PA
TLSH:	3C03E167AFA40B76C6CFA2B23130377E1527D3460359B8CA8751A52A4B26F4CEE7D051
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......\o...............v.......v..........w............................v.......v.......v......Rich....................PE..L......b...

File Icon


Icon Hash:	74f0e4ecccdce0e4

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x10001c13
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x10000000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	32BIT_MACHINE, EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, DLL
DLL Characteristics:
Time Stamp:	0x6213BE9D [Mon Feb 21 16:32:29 2022 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	5
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	5
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	5
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	7c62ab7d5f2ed68e4989689e898c43c4

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push ecx
mov eax, dword ptr [ebp+0Ch]
push ebx
push esi
push edi
xor edi, edi
inc edi
xor ebx, ebx
sub eax, ebx
mov dword ptr [ebp-04h], edi
je 00007FCDFCA6DB51h
dec eax
jne 00007FCDFCA6DB9Bh
push 10004188h
call dword ptr [10003044h]
cmp eax, edi
jne 00007FCDFCA6DB88h
push ebx
push 00400000h
push ebx
call dword ptr [1000302Ch]
mov dword ptr [10004190h], eax
cmp eax, ebx
je 00007FCDFCA6DB1Ch
mov eax, dword ptr [ebp+08h]
mov esi, 10004198h
mov dword ptr [100041B0h], eax
mov eax, esi
lock xadd dword ptr [eax], edi
mov ecx, dword ptr [ebp+10h]
lea eax, dword ptr [ebp+0Ch]
push eax
call 00007FCDFCA6D39Ah
push eax
push 10001874h
call 00007FCDFCA6DB51h
mov dword ptr [1000418Ch], eax
cmp eax, ebx
jne 00007FCDFCA6DB3Bh
or eax, FFFFFFFFh
lock xadd dword ptr [esi], eax
mov dword ptr [ebp-04h], ebx
jmp 00007FCDFCA6DB2Fh
push 10004188h
call dword ptr [10003040h]
test eax, eax
jne 00007FCDFCA6DB20h
cmp dword ptr [1000418Ch], ebx
je 00007FCDFCA6DB0Ch
mov esi, 00002328h
push edi
push 00000064h
call dword ptr [10003038h]
mov eax, dword ptr [10004198h]
test eax, eax
je 00007FCDFCA6DAE9h
sub esi, 64h
cmp esi, ebx
jnle 00007FCDFCA6DAC9h
push dword ptr [1000418Ch]
call dword ptr [1000300Ch]
push dword ptr [00000000h]

Rich Headers

Programming Language:

[ASM] VS2008 SP1 build 30729
[LNK] VS2008 SP1 build 30729
[IMP] VS2008 SP1 build 30729
[EXP] VS2008 SP1 build 30729

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x3550	0x4e	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x3114	0x50	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x6000	0x148	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x3000	0xb8	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x16b7	0x1800	False	0.686360677083	data	6.36921515644	IMAGE_SCN_LNK_REMOVE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_SYSHEAP, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PRELOAD, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_16BIT, IMAGE_SCN_LNK_INFO, IMAGE_SCN_LNK_OVER, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PURGEABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rdata	0x3000	0x59e	0x600	False	0.633463541667	data	5.39585151919	IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_MASK, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_16BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_64BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_LOCKED, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2048BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1024BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_LNK_OTHER, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_32BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_LNK_INFO, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_512BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8192BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_LNK_COMDAT, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4096BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x4000	0x25c	0x200	False	0.18359375	data	0.925062804208	IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_MASK, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_16BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_64BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2048BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_LNK_OTHER, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_16BIT, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_32BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8192BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_LNK_COMDAT, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PURGEABLE, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4096BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.bss	0x5000	0x2dc	0x400	False	0.412109375	data	4.62396270929	IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_MASK, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_256BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_16BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_SYSHEAP, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_64BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_FARDATA, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PRELOAD, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2048BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1024BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_16BIT, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_32BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PROTECTED, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8192BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_GPREL, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PURGEABLE, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4096BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_NO_DEFER_SPEC_EXC, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x6000	0x8000	0x7200	False	0.966317160088	data	7.84372410503	IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_MASK, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_256BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_16BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_SYSHEAP, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_64BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_FARDATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_LOCKED, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PRELOAD, IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2048BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1024BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_LNK_OTHER, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_16BIT, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_32BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_512BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PROTECTED, IMAGE_SCN_LNK_OVER, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_128BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8192BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_LNK_COMDAT, IMAGE_SCN_GPREL, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PURGEABLE, IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4096BYTES, IMAGE_SCN_NO_DEFER_SPEC_EXC, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Imports

DLL	Import
ntdll.dll	_snwprintf, memset, NtQuerySystemInformation, _aulldiv, RtlUnwind, NtQueryVirtualMemory
KERNEL32.dll	SetThreadAffinityMask, CloseHandle, HeapAlloc, SetThreadPriority, Sleep, ExitThread, lstrlenW, GetLastError, GetExitCodeThread, HeapCreate, HeapDestroy, GetCurrentThread, SleepEx, WaitForSingleObject, InterlockedDecrement, InterlockedIncrement, HeapFree, GetModuleFileNameW, SetLastError, GetModuleHandleA, VirtualProtect, OpenProcess, CreateEventA, GetLongPathNameW, GetVersion, GetCurrentProcessId, TerminateThread, QueueUserAPC, CreateThread, GetProcAddress, LoadLibraryA, VirtualFree, VirtualAlloc, MapViewOfFile, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime, CreateFileMappingW
ADVAPI32.dll	ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorA

Exports

Name	Ordinal	Address
DllRegisterServer	1	0x10001e8b

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
May 23, 2022 16:37:37.587388039 CEST	60996	53	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8
May 23, 2022 16:37:37.744772911 CEST	53	60996	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class
May 23, 2022 16:37:37.587388039 CEST	192.168.2.7	8.8.8.8	0x1608	Standard query (0)	fp-afd.azureedge.us	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class
May 23, 2022 16:37:37.076241016 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7	0x15e4	No error (0)	b-ring.b-9999.b-msedge.net	b-9999.b-msedge.net		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
May 23, 2022 16:37:37.076241016 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7	0x15e4	No error (0)	b-9999.b-msedge.net		13.107.6.254	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)
May 23, 2022 16:37:37.744772911 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7	0x1608	No error (0)	fp-afd.azureedge.us	fp-afd.afd.azureedge.us		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
May 23, 2022 16:37:37.744772911 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7	0x1608	No error (0)	fp-afd.afd.azureedge.us	afd.msedge.azure.us		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
May 23, 2022 16:37:37.744772911 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7	0x1608	No error (0)	afd.msedge.azure.us	t-0001.msedge.azure.us		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
May 23, 2022 16:37:37.744772911 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7	0x1608	No error (0)	t-0001.msedge.azure.us	eafd-defaultvips-3p-gov.usgovtrafficmanager.net		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
May 23, 2022 16:37:37.744772911 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7	0x1608	No error (0)	eafd-defaultvips-3p-gov.usgovtrafficmanager.net	eafd-ffgov-phx01.elasticafd.msedge.azure.us		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)
May 23, 2022 16:37:37.744772911 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.7	0x1608	No error (0)	eafd-ffgov-phx01.elasticafd.msedge.azure.us		20.141.10.208	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)

Target ID:	0
Start time:	16:37:42
Start date:	23/05/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll"
Imagebase:	0x3a0000
File size:	116736 bytes
MD5 hash:	7DEB5DB86C0AC789123DEC286286B938
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	16:37:42
Start date:	23/05/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0xdd0000
File size:	232960 bytes
MD5 hash:	F3BDBE3BB6F734E357235F4D5898582D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	16:37:43
Start date:	23/05/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	regsvr32.exe /s C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll
Imagebase:	0x12a0000
File size:	20992 bytes
MD5 hash:	426E7499F6A7346F0410DEAD0805586B
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	16:37:43
Start date:	23/05/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0xef0000
File size:	61952 bytes
MD5 hash:	D7CA562B0DB4F4DD0F03A89A1FDAD63D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	4
Start time:	16:37:43
Start date:	23/05/2022
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	rundll32.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\400000.dll,DllRegisterServer
Imagebase:	0xef0000
File size:	61952 bytes
MD5 hash:	D7CA562B0DB4F4DD0F03A89A1FDAD63D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Adversaries may take advantage of vague references in the library manifest of a program by replacing a legitimate library with a malicious one, causing the operating system to load their malicious library when it is called for by the victim program.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Named Pipes, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Loaded DLLs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules ), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	AWS CloudTrail logs, Azure activity logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs
Platforms:	AWS, Azure, GCP, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network intrusion detection system, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	DNS records, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process monitoring, Process use of network
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report 400000.dll

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Threatname: Ursnif

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Sigma Signatures

Snort Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

Networking

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

E-Banking Fraud

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Rich Headers

Data Directories

Sections

Imports

Exports

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Windows Analysis Report
400000.dll